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1. China’s Path Towards New Growth: 
Drivers of Human Capital, Innovation 
and Technological Change
Ligang Song, Cai Fang and Lauren Johnston1
Introduction
Since the last China Update volume, sluggish world growth, of a touch above 
3  per  cent in 2016, has added to concerns about China’s financial sector and 
sustainable growth prospects at least in the near term. Geopolitical shocks in the 
United States and United Kingdom have exaggerated the uncertainty around 
whether China will be able to navigate away from an export, capital and resource-
intensive growth model towards a new model of economic growth. 
In the 2016 book, we covered China’s economy from the perspectives of reform, 
energy and resources and climate change as volume one. This year’s book explores 
topics in China’s progress in advancing the new growth frontiers of human capital, 
innovation and technological change.
The new growth path that China seeks to tread is broadly that followed by today’s 
advanced economies in earlier times. It involves substitution of intangibles such as 
innovation and technology for tangible components of factors of production such 
as land, labour and physical capital (Maddison 1982). Many countries, however, 
get stuck in that transition and fail over decades in their attempt to enter the high-
income group—a circumstance known as the ‘middle-income trap’ (Eichengreen 
et al. 2013). 
For China, the transition towards new, advanced-economy growth drivers offers 
a route to continued economic development. It means relying less on industries that 
are resource- and pollution-intensive, such as steel and construction, and on labour-
intensive and low-quality manufacturing. It means instead shifting the growth 
model towards consumption, services, higher value-added manufacturing and 
innovation. China has already made significant progress towards the development of 
new high-tech industries in high-speed rail (HSR) transportation,2 high value-added 
1  We thank Shenglang Yang for his help with assembling the data used in this chapter. 
2  The total length of China’s high-speed rail reached 12,000 km in 2016.
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
2
manufacturing including super-fast quantum computing, aviation3 and space 
technologies.4 It has similarly made progress in reducing the adverse environmental 
spillovers of the economy and fostering high-tech manufacturing—not least by 
becoming a world leader in new-energy technology including solar panels, wind 
turbines, hybrid cars and new materials. 
This year’s book takes a closer look at the role of human capital, innovation and 
technological change in affecting the pattern of growth and general development 
of the Chinese economy. First, we explore recent macroeconomic developments, 
alongside trends in education and innovation. We also look at how structural change 
is preparing the economy for a more advanced set of economic growth drivers. 
Macroeconomic development
China’s economy is now growing at a consistently slower ‘new normal’ rate than 
the double-digit growth of the first decade or so of this century. Nonetheless, it 
continues to grow faster than all other major economies. Figure 1.1 shows that 
the Chinese economy grew at 6.7 per cent in 2016, and illustrates the persistent 
growth deceleration. The slowdown is causing immense overcapacity problems in 
some industries. Overcapacity has to be managed alongside major challenges of 
uncertainty about the nature of contemporary change and the risks and problems 






1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 1.1 GDP growth rates, 1975–2016
Source: NBS (various years).
3  China’s first commercial jet aircraft (C919) conducted its first test flight on 5 May 2017. 
4  This includes the prospect that China will own and operate the world’s only space station from 2022.
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China has made progress in recent years in rebalancing the economy towards 
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Figure 1.2 Consumption and investment, 2000–15
Source: NBS (various years).
As required by China’s new model of growth, the tertiary sector has continued to 
increase its relative size, accounting for 52 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 2016, while secondary (40 per cent share in 2016) and primary (8 per  cent) 
industries have continued their relative decline (Figure 1.3). 
China’s new growth model allocates a lesser place for exports as a driver of growth. 
Over the first 30 years of reform, China benefited from a more favourable trading 
environment. The share of exports in China’s GDP rose from about 5 per cent in 
1980 to a peak of 37 per cent in 2006 (Figure 1.4), but has fallen since. 
China became the largest trading nation in the world, surpassing the United States, 
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Figure 1.3 Sector shares in total GDP, 1978–2016
Source: NBS (various years).











Figure 1.4 China’s export share in GDP, 1978–2016
Source: NBS (various years).
Consistent with the new model of growth, China’s trade surpluses have fallen as shares 
of GDP (Figure 1.5). China’s total foreign reserves have also fallen considerably, 
to about US$3 trillion in 2016. After a long period of currency appreciation and 
pressure for more, in recent years, the pressure has now been for renminbi (RMB) 
depreciation against the US dollar. 
The decline in Chinese trade surpluses has eased global imbalances; however, 
reduced  export orientation of the Chinese economy has contributed to the 
deceleration of global trade growth. Developments in China have been a major 







Figure 1.5 Share of China’s trade surpluses in GDP, 1994–2016
Source: NBS (various years).
China’s share of global trade grew more rapidly than its share of output until the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), but more slowly since (Figure 1.6). 








GDP share Trade share manufacturing  share
Figure 1.6 Shares of China’s GDP and trade in global totals, 1978–2014 
(2010 constant US$)
Sources: World Bank (databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx) and NBS (various years).
Data from The Conference Board (2015) show a modest increase in total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth in 2015 after several years of stagnation. According to 
some estimates, the contribution of TFP to China’s economic growth has fallen 
consistently since 2008 (Figure 1.7). This may be explained by the massive increase 
in investment through the fiscal stimulus package that was a response to the GFC 
and which was associated with a large decline in returns to capital. The decline in the 
labour force in recent years and the lower rate of urbanisation have also contributed 
to higher capital/labour ratios and lower capital productivity growth. The share of 
people of working age in the population has been falling since 2012. 














Figure 1.7 Decomposition of China’s GDP growth, 1995–2015
Note: Growth is calculated as a log-difference. 
Source: The Conference Board (2015).
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China has made strides over recent decades in developing its human capital, its 
innovative capacities and technological potential. Transforming these into growth 
drivers that allow China to climb through the middle-income trap into the high-
income group of countries depends on how resources of all kinds are allocated to the 
most productive uses. This requires structural reform.
Structural reform within China’s new model of growth has been highlighted in 
most recent China Update books. This year’s book concentrates on human capital, 
innovation and technology.
Human capital
Improvements in education and skills can considerably increase the productivity 
and earnings of labour. But the capacity to absorb and use physical capital may 
be limited by, among other things, investment in human capital. There may thus 
be  a  close association between education and the mainsprings of technological 
progress (Thirlwall and Pacheco-Lopez 2017: 210). 
Rising levels of human capital per capita could make the average individual better at 
discovering and sharing ideas. As was the case in OECD [Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development] countries in the second half of the twentieth century, 
if new institutions change incentives, the fraction of the available human capital that 
is devoted to producing and sharing ideas could continue to rise. To that end, there 
is enormous potential for similar economic and innovation-driven transformation in 
countries like China and India. It is possible even that growth at the technological 
frontier could continue for the foreseeable future, and who knows, it might even 
increase again in this century compared to the last (Jones and Romer 2010: 235).
For China, in particular, capital per worker must rise in the new phase of its 
development. An effective way of preventing diminishing returns to capital is 
to increase China’s human capital per worker, which could sustain a continual 
improvement in productivity. Towards that goal, China may benefit from its unusual 
workforce structure, in which human capital is highly skewed in favour of younger 
workers. This offers an implicit new productivity potential that structurally is not 
open to economies where the human capital of older workers is closer to that of 
younger workforce entrants. 
In its review of educational priorities for China in the coming century, the World 
Bank (1999: 9; see also 2013) reinforces both the positive correlation between 
education and economic growth and the increasing relevance of education: 
That link is strengthening with increasing globalization, competition for markets and 
dependence of economies on knowledge and information. Skill is replacing other 
factors as a basis for competitive advantage in the global economy; the economic 
strength of a nation will become more dependent upon its ability to develop, utilize 
and manage its human resources.
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Continuous improvement in productivity is expected to become the primary 
mechanism by which Chinese authorities can promote economic growth in 
the next century. Education has played an important role in China’s economic 
growth through the reform period. Changes in government education policy have 
brought rapid change in tertiary education (Figure 1.8), and the share of education 
expenditure in GDP has been rising in recent years, even approaching the level of 
developed countries (Figure 1.9). According to Jones and Romer (2010: 241), ‘[t]he 








Figure 1.8 University students per 100 population, 1978–2014
Source: NBS (various years).
Nonetheless, China must do more to improve the quality of education at all levels 
and also to create an environment in which human capital investment is duly 
recognised and respected. In the university sector, through projects such as Project 
985 and 211, China has, for two decades, invested heavily in ensuring that the 
country is home to some world-class universities. Peking University and Tsinghua 
University are now ranked in the top 100 universities worldwide, at 29 and 35, 
respectively, according to the 2017 Times Higher Education World University 
rankings. Continued investments in this direction are crucial if China is to become 
a more innovative and productive economy and society. 
Harnessing the benefits of rising human capital through improved institutions 
(and,  thereby, incentives) is another key to sustaining China’s future economic 
growth, including its contribution to future global growth and wellbeing (Glazebrook 
and Song 2013).
Innovation and technology
The economic growth literature of the past half-century has identified the importance 
of technological change. Invention and innovation are the sources of technological 
change and can create knowledge that might spill over to entities that were not 
responsible for the original creation (Hall and Rosenberg 2010: 6). This suggests 
a need for policy to encourage the appropriate level of investment in these activities 
(Arrow 1962). 
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To encourage innovation, the Chinese Government and Chinese industrial 






R&D ratio Education expenditure ratio
Figure 1.9 China’s shares of R&D and total education expenditure in GDP, 
1991–2015
Source: NBS (various years).
Technological change has been accelerating in several key sectors, including transport, 
space technologies and telecommunications. Increased competition, government 
subsidises and the chance to learn from frontier markets abroad through opening up 
and reform have supported that process. Contributing factors include collaboration 
between firms and scientific and research institutions, including universities, and 








invention utility model design
Figure 1.10 Number of patent applications, 1995–2015 (million)
Source: NBS (various years).
Such efforts are intended to support technological development in China while 
also enabling continuous learning from other countries. The goal is for China to 
contribute increasingly to extending the global technological frontiers. 
Nurturing private entrepreneurship is important in that context. Enhancing 
competition and improving the productive use of resources can be supported by 
lowering and removing entry barriers to private enterprises in industries providing 
essential services to growing industries—particularly financial and banking services. 
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The increased participation of private firms in service industries will also improve 
private sector access to resources, especially capital and credit, which are critical for 
private sector innovation and development. 
Government policy and regulation seeking to advance the role of the private sector 
in the allocation of key resources can drive increasing productivity in China (Son 
and Song 2015). 
Finding ways to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of R&D expenditure is an 
important concern, for governments and entrepreneurs alike.
We are living in a new era when modern technologies are increasingly affecting all 
aspects of our life. China is making great efforts to embrace these new developments 
across the entire country, but faces tremendous challenges. This 2017 volume is 
an attempt to contribute deeper analysis of the role of human capital, innovation 
and technological change in a transitional economy and to discuss ways in which 
China’s experience has offered some important lessons for China itself and for other 
countries, too.
Structure of the book
Part I: Reform and macroeconomic development
Four chapters provide perspectives on recent macroeconomic developments in 
China. First, Cai and Zhang (Chapter 2) explain the additional reform challenges 
of China’s ‘new normal’ growth era. Thereafter, Huang et al. (Chapter 3) explain the 
official goal of ‘making progress while maintaining stability’. The authors outline 
a new economy index that helps to measure ‘progress’ and draw attention to issues 
of stability, especially in the financial sector. Yao and Wang (Chapter 4) estimate the 
potential for a successful process of internal convergence to sustain China’s long-
run growth. Woo (Chapter 5) rounds out the first section by bridging the domestic 
‘new  normal’ and the more recent ‘international new normal’ arising from the 
election of US President Donald Trump and the Brexit transition. 
Cai and Zhang (Chapter 2) elaborate China’s new and ongoing policy changes in 
the ‘new normal’ era of slower growth. They note that reform is now more difficult, 
especially since many necessary reforms have shifted from being characterised 
by ‘Pareto improvement’—in which the majority of people benefit and no one 
suffers—to ‘Kaldor improvement’, which requires a balance to be struck between the 
winners and losers from reform. Key areas of reform within that challenging context 
therefore include legal and property rights protection reforms, a shift from industrial 
to competition policy and optimising the roles of the market and government in 
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
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deciding the allocation of resources. The authors note that defining boundaries for 
the market and government is a practical matter and that, during a catch-up phase, 
distortions in that balance may be more pronounced. Compared with the states of 
other major economies, the Chinese Government owns a relatively high share of the 
national wealth. Towards reforming the incentive mechanism, policymakers must 
now much better understand the benefits or costs associated with reform and work 
to reach consensus on the direction of the roadmap across government and society. 
This will not only better support greater competition and entrepreneurship, but also 
ensure collective support for an ongoing and deeper reform process.
Huang et al. (Chapter 3) explain how the combination of slowing growth and 
financial risk led the December 2016 Central Economic Work Conference and the 
more recent National People’s Congress (NPC) meetings to decide on an economic 
policy goal of ‘making progress while maintaining stability’. This means a proactive 
fiscal policy with prudent monetary policy, increasing exchange rate flexibility while 
retaining basic exchange stability and resolving systemic risk as macroeconomic policy 
priorities. In this chapter, the recent rise in economic momentum is attributed to 
cyclical factors, including public infrastructure spending, implying uncertainty for 
the medium term. The cause of that broader slowdown and transition uncertainty 
relates to the fact that earlier growth-driving industries have lost competitiveness, 
but new ones have not replaced them. An index of the new economy composed 
and elaborated on in Chapter 3 finds that the new economy accounts for about 
30 per cent of the total economy at the moment. As a greater share of resources shift 
into the new-economy sector, the identified crowding-out effect of the relatively 
high share of investment currently going to old-economy sectors will diminish and 
will, in turn, help to ensure a sustainable growth path. Over time, this may also 
serve to directly and indirectly facilitate a smoother regional progression towards the 
new economy. At present, southeastern China is ahead of the rest of the country in 
that transition. Overall, such progress will also reduce systemic financial risk, which 
probably relates to slow growth, high leveraging, low productivity and limited 
policy flexibility. 
Yao and Wang (Chapter 4) examine how internal convergence—regional, efficiency 
and technological—can sustain China’s long-run growth. The authors estimate 
growth equations for China’s three geographic regions and for the whole country, 
finding different speeds of regional convergence, different levels of investment 
efficiency and different speeds of technological progress in the three regions. 
The  authors calculate that regional convergence in China could offer a growth 
dividend of almost 12 per cent, technological convergence could increase China’s 
growth potential by one-third and convergence of investment efficiency in the two 
inland regions towards that of the eastern region would not have a large effect on 
the level or rate of growth. 
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There are, however, a number of obstacles to realising these potential growth gains: 
it is difficult to attract talent to China’s lesser-developed inland regions and the 
persistence of structural challenges such as the issue of zombie firms. Removing 
these obstacles would add momentum for economic convergence. 
In a year of conflicting signals for China’s economy, Woo (Chapter 5) completes 
part one with a study of three important economic issues for China: the current 
trajectory of the economy, the policy options to influence that trajectory and 
some possible additional elements to be incorporated into international economic 
relations. He specifically takes on conflicting interpretations of China’s economic 
challenges, especially the difference between optimists and pessimists. Adopting 
a  new framework classifying China’s policy challenges—into ‘hardware’ and 
‘software’ categories—the author proposes a reform agenda that will also help China 
to avoid underlying ‘power failure’. This includes structural reforms to rationalise 
the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, deregulation of markets for capital, 
labour and land and structural reform of governance institutions such as the hukou 
household registration system and rural landownership. In addition, in the context 
of the ‘new international normal’—the absence of hegemonic stability—the author 
argues China should now more actively shape globalisation in such ways as to 
expand on former Chinese president Hu Jintao’s notion of a ‘harmonious’ society 
and transform it into a concept of a ‘harmonious world’. 
Part II: Education and human capital
Education provides the building blocks for the accumulation of human capital. 
China’s progress in accumulating human capital and trends in capturing the benefits 
of such productive capacity over time have been mixed. Part two looks at two 
elements of that story. First, Golley and Kong (Chapter 6) compare the educational 
outcomes of Chinese citizens born over five decades after 1940 and identify a number 
of factors that have served to undermine equal opportunity in China’s education 
system over time. Second, Yang and Zhou (Chapter 7) use China’s input–output 
table to study the role of intangible capital in the country by industrial sector.  
Golley and Kong (Chapter 6) show that China’s workforce is, on average, poorly 
educated compared with an OECD average benchmark. Against that backdrop and 
China’s aspiration to close the gap between the domestic and frontier economies, 
the authors study the educational outcomes of Chinese citizens born over the half-
century from 1940 with a focus on whether gaps were driven by ‘inequality of 
opportunity’. Data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) provide years 
of schooling for rural and urban population samples. After identifying the key 
determinants of educational outcomes—among which are China’s hukou system, 
paternal education levels and birth cohort—the authors calculate the share of 
‘inequality of opportunity’ in overall educational inequality. They conclude with 
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a call for policies to reduce the impact of factors exaggerating educational inequality 
in China, especially in light of China’s attempt to transition towards a higher value-
added and innovative economy.
Yang and Zhou (Chapter 7) utilise data from China’s input–output tables to study 
the role of intangible capital by industrial sector. In the process, the authors also 
offer a new methodology for measuring the role of intangible capital for economies 
with poor data. The authors find that growth in intangible capital can explain almost 
20 per cent of the TFP growth over the period 1997–2012. This result is robust 
under various forms of sensitivity analysis. At the sector level, R&D is found to play 
a more important role in agriculture than economic competency and computerised 
information; but the role of economic competency is more important in the services 
and light industry sectors than that of R&D and computerised information. 
Part III: Innovation and productivity
Part III explores in greater detail China’s transition towards a more innovative 
economy. First, Wei et al. (Chapter 8) uses firm-level data to find that, despite being 
at a disadvantage in competing for funds with the state sector, private firms embracing 
international markets and finding creative ways to adapt to rising labour costs are 
pushing the frontier of China’s transition up the productivity and manufacturing 
value chains. Wu et al. (Chapter 9) present new estimates of China’s productivity 
growth rates by province. They find productivity gains are now consistently higher 
in inland areas than coastal areas, and that services sector growth in coastal areas is 
promisingly robust and thus may be able to sustain growth in these areas in future. 
Yang et al. (Chapter 10) find that regional innovation capacity is playing a role in 
determining the rate of regional convergence in China and argue that this must be 
accounted for in China’s policies to reduce regional economic inequalities. 
Yin and Mao (Chapter 11) study firm-level patent-seeking and its impact on R&D 
expenditure. They find that both market-driven patent-seeking and the number 
of patents held are among factors associated with higher levels of R&D activity 
among firms. 
Finally, Krolikowski (Chapter 12) explores the cultural habits and industrial progress 
of China’s frontier aeronautical and space research communities.
Wei et al. (Chapter 8) open with a reminder of the scale of China’s demographic 
challenge. After more than three decades of high growth based on exploitation of 
demographic and wage cost advantages, interacting with international and market-
oriented reforms, China now confronts higher wages and a shrinking workforce. 
Future growth now must depend more on innovation and increased productivity. 
Chapter 8 assesses the likelihood of China making the transition. It uses matched 
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firm-level data on patent applications, receipts and citations and a survey of 
manufacturing firms. It finds that embracing new international opportunities and 
adapting to rising labour costs are two factors leading China’s increasingly innovative 
economy. A result is that the quality of Chinese exports is increasing, but there 
is also evidence of resource misallocation affecting innovation: state-owned firms 
receive a greater share of innovation subsidies, but private firms are more successful 
innovators. The authors argue that the transition to an innovation-led economy will 
progress more quickly if this resource misallocation can be tackled. 
In Chapter 9, Wu et al. note that the greater importance of innovation and 
entrepreneurship as new drivers of China’s economy has led to an intense debate 
about the role and dynamics of productivity growth in China. The authors present 
an update on this area of the literature. Most studies agree that while TFP made 
a significant and positive contribution to China’s economic growth in recent 
decades, both TFP and economic growth rates in China have slowed in recent years. 
Whether this downward trend continues has important implications for China’s 
economic development. Somewhat optimistically, new estimates presented here find 
that China’s inland regions have maintained high growth and have outperformed 
coastal regions across all sectors: primary, manufacturing and services. Whereas 
manufacturing TFP in coastal areas has suffered in recent times, services sector TFP 
growth in coastal China is robust and could thus help to sustain growth in these 
regions into the future. 
Yang et al. (Chapter 10) offer an empirical analysis of the convergence of real GDP 
per capita of 31 Chinese provinces and municipalities over the period 2001–15. 
They explore the impact of innovation capability on economic convergence and 
identify three key results: 1) after considering the spatial effect, China’s regional 
economic development has both conditional convergence and absolute convergence; 
2) the trend towards regional economic development convergence is increasing; and 
3) after regional innovation capacity is taken into account, the convergence speed 
of China’s regional economy will deteriorate. In other words, innovation ability has 
a significant effect on the speed of economic convergence. In turn, if the excessive 
concentration of innovation resources along China’s coastal region is not better spread 
across the country, China’s economic development will experience innovation-led 
regional divergence. In formulating innovation policy, the government should thus 
pay attention to spatial interaction.
In Chapter 11, Yin and Mao use data from the 2013 National Patent Survey to 
study the causal relationship between Chinese patent protection and enterprise 
R&D expenditure, and the more specific effects on promoting R&D of patent 
motivation (e.g. protection of inventions and strategic blocking behaviour), 
accumulation and choice of protection model. The findings include patent filing 
is market-driven and closely associated with R&D expenditure, firms that hold 
a higher number of  patents on average spend more on R&D and the type of 
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patents held (patent quality) is not significantly associated with R&D expenditure. 
Since patent motivation has an important impact on consequential innovation, 
the chapter concludes that Chinese policymakers should pay attention to patent 
motivation when incentivising innovators and, similarly, that both firms and the 
state, if relevant, should encourage patent quality over quantity. Finally, China’s 
unique ‘double-track’ judicial and administrative patent rights enforcement and 
protection mechanism should be strengthened. 
Krolikowski (Chapter 12) offers a fascinating introduction to what is possibly the 
world’s most rapidly advancing space program. Moreover, China is also poised to 
enter the technologically demanding large-carrier segment of the global aircraft 
industry. Within that dynamic system, Chapter 12 informs us how these particular 
scientific expert clusters share specialised knowledge and culture. They are also 
concentrated in two large state-owned defence-industry groups—the Chinese 
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the Chinese Aerospace 
Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC)—several government agencies, military 
organs and technical universities and research institutes. Their culture over time 
has become more meritocratic, but these agencies and areas of expertise in general 
remain relatively insular. They do, however, have a unique role to play in shaping 
China’s innovation policy, especially the long-term ideal of national control over 
satellite and launch vehicle manufacture. Understanding the cultures and hierarchies 
of these scientific communities and their interrelationships with policymakers and 
national goals can shed light on China’s progress towards the high-tech frontiers 
of the aerospace sector.
Part IV: Technological change by sectors
Technological change within key economic sectors lies at the heart of a bigger story 
of transformation. Part IV comprises three chapters that study one topic from each 
of the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. 
Sheng et al. (Chapter 13) present an interesting idea for deepening the mechanisation 
of China’s agricultural sector and raising productivity levels without increasing 
average farm size. Jiang (Chapter 14) looks at renewable energy technologies and 
presents a thorough review of industrial structure and progress for hydropower, 
wind, solar and biomass energy. Kendell and Lees (Chapter 15) round out Part IV 
with an exploration of frontier financing in China. They demonstrate the dexterity 
of China’s financial policymakers in recently advancing China’s ‘repo’ markets 
as an additional and increasingly important source of shorter-term financing in 
the country. 
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Sheng et al. (Chapter 13) tackle a longstanding constraint to the productivity 
growth of agricultural production in developing countries: small farm size. The 
authors argue that, in place of agglomerating small farms into larger ones, contract 
mechanisation services (in particular, capital outsourcing) could offer an alternative 
route to increasing farm productivity. This, in turn, can raise the capital–labour ratio 
of medium-sized and small farms, complementing earlier Chinese land consolidation 
reform towards continued improvement in industry-level agricultural productivity. 
Such institutional creativity could offer China’s small farming households the 
opportunity to continue to increase productivity via ‘increasing returns to scale’ 
and frontier technologies—without having to make prohibitively large investments. 
However, they point out that market-based outsourced mechanisation services are 
constrained by market friction, high transaction costs and various institutional 
barriers. Institutional innovation is therefore required to reduce market transaction 
costs to facilitate the use of outsourced mechanisation services to deal with the issue 
of small farm size in agricultural production along with land consolidation reform. 
In Chapter 14, Jiang sheds light on China as a leading player in renewable energy 
development. Renewable energy capacity in China accounts for some one-third of 
the global total, and growth in the industry has been especially strong since 2011. 
Growth has been especially rapid in solar, which has grown by 110 per cent per 
annum over this period. Strong policy support has led to technological progress 
and large falls in prices. Chapter 14 describes these trends, especially with respect 
to developments in hydro, wind, solar and biomass power capacity and industrial 
development in China. Chinese authorities are committed to reaching the climate 
change–related targets of the Paris agreement. The author highlights that China 
reaching its energy transition and clean air targets are central to the realisation of 
international climate change goals. 
Kendell and Lees (Chapter 15) explore the market for repurchase agreements 
(‘repo’), which are an important source of short-term funding for financial 
institutions operating in China. Used by the People’s Bank of China to manage 
domestic liquidity conditions through open market operations, repos are likely to 
become increasingly important as a channel for the transmission of monetary policy. 
The authors describe the characteristics of China’s repo market. They initially focus 
on the interbank market and then look at recent developments and their impact 
on the bond market. They show that lower and less volatile repo rates over the 
past couple of years have contributed to greater risk-taking in financial markets and 
policy settings in China have been dynamic in shaping and responding to these 
developments. 
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
16
Part V: Technologies with trade and investment 
Part V explores China’s progress in innovation in trade, investment and 
development finance globally. First, Athukorala (Chapter 16) studies China’s trade 
balances in terms of the evolution of East Asian production networks and, despite 
views being trumpeted internationally, the chapter suggests that punitive tariffs 
against China may, paradoxically, hurt competing international business interests 
more than those in China. Chen (Chapter 17) studies empirically the impact of 
China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) on its economic growth by using 
a province-level panel dataset covering 30 provinces and the period 2004–14. 
The final two chapters of the 2017 volume elaborate issues that are important to 
China’s prominent ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative and its new globalisation push. 
Hu et al. (Chapter 18) study existing economic patterns and make suggestions for 
policies that will deepen ties between China and a section of the ‘Road’: the five 
countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Johnston and Rudyak (Chapter 
19) make an important contribution in the context of China’s new globalisation. 
They identify political and economic points of inflection and influences that shaped 
China’s own globalisation as a means to understanding how China may shape 
globalisation itself. 
In Chapter 16, Athukorala explores the implications of China’s evolving role in East 
Asian global production networks. The context of the chapter is increasing recent 
international trade friction and the role of regional and international production 
networks. He argues that China’s widening trade imbalances with many economies 
are a structural phenomenon driven by a process of global production sharing and 
the decades-deep pivotal role played by China within East Asian–centred global 
production networks. Global production sharing is an integral part of economic 
globalisation, so the underlying story of the US–Sino trade gap is more complicated 
than can be revealed by standard trade-flow analysis. China’s final assembly export 
networks are not only extensive across East Asia and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), but also extend increasingly to Africa, 
Latin America and the Middle East. As a result, punitive tariffs on China are bound 
to face opposition from American business interests and the impact on global 
production network flows may be less damaging than is commonly thought. 
Chen (Chapter 17) finds that both OFDI from provincial firms and OFDI from 
central government–controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have a statistically 
significant positive impact on China’s provincial economic growth. The positive 
impact of OFDI on provincial economic growth may be the result of reverse 
knowledge  spillovers from OFDI to the home province’s economy through 
demonstration and imitation, labour movement, backward and forward industrial 
linkages, information flows, promoting the exports of local firms and facilitating 
industrial restructuring and technological upgrading of home economies, 
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thus increasing the productivity and efficiency of local firms and promoting growth 
of the home economy. Overall, the study offers strong empirical evidence that 
OFDI contributes to China’s economic growth. Policies should aim to develop 
a more open and market-oriented OFDI regime, encourage R&D and technological 
development to increase the ownership advantages of home-economy domestic 
firms and encourage interaction between home-economy multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and home-economy domestic firms to enhance and accelerate the diffusion 
of positive reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI to China’s economy.
Hu et al. in Chapter 18 explore ‘5 + 1’ cooperation between China and the five 
countries of the EEU: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. These 
countries are central to the ‘Belt’ in China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. The 
authors compare resource endowments in China and EEU countries and examine 
the potential for greater mutual and global connectivity around infrastructure 
investment, as well as deeper trade and investment ties. The authors make a series 
of policy suggestions to foster greater collaboration between China and the five 
EEU countries. These include encouraging greater financial integration—directly 
through the establishment of Chinese financial institutions in the five EEU countries 
and indirectly through expanding funding levels and mechanisms for development 
projects. Similarly, greater use of the renminbi within the region may reduce currency 
instability, which recently has been an issue. Away from finance, the authors suggest 
more visa-free mobility and enhanced trade and industrial policy coordination as 
mechanisms for facilitating greater economic activity among member countries. 
Johnston and Rudyak (Chapter 19) bring the 2017 volume to a close with their 
chapter on one of the most important features of China’s new globalisation 
agenda: foreign aid and development finance. In his plenary speech to the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in early 2017, the Chinese President Xi Jinping noted 
that China should ‘adapt to and guide economic globalization, cushion its negative 
impact, and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations’. With the stated 
goal of China playing a greater leadership role in globalisation, including through 
delivering benefits to other developing countries, Xi drew attention to the role of 
China’s foreign aid in contributing to global growth. Since understanding China’s 
own experience with foreign aid could shed light on the potential directions of its 
new globalisation agenda, the authors present a chronology that helps explain how 
and why China may now develop its own economic interests and those of other 
developing countries by being more active in shaping globalisation. Africa has been 
an especially important focus of China’s aid policy, since half of China’s foreign aid 
to Africa is also a focus of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative.
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2. Reform Dividends to Sustain China’s 
Economic Growth
Cai Fang and Xiaojing Zhang
Introduction
After three decades of double-digit growth, China’s economy has now moved into 
a period of slower potential growth rates known as the ‘new normal’. To realise 
sustainable growth in this period, China must capture dividends from reform. This 
chapter studies the features of current reforms, including the adjustment of interest 
structure, non-Pareto improvement reform, the interplay between top-level reform 
design and grassroots innovation, achieving unity between a problem-oriented and 
a  goal-oriented approach to reform and the necessity of having a legal basis for 
reforms. Second, it analyses the progress of reforms, including efforts to increase 
market competition and promote a level playing field, reform of the government’s 
role in resource allocation and improving the property rights protection system. Such 
reforms seek to deepen market-oriented reforms that began in the late 1970s. To that 
end, this chapter concludes that the best way for China to capture reform dividends 
is to further clarify the direction of reform, to promote pragmatic reforms and to 
restructure incentive mechanisms to mobilise the enthusiasm of the whole society.
The keys to China’s economic miracle over the past few decades were reform and 
opening-up—the continuation of which is an important choice for the future. After 
the 18th National People’s Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held 
in 2012, and especially following the third plenary session of the 18th CPC Central 
Committee held in November 2013, a new agenda for reform was set, including the 
following:
1. China should continue to promote improvement and development of the 
socialist system with Chinese characteristics, and further develop social 
productivity, thereby releasing the creativity of the whole society. 
2. To promote sustainable and healthy development, and to continue to improve 
people’s wellbeing, China needs to solve major problems. 
3. China should maintain the vitality of the socialist system in a context of global 
interdependence and institutional competition.
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Reform itself is continuous in transitional economies such as China’s as well as 
in developed market economies, such as the United States, Japan and European 
countries. From a global perspective, institutional competition and reform will 
become more entrenched. In institutional economics, it is recognised that the forces 
driving the evolution of internal and external systems include not only the indirect 
effects on international trade and mobility of production factors, but also direct 
institutional adjustment to competition. Globalisation has led to ‘institutional 
(or system) competition’ (Kasper and Streit 1999). Since the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), rebalancing and structural reforms have become more prominent 
themes in global development. China has implemented a comprehensive reform 
agenda, as deployed via the third through sixth plenary sessions of the 18th CPC 
Central Committee. The United States, Japan and Europe have also launched 
structural reform programs and strategies for long-term growth. This suggests 
intense competition for reform has already begun in the wake of the tighter growth 
conditions after the GFC. 
The ability and determination of one country to promote reforms depend mainly on 
its state capacity. The Irish thinker Edmond Burke argued in his book Reflections on 
the Revolution in France: ‘A state without the means of some change, is without the 
means of its own conservation’ (Burke 1986). A state without such means for change 
will inevitably have to take a risk, which is to say it will lose the part of its system 
that it wants to preserve the most. This is the force driving the comprehensively 
deepening reforms in China that are aimed at ‘preserving’ the fundamental nature 
of the socialist system.
In a sense, for China, the pursuit of internal reform in a context of intensified 
global  competition provides the underlying logic of its reform and opening-up. 
Indeed, in the 1980s, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the purpose 
of the reform (of that time) was to establish a solid foundation for sustainable 
development in the next decade and the first half of the twenty-first century. Without 
reform, there would be no sustainable development in the future. As with all aspects 
of reform, we should focus not just on short-term measures and results, but also on 
those impacting over the longer term. Reform, therefore, must continue (Deng 1993).
New features of reform
China’s economy has entered a period in which growth of around 6–7 per cent 
is normal, compared with annual growth of 10 per cent in the previous three decades. 
Only through reform can China sufficiently adapt to the new normal and enter 
a new era of growth. Without reform, China’s continued economic development 
will suffer reduced vitality, could fail to achieve sustainable growth and may even 
fall into the ‘middle-income trap’. The challenges in China’s current economic 
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landscape, however, highlight the fact that deepening structural reform is an urgent 
task. We now elaborate distinctive new features of China’s reform requirements, 
compared with the experiences of the past 30 years.
The deep-water reform zone
After ‘the reform without losers’ in the early years of economic transition (Lau et al. 
2000), China has now entered a deep-water reform zone with more challenges and 
difficulties. This means that this era of reform necessitates confronting multiple 
fundamental and sensitive problems, such as deep-rooted social conflicts, vested 
interests and lack of social mobility. Little progress has been made on such issues 
over many years of reform. This can be attributed, to a large extent, to China’s 
gradualist approach to reform, in which some relatively easy tasks have been pushed 
forward first and the difficult ones have been put aside. This gradual approach has, 
however, also supported the persistence of the so-called protective umbrella of vested 
interests, which refers to the capacity of actors to access individual benefits through 
abuse of public power and to impede the general public’s access to the benefits of 
reform. The ‘umbrella’ thus restrains economic vitality and social creativity, harms 
the efficiency of resource allocation, reduces social mobility and, more importantly, 
has become a major obstacle to further deepening of reform.
No longer a ‘Pareto improvement’
Adjustment of the role played by vested interests is vital to the process of reform, and 
is now unavoidable. Earlier reforms were typically characterised as offering a ‘Pareto 
improvement’, in which the majority of people benefit and no one suffers. Current 
reforms, however, are likely to have the nature of a ‘Kaldor improvement’, in which 
there is a necessary coexistence of improvement (namely, benefiting from a bigger 
pie) and adjustment (benefiting from dividing up the pie). Thus, policymakers need 
to more dynamically and comprehensively consider the likely beneficiaries before, 
during and after implementation of reform, and give top priority to the interests 
of ordinary people. Policymakers also need to coordinate the interests of various 
groups and should focus on the overall long-term benefits, thereby enabling the 
greatest share of people to enjoy the fruits of any reform. This, in turn, will enable 
‘the building of a moderately prosperous (xiaokang) society in all respects with no 
region, no ethnic group and no individual left behind’.1 It means that policymakers 
need to not only alleviate and prevent poverty, but also help people achieve all-round 
economic, political, cultural, social and ecological improvement. It means also that 
policymakers should increase the size of the social wealth ‘pie’ and distribute it fairly 
to create a more equitable and wealthy society full of hope for all.
1  See cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0303/c385476-26629388.html.
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Interplay between top-level design and 
grassroots innovation
Four major problems need to be addressed via top-level design. First, it is important 
to look at the overall picture. Reform is a systemic project, in which opportunities 
and  challenges are entangled, and piecemeal adjustment and repair are often 
unfeasible. There must be comprehensive systemic reform and improvement in all 
fields, which in turn means that top-level design and overall planning of reform 
process are sorely needed. Second, innovations at the grassroots level should be 
consistent with the general direction of reform. Third, there is a need to define 
what can and cannot be done. Fourth, there is a need to break the deadlock due 
to vested interests. Precisely because China’s reform has entered a deep-water zone, 
top-level leadership may be needed to break vested interests’ resistance to reform 
and to add new momentum to the project. At the same time, innovation at the 
grassroots level should be encouraged. Many top-down reform designs provide only 
broad guidance, whereas extensive experimentation is needed to promote reforms. 
Problems that are difficult to solve in theory can often be better addressed in 
practice. Therefore, innovation at the grassroots level is of great importance for the 
development of theory and would not only help achieve practical results, but also 
contribute to institutional innovation.
Problem-oriented and goal-oriented unity
China’s reform process has been driven by the need to solve practical problems; 
therefore, problem-oriented research is of great significance. In particular, to open 
new prospects for reform, China’s policymakers and scholars should aim to solve 
the structural challenges hindering the country’s development. At the same time, 
focusing on problems can lead to the ‘fragmentation’ of reform efforts—that is, 
restricting focus and causing an incoherent approach. It is therefore essential to have 
clear goals for reform and a clear blueprint for achieving it.
Legal basis of reform
In this new era, policymakers seek the best combination of reform and rule of 
law: reform should be promoted under the rule of law and the rule of law needs 
improving in the process of reform. Problems incurred during the passage of reform 
should be solved only within the framework of the rule of law and there must be 
a legal basis for those reforms. The comprehensive deepening of reforms should 
be advanced with courage to ‘break’ institutional barriers and change the status quo. 
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On the other hand, the ultimate goal of breaking such barriers is to thereafter 
establish a set of new, stable and efficient laws and regulations; therefore, reforms 
should not supersede the law. Unlike three decades ago, China has integrated 
itself much more deeply into the global system, where regard for the rule of law 
is necessary for the common achievement of human civilisation. China must now 
promote reform through lawful means to create a favourable external environment.
New progress of reform
Since the third plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013, great 
progress has been made in the comprehensive deepening of reform in China. The 
main framework for reform, with multiple key ‘pillars’, has been established and a 
new, albeit preliminary, pattern of reform has emerged. Achievements include the 
creation of healthy and fair market competition, innovation in the government’s 
role in resource allocation, promotion of the compilation of the Civil Code and 
emphasis on the property rights system as a cornerstone of the socialist market 
economy. All these efforts have helped to clarify the direction of reform and stabilise 
public expectations. On the whole, these reforms—focusing on how to allow market 
forces to play a decisive role in the economy and to improve the government’s role—
constitute the continuation of the market-oriented reforms that began in the late 
1970s, and on which we elaborate further below.
Ensuring a level playing field
In the new normal era, developing a level playing field is of even greater importance 
than before to the vitality and efficiency of the economy, and to achieving innovation-
driven development and maintaining sustainable economic growth. There are three 
keys to facilitating fair competition.
The first is tackling local protectionism—that is, policymakers need to break regional 
blockades and local protection measures, remove market barriers and promote the 
mobility of goods and production factors across regions within the country. This will 
aid the formation of a truly unified domestic market, which is vital to ensuring 
healthy local competition.
Second is the need to tackle industrial monopolies—in particular, the imposing 
challenge of the administrative monopoly of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
A study by Li et al. (2014) found that after the large-scale reform of SOEs in the 
late 1990s, Chinese industry formed a vertical industrial structure, in which SOEs 
continued to dominate and monopolise some of the key upstream industries (such 
as energy, finance and telecommunications), while the majority of downstream 
industries (such as the manufacture of consumer goods, hospitality, entertainment 
and other consumer-oriented services) have, to some extent, been liberalised and are 
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now dominated by private enterprises. In the process of structural transformation 
(i.e. industrialisation) and trade globalisation, private enterprises in downstream 
industries have experienced continuous growth by making full use of China’s 
abundant and cheap labour and by taking advantage of China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which led to rapid economic growth in 
the country. With the expanding scale of production, downstream private enterprises 
have also experienced a growing demand for critical inputs and intermediate 
services, such as energy, telecommunications, finance and so on. SOEs, with their 
monopoly on these key upstream products and services, gain proportionately from 
the higher productivity, output and exports of private enterprises. Currently, the 
nature of the SOEs’ monopoly is mainly administrative—meaning the government 
helps some enterprises gain market resources and access, government procurement 
opportunities and so on, to ensure they remain in an absolute monopoly position. 
Only by breaking the administrative monopoly of SOEs—in particular, withdrawing 
SOEs from some competitive areas—can a level playing field gradually emerge.
The third factor is enabling a shift from traditional industrial policy with a focus on 
infant industry protection to new development policy with focuses on competition 
and improving market institution. Traditional industrial policy can play an active 
role during a period of economic catch-up, because the government can support the 
market to make use of the advantages of backwardness by imitating and introducing 
new technology. This allows the absorption of all kinds of information relating to 
frontier technologies and emerging industries at low cost, and thereafter determines 
the technical route for industry to follow, actively mobilises necessary resources 
and promotes indigenous research, industrialisation and technological innovation 
(developing countries rely on ‘importation’ for more than 80 per cent of their new 
technology; Manyika et al. 2015). As the advantage of backwardness progressively 
shrinks, however, the uncertainty of frontier technological innovation increases and 
the government’s ability to collect information and make appropriate decisions is 
significantly reduced. The industrial policy strategy of ‘the government picking 
the winner’ therefore fails. Due to these challenges, in a more developed economy, 
there is a need for a better institutional environment to nurture original innovation. 
The more seeds of innovation that are sown, the more novel ideas will sprout. 
This  highlights the need for China to now shift from a selective to an inclusive 
industrial policy, to pay more attention to competition policy and to let market 
forces play a greater role in innovation and related incentives.
Reforming the government’s role in resource allocation
Thanks to the deepening of market-oriented reform and opening-up in China, 
the role of the market in resource allocation has been increasingly enhanced—as has 
the role of government.
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Figure 2.1 Trends in the relative size of state-owned assets (as percentage 
of total assets in the corporate sector)
Sources: NBS (various issues); authors’ estimates.
An important aspect of government resource allocation is how to accumulate 
and manage public assets. We can explore the issue from different perspectives. 
Our  estimates indicate that: 1) as of 2015, state-owned assets (including non-
financial and net financial assets) accounted for nearly 40 per cent of total assets in 
the corporate sector (Figure 2.1); 2) in 2015, the government’s sovereign net worth 
reached about RMB100 trillion (Figure 2.2); and 3) the proportion of general 
government net wealth in national net wealth is close to one-quarter, in comparison 
with Germany and Japan, where this ratio is less than 1 per cent, and the United 
Kingdom and the United States, where this ratio is in fact negative (Figure 2.3). 
The result is closely related to China’s ownership structure (with the domination of 
public ownership) and its development stage (government-driven catch-up growth).
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Figure 2.2 China’s sovereign assets, liabilities and net worth (RMB trillion)
Sources: NBS (various issues); authors’ estimates.
From a comparative perspective, the wealth held by the Chinese Government is 
strikingly large, even by conservative estimates. According to Detter and Folster 
(2015), a 1 per cent increase in the rate of return on those assets would generate 
US$750 billion (estimated at US$75 trillion in global public commercial assets) 
of public revenue. Obviously, this figure does not include large amounts of non-
commercial (or non-operating) assets, such as natural resources and assets held by 
administrative institutions (such as China’s science, education, culture and health 
institutions). Given the tremendous holdings of economic resources, reforming the 
government’s role in resources allocation, as well as greater efficiency of resource use, 
will be an increasingly important aspect of future reforms.















Figure 2.3 International comparison of China’s net worth structure, 2015 
(per cent)
Notes: Data for China are from 2013 and from 2014 for other countries. For Canada, non-financial and 
financial sectors have been consolidated. General government assets in China include state-owned 
business assets, non-business assets, natural resource assets, foreign assets, social security funds 
and government deposits at the central bank. 
Sources: NBS (various issues); authors’ estimates.
Resources allocated by the Chinese Government include natural resources and 
resources held by SOEs and public institutions, which are owned on behalf of the 
state and the people. To address outstanding problems—including market price 
distortion and the inefficient allocation and insufficient supply of public services—
it is necessary to shift allocative decisions away from the state and towards market 
mechanisms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of resource allocation. 
First, access to and use of natural resources should be based on the establishment 
of a property rights system. In China, the law clearly stipulates that all natural 
resources—such as land, minerals, water, forests, mountains, grasslands, wasteland, 
sea areas, uninhabited islands, beaches and so on—are owned collectively. For this 
type of public resource, a clear property rights system should be established and the 
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related usage administration improved. In particular, the role of spatial planning in 
guiding the allocation of natural resources needs more attention. ‘Radio spectrum’ 
should also be allocated and managed on the basis of market competition and 
a user-pays system.
Second, the allocation and management of state-owned assets should be reformed. 
For state-owned financial and non-financial operating assets, it is necessary to 
establish a sound management system with an emphasis on capital allocation and 
efficiency, sectoral distribution and investment and withdrawal. To optimise the 
distribution of state-owned capital, the government should concentrate its efforts 
in key industries and infrastructure projects that relate to national security, the 
foundation of the national economy and the people’s livelihood, as well as forward-
looking strategic industries and advancing enterprises with core competitiveness. 
Policymakers should similarly improve the exit mechanism for state-owned capital, 
explore what is a reasonable proportion for state-owned shareholding in financial 
institutions and maintain control of financial institutions of systemic importance. 
The ownership structure of other institutions should be optimised in accordance 
with the principle of market competition and provide incentives to non-state 
investment. There is also an increasing need to improve the system of authorisation 
and franchising of the operations of state-owned capital. Further policy efforts are 
needed to establish a state-owned asset supervision system with a focus on capital 
management, to restructure or set up state-owned capital investment and operation 
companies and to carry out pilot projects in which the government authorises 
state-owned capital investment and encourages operating companies to fulfil their 
responsibilities as capital contributors. Policymakers should also keep a focus on 
capital management, aiming to enhance the liquidity of state-owned capital and 
actively change the form of public capital, such as securitisation of operating 
state-owned assets, and also emphasise the role of public capital in the country’s 
macroeconomic regulation and control, long-term development strategy and the 
protection of people’s basic livelihoods.
Third, regarding non-operating state-owned assets for the purpose of public 
administration and public service provision, policymakers should adhere to 
a  principle of fair distribution and actively introduce competition mechanisms 
to increase allocation efficiency and thus improve the accessibility and fairness of 
basic public services. Government departments and public institutions should be 
distinguished by their different functions, as should government administration 
and business operation. That is, policymakers should clearly define the different 
functions of the government as a capital owner and as an industry regulator, improve 
mechanisms for direct resource allocation and strengthen the regulatory functions 
of departments/institutions in the education, health, social security, culture, sports 
and other sectors. The government must also be innovative with respect to the 
supply mode for public services. Policymakers should establish a diversified public 
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service supply system with a focus on government leadership, social engagement, 
independent operation and public oversight. All localities and departments can 
expand and improve the supply of public goods and services through franchising 
and government procurement of services, according to their needs and financial 
conditions. The government should promote the integration and sharing of non-
operating state-owned assets. With clearly defined property rights and accurate 
assessments of assets and capital, the government needs to abolish the administrative 
segmentation of departments and build a shared platform for the dissemination of 
public knowledge, education, health care, culture and other non-material resources.
Improving the property rights protection system
In November 2016, China issued ‘The Opinions of the CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council on Improving the Protection System of Property Rights and 
the Protection of Property Rights in Accordance with Law’. The document stresses 
that the property rights system is the cornerstone of the socialist market economy 
and that the protection of property rights is an inevitable requirement to adhere to 
the fundamental socialist economic system. As an old Chinese saying goes, ‘one shall 
have his (or her) peace of mind when he (or she) possesses a piece of land’, so the 
effective protection and recognition of the property rights of economic agents serve 
as the basis of sustainable and healthy socioeconomic development.
A large number of studies from outside China suggest that reform of the property 
rights system has, to some extent, been ignored in China’s reform process (see, among 
others, Murphy et al. 1992; Young 2000; Brandt and Rawski 2008). Other 
studies recognise that China’s property rights system in fact has many distinctive 
features and that these are open to change as China experiments to find the best 
property rights structure. First, in an economy dominated by public ownership, the 
contracting out of property use rights (exemplified especially by the rural household 
responsibility system (HRS)) has been solidified from the abstract and often ill-
defined ownership of ‘whole people’ or ‘collectivity’. Second, making further effort 
to respecting private ownership of various factors of production, including capital, 
labour, technology and entrepreneurship. Third, private property rights have been 
redefined or new forms recognised. The need for further transfers of property to 
preserve and increase property values has seen the emergence of market transactions. 
In particular, transfer rights, pricing power, the right to bid and bargaining power 
have been recognised, and have resulted in the market playing an increasingly 
important role in resource allocation; the system of central economic planning is 
gradually being dismantled as well. Fourth, in the framework of the shareholding 
system, contracts can be concluded for various types of property rights that could be 
recognised and protected, and corporate enterprises with clear property rights can 
be established (Zhou 2010). 
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As China’s reform process continues, challenges with the definition and protection 
of property rights should not be underestimated. First, regarding the protection of 
state-owned property rights, the relationship between owners and agents is not clear 
and there are some problems—such as insider control and related party transactions—
that could lead to the loss of state-owned assets. Second, the protection of private 
property rights also remains weak, and is often encroached on by public power. 
Third, the protection of intellectual property rights is still weak and infringements 
are pervasive with low penalties.2 Therefore, the government should focus on the 
following three factors to improve the property rights protection system.
First, public property rights need to be defined and protected. China’s economic 
system is dominated by public ownership, with allowances for the development 
of other types of ownership. Therefore, the protection of public property rights—
which involves the protection of land, natural resources and state-owned assets—
can be viewed as a fundamental feature of China’s political-economic institutions.
Second, private property rights need to be defined and protected. China’s planned 
economy has long discriminated against private ownership. Policymakers therefore 
need to break the ideological constraint of ‘public versus private’ and strengthen 
the equal protection of property rights for all kinds of economic organisations and 
agents. The most urgent is to get rid of the ‘original sin’, and to strictly follow 
the principles of non-retroactivity, nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law), 
in dubio pro reo ‘(when) in doubt, for the accused’ and ‘to rectify whatever is wrong’, 
as well as application of the existing law unless a lesser punishment is stipulated in 
the new law. In taking the perspectives of history and development, the irregularities 
of the enterprises, especially private enterprises, should be properly handled in full 
consideration of their contexts, where the legal system and market institutions were 
immature. This will strengthen confidence in development and property security 
and help to stimulate entrepreneurs’ spirit of innovation.
Third, intellectual property rights must be protected. Further work is needed to 
refine the laws and regulations relevant to intellectual property rights protection, 
to gradually establish a punitive damages mechanism for intellectual property 
infringements to prevent infringement behaviour and to improve compulsory 
remedial measures after infringement. Enforcement of intellectual property 
rights protection is essential, as is eliminating any arbitrariness and selectivity in 
such enforcement. The government’s simplistic interventions on patents, specific 
industrial policies and talent policies must be reduced to promote technological 
2  As an example, we refer to a recent report released by the Global Intellectual Property Center (2016), which 
measures efforts in the legal enforcement of intellectual property rights in the 38 economies including China, 
United States, the United Kingdom, and India. On a scale in which the highest score is 6, China’s law enforcement 
efforts were given 1.51 points, ranking it the 31st of 38 countries. In the context of weak intellectual property 
rights protection, imitation becomes the norm for enterprises’ ‘innovation’, and even piracy and counterfeiting 
can become common—cultivating a cultural atmosphere in which intellectual property rights are not respected.
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innovation. Policymakers should also gradually improve market incentives, allowing 
market forces to become the main drivers of growth in patent quantity and quality. 
The definition and protection of the human capital property rights of scientific 
and engineering personnel in the public sector must be examined to release the 
innovative capabilities of scientific researchers.
Policy recommendations and perspectives 
on reform
The third plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013 outlined 
a blueprint for China’s reform. Given the success of reforms and the attainment of 
the ‘two centenary goals’,3 China now needs to focus on the following four factors: 
1) further clarifying the direction of reform; 2) promoting the implementation 
and practical achievement of reform; 3) reconstructing incentive mechanisms to 
mobilise the enthusiasm of private and public economic agents; and 4) capitalising 
on the benefits of the reform dividend to achieve sustainable growth.
Further clarifying the direction of reform 
China’s process of economic catch-up over more than three decades has been 
accompanied by a variety of distortions,4 including price distortions in favour of 
industrial products, financial repression, trade protection and industrial policy 
with the intention of infant industry protection. Broadly speaking, distortions 
can be viewed as different forms of government intervention. There is an extensive 
literature on the role of government in economic development. A prime example 
is the study of the ‘developmental state’, which refers to government playing an 
extremely proactive role in promoting economic growth through strong and direct 
intervention, including extensive regulation and planning (see Johnson 1982; Woo-
Cummings 1999). Governments in East Asia, including China, are typical of those 
in the developmental state. Interestingly, we can also find a parallel but much earlier 
strong push from the hand of government in most developed countries in their early 
stages of development, such as mercantilist Holland and the United Kingdom in the 
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries and emerging Germany and the United States in 
the late nineteenth century.
3  See Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th CPC National Congress, held in November 2012. For an English translation of the 
report, see: news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm.
4  In economics, the standard definition of distortion is deviation from the optimal equilibrium state of the 
market. 
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The role of distortion, either positive or negative, is closely related to the economy’s 
development stage. When an economy is in an early stage of development—
characterised by an immature industrial system, imperfect market mechanisms 
and unfavourable international competition—intensive policy distortions are often 
required to mobilise economic resources, foster domestic industries and assist the 
formation of comparative advantages. As the economy enters a higher income stage 
of development—characterised by a more mature industrial system and sound 
market mechanisms—too much policy distortion is no longer conducive to the 
efficient allocation of economic resources and often results in changes in incentives 
and behaviour through ‘rent-seeking’ for public power. This then serves to inhibit 
innovation and the sustainability of growth. Zhang et al. (forthcoming) support 
the above argument with evidence from international and Chinese experiences. 
The recent study of Bardhan (2016) also confirms this view.
Although many agree about the reduction or elimination of policy distortions 
and interventions, there are still some controversies and ambiguities on the topic. 
For example, when it comes to allowing the market to play a decisive role in resource 
allocation and improving the government’s role, some thinking remains unclear on 
how to deal with the relationship between the market and government.
With the Central Committee having clearly outlined the general direction of 
China’s  reform, the challenge now is how to achieve practical results. First, 
however, some basic theoretical questions remain unanswered. For example, the 
aforementioned twofold emphasis on allowing the market to play a decisive role 
in resource allocation and improving the government’s role may not only lead to 
a more balanced relationship between the market and government, but also throw up 
substantial obstacles to the promotion of reform in practice. Different departments, 
interest groups and social classes will have their own interpretation of this argument, 
with some emphasising the market and others the government. As an example, the 
recent fierce debate on industrial policy in China shows that consensus has not yet 
been reached on the issue of the market–government relationship.5
Defining the respective boundaries of the market and government is a practical 
matter (which is the case in both developed and developing economies); however, 
if,  in  theory, some ‘moderate distortions’, albeit ill defined, are believed necessary 
during the catch-up stage, such distortions will appear pervasively. Indeed, ‘improving 
the government’s role’ mainly implies that the government cannot be absent from its 
essential functions—for example, providing public goods, fairness, justice and good 
governance. China’s economy on a per capita level is currently moving from middle 
income towards the high-income level. Only by eliminating all remaining distortions 
during the catch-up period can China better promote sustainable development. 
5  See a news report on the debate between Yifu Lin and Weiying Zhang, two economists of influence in China. 
Available from: finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-09-26/doc-ifxwevmf2320320.shtml [in Chinese].
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In this sense, China needs ‘limited’ government that follows the logic of the market 
and serves the market. Therefore, policymakers need to further clarify and highlight 
the decisive role of the market in the next stages of reform.
Promoting reform plans
In his book An Economist in the Real World: The art of policymaking in India, Basu 
(2015) argued that although former prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and other 
leaders in India participated in the development of economic planning, they were 
concerned more with the quality of the wording than with the content of the plan. 
It is not surprising, then, that South Korea worked out the most effective method 
of planning, while India’s planning is written with the most literary grace.
And yet, it is also possible that the wording of China’s reform plans is also a literary 
effort (even better than India’s). The issue is how to promote these texts so they 
can be implemented in practice. The phenomenon of the ‘implementation of 
documents by documents’ is not uncommon, and worries about incompetence in 
implementing reforms are also pervasive. Among many factors leading to difficulties 
in the implementation of reform plans, the following should receive more attention 
from policymakers.
First, the dividends of reform are not fully understood. Structural reform—through 
which China could achieve real dividends—is not a substitute for economic 
growth, but is a catalyst or even prerequisite for growth. However, this argument 
has not yet been widely recognised and the incentives for reform are often weak and 
incompatible. For a long time, there has been a view both in China and abroad that 
there is a waxing and waning relationship between reform and growth—such that 
economic growth should be sacrificed to achieve breakthroughs in reform. In view 
of this, for government departments or local governments concerned about the pace 
of growth, the stimulus strategies on the demand side are usually visible in terms 
of the means of implementation, and the results or outcomes are often rapid. The 
policy tools also correspond to their effects quite well. On the contrary, for structural 
reform of the supply side, policy instruments seem to be invisible and there is no 
clear correspondence between the policy tools and their effects.
Second, the various incentives for reform are often incompatible. Due to the lack 
of appropriate standards with which to define the responsibilities of government at 
different levels, many reforms involving costs and benefits that need to be shared 
appropriately across all levels have not yet begun. Even if the economic agents 
understand that they can benefit from reform in principle, there is inconsistency as 
to which bodies will bear the reform-related costs and which will enjoy the benefits; 
therefore, some departments and localities have a wait-and-see attitude towards 
reform due to the asymmetry between cost and benefit. To some extent, this is also 
the case in countries other than China; thus, when promoting structural reforms, 
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there is a need for persuasion and specific institutional arrangements to achieve 
incentive compatibility (Rajan 2004). In some areas of reform in China, such as that 
of the household registration system (hukou), a proper mechanism for sharing the 
expected costs and benefits is the key to promoting timely reform.
The third area for attention is deviation from the reform roadmap. In the presence 
of the above obstacles, reform initiatives in some areas are likely to be avoided, 
delayed, deformed or distorted in disregard of the original intention of the reform, 
so reform in practice deviates from the timetable set out by the CPC Central 
Committee. Related problems include: 1) when deciding on the balance between 
a supply-side structural reform program and a demand-side stimulus plan, some 
promoters prefer the latter, which is relatively easy to implement, thus creating 
a dependence on stimulus policies that results in the delay of structural reform. 
2) Some reform officials focus only on statistics and indicators—which are crucial 
for government performance assessment and thus officials’ prospects for promotion 
(meeting related political goals)—rather than on deep reform of institutions and 
mechanisms. As a result, even if some old problems can be temporarily resolved, 
the institutional flaws left untouched will create new problems. 3) Some reform 
promoters tend to avoid the important problems and focus on the trivial ones, 
and even count quotidian and routine management activities as reform initiatives. 
As a result, they have failed to fundamentally reform the existing institutional system 
and mechanisms, which, in particular, protect vested interests.
In short, to promote reform plans and achieve practical results, Chinese policymakers 
need to improve the public’s understanding of the benefits or dividends of and 
costs associated with reform, and reach a consensus on the direction of reform 
across all levels of government and society. Policymakers should appeal to a sense of 
responsibility, political courage and perseverance to ensure further reform efforts. 
They should welcome experimentation and innovation at the grassroots level and 
promote positive interaction with top-level reform designs. They should encourage 
differentiated pilot programs and reform experiments in different regions and respond 
to people’s concerns, especially the difficulties in their lives, by promoting targeted 
reform measures. They should also ensure the compatibility of incentives, so that 
government departments, localities and ordinary people can benefit from reform.
Restructuring the incentive mechanism 
Thanks to strict governance by the CPC, its tough stance on corruption and the 
establishment of rules and regulations, solid regulatory mechanisms have gradually 
been established since the 18th CPC National Congress and, particularly, the 
third plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. This is an important 
achievement; however, an appropriate incentive mechanism, which is also necessary 
for the success of reform, is still in the making.
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First, in principle, competition among localities can continue to play a positive role 
in boosting market dynamics and economic development. In the past four decades, 
interregional competition and local vitality have underpinned China’s economic 
success, which is also recognised internationally as an important component of the 
‘Chinese characteristics’ defining its system. But the same institutional competition 
has produced a series of adverse impacts, such as vicious competition, local 
protectionism and market segmentation, structural distortion, homogenisation of 
development, overcapacity and so on. In view of this, China should redirect local 
competition—shifting from competition for gross domestic product (GDP) to 
competition for public goods and services. It is widely argued that until now local 
competition in China has centred on GDP growth performance. In the process 
of rapid urbanisation in recent years, the provision of public goods and services—
including public security, education, health care, community services, social security 
and social housing—has become a ‘short board’ for socioeconomic development. 
Therefore, policymakers should focus on the type, quantity and quality of public 
goods and services to assess the performance of local governance and, in so 
doing, foster a new type of local competition for this new phase of development. 
In addition, evaluation of local government performance should be gradually shifted 
from a ‘top-down’ to a ‘bottom-up’ approach. If the past competition for GDP was 
mainly evaluated through a top-down approach, competition for public services 
needs to be evaluated through a bottom-up approach—because ordinary people 
should have a say about these public services. A bottom-up approach would also 
rely on the supervision of local people’s congresses, the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the media and independent third parties. 
The central–local government relationship must also be restructured in terms of 
establishing rights and responsibilities and setting up mechanisms for compatible 
incentives. At present, local government expenditure makes up about 80 per cent of 
total public expenditure, while local revenue is only about 40 per cent of the total. 
This mismatch leads to problems, such as land-based public finance, local debt risks 
and so on. Local government should therefore be provided with a greater range of 
sources of tax revenue, such as taxes on real estate and household consumption, and 
an increased proportion of the revenue from value-added tax (VAT). Local issuance 
of bonds should also be allowed. Local government power over legislation should be 
enhanced to facilitate the exercise of discretion over local matters.
Second, entrepreneurship should be stimulated and protected. ‘Original sin’ must be 
tackled and private property rights protected. A new type of government–business 
relations must be established so that entrepreneurs can more clearly follow the rules 
of the game. From a government perspective, it should improve its role in creating 
an environment conducive to enterprise development. On the one hand, the 
Chinese Government needs to treat enterprises with different ownership structures 
equally, create a legal environment to protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
entrepreneurs and accelerate the formation of a market environment conducive to 
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fair competition and business integrity. Information exchange and communication 
with entrepreneurs, especially those in the private sector, should also be strengthened, 
and the streamlining of administration and institutional decentralisation should 
continue, to provide efficient and pragmatic quality services and practical solutions 
for businesses and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, it is necessary to make 
a clear distinction between public and private interests in the interaction between 
entrepreneurs and government officials. In particular, the latter should not abuse 
their power for personal gain or engage in collusion between power and money. 
Nor should they shift responsibility on to others. The income distribution system 
must be improved to enable entrepreneurs to take risks equivalent to their potential 
gains. Indeed, by taking a greater risk in the innovation process, entrepreneurs can 
be viewed as a kind of scarce resource. Therefore, China should also further improve 
mechanisms for long-term incentives so that the gains of entrepreneurs are matched 
with their contribution to innovation and management, as well as with their 
responsibilities and risks. There should be greater tolerance for and encouragement 
of innovation by entrepreneurs. Although the entrepreneurial spirit—especially the 
spirit of innovation—often manifests as unusual thoughts and behaviour, as long 
as these are within legal boundaries, they should be respected. In particular, the 
government needs to create an atmosphere of respect for and encouragement of 
private innovation and entrepreneurship. Fundamentally, the Chinese Government 
needs to establish a legal system that protects the rights of  entrepreneurs and 
recognises their contribution.
Third, policymakers should ensure that people benefit sufficiently from any reform 
dividends. Ordinary people should be allowed to participate in and share more of the 
gains of reform (a recent field study in Jiangxi province by the authors found that, in 
some regions, poverty levels and poverty-reduction efforts are basically determined 
by the government and local people have little say). The reason past reforms were 
promptly promoted lies in the fact that they brought substantial benefits to most 
people as well as opportunities for equal participation and development. This is the 
fundamental driving force for reform that is supported by the majority of people. 
For the comprehensive deepening of reforms, the government needs to make its 
starting point the promotion of social equity and justice and the enhancement 
of the wellbeing of the general public. Therefore, it is necessary to establish fair 
and effective institutional mechanisms so the dividends of reform and the fruits of 
development can be shared equitably among all people. To achieve this, first, the 
government should protect the interests of the poor and low-income individuals 
and families, so they have greater access to opportunities for development through 
and as a result of reform; and second, it must allow the gradual expansion of the 
middle class and give it greater space for development. The government should 
also protect the legitimate interests of the high-income group and create a better 
development environment to give them incentives to invest and innovate. It is 
important to actualise the full potential of different social groups and allow labour, 
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knowledge, technology, managerial expertise, capital and other sources of wealth to 
play their full part in invigorating the market, thereby ensuring that all social groups 
can benefit from, and thus support, the reform process.
Achieving sustainable growth through reform dividends 
In the new normal era of China’s economic development, the country confronts 
a decline in its potential growth rate. How to benefit from continued reform and 
improve the potential growth rate are key issues for achieving sustainable economic 
growth in China.
In theory, there are two ways to increase the potential growth rate. The first is to 
maintain the traditional growth momentum. This does not mean maintaining 
the traditional model of growth, which was driven by factor accumulation, but 
rather means focusing on the exploration of potential production factors, especially 
the potential supply of labour (namely, to extend the demographic dividend). 
The second is to develop new drivers of economic growth. This is mainly about 
increasing human capital accumulation and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. 
Both these sources of economic growth are related to reform dividends and embody 
the following aspects.
First, the participation rate of workers in sectors of high productivity needs to be 
increased. Indeed, almost all the factors causing China’s economic slowdown can 
be attributed to the fading of China’s demographic dividend, meaning there is 
no longer an unlimited supply of new (and low-cost) labour. Thus, increasing the 
supply of labour in productive sectors can help alleviate the decline in the potential 
growth rate. As a result of changes in the population age structure, not only is the 
working-age population (those aged 15–59 years) now decreasing, but also current 
labour force participation rates suggest the growth rate of the economically active 
population will be negative after 2018. That is, after that point, it will be difficult 
to increase the size of the total labour force. The only way to increase the potential 
supply of labour will be to improve the labour participation rate. Due to the size 
of China’s working-age population, an increase of 1 per cent in the labour force 
participation rate in 2015 would have corresponded to more than nine million 
active workers. Simulation shows that across the period 2011–22, if the labour 
participation rate of the non-agricultural sector increases by 1 per cent per year, 
China will increase its potential growth rate by 0.88 per cent (Cai and Lu 2013). 
With this prospect in mind, we think the most important measures to improve 
the labour force participation rate include reform of the household registration 
system and improvements in urbanisation, both of which would help to stabilise 
and improve the employment of migrant workers in the urban economy and non-
agricultural industries.
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Second, population policies could increase the total fertility rate and establish 
a balanced population age structure in the future. Chinese President Xi Jinping has 
asked the country to ‘stand on the strategic height of the long-term development 
of the Chinese nation and promote the balanced development of the population’.6 
According to international and Chinese experience, a decline in fertility is a typical 
result of economic and social development, and fertility policy itself plays a role only 
at the margins in most cases. For 35 years from the early 1980s, China implemented 
its ‘one-child’ family planning policy. Recent reforms to this policy now allow two 
children per family and are expected to significantly raise the fertility rate over time. 
It is hoped this adjustment to fertility policy is able to increase, or at least slow the 
decrease of, the fertility rate, which is currently believed to be about 1.5, and move 
it towards a balanced replacement level—namely 2.1. Policy simulations show that, 
if the fertility rate increases to 1.8 from the benchmark rate of 1.6, the potential 
growth rate in the period 2036–40 could be increased by 0.2 per cent (Cai and Lu 
2016). It is worth noting that reform aiming to balance population development 
should not be limited to fertility policy adjustments. It also requires improving the 
supply of public services and reducing the financial burden of raising children to 
allow people to decide the number of children they have in accordance with policy 
requirements.
Third, there is a need to maintain a reasonable pace of human capital accumulation. 
As shown in the experiences of East Asian economies, economic development 
characterised by structural transformation is often followed by a stage of development 
driven by human capital accumulation. One of our research simulations (Cai and 
Lu 2016) shows that, under some scenarios with improved human capital due to 
development of education and training, China’s future potential growth rate could 
increase by about 0.1 per cent. This number cannot be ignored for China, which 
is seeking to maintain medium–high growth in the new normal era. Moreover, our 
simulations consider only the quantity of human capital. If the quality of education 
is taken into account, the effect of human capital on economic growth will become 
more significant, and could even surpass the contribution to economic growth 
of productivity progress (Manuelli and Seshadri 2005).
Fourth, further policy efforts should be made in favour of the rate of TFP growth, 
thereby obtaining a more sustainable source of growth. The theoretical literature 
and empirical analysis (e.g. Cai and Lu 2016) show that although an increase in 
the labour participation rate will help boost the potential growth rate, that impact 
gradually diminishes over time. By contrast, the contribution of TFP growth to 
potential growth is not only immediately effective, but also endures over the long 
term. Growth in China is approaching that of the neoclassical model. On the one 
hand, China’s economy is increasingly dependent on scientific and technological 
6  See health.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0819/c398004-28648312.html.
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innovation to maintain its sustainability; on the other, there is still plenty of room 
to improve the efficiency of resource allocation by eliminating institutional barriers. 
Our simulation shows that if the average annual growth rate of TFP increases by 
1 per cent over 2011–22, the rate of potential growth will increase by 0.99 per cent 
over the same period (Cai and Lu 2013).
Based on the hypothetical contribution of reform of the household registration 
system, the education and training system, SOEs and population policies, as well 
as changes to the labour participation rate, human capital accumulation and TFP, 
we considered different scenarios that could generate reform dividends. We find that 
different intensities of reform will produce significantly different growth trajectories 
in both the short and the long term (Figure 2.4).
As for long-term growth prospects, Figure 2.4 illustrates that, on the one hand, we 
should not expect a V-shaped recovery that is attributed to cyclical (short-term) 
factors. On the other hand, under the different assumptions about supply-side 
structural reform, the growth prospects also differ. Looking at Figure 2.4 from left 
to right, and comparing the benchmark scenario without effective reform initiatives, 
we can conclude that there is a positive correlation between in-depth reform and 
growth performance and, moreover, that the deeper the reform, the more likely it is 
that growth follows an L-shaped trajectory.
In sum, as China’s economy transitioned into the ‘new normal’—characterised 
by economic slowdown and other socioeconomic structural changes—its market-
oriented reform program encountered new challenges and opportunities. In this 
new context, how to achieve sustainable growth via the promotion of reform 
becomes an issue of primary importance. With these considerations in mind, this 
chapter has examined some emerging features of China’s economy in the new era, 
with an emphasis on adjustment of interest structure and reforms of non-Pareto 
improvement. The current study also discusses some policy issues regarding reforms 
and sustainable growth, which include top-level design and grassroots innovation, 
legal reforms, government restructuring, local competition and property rights 
protection. Finally, this chapter concludes that the best way for China to capture 
reform dividends is to further clarify the direction of its reform program, promote 
pragmatic reforms and restructure incentive mechanisms to mobilise the enthusiasm 
of the whole society.
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Figure 2.4 Supply-side structural reform and growth scenarios
Source: Cai and Lu (2016).
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3. China’s Macroeconomic Balancing 
Act: Shifting to New Drivers of Growth 
and Sustaining Financial Stability
Yiping Huang, Yan Shen and Qiuzi Fu
Introduction
At the National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting in early March 2017, the Chinese 
Government set its annual growth target at 6.5 per cent, a notch down from the 
actual performance of 6.7 per cent in the previous year. It vowed, however, to 
achieve better results, if possible (see Figure 3.1). In the first quarter of 2017, better 
than expected results were recorded, with growth in gross domestic product (GDP) 
reaching 6.9 per cent. High-frequency economic data, such as those on industrial 
production, trade and fixed-asset investment, also confirm that, since mid-2016, 
economic momentum has continued to improve. Analysts’ views on the economic 
outlook through 2017, however, remain divided. Some believe the economy will do 
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Figure 3.1 Quarterly GDP growth in China, 2007–16 (percentage year-on-year)
Source: CEIC Database: www.ceicdata.com.
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We are cautiously confident of the continuation of the current upswing, partly 
because some of the key drivers of the improvement in economic activity over the 
past several quarters might not be sustainable. This does not necessarily imply, 
however, that the Chinese economy will be unable to achieve its growth target. 
Across various levels, the government is especially committed to supporting growth 
in the lead-up to the 19th NPC in the third quarter of 2017. 
At both the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2016 and the recent 
NPC, policymakers set the basic tone for economic policy as ‘making progress while 
maintaining stability’. They specifically outlined three key features of macroeconomic 
policies for 2017: 1) adopting proactive fiscal policy but prudent/neutral monetary 
policy; 2) increasing exchange rate flexibility while maintaining basic exchange rate 
stability; and 3) prioritising the control and resolution of systemic financial risks.
Any bottoming out of economic growth in the near term will likely be short-lived. 
Since 2010, economists have been debating the nature of the growth slowdown. 
Some argue that it is a cyclical phenomenon, while others believe it is mainly 
a change in trend. While these assessments are certainly correct, they probably do 
not pay sufficient attention to the structural shifts that the current growth slowdown 
is making necessary, and thus could lead to inappropriate policy suggestions.
The most important cause of the current growth slowdown is a structural one: most 
of the industries that supported strong economic growth during the past several 
decades have lost competitiveness, but new industries and the forces driving them, 
such as consumption, have not developed sufficiently to carry the Chinese economy 
forward with the previous levels of momentum. In the past, two engines—export 
and investment—were the main drivers of Chinese growth, while consumption 
was relatively weak. These two engines were facilitated, respectively, by the labour-
intensive manufacturing industries along the southeast coast and the resource-based 
heavy industries in the northeast and northwest of the country. Both have since 
lost competitiveness.
In a way, China is confronting challenges today that are typical of the ‘middle-
income trap’ hypothesis. That is, prior to an economy reaching the industrial 
competitiveness frontier—or at least before momentum in that direction 
is sufficiently large—downward pressure on growth continues. During the past six 
years, economists have repeatedly forecast the bottoming out of growth in every 
quarter. But every bottoming out was followed by even slower growth—a trend that 
evidently continues.
In this chapter, we: 1) briefly forecast the performance of the Chinese economy in 
the near term; 2) estimate the scale of China’s transition towards those identified 
‘new’ drivers of growth; 3) elaborate on the risks and potential of useful policies for 
maintaining growth in the future; and 4) suggest some appropriate policy strategies.
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses 
some of the key drivers of the short-term growth outlook and concludes that, while 
some important uncertainties remain, the economy should be able to achieve its 
growth target of 6.5 per cent. The third section outlines the new-economy index 
(NEI), developed by one of the authors of this chapter, to draw some implications 
from the recent literature. In particular, the share of the new economy in the overall 
economy remains relatively small and there is a clear trade-off between the new and 
the old economies. Section four analyses the key risks facing the Chinese economy, 
especially zombie firms and systemic financial risks, followed by some policy 
recommendations in the final section. 
Cyclical versus structural factors
High-frequency official data, grassroots surveys and independent big data analyses 
agree that Chinese economic momentum picked up after mid-2016. This improved 
economic outlook was led by three factors: infrastructure investment, property 
investment and manufacturing investment (see Figure 3.2). Between March and 
August 2016, growth in infrastructure investment slowed steadily but quickly 
stabilised thereafter. Property investment also increased marginally after July 2016, 








2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Property Manufacturing Infrastructure
Figure 3.2 Monthly growth of fixed-asset investment in property, infrastructure 
and manufacturing, 2007–16 (percentage year-on-year)
Source: Wind Database: www.wind.com.cn.
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It is important to ask whether these trends are likely to continue throughout the 
year ahead. Property sales, for example, have already softened in several major cities, 
after widespread tightening policies introduced during the National Day holiday in 
2016. Interestingly, growth in property sales started to moderate from early 2016. 
Property prices, however, are far more resilient, even after the tightening policies 
were introduced (see Figure 3.3). Levels of property investment continue to do 
well in early 2017; however, if sales do not recover, it will be a matter when, not if, 










Figure 3.3 Monthly growth of property prices for groups of cities,  
2007–16 (per cent)
Source: Wind Database: www.wind.com.cn.
Improvements in manufacturing investment, especially in the private sector, come as 
something of a surprise, explained in part by the sharp turnaround of the producer price 
index (PPI). After experiencing more than 50 continuous months of negative growth, 
the PPI turned positive in September 2016 and rose to 7.8 per cent in February 2017. 
This change—heavily associated with changes in commodities markets—was likely 
driven by the Chinese Government’s efforts to reduce excess capacity, especially in 
steel and coal, and also by an improved global economic outlook. The end of deflation 
in particular has provided important support for investor confidence.
Whether or not this improvement can be sustained depends partly on transmission 
from the PPI to the consumer price index (CPI). For instance, in February 2017, 
while the PPI hit a cyclical high, the CPI stayed at 0.5 per cent (Figure 3.4). This 
led to concern that any rise in upstream industry prices could squeeze the profit 
margins of downstream industries, leading to an abrupt end to the improvement 
in manufacturing investment. Some analysts, however, believe that what happened 
in February was temporary because: 1) the CPI excluding food was in fact in the 
more healthy 2–3 per  cent range; 2) transmission from the PPI to the CPI could 
be experiencing a  time lag; and 3) broad-based improvements in manufacturing 
profitability started to emerge. 
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Figure 3.4 Monthly PPI and CPI, 2007–16 (per cent)
Source: Wind Database: www.wind.com.cn.
Despite uncertainty about the sustainability of the recovery in property and 
manufacturing investment growth, there are two important factors underpinning 
China’s growth performance in the near term. First, the growth outlook has 
brightened somewhat for most developed economies, especially the United States, 
Japan and the European Union (EU), which could induce increased demand for 
China’s exports. Second, as Chinese leaders emphasise the importance of stability 
ahead of the party congress, local governments are strongly motivated to support 
growth. Therefore, the Chinese economy will likely be able to achieve the 6.5 per 
cent growth target in 2017, even if some of the downside risks do materialise.
This otherwise benign scenario, however, may not continue for long because current 
improvements in economic momentum are being driven mainly by cyclical and not 
structural factors. During the past several years, there has been heated debate about 
the nature of the current growth slowdown, with some commentators believing it to 
be cyclical while others claim it is a long-term trend. Among the important challenges 
is the need for industrial upgrading in response to the fact that industries that 
previously supported rapid economic growth are no longer sufficiently competitive 
or generating enough demand to achieve the previous levels of growth. During 
the first three decades of its economic reform, China’s surging economic growth 
was driven by exports and capital investment. More recently, consumption levels 
have been rising relative to GDP (Figure 3.5). Before any industrial upgrading is 
complete, any bottoming out and upturn in economic activity could be short-lived. 
To some extent, this is typically reflective of the middle-income trap phenomenon.
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Figure 3.5 Consumption share of GDP, 2000–15 (per cent)
Source: CEIC Database: www.ceicdata.com.
Assessing the emergence of the ‘new’ economy
After more than three decades of rapid economic growth, China has entered the 
‘new normal’ stage in which economic growth is slowing and the earlier export-
oriented, investment-pulling growth pattern is no longer sustainable. Moreover, 
space for further export growth appears to be limited given that China’s share in 
global exports grew from 0.8 per cent in 1978 to 14 per cent in 2015, surpassing 
Germany (12.1 per cent in 1987) and Japan (9.52 per cent in 1988) at their peak 
levels. The after-tax return to capital dropped from 12 per cent before 2005 to 
4.17 per cent in 2013 (Bai et al. 2006; Bai and Zhang 2014). In parallel, labour 
costs have been increasing as the demographic dividend began to disappear from 
around 2013. From 1982 to 2000, the demographic dividend was an important 
source of growth, contributing 26.8 per cent of the growth in per capita GDP 
(Cai and Wang 2005). In terms of population structure, China is ‘ageing before 
affluence’, and the share of those aged 60 and above is projected to increase from 
10 per cent of the population in 2000 to about 30 per cent in 2050 (Cai 2010)—
increasing the burden of providing support to the elderly. 
As China’s previous sources of rapid growth become less effective, the capacity 
of the ‘new economy’ to offset this slowdown will determine whether China can 
enjoy sustainable growth from now on. China’s ongoing economic transition will 
be considered successful only if these new sectors can drive productivity increases 
and technological advancement. To better gauge the extent of China’s economic 
transition, it may be useful to measure the size of the new-economy sector and 
understand how it interacts with the traditional-economy sector. However, partly 
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because of the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes the ‘new-economy’ 
sector, official statistics cannot help us answer these questions. To fill the void, we 
have constructed an index that tracks the size and change of the new-economy 
sector in China using big data collected from the internet. 
The new-economy index
To construct the NEI, we first need to specify the scope of the new-economy sector, 
which includes both newly developed industries and upgraded existing industries. 
Based on international experience and observations about China, we define an 
industry as belonging to the new-economy sector if: 1) it is human-capital intensive, 
technology intensive and/or has a low share of fixed capital investment in its cost 
structure; and 2) its development follows the country’s industrial policies. We use 
the Industry Input–Output Table for 2010 and the Sixth Economics Census1 data 
to identify industries satisfying these standards. 
Specifically, we consider an industry to be human-capital intensive if the sum of 
income from labour and the operating surplus is more than 70 per cent of the 
value added, the average level of workers’ education is more than 12 years and 
its share of research and development (R&D) is among the top 10 per cent for 
that industry. The industrial policies we refer to include documents such as the 
Guidance for Accelerating the Development of High-Tech Service Industries, issued by 
the State Council in 2011; the Decision to Accelerate the Cultivation and Development 
of Strategic Emerging Industries, released in 2012; and Made in China 2025, released in 
2015. Ten industries are identified as belonging to the new-economy sector: energy 
conservation and environmental protection, new energy, new energy vehicles, new 
materials, new information technology (IT) and information services, recreation, 
high-tech services and R&D, biological medicine, financial and legal services and 
high-tech equipment manufacturing.2
It is not feasible to directly measure the size of the new-economy sector, as the 
official statistics do not yet measure its contribution to GDP. We instead focus on 
the share of the new-economy sector in the whole economy, and particularly its 
share of inputs. If a Cobb–Douglas production function is employed, the share of 
the new economy in total output can be calculated from the relative shares of capital, 
labour and technology, with appropriate weights. The focus of the construction then 
becomes how to measure capital, labour and technology for both the new-economy 
and the traditional-economy sectors.
1  National Bureau of Statistics of China: www.stats.gov.cn.
2  The four-digit industry code for the new-economy sector can be found in our technical report. Available from: 
mt.sohu.com/20160504/n447633738.shtml.
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As official statistics do not measure the above input factors for the two sectors 
separately, we rely on the big data obtained from the internet to accomplish this 
task. The data include information on registration for each new enterprise, patents 
and commercialisation of patents (measuring technology), millions of posts on the 
websites of major internet recruitment companies, population mobility via rail and 
air (labour), information on venture capital investment, bidding and companies listed 
on the New Third Board market (capital). After using machine-learning techniques 
to separate these inputs into the new-economy and the traditional-economy sectors, 
we construct the NEI and its capital, labour and technology subindices (for details, 
see Shen et al. 2016).3
Figure 3.6 presents the average share of new-economy industries in terms of the 
percentage of inputs that has been distributed to this sector between December 
2015 and March 2017. The three largest industries are new IT and information 
services (12 per cent), financial and legal services (6 per cent) and bio-medicine 
(3 per cent). IT and financial services have grown relatively rapidly over the years, 
so  it  is not surprising this is the largest industry in the new-economy sector. 
The  industry with the lowest share in the new-economy sector is new energy 
vehicles, which is consistent with the observation that this industry is heavily 





















Figure 3.6 NEI industries and their shares
Source: Authors’ calculations.
3  Appendix 3.1 provides the main websites from which we collected the data. 
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Can the new-economy sector outpace the 
traditional-economy sector?
We document the size of our NEI and track its relative change over time. Figure 3.7 
delivers two messages about the NEI. First, the new-economy sector accounts 
for about one-third of China’s GDP; this share increased from 31.4 per cent in 
October 2015 to 35 per cent in February and March 2016, and then fluctuated 
around 33 per cent in March 2017. Second, and worryingly, there appears to have 
been a declining trend in recent months, even though the series is too short for 
reliable seasonal adjustment. In particular, the March 2017 NEI share is 2 percentage 
points, or 6 per cent, lower than that of March 2016, indicating that the relative 
share of the new-economy sector in 2017 is lower than it was in 2016.
Figure 3.7 NEI (left-hand side) (per cent) and PMI in China
Source: Authors’ calculations.
As the NEI documents the relative share, the shrinkage of the new-economy 
sector may be due to recovery in the traditional-economy sector, the slower pace 
of growth in the new-economy sector or both. To find out whether the recovery 
of the traditional-economy sector is the main driver, we also compare the NEI 
with the official purchasing manager index (PMI) for manufacturing industries 
(Figure 3.7). The PMI is constructed based on surveys of representative firms to 
obtain information on their expectations about the economy. A PMI score lower 
than 50 indicates a pessimistic attitude towards economic prospects, and a score 
higher than 50 shows an optimistic attitude. As the firms surveyed in the PMI 
come predominantly from the traditional-economy sector, growth momentum in 
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this sector is likely driving the PMI. Figure 3.7 clearly shows that there is a negative 
relationship between the NEI and the PMI—that is, when the PMI increases, the 
NEI tends to decrease and vice versa. This is true for 14 of the 17 months for which 
we have records of the NEI.
Figure 3.7 suggests there is a trade-off between the development of the new-economy 
and the traditional-economy sectors. In particular, starting from July 2016, the 
PMI passed 50, entering the zone of optimistic attitudes towards the traditional-
economy sector. Even in the new-economy sector, there is evidence that industries 
more closely related to the traditional economy appear to attract more resources. 
Figure 3.8 plots the shares of the capital, labour and technology subindices in the 
NEI. It shows that between July 2016 and March 2017, the share of capital inputs 
has increased, but labour and technology decreased. We therefore need to carefully 
investigate whether the new-economy sector is being sacrificed to meet the short-














Figure 3.8 Capital, labour and technology subindices
Source: Authors’ calculations.
In Figure 3.9, we compare the NEI with the month-on-month growth rate of value 
added in the manufacturing industry (VAI). An interesting pattern emerges if the 
series is split into two periods: before and after July 2016. Before July 2016, the 
NEI and VAI appear to have a positive relationship; however, after July 2016, this 
relationship switches to negative. To be more specific, the correlation coefficient for 
the NEI and VAI is 0.15 before July 2016 but changes to –0.71 after that time.
















































































Figure 3.9 NEI (left-hand side) and month-on-month value-added growth rate 
(per cent)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The trends presented here suggest that recovery of the traditional economy may hurt 
the development of the new economy—something also reflected in Figure 3.10, 
in which we compare the NEI with the month-on-month growth rate of investment 
in infrastructure. Again, we observe very different patterns before and after July 2016. 
After July 2016, an increase in the infrastructure growth rate is accompanied by 
a drop in the NEI, and vice versa. Figure 3.10 indicates that when more investment 
is directed to infrastructure, fewer resources will be accessed by the new-economy 


















































































Figure 3.10 NEI (left-hand side) and month-on-month growth rate 
of infrastructure investment (per cent)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Here we have described the emergence of China’s new-economy sector and 
established an index via which to measure it. We find that the new-economy 
sector comprises about one-third of the whole economy, so it will take some time 
to replace the traditional-economy sector as the main engine for growth. From 
the comparisons of the NEI with the PMI, with VAI and with the growth rate 
of infrastructure investment, we find a disturbing phenomenon that suggests that, 
in recent months, more resources have been redirected to the traditional-economy 
sector, limiting the growth of the new-economy sector. Policymakers may need to 
carefully balance the trade-off between relying on the traditional-economy sector 
to ‘stabilise growth’ in the short run and developing the new-economy sector to 
create space for sustainable, long-run and high-quality growth. Rebalancing capital 
structure by reducing capacity in the traditional-economy sector, eliminating 
‘zombie firms’ and increasing investment in the new-economy sector could increase 
the efficiency of capital utilisation. As development in the new-economy sector 
often means exploring new business models, the market needs to be the determining 
factor in fostering the environment for that sector’s prosperity.
Rising systemic financial risks 
At the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2016, the NPC in March 
2017 and the Politburo meeting in April 2017, China’s leaders—for the first time in 
recent years—made repeated warnings about rising systemic financial risks. 
Indeed, during the past couple of years, many financial areas—from equity and 
bond markets to shadow banking, property markets, digital finance and foreign 
exchange markets—have experienced various financial risks. For example, the 
Shanghai A-share Index rose from about 2,000 in May 2014 to 4,500 in May 
2015, before dropping below 3,000 in May 2016. The average ratio of commercial 
banks’ non-performing loans (NPLs) jumped by 75 per cent during the past two 
years (Figure 3.11). Although the absolute ratio is still relatively low, many analysts 
believe that number could be significantly underestimated. The property market has 
also gone through three cycles since 2009, with each becoming increasingly violent 
(see Figure 3.3). The most recent example of financial risk is the pressure for capital 
flight and currency depreciation. The fact that financial risks rotate around different 
markets could be an important warning sign that such risks have become systemic.
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Figure 3.11 Commercial banks’ average NPL ratio (per cent)
Sources: Wind Information Company; CEIC Data Company.
To date, China remains the only major emerging market economy that has not 
experienced a serious financial crisis—probably for two reasons. First, continued 
rapid economic growth helped to subdue or hide financial risk. Second, government 
guarantees have supported investor confidence. A good example of this was that 
although the Chinese banks’ average NPL ratio probably reached 30–40 per cent at 
the height of the Asian Financial Crisis, China did not experience a banking crisis. 
With an implicit, blanket guarantee for bank deposits, depositors were not worried 
about the safety of their money even though the banks were technically insolvent. 
Therefore, the government had the time to write-off NPLs, inject capital, introduce 
strategic investors and list banks’ initial public offerings (IPOs) on domestic and 
international capital markets. Several years later, the banks were among the strongest 
in the world, in terms of both size of assets and profits.
Now, however, it will be increasingly difficult for China to maintain that no-crisis 
record. China’s current macroeconomic conditions are falling within those for 
a phenomenon the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) calls the ‘risky trinity’: 
rising leverage ratios, declining productivity and shrinking policy flexibility. On the 
first, between 2007 and 2014, China’s total non-financial borrowing as a proportion 
of GDP increased by more than 65 percentage points (Figure 3.12). Data also confirm 
China’s slowing total factor productivity (TFP) gains since 2008, with the incremental 
capital–output ratio (ICOR) rising from 3.5 in 2007 to 5.9 in 2015—implying 
declines in the efficiency of capital use, the effectiveness of stimulus policy and 
returns to investment. Finally, compared with 2007, the government’s ability to adopt 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies is now more limited. Such trends suggest 
that the government might be less able to contain financial risks than in the past.
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Figure 3.12 China’s leverage ratios (percentage of GDP)
Source: Wind Information Company.
In the meantime, financial risks have grown rapidly. Alongside a rising leverage 
ratio and falling productivity, the persistent growth slowdown and structural shifts 
have led to a significant deterioration of corporate balance sheets and produced 
large numbers of zombie firms. In a way, zombie firms have become a key source 
of China’s current economic problems: they hinder industrial upgrading, lower 
financial efficiency and increase financial risks. If we look around the country, 
industrial upgrading is progressing unevenly between regions. In the south of the 
country, where the market functions relatively effectively and entrepreneurs are 
empowered to play active roles in the economy, industrial upgrading is proceeding 
smoothly. In the north, however, where zombie firms are concentrated, industries 
are stuck in a state of excess capacity and innovation is proving extremely difficult. 
These factors are clearly reflected in the differing growth performance of individual 
provinces (Figure 3.13).
In addition, broad money supply (M2) reached 210 per cent of GDP at the end of 
2016, which is among the highest in the world. China’s relatively high M2–GDP 
ratio is partly attributable to the banks’ domination of its financial system. Any 
financial transactions are reflected in forms of money supply and borrowing. More 
important, as a result of the government’s guarantee against financial risks, there is 
a built-in acceleration mechanism for money supply: when the economy does well, 
M2 must accelerate to facilitate expansion of economic activities; and when the 
economy does not do well, M2 must also accelerate to stabilise growth and financial 
markets.














2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Guangdong Jiangsu
Liaoning Heilongjiang
Figure 3.13 Provincial GDP growth of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Liaoning 
and Heilongjiang, 2007–16 (per cent)
Source: Wind Information Company.
The combination of large volumes of liquidity and limited investment channels 
(the other side of the coin of a bank-dominated financial system) could easily be 
equated with financial instability; when large amounts of liquidity flow to a single 
market, asset prices could quickly skyrocket, followed by a bursting bubble. This 
is exactly what happened during the past few years in the equity, bond, property, 
wealth management, digital finance and foreign exchange markets. There was one 
important reason financial risks were suddenly exacerbated. In the past in China, 
as in many other countries, M2 growth always exceeded growth in narrow money 
supply (M1). However, in China from October 2015, M1 growth suddenly 
accelerated, far exceeding the pace of M2. This essentially implies a massive transfer 
of funds from term to saving deposits. Depositors, however, were no longer happy 
with low interest rates on their term deposits and wanted to make better use of their 
funds; but, because of limited investment opportunities in the domestic market, 
wherever the funds flew, there was always first a boom and then a bust.
Concluding remarks and policy implications
China’s two fundamental macroeconomic challenges today are achieving growth 
sustainability and maintaining financial stability. After more than three decades 
of remarkable economic performance, China’s GDP has moderated steadily since 
2010. Although there was an upturn in growth from late 2016, there are doubts 
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about whether and for how long it will be sustainable. China is also the only major 
emerging market economy that has not yet experienced a serious financial crisis—
but how much longer can it retain this record?
Analyses in this chapter led us to three important conclusions. First, recent 
increased economic momentum was driven mainly by cyclical factors, especially 
public infrastructure spending and investment in property and manufacturing. The 
outlook for property investment depends on future property sales, while prospects 
for manufacturing investment hinge on manufacturing profitability. There is little 
doubt, however, that China’s economy should realise its growth target in the near 
term given the combination of an improved global economic outlook and the fact 
that governments at all levels in China are strongly motivated to support growth 
ahead of the 19th party congress.
Second, the medium-term picture for China’s economy is less rosy, or at least less 
certain. The underlying cause of the slowdown in China’s economy is an incomplete 
transition to new drivers of growth; old industries that had previously supported 
China’s growth have lost competitiveness, but new industries and new drivers of 
growth are not yet sufficiently developed to carry China forward with equivalent 
momentum. The NEI discussed in this chapter suggests that the new economy 
accounts for only 30 per cent of the total economy so far, and, to some extent, 
there are clear trade-offs between the new and old economies. Recent strengthening 
of property and infrastructure investment, while supporting the near-term growth 
outlook, could actually dim the outlook in the medium term. Before the process of 
industrial upgrading is complete, any bottoming out and pick up in growth may be 
short-lived. 
Third, there has been an escalation of systemic financial risks in China recently. 
This is probably related to slow growth, high leveraging, low productivity and 
limited policy flexibility. Abundant liquidity and limited investment channels have 
exaggerated the challenge. In recent years, financial risks have rotated between and 
within different markets, including the equity, property, bonds, wealth management 
product, digital financial and foreign exchange markets. This suggests that China’s 
first financial crisis might be closer than we think.
So what should the government do? Since July 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
has advocated pushing for ‘supply-side reform’. Although interpretations of this 
are often diverse and sometimes confusing, in essence, supply-side reform means 
improving productivity instead of concentrating on cyclical demand. In 2016, the 
government identified five policy objectives that could be regarded as detailed tasks 
of supply-side reform: reducing excess capacity and housing inventory, deleveraging, 
lowering costs and overcoming bottlenecks. 
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The overall objectives of supply-side reform should be to help achieve growth 
sustainability and maintain financial stability. For the former, the key is to facilitate 
industrial upgrading—clearing out old industries and developing new ones. 
And, for the latter, the key is to control overall financial risks—eliminating old risks 
and containing new ones. 
To achieve these two goals, there are lots of policy steps the government could take. 
Of these, the most important measures should include enforcing market discipline 
and improving financial regulation.
Letting market forces play a more decisive role in resource allocation was a reform 
principle decided by the third plenum of the 18th party congress. This is especially 
important today because government controls present selective challenges to growth 
sustainability and financial stability. One of the most sticky such issues is how to deal 
with zombie firms. In past years, governments at various levels have made significant 
efforts to develop new industries. The continued presence of old industries, 
especially where these have become zombie industries, reduces the urgency and 
space for developing new industries. Moreover, zombie firms themselves generate 
many financial challenges and risks. Therefore, dealing with zombie firms should be 
a top policy priority. 
Compared with those in the 1990s, today’s zombie firms are fewer in number but 
much greater in size. Although the economy-wide effects of the exit of zombie firms 
should be much more limited now, the more localised effects on economies and 
societies could be much more damaging. For some zombie firms, which still enjoy 
competitiveness in certain areas but suffer from temporary market setbacks, measures 
such as granting shares to management, mixed ownership, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) and debt–equity swaps may be used to re-energise them. For others, which 
continuously lose money and are in old-economy industries, bankruptcy might be 
the only option. The central government should set up a special fund to help ease 
the pain of any bankruptcies in local society.
In addition, the financial regulation framework should be revamped to preserve 
financial stability, as the current system suffers from a number of problems. 
For example, regulators are not independent, so their policies are often compromised 
by other policy considerations, such as pressure for economic growth and achieving 
industrial development goals. Regulators also lack an effective coordination 
mechanism because of the segregated setup, which often leads to either repetition or 
a regulatory vacuum. Macro prudential regulation, meanwhile, remains immature 
and needs to be improved significantly to contain systemic financial risks.
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4. Internal Convergence and China’s 
Growth Potential
Yang Yao and Mengqi Wang
Introduction
Amid declining growth rates, the debate about China’s growth potential has 
re-emerged. Something overlooked in this debate, however, is the role played by 
internal convergence. China’s unprecedented growth over the past 30 years or so, 
and particularly in the years before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), has been 
concentrated in its coastal provinces, while the vast inland areas have largely lagged 
behind. By 2015, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the eastern provinces 
was 1.8 times that in the central and western regions. Shanghai, the richest province 
in China, enjoyed a per capita GDP of $15,265 in 2015, 3.5 times that of Guizhou, 
one of the poorest provinces in China. Since the GFC, growth in the eastern 
provinces has slowed, while growth in the inland provinces has picked up. Internal 
convergence could serve as a driver for the growth of China’s inland provinces.
This chapter studies how internal convergence can contribute to China’s long-run 
growth. In particular, we study three kinds of convergence: regional, efficiency 
and technological. Regional convergence is the convergence of provinces within 
China’s eastern (coastal), central (inland) and western (inland) regions, and allows 
China’s inland provinces to enjoy the advantage of backwardness to sustain a longer 
period of high-speed growth. Efficiency convergence is the convergence of the 
two inland regions towards the efficiency level maintained by the eastern region, 
and pulls inland provinces to the production frontier, so the growth rates in their 
transition paths become higher. Technological convergence is the convergence of 
the two inland regions towards the speed of technological progress achieved by the 
eastern region, and raises the inland regions’ steady-state growth rates. Technological 
convergence also increases inland regions’ growth rates in their transition paths 
because the steady-state growth rate is part of the growth rate in the transition path. 
The three kinds of convergence thus have the potential to greatly enhance China’s 
overall long-term growth.
Our analysis is organised as follows. In the next section, we introduce the 
theoretical framework of our analysis, which is based on the neoclassical growth 
model and China’s regional growth disparities. In section three, we introduce the 
data and correction methods to the growth figures reported for various provinces. 
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
68
In section four, we estimate the growth equations for each region and nationally 
and, in section five, we present our forecast for the growth potential of each region 
and for the country as a whole. Using that forecast, we then conduct several policy 
experiments as well as a counterfactual analysis to study the effects of the three kinds 
of convergence. Section six concludes the chapter.
The theoretical framework
The theoretical basis for the three types of convergence studied in this chapter is 
neoclassical growth theory. It is well known that the theory predicts conditional 
convergence among countries or regions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). Specifically, 
since countries/regions have a steady state (where growth in per capita GDP is the 
rate of technological progress), countries/regions with lower levels of per capita 
GDP (or lower levels of capital stock) should grow faster than those with higher 
levels of per capita GDP (or higher levels of capital stock). Ultimately, therefore, 
per capita GDP converges (σ-convergence). 
In reality, countries/regions may not have the same steady state, in terms of having 
the same rates of saving and technological progress in particular. Thus, income 
convergence is not realised. However, given its own steady-state growth rate, 
a  country/region nonetheless grows faster when its per capita GDP is low than 
when its per capita GDP becomes higher (so-called β-convergence). This provides 
the basis for the advantage of backwardness, which, in turn, forms the basis of the 
first kind of convergence to be examined in this chapter: regional convergence. 
In the past 20 years, China’s growth has been concentrated in its coastal provinces 
(the eastern region), while the two inland areas lagged behind. The reasons for 
this include the fact that the eastern region: 1) maintains a higher level of resource 
efficiency; and 2) has faster rates of technological progress. Eastern provinces 
are now close to their steady states, so their growth rates have declined. Inland 
provinces, however, remain at a distance from their steady states, so their growth 
rates, at least theoretically, can be high relative to those of the eastern region. If the 
inland regions can realise higher growth rates, the country as a whole can maintain 
a higher growth rate. 
The second type of convergence sees inland regions obtaining the investment 
efficiency of the eastern region, and the third type sees them reaching 
the technological progress levels of the east. To provide a more structured view of 
the three types of convergence, let us consider the following variant of the Solow 
model with technological progress.
Let a region’s production function be expressed by Equation 4.1.
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Equation 4.1
Y = (K δ)a(AL)1–a, 0 < a < 1
In Equation 4.1, K captures the stock of capital, L is the stock of labour (population), 
Y is output and a is the output elasticity of capital (so 1–a is the output elasticity 
of labour). In addition, δ is an index of the efficiency of capital utilisation and 
A is an index of a labour-augmenting technology. The efficiency of capital utilisation 
is constant and A grows at a constant rate, η. The population grows at a constant rate 
of n. L* = AL is the stock of effective labour, which has a growth rate of *̂L nh= + . 
Output per effective labour is shown as Equation 4.2.
Equation 4.2
( )* */ / ay Y L K ALd= =
Output per labour unit is therefore y = Ay*, and we can now show that in the transition 
path the growth rate of output per effective labour is shown as Equation 4.3.
Equation 4.3
( ) ( )* * ˆˆ ˆˆ 1y a K L a k nd d d hé ù= - = - - -ë û
In Equation 4.3, k = K/L is capital stock per unit of labour, so the growth rate 
of output per labour unit (or GDP per capita) in the transition path is shown as 
Equation 4.4.
Equation 4.4
( ) ( )ˆˆ 1 1y a k n ad d hé ù= - - + -ë û
In other words, the growth of GDP per capita in the transition path is derived from 
two sources. First—represented by the terms in the right-hand bracket—is growth 
of capital stock per capita adjusted by the efficiency of capital utilisation. Second, 
is the growth of the labour-augmenting technology, the rate of which is η. The two 
sources are weighted by the output elasticities of capital and labour, respectively. 
In the steady state, output per effective labour becomes constant. By Equation 4.3, 
we get Equation 4.5.
Equation 4.5
( )ˆ 1k nd d h= - +
From Equation 4.5, we in turn obtain the growth rate of GDP per capita in the 
steady state (Equation 4.6).




That is, the growth rate of GDP per capita at the steady state is equal to the 
rate of technological progress. This is the standard result of the Solow model for 
technological progress.
The above model informs our understanding of the three kinds of convergence we 
have defined. First, Equation 4.5 implies β-convergence: when per capita GDP is 
low, the rate of growth of per capita capital stock, k̂ , is large,1 as is the rate of growth 
of per capita GDP. This is what we refer to as regional convergence. The two inland 
regions still have low per capita GDP, meaning their growth rates should be higher 
when they follow their own rates of convergence than when they follow the national 
rate of convergence. In other words, regional (club) convergence could help China 
maintain a higher growth period for longer. 
Second, Equation 4.5 also explains the second kind of convergence. The equation 
informs us that a higher efficiency index, d, increases the growth rate of GDP per 
capita. To the extent that the eastern region has the highest level of investment 
efficiency, convergence of the two inland regions towards that level will increase 
their growth rates. The national growth rate will, in turn, also rise. Last, Equations 
4.5 and 4.6 tell us that a higher rate of technological progress boosts the growth rate 
of per capita GDP in the steady state as well as in the transition path. Again, because 
the eastern region has the highest rate of technological progress, convergence of the 
two inland regions towards the rate of the eastern region will increase not only their 
own growth rates, but also the national growth rate. 
Data
Data used in this study include real GDP per capita and its growth rate, alongside 
the growth rate of real investment per capita across 28 provinces2 in China and over 
the period 1984–2015. We collect the data from China Statistics Yearbooks (NBS 
1985–2016) and The Gross Domestic Product of China: 1952–1995 (NBS 1997). 
One issue when using provincial GDP data is a tendency by local governments to 
overstate growth rates. It is widely acknowledged that the published growth rates 
of almost all provinces in China have been consistently higher than the published 
national growth rate. To account for this, we adopt a method of deflation to correct 
provincial growth rates as follows. 
1  This result comes from one of the standard assumptions made by the Solow model—namely, the national saving 
rate is exogenous and constant. 
2  We leave out Tibet, Chongqing and Hainan due to missing data.
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First, we calculate the national average growth rate of real GDP among all provinces 
for each year, weighted by their shares of real GDP in the national total. Second, to 
obtain the deflator for each year, we divide this average growth rate by the national 
growth rate as published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). Third, 
we deflate each province’s growth rate in any particular year by the common deflator 
for that year. Fourth, assuming that the GDP figures of the base year (1984) were not 
inflated, we then apply the deflated growth rates to capture the ‘true’ GDP figures 
for each year thereafter. Finally, by dividing the deflated GDP by each province’s 
population, we get each province’s per capita GDP for each year.
Our study involves estimation of the growth equation, during which we will study 
only one input: the real growth rate of investment per capita. Since the NBS publishes 
only nominal figures of investment, we obtain the real growth rates of investment 
by deflating the value of investment by the price indices of fixed investment. 
Depreciation rates for investment after 1995 are from the China Statistics Yearbooks 
(NBS 1985–2016) and those before 1995 are constructed according to Zhang 
et al. (2004) and using investment data from The Gross Domestic Product of China: 
1952–1995 (NBS 1997). 
The 28 provinces are divided into three regions: eastern, central and western.3 
Summary statistics of the main variables by region are presented in Table 4.1. 
The national data are simple averages of the 28 provinces.
Table 4.1 Summary statistics
Real GDP per capita  
(RMB100)
Growth rate of real 
GDP per capita
Growth rate of real 
investment per capita
Panel A: Eastern
Observations 288 288 288
Mean 49.497 0.085 0.127 
Std deviation 45.758 0.049 0.141 
Maximum 243.329 0.227 1.384 
Minimum 4.700 –0.110 –0.244 
Panel B: Central
Observations 320 320 320
Mean 23.523 0.086 0.127 
Std deviation 20.367 0.038 0.138 
Maximum 114.853 0.198 0.973 
Minimum 2.985 –0.043 –0.370 
3  The eastern region provinces are: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and 
Guangdong; central region: Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan 
and Guangxi; western region: Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia 
and Xinjiang.
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Real GDP per capita  
(RMB100)
Growth rate of real 
GDP per capita
Growth rate of real 
investment per capita
Panel C: Western
Observations 288 288 288
Mean 18.848 0.084 0.135 
Std deviation 15.989 0.062 0.147 
Maximum 87.995 0.555 0.729 
Minimum 2.683 –0.347 –0.288 
Panel D: National
Observations 896 896 896
Mean 30.369 0.085 0.130 
Std deviation 32.840 0.050 0.142 
Maximum 243.329 0.555 1.384 
Minimum 2.683 –0.347 –0.370 
Notes: The period covered is 1984–2015. Tibet, Hainan and Chongqing are not included due to 
missing data. GDP and its growth rates are modified under the assumption that the national figures 
reported by the NBS are correct. 
Source: Original data are from NBS (1985–2016).
Figure 4.1 shows the growth of GDP per capita in each region using the modified 
GDP data. On average, the eastern region has grown faster than the two other 
regions. As a result, the economies of the country’s coastal provinces and those of its 
inland provinces have diverged. The gap between the central region and the western 
region has also grown over the years. By 2015, the per capita GDP of the eastern 
region was two times that of the central region, while per capita GDP in the western 
region was 23 per cent lower than in the central region. These contrasts provide the 
basis for this study. Since the gap is greatest between the eastern region and the other 
two regions, we will study the catch-up process of the two inland regions.
Figure 4.2 presents each region’s average growth rate of real GDP per capita and 
Figure 4.3 shows the average growth rate of real investment per capita for each 
region over the period 1984–2015. The eastern region led the growth of real GDP 
until 2007, after which it was overtaken by the two inland regions. The eastern 
region had higher rates of investment growth than the two inland regions until the 
middle of the 1990s, but much lower rates since 2000. Clearly, investment efficiency 
has been lower in the two inland regions, particularly across China’s high-growth 
period of 2001–08. This provides the basis for the potential internal convergence 
of efficiency.





























































































Figure 4.1 Real GDP per capita (RMB100 per capita)
Note: GDP per capita is measured in 1984 renminbi and is adjusted under the assumption 
that the national growth rates published by the NBS are correct. 


















































































Figure 4.2 Growth rates of real GDP per capita 
Note: The growth rates presented are adjusted under the assumption that the national growth rates 
published by the NBS are correct. 
Source: Original data from NBS (1985–2016).

















































































Figure 4.3 Growth rates of real investment per capita
Source: The growth rates of real investment are obtained by applying the price indices of fixed 
investment to the nominal investment data published by NBS (1996–2016). The price indices before 
1995 are constructed according to Zhang et al. (2004) using investment data from NBS (1997).
Estimation of the growth equations
Econometric setups
We estimate two growth equations: one to determine the conditional convergence 
of each region and the other to determine the conditional convergence of the whole 
country. Both are consistent with the theoretical model introduced in the previous 
section. The first equation assumes heterogeneous parameters for individual regions 
and takes the following specification (Equation 4.7).
Equation 4.7
In Equation 4.7, the dependent variable git is the modified annual growth rate of 
real GDP per capita for province i in year t. On the right-hand side, ln(yi,t–1) is 
log-lagged real GDP per capita, which aims to capture the convergence effect. We 
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allow for different speeds of convergence in different regions. DC and DW are two 
dummy variables representing the central and western regions, respectively. As a 
result, βE measures the speed of convergence in the eastern region and βE + βC and 
βE + βW measure, respectively, the speeds of convergence in the central and western 
regions. Next, Git is the growth rate of real investment per capita in province i in 
year t. To capture the different levels of efficiency in individual regions, we estimate 
a different coefficient for Git for each region. We expect that δE, the efficiency 
coefficient for the eastern region, is larger than that for the other two regions—that 
is, δC and δW should be negative. To measure the rate of technological progress in 
each region, we estimate a linear time trend for each. The parameters ηE, ηE + ηC and 
ηE + ηW are, respectively, the speeds of technological progress in the eastern, central 
and western regions. We expect that ηE is positive and the other two parameters, ηC 
and ηW, are negative. We also add province fixed effects to control the influences of 
unobserved province-specific and time-invariant factors. Last, εit is an independent 
and identically distributed (IID) error term.
By Equation 4.7, we can calculate the steady-state growth rate for each region. 
In the steady state, the growth rate of investment per capita is constant, as is the 
growth rate of GDP per capita. So, for any two consecutive periods, t and t – 1, 
we have the following (Equation 4.8).
Equation 4.8
In Equation 4.8,  represents the estimates for βE, βE + βC and βE + βW and  
represents the estimates for ηE, ηE + ηC and ηE + ηW. As a result, the steady-state 
growth rate, which equals ln(yj,t) – ln (yj,t–1), is shown as Equation 4.9.
Equation 4.9
This, of course, is a restatement of a result derived by the neoclassical growth model: 
the growth rate of GDP per capita in the steady state is equal to the long-term speed 
of technological progress.
To study convergence nationally, we estimate the following common-parameter 
equation (Equation 4.10).
Equation 4.10
git = α + βln(yi,t–1) + δGit + η(t – 1983) + ϕi + εit
In this specification, we assume common speeds of convergence, efficiency of 
investment and technological progress in all provinces.
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Estimation results
We report the results of Equations 4.7 and 4.10 in Table 4.2. The first three columns 
show the estimated parameters for each of the three regions in the heterogeneous-
parameter specification. The speeds of convergence in the eastern, central 
and western regions are, respectively, 8 per cent, 7.1 per cent and 7.7 per cent. 
The eastern region converges the fastest because it has the highest per capita GDP 
and is therefore closer to its steady state than the other two regions. It is interesting, 
however, to find that the western region has a higher speed of convergence than 
the central region. The western region has a lower per capita GDP than the central 
region at the  moment, so it must also have a lower per capita GDP than the 
central  region in the steady state. This is one piece of evidence that the western 
region has impediments to its long-term technological progress.
Table 4.2 Regression results
Eastern Central Western National
Ln(lagged real GDP per capita) –0.080*** –0.071*** –0.077* –0.076***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.044) (0.016)
Investment growth 0.160*** 0.141*** 0.157*** 0.154***
(0.047) (0.020) (0.032) (0.019)
Time trend 0.00613*** 0.00606*** 0.00601* 0.00606***
(0.00127) (0.00181) (0.00327) (0.00129)
Steady-state growth rate 7.66% 8.54% 7.81% 7.97%
Average province fixed effect –0.020 –0.089 –0.092 –0.056 
Constant 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.239***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
Province FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.297
Observations 896 896 896 896
* significant at 10 per cent
** significant at 5 per cent 
*** significant at 1 per cent 
Notes: This table shows the regression results of Equations 4.1 and 4.3. Columns 1–3 are results 
from Equation 4.1. Parameters are consolidated for the regions. Column 4 presents the results from 
Equation 4.4. 
A 1 percentage point increase in the rate of investment growth can bring increases 
in  the GDP growth rate of 0.16 percentage point for the eastern region, 0.141 
for the central region and 0.157 for the west. As expected, the eastern region has 
the highest level of investment efficiency, while the level of investment efficiency 
in the western region is higher than in the central region. Technological progress 
in the eastern region is the fastest, growing at 0.613 per cent each year, followed 
by the central region on 0.606 per cent and the western region on 0.601 per cent. 
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Based on Equation 4.3, we calculate the growth rate for each region in their respective 
steady states and present them in Table 4.2. We find that in their steady states, the 
eastern region would grow at 7.66 per cent, the central region at 8.54 per cent and 
the west at 7.81 per cent. These rates are high, for which we can see two reasons: the 
first is that the period studied was one of very high growth; and second is Chinese 
provinces are, on average, likely still far from reaching their steady states. Both of 
these factors can inflate the estimates of technological progress. As it is not the 
purpose of this chapter to make a forecast of China’s growth prospects, but rather to 
study how internal convergence raises China’s growth potential, attention should be 
paid to comparisons between different scenarios of convergence and not the growth 
rate levels.  
The last column of Table 4.2 presents the regression results of Equation 4.4 for the 
national average. The speed of convergence is 7.6 per cent per annum, which is 
within the range obtained for the three regions. The rate of investment contribution 
is 0.154, which is also within the range obtained for the three regions. Finally, the 
speed of technological progress is 0.606 per cent, which is the same as that for 
the central region. Because the rate of convergence is higher nationally than in the 
central region, national growth in the steady state ends lower, at 7.97 per cent.
Forecast and analysis
With the estimation results in Table 4.2, we proceed to offer a forecast for China’s 
growth potential in the period 2016–30. Our focus is not the forecast itself, but 
analysis of the effects of internal convergence. Specifically, we study three kinds of 
convergence: 1) the two inland regions converge to their own steady-state growth 
rate with the speed of convergence of the eastern region; 2) the two inland regions 
reach the investment efficiency of the eastern region; and 3) the two inland regions 
reach the speed of technological progress of the eastern region. Because the eastern 
region has faster convergence than the other two regions, regional convergence 
would lower the GDP growth rates of the other two regions. This counterfactual 
analysis thus shows that the backwardness of the two inland regions actually offers 
the potential for China to sustain higher rates of growth into the future. The second 
kind of convergence helps the inland regions reach the efficiency frontier maintained 
by the eastern region. As a result, it increases the inland regions’ growth rates in their 
transition paths towards steady states. Last, the third kind of convergence raises 
the rates of the inland regions’ long-term technological progress to the level of the 
eastern region so they would have higher GDP growth rates in their steady states. 
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The steady-state growth rates of the three regions and the whole country were 
presented in Table 4.2. Our forecasting task is to estimate the GDP growth rates in 
the transition pathways. For region j, we use the following equation to iterate our 
forecast, starting in 2016 (Equation 4.11).
Equation 4.11
In Equation 4.11, the variables with the bars are the averages for the given region, 
and the key is to forecast the average growth rate of investment.
Forecasting investment growth
China has broadly followed a unique path of high savings and high investment since 
the People’s Republic was established in 1949. But in the decade leading up to 2012, 
the saving and investment rates were particularly high, reaching above 50 per cent 
of GDP. Although in the past several years the economy has embarked on a path 
of rebalancing, China’s saving and investment rates are still high by international 
standards. This makes it difficult to use an international benchmark to forecast 
China’s future investment growth. In this chapter, we adopt the time-series analysis 
model ARIMA (2, 2) to forecast China’s investment growth rates for the period 
2016–30. Once again, our focus is not on the levels forecast; rather, the forecast 
offers a basis for us to study the effects of the three convergence types.
Our forecast adopts 2015 as the base year. Based on the observed investment growth 
rates in the period 1984–2015, we apply the ARIMA (2, 2) model to predict the 
investment growth rates of each region across the period 2016–30. The national 
forecast for each year is the weighted average of the three regions. Forecast per capita 
investment growth rates are presented in Figures 4.4a–d, alongside greater details 
listed in Appendix Table 4.A1. In all three regions, investment growth is predicted 
to pick up from 2016, but this is not what is observed that year. 
Investment growth continued to decline in 2016. Again, however, our primary 
purpose is not to obtain exact estimates for the levels of investment growth; rather, 
we are more concerned with how improvements in investment efficiency would 
sustain higher growth rates in China. The future growth rates of investment in the 
eastern region are predicted to converge to 11.7 per cent from 2022. In the central 
region, investment growth will converge to 10.9 per cent from 2027. In the western 
region, investment has grown by very high rates in recent years, but it is expected 
to quickly converge to 12.8 per cent from 2021. 
















































































































































































































Figures 4.4a–d Forecast investment growth rates
Note: The forecast for each region is done using ARIMA (2, 2) based on the data for the period 
1984–2015. The national average is the weighted average of the three regions’ growth rates.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Forecasting GDP growth
Based on the forecast investment growth rates and applying Equation 4.11, we can 
forecast future growth rates of GDP per capita for each region. We can then 
compute the national weighted average growth rates.4 These forecasts are presented 
in Figures 4.5a–d together with their corresponding historical records. Detailed 
numbers are presented in Appendix Table 4.A2. In sum, all three regions see rising 
GDP growth rates over the coming decade—mostly brought about by the predicted 
higher investment growth rates in the ensuing few years and the positive speed of 
technological progress, as reported in Table 4.2. By 2025, however, growth rates for 
the three regions will have stabilised,5 although they will still be higher than in their 
respective steady states. That is, convergence towards the steady state will not begin 
































































































































4  The population in each region is assumed to be constant from 2015 onwards.
5  The average half-life of convergence in the three regions is nine years, which is consistent with this finding.




































































































































Figures 4.5a–d Forecast growth rates of GDP per capita
Note: The forecasts are done following Equation 4.11 and the forecast investment growth rates 
reported in Figure 4.4.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Comparative analyses
As we have emphasised, our main purpose is to study the effects of the three kinds of 
convergence, which we will do in this subsection. Before this, however, we show that 
ignoring regional convergence could lead to underestimation of national growth 
potential. It amounts to making a comparison between the national growth rates 
calculated as the weighted averages of the forecast regional growth rates introduced 
above and the counterfactual in which the national growth rates are forecast by 
the estimated results of the national growth equation (Equation 4.10), the results 
of which are presented in the last column of Table 4.2. 
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Equation 4.10 assumes that all provinces share the same speed of convergence, 
have the same level of investment efficiency and converge to the same steady state. 
Subsequently, we will call estimates derived using Equation 4.10 ‘common-parameter 
estimates’. These form the counterfactual because, in reality, provinces in the three 
regions converge to different steady states at different speeds and have different levels 
of efficiency. Depending on the composition of those factors, the national growth 
rates calculated by the weighted averages of the three regions’ growth rates can be 
higher than the national growth rates forecast by the common-parameter estimates. 
Figure 4.6 shows that this is indeed the case here. The weighted-average forecast is 
1.51 percentage points higher than the common-parameter forecast. In other words, 
this illustrates that ignoring regional convergence can lead to underestimation of the 
national growth potential. There are probably two explanations for this. First, the 
eastern region is more efficient and has a higher steady-state growth rate than the 
other two regions. In the meantime, its share of national GDP is also large (about 
60 per cent). Second, the two inland provinces have slower convergence than the 



















Figure 4.6 Common-parameter estimation versus heterogeneous-parameter 
estimation
Note: The common-parameter forecast uses the results of the national regression reported in Table 
4.2 and the national investment growth rates forecast by the weighted averages of the three regions. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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We now study the effects of the first kind of convergence: regional convergence. 
We compare the central and western regions’ growth rates forecast by their respective 
growth equations with their growth rates in the counterfactual in which their speed 
of convergence catches up with the speed of convergence in the eastern region. 
The results are presented in Figures 4.7a–c, which also present a comparison with 
the national average. As expected, reaching the eastern region’s speed of convergence 
would lower the growth rates in the central and western regions. This is more 
the case in the central region than in the west because the central region has the 
lowest speed of convergence (Table 4.2). On average, the central region’s growth 
would slow by 2.7 per cent, while the western region’s growth would slow by only 
0.8 per cent. Together, this would lead to an average reduction of 0.9 per cent in 
the national growth rate, which is equal to 11.7 per cent of the average national 
growth rate of 7.7 per cent that was originally forecast for the period 2016–30. 
In other words, the lower speeds of convergence in the two inland regions that result 
from the advantage of backwardness can indeed sustain higher national growth rates 
in China.
Coming to the effects of convergence on investment efficiency, we find these are 
very small—mostly because the coefficients of investment growth for the three 
regions (Table 4.2) do not differ much. On average, the growth rate in the central 
region would be increased by only 0.1 percentage points if the region’s investment 
efficiency caught up with that of the eastern region. In addition, the investment 
growth rate in the western region would stabilise at a higher rate than that of the 
eastern region, which would cancel the efficiency gains of the latter. As a result, 
the growth rates of the western region would be almost unchanged if it obtained the 
investment efficiency of the east.
Last, we study the effects of the convergence of technological progress. Technological 
progress has cumulative effects on the growth rate in the transition path, so 
convergence towards the level of technological progress in the eastern region would 
allow the other two regions to have substantially higher rates of growth in their 
transition path (although Table 4.2 shows that the eastern region does not lead the 
other two regions by large margins). Figures 4.8a–c illustrate these results, including 
that the improvements in technological progress are substantial. On average, the 
central region would grow 4.7 percentage points faster and the west 4.8 percentage 
points. As a result, the national economy would grow an average of 2.6 percentage 
points faster. This is more than one-third of the average national growth rate 
originally forecast for the period 2016–30. Therefore, convergence of technological 
progress has by far the largest effect of the three kinds of convergence on regional 
and national growth. 






























































Speed	of	 convergence	changed Original	 forecast
c
Figures 4.7a–c Effects of regional convergence
Notes: Original forecasts are the same as those presented in Figures 4.5a–d. The counterfactual forecasts 
assume that the central and western regions adopt the speed of convergence of the eastern region.  
Source: Authors’ calculation.























































Speed	of	 tech	progress	 changed Original	 forecast
c
Figures 4.8a–c Effects of the convergence of technological progress
Note: Original forecasts are the same as those presented in Figure 4.5; the counterfactual forecasts 
assume that the central and western regions adopt the speed of technological progress of the 
eastern region.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we have estimated growth equations for China’s three geographic 
regions and for the whole country. We have found different speeds of regional 
convergence, different levels of investment efficiency and different speeds of 
technological progress in the three regions, which provide the basis for regional 
convergence, efficiency convergence and technological convergence, respectively. 
Second, our counterfactual analysis found that: 1) the advantage of backwardness 
in the two inland regions produces their lower speeds of convergence relative to the 
eastern region, which increases China’s future growth potential by 11.7 per cent; 
2)  convergence of technological progress in the two inland regions towards the 
speed of the eastern region would increase China’s growth potential by more than 
one-third; and 3) convergence of investment efficiency in the two inland regions 
towards that of the eastern region does not have a large effect on either the growth 
rate or the level of income, mainly because the eastern region’s advantages over the 
other two regions are not large.
To realise the identified gains from convergence of technological progress, the two 
inland regions should improve their policy environments and their stocks and 
quality of human capital. One challenge in achieving that goal, however, is the 
fact that China’s inland provinces are in a disadvantageous position when it comes 
to attracting talent. To that end, efforts to improve the policy environment may 
be particularly important. In addition, the provision of affordable housing, good 
education for the next generation, an amiable work environment and preferential 
taxation arrangements is probably the most important and effective measure to 
attract and retain talent.
In addition, there is potential to improve investment efficiency in all three regions. As 
measured by the incremental capital–output ratio (ICOR), however, the efficiency 
of investment in China seems to have declined since a new investment drive was 
started after the GFC. Specifically, the ICOR increased from four in the period 
2000–07 to 14 in 2015.6 Growth in infrastructure-related investment, which has low 
rates of return, could explain part of this increase, but the ICOR data suggest that 
falling investment efficiency is also likely to be a major cause. In general, China has 
been on the downside of a business cycle since 2013, and overcapacity has become 
a serious issue in several key sectors. This may also account for part of the efficiency 
decline. As China’s economy has already started to recover from that downturn, it 
is expected that the level of investment efficiency will increase in the next few years. 
Ongoing supply-side structural reforms that help reduce excess capacity and address 
the issue of zombie firms should also help improve efficiency in the economy. 
6  Authors’ calculations based on data released by NBS (various years).
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Appendix 4.1
Table 4.A1 Forecast investment growth rates
Year Eastern Central Western National
2012 0.073 0.116 0.192 0.107 
2013 0.085 0.087 0.179 0.104 
2014 0.055 0.055 0.112 0.066 
2015 0.048 0.032 0.089 0.052 
2016 0.087 0.044 0.121 0.083 
2017 0.083 0.056 0.118 0.084 
2018 0.098 0.062 0.113 0.092 
2019 0.109 0.079 0.124 0.105 
2020 0.114 0.090 0.127 0.111 
2021 0.116 0.097 0.128 0.114 
2022 0.117 0.102 0.128 0.116 
2023 0.117 0.105 0.128 0.117 
2024 0.117 0.106 0.128 0.117 
2025 0.117 0.108 0.128 0.118 
2026 0.117 0.108 0.128 0.118 
2027 0.117 0.109 0.128 0.118 
2028 0.117 0.109 0.128 0.118 
2029 0.117 0.109 0.128 0.118 
2030 0.117 0.109 0.128 0.118 
Notes: The forecast for each region is made using ARIMA (2, 2) based on data for the period  
1984–2015. The national average is the weighted average of the three regions’ growth rates.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. Adjusting to the New Domestic 
Normal and the New International 
Normal: Supply-side Structural 
Reform 2.0
Wing Thye Woo1
On the eve of the 19th party congress
The past year has been one of conflicting signals for China’s economy. Real estate 
prices in the largest cities (e.g. Beijing and Shenzhen) and in most second-tier 
cities (e.g.  Xiamen and Qingdao) have continued to soar, but the phenomenon 
of ‘ghost cities’ continues to haunt many inland and smaller cities. Excess capacity 
still plagues heavy industry (e.g. iron and cement). Together with the  large 
inventory  of  unsold houses in ghost cities, this has, however, not caused the 
proportion of non-performing bank loans to rise much.
How should one interpret the fact that the number of bank loans in the ‘special-
mention’ category (i.e. loans that have potential weakness) has increased significantly 
in the past two years? Is this caused by temporary difficulties in debt servicing that 
will disappear after cost-cutting measures by firms? Or is this development the 
outcome of the special-mention category being the hiding place for non-performing 
loans (NPLs) and a prelude to a jump in the NPL rate?
China’s trade surplus remains large and has fallen little in the past three years. The stock 
of foreign exchange reserves of the People’s Bank of China has, however, continued 
to decline. This implies that the deficit of the non–central bank component of the 
Financial Account2 is larger than the trade surplus. These symptoms suggest that the 
renminbi (RMB) has been overvalued for at least the past three years—a suspicion 
that is reinforced by the steady tightening of capital controls on outflows.
Is this massive capital outflow the result of a similarly massive loss of confidence 
in China’s future economic prospects? Or is this the result of massive flight of 
ill-gotten wealth induced by the widening of investigations in the campaign 
1  I am most grateful to Lauren Johnston for excellent editing and insightful critical review that improved this 
chapter tremendously.
2  The Financial Account is known as the Capital Account in the old terminology in balance of payments accounts. 
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against  corruption? Or is this a speculative bet against the current value of the 
renminbi? The first interpretation signals a dim economic future for China, while 
the second means a brighter economic future. The third interpretation signals 
a temporary state of affairs that could be reversed at any time by the government, 
but the economic implications (good or bad) would depend on how the government 
reduced capital outflow. 
At the same time, conflicting signals are also seen at the international level, 
and  China’s  geopolitical positioning is changing amid broader global shifts. 
The  unexpected election of Donald Trump has resulted in the United States 
withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and demanding renegotiations 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In parallel, the United 
Kingdom (UK) has voted to leave the European Union (EU), threatening the 
process of further European integration and, potentially, existing European unity. 
Partly in response to these developments, China is moving more decisively than 
ever into the role of a responsible global stakeholder. At the January 2017 meeting 
of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged his 
country’s leadership in the fight to prevent deglobalisation:
We should commit ourselves to growing an open global economy to share 
opportunities and interests through opening-up and achieve win-win outcomes. 
One should not just retreat to the harbor when encountering a storm, for this will 
never get us to the other shore of the ocean. We must redouble efforts to develop 
global connectivity to enable all countries to achieve inter-connected growth and 
share prosperity. (Xi 2017)
The Wall Street Journal reported that at the ‘One Belt, One Road’ summit in Beijing 
on 14–15 May 2017: 
Mr Xi portrayed China as a committed free trader and pledged more than 
$100  billion  in new financing and assistance for projects and countries involved 
in an updated revival of ancient Silk Road trading … Mr Xi said over the last three 
years China has invested more than $50 billion in Silk Road countries, and Chinese 
officials have branded the venture as a new form of globalization, one that is more 
inclusive and fairer than previous tides of world commerce. (Wong 2017) 
It is therefore jarring that The Wall Street Journal also carried on its website at the 
same time a video recording of Charlene Barshefsky, the former US trade negotiator 
for China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, claiming that President 
Xi had ‘stopped the process of economic reform and opening’ in China (Barshefsky 
2017). In her opinion, China has been retreating from economic liberalisation since 
2007 and President Xi has accelerated the introduction of mercantilist policies with 
programs such as those relating to ‘pillar industries’, ‘strategic emerging industries’ 
and ‘Made in China 2025’. Barshefsky described President Xi’s economic strategy 
as a ‘techno-nationalist push across-the-board’—that is, ‘an import-substitution 
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strategy’ à la Brazil of many years ago—to ‘Sinicize the Chinese economy’ with 
homemade replacements (e.g. cloud computing, integrated circuits, new materials) 
unleashed by ‘indigenous innovations’.3 Barshefsky also described China’s 
globalisation strategy as ‘a zero-sum game’ because it is focused on making sure that 
‘everyone else’s market is open’. 
How could Barshefsky have described the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative—the 
key mechanism of China’s globalisation strategy—as a zero-sum game? While 
the construction of bridges, dams and railroads in Pakistan and South-East Asia 
would certainly help alleviate the excess capacity problems in China’s heavy 
industries, it cannot be denied that the additional infrastructure will also enrich 
these neighbouring countries. Similarly, the greatly improved rail link between the 
Central Asian republics and Europe will enrich the economies of both Central Asia 
and Europe—not just China.
The above conflicting interpretations of various Chinese economic features show 
clearly that there are some deep misunderstandings about China’s economy and 
the government’s policy choices, and deep suspicions about the motives of China’s 
economic policymakers. It must be recognised that at the heart of the Xi–Barshefsky 
disagreement is the fact that the US-dominated post–World War II world order is no 
longer viable, and there is now a tussle to shape the architecture of the new framework 
within which countries conduct their affairs internally and internationally.
This chapter is an effort to clarify understanding on three issues relating to the 
Chinese  economy: the current trajectory of the economy, the policy options to 
influence that trajectory and possible additional elements to be incorporated into 
international economic relations. Our view is that for China to embark on dynamic 
sustainable development that will put the country in the ranks of the most advanced 
countries in the medium term, China must comprehensively scale up its program 
of supply-side structural reform by broadening it to include not only policy 
realignments in other domestic spheres (e.g. the socioeconomic rights of the rural 
population), but also an ambitious revamping of the institutional arrangements 
of international  governance (e.g. the nature of collective global leadership). 
Bold  implementation of the revised reform program, which we call ‘supply-side 
structural reform 2.0’, will hopefully begin on conclusion of the 19th Communist 
Party Congress in late 2017.
3  A low-key summary of Charlene Barshefsky’s speech is reported in Cheng (2017).
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The current trajectory of China’s economy
The average annual growth rate of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
period 1979–2010 was 10 per cent. After economic growth came in at 7.9 per cent 
in 2012 and 7.8 per cent in 2013, the government announced, in 2014, that 
the Chinese economy had reached a different development stage, called the ‘new 
normal’. Many analysts at that time took this to mean an implicit growth target of 
7 per cent. Growth shrank to 7.3 per cent in 2014 and remained sluggish in mid-
2015, so the government announced in late 2015 that the target growth rate for the 
next Five-Year Plan (2016–20) would be in the range of 6.5–7 per cent. Growth was 
6.9 per cent in 2015 and 6.7 per cent in 2016. 
The diagnoses by leading China experts of the cause of the steady decline in the 
growth rate since 2010 are all over the map. Naturally, their advice to China’s 
policymakers is also all over the map. Broadly speaking, the identified causes for the 
post-2010 slowdown range from temporarily insufficient aggregate demand created 
by cyclical factors to inescapable productivity collapses created by deep-seated 
structural flaws. In other words, the first key differentiating factor in competing 
diagnoses of China’s economy is the degree of optimism about the sustainability 
of the three-decade-long high growth rates up to 2010. 
Justin Lin (2016) typifies the optimistic faction of analysts when he identifies ‘external 
and cyclical factors, not some natural limit’ as the primary causes of the growth 
slowdown. He therefore urges boosting domestic demand—through ‘improvements 
in infrastructure, urbanization efforts, environmental management, and high-tech 
industries’ (Lin 2016)—to reach the official growth targets. The underlying basis 
for Lin’s optimism is his observation that the Sino–US ratio of GDP per capita (in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars) was 20 per cent in 2008, which was the 
level of the Japanese–US ratio in 1951 and the South Korean–US ratio in 1977. 
Japan and South Korea went on to grow 9.2 per cent and 7.6 per cent annually, 
respectively, for the next 20 years. Lin (2015) concludes that ‘in the 20 years after 
2008, China should have a potential growth rate of roughly 8%’.
Other notable members of the optimistic faction are Michael Spence and Fred Hu 
(2016). They feel that, despite challenges such as significant industrial overcapacity 
and  excessive credit expansion, ‘the reality is that China’s transition to a more 
innovative, consumer-driven economy is well underway. This suggests that the 
economy is experiencing a bumpy deceleration, not a meltdown.’ Importantly, 
‘bumpy’ refers to a temporary deviation from the norm. Because Spence and Hu 
choose to focus on how to moderate the bump rather than how to raise the level 
of the norm, they advise the Chinese Government to increase the transparency 
of  its decision-making and to communicate its policy decisions more effectively. 
The  defining characteristic of these optimists is that they do not mention 
(or emphasise) in their articles any specific structural or institutional reform. 
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Keyu Jin (2016a), on the other hand, is pessimistic about sustaining the high growth 
of the past because she sees the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector ‘as choking the 
private sector’ through unfair competition resulting from the preferential treatment 
given to SOEs (such as cheap land and cheap capital). Jin calls for root-and-
branch reform of the entire social system: ‘The economic reforms China needs now 
presuppose political reform … it will have to overhaul its governance system—and 
the philosophy that underpins it’ (Jin 2016a).
Like Jin, Zhang Jun (2016b) identifies ‘a far-reaching restructuring of large SOEs 
[involving the] sale or transfer of state-owned assets’ as the most effective remedy for 
the biggest threats to China’s economy. Private firms must be allowed to enter the 
‘SOE-dominated, capital-intensive, and high-end service industries’, zombie SOEs 
should be shut down and the rollback of the SOE reforms undertaken earlier by 
Zhu Rongji should be reversed. Optimally, ‘the role of SOEs needs to be once again 
limited to a few relevant sectors’ (Zhang 2016b).
Unlike Jin, however, Zhang makes no mention of sociopolitical changes as the 
required complement to economic reform. This omission highlights the fact that 
the second key differentiating factor among China analysts (besides the optimist–
pessimist divide) is the degree to which they see complementary linkages between 
political reform and economic reform.
To some segments of the Western media, the recent political developments in China 
re-concentrating power from the periphery to the centre (specifically from other 
members of the Standing Committee to President Xi), strengthening censorship of 
the domestic media and beefing up the ‘Great Firewall’ to reduce access to foreign 
websites are usually regarded as setbacks to sociopolitical progress (possibly also 
resulting in setbacks for economic progress later on). Keyu Jin (2016b), however, 
disagrees with this interpretation.
According to Jin (2016a), the reason the Chinese Government has not implemented 
necessary economic reform is because of its concern about ‘the potential for mass 
protest and civil unrest’. Jin (2016b) hails the ongoing process of amassing power in 
the hands of Xi Jinping on the grounds that the President needs greatly enhanced 
political power to be able ‘to strengthen China’. According to Jin, the situation 
is that ‘over three decades of lax governance, some local authorities have formed 
political cliques that work together to protect their illicit gains and economic 
interests’, thereby producing the present sociopolitical and economic malaise.
It must therefore be emphasised that optimism about China’s future economic 
performance is not a minority opinion. As noted, even Keyu Jin, who calls 
for sweeping sociopolitical reforms to remove deeply embedded barriers to 
socioeconomic progress, is pessimistic only about the economy at present and in 
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the short run. She is very optimistic about the inevitability of radical reforms that 
will be enacted to entrench dynamism into China’s economy (perhaps after the 
19th party congress in late 2017?). 
Another analyst embodying Lin’s optimism about the present and Jin’s optimism 
about the future is Stephan Roach (2016), who is convinced that ‘China has 
the strategy, wherewithal, and commitment to achieve a dramatic structural 
transformation into a services-based consumer society while successfully dodging 
daunting cyclical headwinds’.
On the question of whether the post-2010 growth slowdown was caused by cyclical 
factors or by a decline in the potential growth rate, one could hedge by stating that 
the slowdown was caused by both factors. While this cautious answer is likely true, 
it is not useful unless it also specifies the relative contribution of each set of causes 
to the decline in the growth rate.
Yu Yongding (2016b) states that ‘China faces two separate challenges: the long-term 
issue of a declining potential growth rate and the immediate problem of below-
potential actual growth’. Yu (2016a) therefore points out that ‘another stimulus 
package that increases aggregate demand through infrastructure investment is 
needed’. Yu adds that the ‘key will be to finance projects mainly with government 
bonds, instead of bank credit’. While this suggestion would help to prevent a future 
banking crisis created by NPLs, this additional debt servicing could contribute to a 
future fiscal crisis.4
Moreover, financial soundness is not sufficient to justify Lin’s and Yu’s enthusiastic 
endorsements for another round of macro-stimulus because policymakers should also 
consider whether there is a trade-off between short-term macroeconomic stability 
and long-term economic dynamism. Experience shows that the usual types of 
macro-stimulus (e.g. generalised monetary loosening and more investments chosen 
at the discretion of local governments) generally keep zombie firms alive, support 
disproportionate growth of the SOE sector and result in the eventual appearance of 
large excess production capacity in heavy industry (see Tan et al. 2016). 
In other words, the usual macro-stimulus in China enables more of the wasteful 
behaviour associated with the soft-budget constraint hypothesis. But, as China’s 
surplus labour diminishes and the demographic dividend fades, this type of macro-
stimulus reduces the potential growth rate of the economy, and hence accelerates 
the decline in the actual growth rate. The more frequent is the use of the usual 
4  An infrastructure project that does not generate a private rate of return high enough to cover the loan rate will 
create an NPL for the bank. An infrastructure project that does create enough (direct and indirect) revenue 
to the government to cover the servicing of the infrastructure bonds will create a fiscal crisis if it increases the 
government budget deficit substantially, necessitating large cuts in important government programs. 
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type of Chinese stimulus to keep zombie firms alive, the higher is the probability 
that China will fall into the middle-income trap, where its growth rate is not high 
enough to close the development gap between it and the advanced economies.5 
The exit of most zombie firms is a necessary condition for the long-term dynamism 
of the Chinese economy, and the key is to reduce the pain of shutting them down 
through targeted assistance to displaced workers. The right kinds of fiscal stimulus 
to accompany the tightening of the soft-budget constraint would have as their key 
components the enlargement of unemployment insurance and the expansion of job 
retraining programs. 
To avoid unemployment, China must stop using the usual types of macro-stimulus 
that maintain the status quo of output composition—for example, choosing 
infrastructure investment to reduce excess capacity in specific heavy industries and 
dispensing subsidies and loans to firms that cannot sell all the goods they produce. 
These traditional types of stimulus actually encourage such heavy industries to 
expand their production capacity. The existence of this trade-off between short-term 
macroeconomic stability and long-term economic dynamism is the reason official 
commentary on economic policies since November 2015 has overwhelmingly 
emphasised supply-side structural reform.
It is reasonable to assume that Xi Jinping has concluded that the primary cause 
of  the growth slowdown is the decline in the potential growth rate. This reading 
of Xi’s assessment is consistent with the comment of the mysterious ‘authoritative 
official’ featured on the front page of the People’s Daily on 9 May 2016, that ‘boosting 
growth by increasing leverage was like “growing a tree in the air” and that a high 
leverage ratio could lead to a financial crisis’ (Zhou 2016). The Sino–US ratio of 
GDP per capita (in PPP dollars) is about 30 per cent today, showing that there 
are still significant possibilities for large increases in China’s productivity through 
technological catch-up. So why are China’s policymakers pessimistic about the 
sustainability of high growth? 
There are two good reasons to be wary of the sustainability of the pre-2010 growth 
rate. First, there is no reason to believe that technological catch-up is an automatic 
process or even the dominant outcome. Taking the five largest Latin American 
countries as a group, their GDP per capita (in PPP dollars) was about 30 per cent 
of the US level in 1955, and it is still roughly that level today. The absolute standard 
of living has improved in Latin America, but the size of the development gap between 
it and the United States has not changed for more than 60 years. This  failure to 
catch-up is what is meant by the term ‘middle-income trap’.
5  Woo (2012) defines a catch-up index (CUI) as the ratio of the Chinese living standard to the US living standard 
(both measured in PPP dollars). The size of the development gap is 100 minus the country’s CUI value. 
A middle-income trap is the phenomenon where CUI is stuck in the 25–50 per cent range. 
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The economic stagnation of Latin America is not unique. Malaysia reached 
30 per cent of the US standard of living in 1994 and about 35 per cent in 2016, 
reducing the development gap by only 5 percentage points after 22 years. Thailand 
reached 27 per cent of the US standard living in 1994 and has been stuck there 
since. The significant growth slowdown in these two South-East Asian countries has 
resulted in people dressed in different-coloured clothes (Red Shirts versus Yellow 
Shirts) fighting each other in the streets. Such confrontations hark back to the 
political disruptions of the Brown Shirts, Black Shirts and Blue Shirts in Europe 
in the 1930s. 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are the only Asian economies of significant size 
to have rapidly narrowed their development gaps with the United States. China 
cannot simply count on the economic exceptionalism of these economies to relieve 
it of worry about losing its shirt in the middle-income trap, especially as many of its 
problems are much larger in scale and more varied and complex in nature.
The second reason for China to be cautious about the sustainability of past growth 
rates is that it is rapidly becoming an ageing society. An ageing population will 
have fewer savings (and hence will undertake less investment) and will accumulate 
human capital more slowly. An ageing society will also become one with a declining 
population, and this reduces the efficiency gains from economies of scale in 
production and from synergy-induced innovation.
It must be pointed out that some economists anticipated the post-2010 growth 
slowdown. Cai Fang (2011) pointed out that China—unlike Japan and South 
Korea—was ageing before becoming affluent, and warned that this demographic 
factor could cause China to fall into the middle-income trap.6 The abrupt drop in 
Japanese growth rates occurred in the early 1990s when the Japanese dependency 
ratio (the proportion of the population younger than 15 and older than 60 years) 
started rising sharply, after increasing very slowly in the period 1970–90. Similarly, 
South Korea’s growth rates slowed significantly after its dependency ratio bottomed 
out in 2010 and started climbing rapidly. 
China’s dependency ratio bottomed out in 2010, and its subsequent rise has been 
quite rapid although still a little slower than in Japan after 1995 and in South 
Korea after 2010. Cai Fang called for the relaxation of the one-child policy and the 
household registration (hukou) system to retard the rise of the dependency ratio via 
a higher fertility rate and to increase the labour participation rate via more rapid 
urbanisation. 
6  See Johnston et al. (2016) for a sceptical assessment of Cai’s hypothesis.
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In 2013, before the present slowdown in China’s trend growth rate was recognised 
by most analysts, Cai Fang and Lu Yang (2013) used demographically adjusted 
growth accounting to determine that the average annual potential growth rate 
would be 7.19 per cent in the period 2011–15 and 6.08 per cent in 2016–20. 
This prediction might have become reality earlier but for two reasons—the first of 
which was the frequent monetary and fiscal stimulus to keep zombie SOEs alive, 
enlarge the inventory of unoccupied housing in some regions and increase the 
demand for goods made by firms with excess capacity. The second reason is the 
implementation of some fundamental reforms such as cancellation of the one-child 
policy and further relaxation of hukou restrictions. 
Cai Fang’s work alerts us to a general methodological issue. Justin Lin had looked 
at the Japanese–US and South Korean–US ratios of GDP per capita and predicted 
continued high growth (8 per cent) for China in the next 20 years. Cai Fang studied 
the relationship between the dependency ratio and the GDP growth rate in Japan 
and South Korea and predicted a drop in China’s annual growth rate. Which is 
the right variable to pick for comparison across countries to project the trajectory 
of another variable?
The answer is that cross-country comparison is useful only when the analyst is well 
informed about the specific conditions in each country and the relative importance 
of these specific conditions to the trajectory of the variable of interest in that country. 
In short, cross-country institutional knowledge is needed to supplement standard 
economic theory to assess the relative importance of the economic mechanisms 
listed in textbooks.
Country-specific knowledge is absolutely essential because the same observed 
outcome could be produced by different factors. China might be caught in the 
middle-income trap because of the accelerated ageing of its population and the 
unusually slow process of rural–urban migration. Malaysia is in the middle-income 
trap for an entirely different set of reasons: a comprehensive ethnic preferential 
system that has spawned rampant rent-seeking, promoted massive capital flight and 
created a continuing and large brain drain; and an overly centralised administrative 
structure that suppresses local development initiatives. Thailand has also been forced 
into the middle-income trap because of the intense political conflict caused by the 
refusal of the traditional elite to accommodate new social forces. 
Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng (2016) warn that ‘the success of the structural 
rebalancing that China needs to ensure sustainable long-term growth is far from 
certain’. They believe the origin of China’s economic problems lies in the interaction 
between imperfect markets and an imperfect bureaucracy. While they do not identify 
whether the greater severity of such problems is due to increased imperfections in the 
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markets or increased imperfections in the bureaucracy, they are confident that the 
solution to today’s more difficult problems requires the government to go beyond 
structural reform to ‘institutional reform’.
The one institutional reform that Sheng and Xiao chose to mention is: 
the central and local authorities must clearly delineate property rights with regard 
to land, capital, and natural resources, and establish industrial standards and best 
practices. Such clarity is critical to curtail a surge in disputes over rights, which block 
productivity-enhancing market-oriented adjustments. (Sheng and Xiao 2016)
It would have been helpful if Sheng and Xiao had indicated how to operationalise 
their advice.
The most common way to clearly delineate property rights is to privatise state-
controlled assets; and the most common way to establish industrial standards and 
best practice in a country is to adopt standards and practices from abroad and 
carefully adapt them to ensure their effectiveness under local conditions. China’s 
approach to economic reform should continue to be based on the adage that there 
is no need to reinvent the wheel for most issues (Woo 2001). There is only the need 
to have adequate knowledge of how local conditions differ from the conditions in 
the country from which standards are borrowed so that appropriate modifications 
can be made.
What is to be done?
Framework for classifying policy challenges 
At the China Update 2010 conference, Woo (2010) compared the performance 
of China’s economy during the past three decades to a speeding car. He classified 
what could cause the car to crash (or stop) under three headings: hardware failure, 
software failure and power supply failure. 
Using the Marxist distinction between base structure and superstructure, Woo 
(2010) called the breakdown of an economic mechanism a crisis in the base structure, 
which he termed a hardware failure. Probable hardware failures include a banking 
crisis, a budget crisis and a productivity crisis. He called a crisis in the superstructure 
a software failure because it refers to a flaw in governance that creates frequent, 
widespread social disorder that disrupts economy-wide production and discourages 
private investment. Software failures usually result from not having the right 
institutional incentives to guarantee good governance—for example, technocratic 
competence in economic management and effective administrative responses to 
social concerns over severe inequality, serious corruption and political repression. 
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Woo (2010) inserted cyber-terminology into the Marxist dichotomy to create 
a comprehensive framework to capture the phenomenon of a power supply failure, 
where the economy stalls after reaching either a natural limit or an externally imposed 
limit. Examples of power supply failures are an environmental collapse, a nuclear 
war (not necessarily involving China) and a trade war. 
We will make the case that there is now a ‘new international normal’ (of which the 
election of Donald Trump is a manifestation) in which enlightened self-interest 
requires China to become a responsible stakeholder and help supply global public 
goods to meet existential global threats—that is, threats of power supply failures at 
the global level. China must help to build effective collective global leadership to 
mobilise the global community to achieve the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015. Global progress under 
the new international normal necessitates collective action to prevent power supply 
failures such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, technological stagnation and 
military confrontation.
The hardware reform agenda
At the China Update 2016 conference, Woo (2016) identified the two most likely 
types of hardware failure under the present policy regime as: 1) fiscal stress from 
having to bail out the state banks by taking over the NPLs generated by the soft-
budget constraint of SOEs; and 2) low productivity growth from the disproportionate 
expansion of the SOE sector. These two hardware failures have been mainly 
unintentional outcomes of China’s use of SOEs as instruments of macro-stimulus. 
The stimulus-through-SOEs mechanism creates a trade-off between maintenance 
of full capacity utilisation in the short run and sustaining a high rate of capacity 
expansion in the long run. 
Chinese policymakers should now replace the stimulus-through-SOEs mechanism 
with three new interrelated market-friendly macro-stabilisation tools and growth 
drivers. First, they should foster new private entrepreneurs; second, they should 
promote urbanisation according to the principles of future homeownership and 
consumer location choice; and third, they should develop a modern financial system 
in which the private sector has a greatly enhanced role. 
Foster new private entrepreneurs
In section two, we identified the taming of SOEs as the most common element 
in the  policy advice that is offered to China to raise its potential growth rate. 
This common element does not reflect ideological bias but rather the reality that 
SOEs constitute a growing burden on the economy. There should be rationalisation 
of the sector by privatising some, but not all, SOEs. There is no need to privatise most 
of the largest SOEs provided the government allows free entry into their industries 
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(with exceptions such as armaments), imposes the hard-budget constraint on both 
SOEs and private firms (no SOE bias and no crony capitalism) and practices free 
trade (with exceptions such as opium). 
The state can partly offset the contractionary effects of the shrinking state sector 
by mobilising the laid-off workers to form an entrepreneurial force. Many of these 
workers could start their own factory workshops to take advantage of the increased 
cost competitiveness in China’s inland provinces created by the explosive extension of 
the national transportation network since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
Because the primary barrier to the emergence of this group of owner-operators is 
the availability of credit, the government should legalise small and medium-sized 
private banks as they have comparative advantage over the four large state banks 
in catering to the needs of these new entrepreneurs. 
Promote urbanisation 
The second new growth-oriented macro-stabilisation instrument is urbanisation 
based on the principles of affordable future homeownership and consumer 
location choice. The prolonged rapid growth of the real estate sector and the large 
increases in housing prices reflect not just speculative demand but also genuine 
pent-up demand for housing and genuine accommodation of the rapid rate of 
the joint industrialisation–urbanisation process. The bulk of new arrivals from the 
countryside, however, do not qualify for bank mortgages, so many investors have 
been buying multiple housing units to rent to new arrivals with the intention of 
raising the rents over time in line with the income growth of the renters. In this 
sense, much of the recent housing demand has been speculative.
As financial sector development is a protracted process, efficient markets for 
mortgage loans are a long time coming. Meanwhile, China should significantly scale 
up its low-cost housing program by allowing new arrivals to the cities to rent for 
seven years and then have the first right to buy these units at a price based on the 
cost of construction. This ‘future ownership’ form of urbanisation would prevent 
the problem of empty housing being held for speculative reasons and escalating into 
NPLs. China can afford a massive public housing program because the expensive 
part of such programs in other countries is the cost of land and not the cost of the 
structures, and land in China is mostly owned by the state. 
To prevent the very real possibility of any massive low-cost housing scheme turning 
into a ghost town, the government must abandon its present practice of forcing 
real estate development to follow a preconceived (bureaucratically determined) 
distribution of city size (that is, the preconceived notion of what the proportions of 
large, medium and small cities ought to be) and a preconceived notion about what 
the absolute size of a large city should be. 
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The interaction of these two preconceived notions of urbanisation and the hukou 
system7 has produced an urbanisation strategy that favours the growth of small cities 
at the expense of the growth of large cities. Lu and Wan (2014: 674) point out that 
this anti–big cities strategy has created many abnormalities such as: 
urbanization lagging behind development and industrialization status; urban land 
expanding much faster than urban population growth; open discrimination against 
migrants; a significant proportion of urban residents being excluded from urban 
society; and serious distortions in the urban system with too many small cities and 
too few big cities.
Since 2003, the central government has increased the share of land-use quotas 
allocated to the country’s central and western regions to support their development. 
Liang et al. (2016: 70) found that this ‘relative decline in land supply in the eastern 
regions’ caused rapid growth of housing prices that were then accommodated by 
higher wages. The result of China’s pro–small cities land policy is a reduction in 
the economic competitiveness of the eastern regions. Since the eastern regions 
are advantageously located for international trade, the land policy has decreased 
China’s overall economic efficiency.
Furthermore, because ‘the large cities are not large enough’ (Lu and Wan 2014: 
671), China’s economic growth has insufficiently benefited from agglomeration 
effects. The primary agglomeration effect is human capital externality, the primary 
manifestation of which is multidimensional creativity, which, when appropriately 
harnessed, translates into efficiency gains across the board.
Gao and Lu (2015: 126) use probit models of employment determination to 
investigate the influence of city scale on employment levels. They find: 
A 1 percent increase in city scale increases one’s employment probability by between 
0.044 and 0.050 percentage points. Moreover, the scale advantage of big cities is 
heterogeneous among individuals with different levels of human capital, with the 
least-skilled workers benefiting the most.
The first reform that is necessary to support urbanisation as a driver of growth 
is to let  the locational preferences of Chinese residents determine both the size 
distribution and the absolute size of cities. The state should limit its role to linking 
cities with adequate infrastructure and to treating all cities on an equitable basis. 
For example, one way to make housing more affordable in the most desired cities is 
to allow these cities to expand in land area according to demand. 
7  The hukou system prevents mobility across locations and not just between urban and rural areas.
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The second reform to maximise the growth effects of urbanisation is to phase out 
the hukou system to allow the size and composition of the urban population to 
reach their optimum values. We will have more to say about this correction in our 
discussion of the superstructure (software) reforms below.
Develop a modern financial system 
Our third, interrelated new growth-oriented macro-tool is the true legalisation 
of privately owned financial institutions. First, the legalisation of private banks is 
fundamental to allowing the smooth working of the first two new growth drivers: 
the emergence of new dynamic entrepreneurs, and the emergence of an efficient 
mortgage market and thus a more rational pattern of urbanisation. Second, the 
legalisation of private banks is also an independent driver of growth in its own right. 
The healthy development of new private banks would of course require that 
the system of prudential supervision be strengthened and that interest rates be 
deregulated. 
The emergence of a strong small–medium banking sector will reduce the dominance 
of the state-controlled banks and hence make the economy less vulnerable to their 
collapse from potential NPLs. The entry of private banks (domestic and foreign) 
will reduce the probability of any one of the big four state banks remaining too big 
to fail, and hence reduce the soft-budget protection enjoyed by the monopoly state 
banking system. The development of a modern banking system with a major role for 
the private sector will therefore increase the quality and the quantity of bank loans. 
The replacement of the usual macro-stimulus of SOE-led investments with market-
directed investments will reduce the generation of NPLs. 
The software reform agenda
Former president Hu Jintao made the establishment of a ‘harmonious society’ the 
overarching objective of his administration. This emphasis reveals his judgement 
that the probability of a software failure is higher than the probability of a hardware 
failure because fixing the former is much more difficult.8 There are two reasons 
for the greater difficulty. First, popular expectations of administrative performance 
have risen dramatically with income growth and, more importantly, with increasing 
knowledge of the outside world. Second, successful reconfiguration of the 
administrative software requires not just highly developed political skills, but also 
favourable circumstances in the domestic political arena and a benign international 
environment—both of which are beyond the reach of most politicians. 
8  Judging from China’s passive stance at the WTO negotiations in Potsdam in 2007 and its uncooperative position 
at the climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009, power supply failure was not something that was on 
the radar screens of Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao.
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The satisfactory functioning of a market economy requires a wide array of regulatory 
institutions, ranging from straightforward administration of law and order to 
complicated legal adjudication. The lack of accountability (because of the absence 
of a mechanism for popular political competition) and the lack of transparency 
(the absence of a free press) have resulted in inefficient governance on many fronts. 
The ongoing anticorruption campaign that China has enforced since 2012 represents 
a serious attempt to improve governance.
Other important institutional reforms that should be started to enhance economic 
dynamism are reform of the hukou system and reform of rural landownership. These 
two reforms are really complementary and mutually reinforcing. The hukou system 
has created great disparities in access to public services (such as education, health 
care, public housing and social security) between cities and between urban and rural 
residents. For example, until recently, admission into almost all universities required 
lower academic scores for students who were legal residents in the towns in which 
the universities were located. This is particularly unfair to students who attend rural 
schools that are less well funded and less well staffed.
Many rural people are working in cities as residents with no hukou in these cities, 
leaving their rural residences mostly unoccupied and their rural farms untended. 
‘Permanent nonlocal labor without local Hukou has already exceeded a third of the 
total urban population in the big cities of the eastern region, and is over 50% in 
Guangdong’, according to Lu and Wan (2014: 678). Because these migrant workers 
are usually not entitled to any public services, their children normally stay in the 
rural area with aged relatives, resulting in widespread underinvestment in the human 
capital of rural children. 
The hukou system is grossly unfair as well as economically inefficient. We agree with 
the suggestion of Lu Ming and Wan Guanghua (2014: 678) that:
Hukou reforms should be simultaneously advanced on two fronts. First, the 
thresholds for nonlocal residents to obtain local urban Hukou should be gradually 
lowered. Second, steady, moderate equalization in urban–rural and interregional 
basic public services should be promoted through central fiscal transfers.
… Who should be granted local urban Hukou? The key is to give priority to those 
pursuing employment over those pursuing public services. Therefore, the criteria 
should mainly be employment and social security contribution records. One could 
use years of work and unbroken residence in one area as conditions for conferring 
Hukou. At the same time, educational level and professional qualifications should 
be removed from the list of requirements. For university graduates, their actual 
employment status, not their educational qualifications, should be used as conditions 
for entry.
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… [There should be] a series of parallel reforms in social security and public services. 
Portability of social security benefits is urgently needed, and the link between local 
Hukou and social security benefits needs to be weakened. The gap in social services 
between permanent residents with and without local Hukou should be narrowed 
through central fiscal transfers. 
Presently, rural land is collectively owned, but the right to use the land is assigned 
to individuals, usually for 30 years. When the legal status of a rural resident changes 
to ‘urban resident’, this person loses their claim to the use of the piece of rural land 
assigned to them. Because of the large-scale privatisation of collectively owned assets 
in urban areas in the 1990s, many rural residents have the expectation that rural 
land will also one day be privatised. This expectation has therefore rendered many 
rural residents reluctant to accept legal urban resident status when offered.
Land in rural areas is divided between that for residential use and that for farming 
use, and the state decides the amount of land set aside for each. The administrative 
land area of a Chinese city contains land for urban construction and rural land 
(divided into residential use and farming use), and the amount of each type of land 
is set by the state.
There are many good reasons rural land should be privatised to existing leaseholders. 
One common objection to rural land privatisation is that it will increase inequality 
because rural land in poor provinces is worth a fraction of the rural land within 
the limits of big cities in the rich provinces. This objection is facetious because 
privatisation would mean formal recognition of existing inequalities in access to 
high-value land rather than the creation of more inequality. Privatisation of urban 
housing to the existing occupants and privatisation of small state enterprises to their 
staff occurred more than 20 years ago; it is hard to find economic or moral reasons 
to continue discriminating against rural residents.
If rural land cannot be privatised, China should adopt the ‘mechanism to enable the 
trading of land usage rights’ suggested by Lu and Wan (2014: 680):
The core of our proposal is to enable long-term migrants to convert their rural 
residential land into construction-use land quotas which are then transferred to the 
city of their employment for urban expansion. The residential land at the origin is 
then restored into farmland. The migrants win as they obtain urban Hukou and 
associated benefits. The native urbanites also win because some of the gains from the 
appreciation of suburban land (as it becomes construction-use land) can be used to 
fund public services and social security for themselves as well as for new migrants. 
In fact, all parties involved will win … 
The population-inflow region’s government represents local residents in obtaining 
a portion of the land appreciation gains while the population-outflow region’s 
government also shares part of the gains as they restore abandoned residential 
land to farmland for productive use, which in turn provides revenues for funding 
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local public services to be enjoyed by those staying behind. To make this win-win 
proposal a reality, a nation-wide construction-use land quota trading system could 
be established, to maximize the gains from construction-use land usage rights while 
preserving sufficient land for farming or food security.
The policy agenda to avert power supply failures
At the China Update 2010 conference, Woo (2010) emphasised the importance of 
environmental protection in China and of harmonious international relations in 
enabling the rate of China’s economic catch-up to remain high. China’s severe air 
pollution shortens lifespans at home and in neighbouring countries, and China’s 
management of water from the Tibetan Plateau affects the economic development 
in northern versus southern China and in its southern neighbours such as India, 
Thailand and Vietnam. The win-win solutions for most types of power supply 
failures will involve both technological breakthroughs and creative international 
diplomacy. In both cases, the probability of success is greatly increased when there 
is cooperation with foreign partners. 
The global situation in 2017 requires that China doubles down on its cooperation 
with foreign actors because globalisation is now under threat and China is (arguably) 
the biggest beneficiary of globalisation. Popular dissatisfaction with different aspects 
of globalisation played an important part in the unexpected victories of the Brexit 
movement in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump in the 
United States. 
The British public could accept the free movement of goods and capital but could 
not countenance the free movement of people because of its threat to ethnic identity. 
The American white working class and white middle class in the rust belt had a lot 
to be resentful about: the loss of their manufacturing jobs to foreign imports and 
to relocation of production plants abroad, the potential dilution of their cultural 
identity by the inflow of immigrants, the venality of the US financial industry that 
caused many workers to lose their homes and savings, the unresponsiveness of the 
conservative political class to their need for assistance, the contemptuousness of 
the liberal political class towards their values relating to guns and religion and the 
blow to their national pride from the decline in the international standing of the 
United States. 
Globalisation was seen as the process that brought many of these ills to American 
shores and also as the process that strengthened many of America’s enemies. 
The deepening and widening of US interaction with China were perceived to be 
responsible for a significant part of the United States’ problems. After all, even the 
ever-reasonable Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, had 
identified surplus savings from China as one of the key factors in the meltdown 
of US financial markets in 2008. 
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Furthermore, China was also seen as the quiet ally of the seemingly mad North 
Korean regime and of the highly antagonistic Iranian theocracy, both of which 
constantly threaten the destruction of US allies. Seeking advantage from the growing 
Sino-phobia, candidate Trump promised to impose a 40 per cent tariff on Chinese 
imports and embraced the ‘America first’ economic agenda of US economist Peter 
Navarro (2015), who penned the conspiratorial tract Crouching Tiger: What China’s 
militarism means for the world.
US President Donald Trump has stayed true to many of his key campaign promises 
so far—albeit in sometimes inscrutable ways. He confronted China at the beginning 
of his term by speaking with the Taiwanese President, but he then also ended former 
president Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia by pulling the United States out of the 
TPP. Trump’s gutting of the TPP is unfortunate because it denies the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia the option of adopting the 
formally neutral position of being in both the US-led TPP and the China-led 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), effectively pushing them 
into de facto alliance with China. 
For good measure, Trump also declared the withdrawal of the United States from 
the Paris Climate Treaty, expressed strong approval for Brexit, proposed rollbacks 
of  prudential supervision of financial institutions and removed regulations on 
fossil fuel industries. Trump’s eagerness to play the ‘Ugly American’—for example, 
slamming down the phone on Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and 
building the ‘Great Wall’ that Mexico would somehow be made to pay for—has 
left the world lacking adult leadership on the provision of global public goods. 
This vacuum in global leadership is threatening to unravel globalisation.
Even though it is true that the governance of globalisation by the major powers and 
international agencies has often been incompetent and unfair in many ways, we urge 
that the rollback of globalisation be resisted because we know that globalisation-
induced socioeconomic problems can be solved without deglobalisation. Deepening 
globalisation does not require the less developed countries to fall even further under 
the thumb of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (which acted as the collector 
of Latin American debt on behalf of the US banks in the 1980s and mishandled 
the Asian Financial Crisis in the 1990s)9 nor does it require the strengthening of 
the two-decade trend in international trade agreements that favours multinational 
corporations at the expense of less developed countries (e.g. the removal of the 
adjudication of commercial disputes involving foreign investors from domestic 
courts to external private arbitration bodies).10 
9  To be fair, the IMF has learned from its mistakes and improved its performance.
10 The Investor–State Dispute Settlement Mechanism reduces the regulatory space of the host country.
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In the face of the US withdrawal from global roles, major countries in the G20, 
including China, should step up to the plate and change the governance of the 
international economy for the better, to prevent deglobalisation. We must keep in 
mind the conclusion of Charles Kindleberger in his magisterial book The World 
in Depression, 1929–1939 that the mechanism responsible for the depth and length 
of the 1929 Great Depression was deglobalisation: ‘When every country turned to 
protect its national private interest, the world public interest went down the drain, 
and with it the private interests of all’ (Kindleberger 1973: 291).
The fundamental insight in Kindleberger’s book is the hegemonic stability thesis. 
The ultimate reason the world experienced the Great Depression rather than a great 
recession, according to Kindleberger, was the absence of a benevolent hegemon 
during the period 1929–39—the absence of: 
a dominant economic power able and willing to take the interests of smaller powers 
and the operation of the larger international system into account by stabilising 
the flow  of spending through the global or at least the North Atlantic economy, 
and  doing  so by acting as a lender and consumer of last resort. (DeLong and 
Eichengreen 2012)
The essence of the hegemonic stability thesis is that whenever the global economy 
is hit by sizeable shocks, it becomes unstable unless some country intervenes to 
stabilise it. The United Kingdom played that stabilising role in the nineteenth 
century and up to 1913, but, by 1929, it had declined to middle-power status and 
no longer had the overwhelming economic power to hold back collapsing global 
demand and to mobilise others to join countervailing actions. The United States 
in 1929 was not yet big enough to be the global hegemon, but, even if it had been, 
it was not mentally willing to take on that role. It was only after World War II 
that the United States became the unchallenged global hegemon and developed the 
mindset to play that role. 
A global hegemon no longer exists in 2017 because the size of the Chinese economy 
measured in PPP dollars is now as large as the US economy. Will China emerge 
as the global hegemon in 2060 if it succeeds in catching up to the US standard of 
living by that time? The answer is no. If India maintains its present pace of economic 
catch-up, its economy in 2060 will be at least as big as China’s. In 2060, the standard 
of living in India might still be lower than in China, but the Indian population will 
be significantly larger, making India’s GDP as large as China’s.
In brief, the world from this point would no longer have a monopoly economic 
power  that could act as the global hegemon. An oligopolistic distribution of 
economic power would henceforth be the norm: China–United States–European 
Union in 2017 and India–China–United States–European Union in 2060.11 
11 The bold prediction here is that the European Union will have achieved total political integration by 2060. 
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The new international normal is a multipolar world. From the lens of the hegemonic 
stability thesis, this is a terrible development because a leaderless world is prone to 
adopting self-defeating protectionism. The world is now facing the challenge of 
Karl Marx’s (1852) observation that ‘History repeats itself, first as tragedy and then 
as farce’.
The most common outcome in a situation of oligopolistic distribution of power is 
the division of the world into spheres of influence because of the security concerns 
of each major power. The present squabbles in Ukraine and the South China Sea 
could be the beginning of this process. However, it could be a mistake to see the 
future as a replay of the past; it would certainly signal a lack of imagination if we 
were to do so.
With the right regional arrangements and interregional agreements in place to address 
the security concerns of each major power, a new form of benign globalisation could 
emerge. The sphere of influence of each major power could become a geographical 
cluster for economic development and not a geographical cluster for economic 
exploitation (as between Africa and Europe in the first half of the twentieth century) 
or a geographical cluster for political domination (as between Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century). Given the existence 
of economies of scale in production, every geographical cluster must practise open 
regionalism to maximise economic prosperity. Existing global institutions such as 
the United Nations and its agencies, the World Bank, the IMF and the G20 will have 
the additional task of regional coordination to ensure global economic integration. 
Each major power would be the chief funder of economic institutions in its own 
cluster—for example, the European Stabilisation Fund, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Inter-American Development Bank. The existence 
of competing/complementary regional institutions means there are multiple 
independent analytical centres in the world instead of a monopoly international 
financial institution and a monopoly international development bank. This outcome 
would minimise the possibility of wrong diagnoses and/or the wrong prescriptions, 
avoiding a repeat of the mistakes made by the IMF and the World Bank in the past.
As China will continue to grow in relative size, it can play an important role in 
making collective leadership for global governance successful and in fostering the 
creation of these clusters for economic development. China’s engagement with its 
neighbours through the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, the AIIB and the RCEP 
is very much in line with a multipolar world in which each development-oriented 
cluster practises open regionalism.12 However, for globalisation to deepen and 
widen, China must take greater leadership in the supply of global public goods such 
as fighting climate change and species extinction, stopping nuclear proliferation 
12 For a good recent discussion of the foreign aid practices of China, see Johnston and Rudyak (2016).
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and international terrorism, stabilising the international monetary system by 
internationalising the RMB to broaden the choice of reserve currencies to reduce 
currency risks from globalisation, and getting the world to agree to a worldwide 
minimum tax rate on capital to prevent a race to the bottom in financing social 
safety nets.
The new international normal of a multipolar world would necessarily mean the 
political and economic fragmentation of the post–World War II global order. There 
is, however, good fragmentation as well as bad fragmentation. Good fragmentation 
protects globalisation in a setting of effective collective leadership and bad 
fragmentation is the situation in which Kindleberger’s hegemonic stability thesis 
applies and Marx’s dictum on repetitive history rules.
Final remarks
China has now achieved middle-income status through the marketisation and 
internationalisation of its economy. The internal economic conditions in China 
have also changed: the supply of surplus labour is exhausted, the demographic 
dividend is ending, and the natural environment is under severe stress. This outcome 
creates a new domestic normal that requires the creation of reform dividends to 
drive growth. Specifically, China must undertake: 1) structural reform of economic 
mechanisms such as rationalising the SOE sector and deregulating the markets 
for capital, labour and land; 2) structural reform of governance institutions such 
as administrative accountability, the hukou system and rural landownership; and 
3) structural reform of institutional incentives to protect the environment. These 
three sets of reform measures in response to the new domestic normal comprise 
what we call ‘supply-side structural reform 1.0’.
At the same time, the global picture that China faces has changed, and this change 
is part of China’s making. The architecture of global governance that rested on the 
hegemonic stability provided by the United States is crumbling because China’s 
rise has ended the days when the US had such overwhelming economic power that 
it could impose order on economic dwarfs. The inevitable emergence of India as 
a global superpower guarantees that hegemonic stability will stay in the garbage bin 
of history. A multipolar world is now the new international normal.
Having helped bury hegemonic stability, China must now help make collective 
global leadership work by expanding Hu Jintao’s concept of a harmonious society 
to the concept of a harmonious world. Out of enlightened self-interest, China 
must help mobilise the world to work together to protect the global environmental 
commons, the global trading system and global security; and to promote continued 
globalisation to maximise the synergy for global progress created by interaction. 
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Finally, the 1992 nanxun-inspired13 economic strategy that has so impressively 
transformed China for the better is no longer adequate because China today faces 
a new set of domestic conditions (the new domestic normal) and a new set of 
international challenges (the new international normal). For China to avoid the 
middle-income trap, it must now take a path of dynamic sustainable development 
to continue the process of economic catch-up. In this chapter, we have provided 
a sketch of such a strategy under the new domestic normal and the new international 
normal, which we call supply-side structural reform 2.0. 
Chinese and world socioeconomic progress, as well as the necessity for 
environmental  protection, require decisive reforms in both the structure of 
domestic incentives14 that determines domestic production, and in the structure 
of international governance15 that determines the provision of global public goods.16
In a multipolar world, the business-as-usual outcome is the partition of the world 
into competing spheres of influence where deglobalisation is the by-product. 
However, if enlightened self-interests prevail in the major countries, the outcome 
will instead be geographical clusters for sustainable economic development based on 
the principle of open regionalism. The world is likely to be now at the critical point 
where each of the major powers is choosing either to be enlightened enough to act 
according to its long-term interests or to be cynical and continue to play the usual 
zero-sum realpolitik game. The outcome of benign globalisation in a multipolar 
world need not be a dream.
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6. Educating ‘the Masses’ in China: 
Unequal Opportunities and Unequal 
Outcomes 
Jane Golley and Sherry Tao Kong
Introduction
Following a staggering growth rate of 10 per cent per annum between 1979 
and 2010,  China’s growth has steadily decelerated over the past five years, from 
7.9 per cent in 2012 to 6.7 per cent in 2016. Yet it remains by far the fastest-growing 
major economy in the world. In the decades ahead, China aims to sustain its progress 
of development and to advance from middle-income to high-income status by mid-
century. The road towards this ambitious goal is mapped out by a comprehensive 
reform plan, geared towards switching from a reliance on an abundance of cheap 
labour to a more innovative, skilled workforce. The success of this transition will 
require concerted effort on various fronts, among which significant improvements 
in human capital will be critical. 
Compared with the high-income-country group that China aspires to join, the 
education level of China’s current labour force is shockingly poor. As of 2010, 
the  share  of China’s labour force that had ever attended senior high school 
(24  per  cent)  is less than one-third of the average upper secondary attainment 
rate in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries (Khor et al. 2016). Moreover, as this chapter will demonstrate, there is 
a substantial degree of inequality of educational opportunity across China’s cities 
and countryside, as well as across a number of other dimensions. While successive 
generations of  Chinese children are better educated than their parents, these 
unequal opportunities will constrain the country’s human capital potential in the 
decades ahead.
Inequality of opportunity in education (or in any other measure of economic 
‘advantage’) is quite distinct from inequality in educational outcomes. In particular, 
while there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes the ‘optimal’ or ‘ideal’ level 
of inequality in outcomes, there is broad consensus that inequality resulting from 
unequal ‘effort’ is ethically acceptable, while inequality resulting from unequal 
‘circumstances’ or opportunities—which lie beyond the control of an individual—
is not. 
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A rapidly growing literature has used this idea as the basis for measuring the extent 
of inequality of opportunity for a range of economic outcomes—including per capita 
income, earnings, wealth, consumption and health—in a wide range of countries, 
confirming that the ideal of equality of opportunity is by far the exception, not 
the rule. Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), for example, in their analysis of six Latin 
American countries, find that the share of inequality of opportunity in outcome 
inequality is substantial, ranging from 23 per cent in Colombia to 34 per cent in 
Guatemala for household per capita income. Zhang and Eriksson (2010) likewise 
find a very high share of inequality of opportunity in individual income inequality 
in China—increasing steadily from 46 per cent in 1989 to 63 per cent in 2006. 
These papers identify a range of ‘circumstances’ that contribute to inequality of 
opportunity, with one’s place of birth, gender and parental education levels almost 
always playing significant roles.
In this chapter, we take it as given that equality of opportunity—as opposed 
to equality of outcomes—has indisputable merit, and set out to examine the extent 
to which the educational outcomes of Chinese citizens born between 1940 and 
1989 diverge from this ideal. For a country intent on raising the level of human 
capital to support productivity, growth and a higher value-added economy in the 
future, equality of opportunity seems like a very good place to start. 
The next section introduces the methodology used to calculate inequality of 
opportunity and identifies the set of ‘circumstance’ variables that we use to measure 
this in the case of China’s educational attainment (measured in years of schooling), 
using the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) surveys for 2010 and 2012. 
The following section confirms the importance of these variables using regressions 
for the nationwide sample, and separately for the urban and rural samples, as 
a  way of assessing the unequal opportunities not only between urban and rural 
populations, but also within them. We then present the key empirical results 
regarding inequality of opportunity in education in China, before concluding with 
some policy implications.
Measuring ‘inequality of opportunity’
Method
Attempts to measure ‘inequality of opportunity’ begin with the premise that the 
observed inequality in any particular economic outcome can be attributed to two 
components. The first component derives from the different circumstances in which 
individuals find themselves and over which they have no control—for example, 
their gender, place of birth or the socioeconomic status of their parents. The second 
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derives from the different levels of effort that individuals may exert to influence 
a given outcome—for example, how hard they study. This distinction has long been 
recognised as critical for assessing the extent to which equal opportunity does or 
does not prevail. 
In his seminal paper, Roemer (1998) defines equality of opportunity as a situation 
in which the distribution of a given outcome is independent of circumstances or, 
in other words, that all individuals who exert the same effort would achieve the same 
outcome, regardless of their circumstances. Partitioning the population into groups 
or ‘types’ of people with identical circumstances and measuring the extent to which 
this condition is not satisfied provide one measure of inequality of opportunity. 
An alternative, weaker criterion for equality of opportunity is that the mean outcome 
levels—rather than the entire distributions—are identical across types, as proposed 
by Van de Gaer (1993). This criterion involves suppressing ‘intra-type’ inequality 
and calculating the extent of ‘between-type’ inequality based on the mean levels for 
each type as a measure of inequality of opportunity. 
These ideas have been developed and applied in a burgeoning empirical literature 
that adopts a range of methods to measure the degree of inequality of opportunity 
in a range of countries and for a range of different outcomes.1 Here, we follow 
the methodology of Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), which has emerged as the most 
common approach,2 adapting it to suit our economic advantage of interest: years 
of education. 
In particular, we begin with a stylised model of advantage (here, years of schooling) 
of  the form y = f (C, E, u), where C is a vector of circumstance variables, E is 
a vector of  effort variables and u represents random unobserved variables. While 
circumstances are exogenous by definition (that is, they cannot be influenced by 
any actions of the individual), it is likely that effort will be influenced by a range 
of factors, including circumstances.3 This implies that the model is more accurately 
expressed as y = f (C, E (C, v), u). For a number of reasons, touched on further below 
(and expanded on at length in Ferreira and Gignoux 2011), we choose to treat effort 
as unobserved and estimate the reduced-form regression (Equation 6.1). 
Equation 6.1
yi = βCi + ε
1  For alternative approaches, see Checchi and Peragine (2010); Lefranc et al. (2008); Bourguignon et al. (2007). 
2  For some key examples, see the survey by Brunori et al. (2013); also Bourguignon et al. (2007); Marrero and 
Rodríguez (2012); Singh (2012). For a more detailed discussion, see Golley and Kong (in press).
3  For example, it could be the case that less-educated rural parents place less pressure on their children to study 
hard, encouraging them instead to leave school early because of the financial burden and opportunity cost of 
keeping them in school. Yi et al. (2012) provide some evidence of this in their analysis of why students in poor 
rural areas in China are failing to complete junior high (using a survey of 7,800 students in 2009 and 2010). 
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In Equation 6.1, yi is the years of schooling attained by individual i, and Ci is 
a  vector of  discrete circumstance variables pertaining to that individual, which 
allows a partition into types as described above. For example, if there were just 
two circumstance variables—gender and hukou (household registration) status—
there would be a total of four ‘types’: rural boys, rural girls, urban boys and urban 
girls. Using the estimated coefficients, , and the actual values of circumstances, 
we construct a distribution, , in which . That is, y is replaced with its 
prediction, given the vector of circumstances, which is identical for all individuals in 
any given type, thus eliminating all intra-group inequality. This gives us an absolute 
scalar measure of inequality of opportunity, . The corresponding 
relative measure, , determines inequality of opportunity as a share 
of total inequality, for an appropriate inequality measure, I.
Only certain indexes of inequality satisfy the critical property of additive 
decomposability that enables total inequality to be decomposed into its between-
type and intra-type components—including the generalised entropy class, but not 
the Gini coefficient. Neither GE(0) (mean log deviation) nor GE(1) (the Theil 
entropy index) is an option for measuring inequality in educational outcomes 
as they both involve log values and there are many individuals with no years of 
schooling (which is not the case in the more standard analyses focused on earnings 
or consumption). This leaves GE(2), half the coefficient of variation, as the best 
scalar measure of inequality, which we use below.
We are also interested in the partial contributions of each of the circumstance 
variables. To assess these, we produce a counterfactual distribution, ,   where 
, which assigns the mean level of circumstance J to all 
individuals, one circumstance at a time. Note that the corresponding partial 
measures of both the absolute and the relative inequality of opportunity—the latter 
being —will be lower for a variable that has a larger impact 
on inequality of opportunity. That is, by eliminating the variation in that variable, 
inequality of opportunity will fall by a greater amount.
Whatever the number of circumstance variables included in the regression above, 
an important property of the estimates for IOA and IOR is that they are lower-
bound estimates of inequality of opportunity.4 This is because the vector of observed 
circumstances will necessarily be a subset of all relevant circumstances that impact 
on individual outcomes, with the implication that the estimates for IOA and IOR 
would be higher if unobserved circumstances were added to the vector C. This 
lower-bound result, however, applies only to the overall measures of IOA and IOR. 
In particular, excessive weighting will be attributed to an observable circumstance if 
4  For a formal proof, see Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).
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it is correlated with an unobservable or omitted one. In this case,  will still provide a 
reasonable measure of all the factors that are linked to the observable circumstances, 
but it means that the partial estimates, IORP, should be treated with caution. 
Our decision to treat effort as unobserved is for both practical and logical reasons. 
We can think of only one variable—hours of study—that could possibly be 
classified as effort when educational attainment is the outcome of interest, and 
which is necessarily omitted, as it is not recorded in the survey data utilised below. 
Whether this is treated as an omitted ‘effort’ variable or an omitted ‘circumstance’ 
variable, however, the implications are the same. In particular, either it has no 
correlation with the observed circumstance variables, in which case its omission 
will not impact on the inequality of opportunity estimates, or it is itself impacted 
by observed circumstances, in which case this impact will be indirectly incorporated 
into the estimated coefficients. While this again points to the need for caution in 
interpreting the regression coefficients as causal links between a given circumstance 
and the outcome, it is not critical to the measurement of inequality of opportunity, 
which is the primary concern of this chapter. For a more in-depth discussion on this 
point, see Golley and Kong (in press).
Which circumstances matter?
Throughout the era of the People’s Republic, China has achieved remarkable advances 
in expanding its education system and raising the average level of education achieved 
by its vast population. However, these advances have also resulted in significant 
educational inequalities along a number of dimensions. 
The most prominent dimension of these inequalities is the rural–urban divide, which 
was solidified by the introduction of the hukou system of household registration in 
the late 1950s, and which effectively divided—and continues to divide—Chinese 
citizens into two distinct groups, with starkly different access to China’s expanding 
education system. An extensive literature has documented the persistent gap 
in educational attainments between urban and rural China since this time, with 
weaknesses in the rural education system reflected in higher dropout rates and 
lower participation at every level of the system, from preschool through to college 
(see Qiao 2008; Wang et al. 2009; Golley and Kong 2012, 2013; Knight et al. 2012; 
Yi et al. 2012; Wu 2013; Li et al. 2015). 
Another critical dimension of educational inequality in China—and in a large 
number of other countries as well—stems from intergenerational persistence in 
educational attainment.5 An ongoing debate centres on the extent to which this 
5  See, in particular, Hertz et al.’s (2007) study of 50-year time trends in 42 countries, and also Checchi et al. 
(2008) and Black and Devereux (2010).
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observed persistence is directly causal (for example, the likelihood that better-educated 
parents may have greater intellectual capacity because of their own education, rather 
than because of their innate ability, to invest in educating their children) as opposed 
to indirectly causal (for example, due to higher genetic intelligence or the greater 
financial capacity of parents with higher incomes to invest in higher-quality schools) 
(Black and Devereux 2010). The reason for persistence is not central to the analysis 
here. Suffice to say that, in its presence, children with better-educated parents find 
themselves in a relatively enviable circumstance with regard to their prospects, or 
opportunities, for educational advancement. There is ample evidence to suggest that 
this is the case in China (see Golley and Kong 2012, 2013; Knight et al. 2012).
The observed persistence in educational attainment across generations feeds into 
the importance of family origin or socioeconomic status more generally, which has 
been shown to be of particular significance in China during both the Maoist era 
(see, for example, Deng and Treiman 1997; Meng and Gregory 2002; Sato and 
Li 2008) and beyond. A wealth of evidence concurs that during the reform era, 
the educational advantages of the ‘dominant’ or higher socioeconomic classes—
whether measured in terms of parents’ class origins, Communist Party membership, 
educational levels, occupations or incomes—have been restored and strengthened, 
with educational inequalities increasing as a result.6 
The literature reveals a number of other dimensions that have contributed to 
a widening gap between the most and the least advantaged members of society: 
across regions, provinces and counties (with children in richer areas achieving higher 
education levels on average) (Hannum and Wang 2006; Heckmann 2005; Zhang 
and Kanbur 2005),  between different ethnic groups (Hannum 2002) (with Han 
Chinese maintaining their traditional lead), between genders (Zhang et al. 2007; 
Zhang and Chen 2014) (with girls being out-educated by boys across all educational 
levels at nearly all points in time) and between children from families of varying 
size—invoking Becker and Lewis’s (1973) ‘quantity–quality trade-off’ (see Li et al. 
2008; Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009). 
Crucially, all the dimensions identified above are essentially ‘circumstances’ into 
which each individual is born, rather than facing by choice: their hukou status 
(in childhood), father’s education, parents’ socioeconomic status, province of birth, 
ethnicity, gender and the number of siblings they have all fall into this category.
We use the CFPS survey, which is a nationally representative biannual longitudinal 
survey of Chinese communities, families and individuals produced by the Institute 
of Social Science Survey (ISSS) of Peking University. The CFPS collects individual, 
family and community-level longitudinal data covering a wide range of economic 
6  For a few of the countless examples, see: Zhou et al. (1998); Liu (2006); Sato and Li (2008); Wu (2009); Emran 
and Sun (2015); Zhang and Chen (2014).
6. Educating ‘the Masses’ in China
123
activities, education outcomes, family dynamics and relationships, migration 
and health. In the 2010 baseline survey, the CFPS successfully interviewed 
14,960 households and 42,590 individuals, with an approximate response rate of 
79 per cent. Respondents are tracked through annual follow-up surveys, and we draw 
on the 2012 survey to take advantage of the supplementary parental information 
that is missing from the 2010 baseline dataset. 
Given the available data, we select the following set of circumstance variables: father’s 
education level, for which we use three dummy variables—primary school, junior 
high and senior high and above (with illiteracy as the fourth, excluded category); 
hukou status at age 12 (urban = 1); gender (male = 1); parents’ Communist Party 
membership (= 1 if either parent is a member); number of siblings (dummy 
variables for one or two siblings and three or more siblings, with only children as 
the third, excluded category); ethnic minority status (= 1 if Han Chinese, 0 for 
others); and province (with Beijing as the excluded category). To account for the 
significant variation in educational policies and outcomes over time, we also include 
dummy variables for each of 10 five-year birth cohorts, from 1940–44 through to 
1985–89, before running separate regressions for each of these cohorts. We further 
investigate the determinants of educational outcomes—and the sources of inequality 
of opportunity—within the rural and urban subsamples.
Due to data limitations, we do not include parental income or occupation, which, 
along with education levels, are indicators of socioeconomic status. We also exclude 
mother’s education level because of the high degree of ‘marriage matching’ observed 
in China, and hence the high correlation between parents’ education levels (Knight 
et al. 2012). These variables are hence treated as omitted circumstance variables, 
which, if correlated with the included variables, will bias their estimated coefficients. 
This seems most likely for father’s education. While this means we need to be careful 
interpreting the coefficients on the fathers’ education dummies, it is not problematic 
for our estimate of inequality of opportunity; it just means that it is a lower-bound 
result, as discussed above. 
Some preliminary statistics for these variables are shown in Table 6.1. This confirms 
the educational gaps between each of the circumstance variables across the entire 
national sample, and within the urban and rural samples as well. Not surprisingly, 
average years of schooling are higher for urban children, boys, Han Chinese, 
only children and children with parents who are Communist Party members. 
One final point worth noting is that our classification of rural or urban based on 
hukou status ‘at the age of 12’ means that virtually all migrants remain ‘rural’ in the 
analysis here, with the rural sample accounting for 84 per cent of the total. This is 
indicative of just how rapid urbanisation has been in recent decades, given a 2013 
split of 36–64 per cent for urban and rural hukou holders, respectively, and an even 
greater share of the population actually living in urban areas, at 54 per cent. 
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Table 6.1 Preliminary statistics
Education (%) Nationwide Urban Rural
Illiterate 22.7 3.7 26.6
Primary school 20.8 6.0 23.8
Junior high school 32.0 29.4 32.5
Senior high school 13.8 28.5 10.8
College and above 10.8 32.4 6.4
Average schooling (years) 7.4 11.5 6.6
Male (YES = 1, %) 51.3 51.4 51.2
Male average schooling (years) 8.1 11.6 7.4
Female average schooling (years) 6.7 11.4 5.8
Father’s education (%)
Illiterate (no schooling) 44.9 22.3 49.4
Primary school 27.4 26.0 27.7
Junior high school 16.8 23.9 15.4
Senior high school 8.6 18.3 6.6
College and above 2.4 9.6 0.9
Father’s average schooling (years) 4.5 7.3 3.9
Parents party member (YES = 1, %) 12.9 22.2 11.1
Party member average schooling (years) 9.0 12.4 7.7
Non-party member average schooling (years) 7.2 11.2 6.5
Family size (%)
Only child 8.9 23.0 6.0
One or two siblings 40.5 43.2 40.0
Three or more siblings 50.6 33.9 54.0
Only child average schooling (years) 10.0 13.3 7.4
One or two siblings average schooling (years) 8.4 11.7 7.8
Three or more siblings average schooling (years) 6.2 10.1 5.7
Han Chinese (YES = 1, %) 89.3 94.4 88.4
Han average schooling (years) 7.7 11.4 6.9
Minority average schooling (years) 5.4 12.1 4.7
No. of observations 25,937 4,364 21,573
Note: All figures are weighted by CFPS sample weights to be nationally representative.
Sources: CFPS (2010, 2012).
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Unequal educational outcomes and their 
determinants
Before presenting the inequality of opportunity results, this section presents 
a general picture of trends in educational outcomes across birth cohorts, and their 
determinants. Figure 6.1 illustrates the rise in average years of schooling attained 
by successive generations in China, from just 3.9 years for the oldest cohort to 
10.1 years for the youngest one nationwide, with children in each cohort being ‘out-
educated’ compared with their parents by a large margin. While these average gains 
are impressive, the figure also shows the persistent gap between the rural and urban 
populations, peaking at 5.6 years for the 1950–54 cohort and with still a substantial 

































































Figure 6.1 Years of schooling across two generations, 1940–89
Sources: CFPS (2010, 2012) and authors’ calculations.
The distributions of educational outcomes for the urban and rural populations are 
illustrated in Figures 6.2a and 6.2b, respectively. For the urban population, the most 
striking increase has been at the college level, accounting for just 11 per cent of the 
1940–44 cohort compared with 61 per cent of the 1985–89 cohort. The reduction 
in  the urban shares of people either receiving no education (i.e. illiterate) or 
completing only primary school also stands out, falling from 25 per  cent and 
24 per cent to 1.7 per cent and 2.1 per cent, respectively, from the oldest to the 
youngest cohort. 

































































Figure 6.2a Educational attainment, urban China (per cent)































































Figure 6.2b Educational attainment, rural China (per cent)
Sources: CFPS (2010, 2012) and authors’ calculations.
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For the rural population, the most dramatic change is the reduction in illiteracy, 
declining from a peak of 54 per cent of the 1945–49 cohort to 7.5 per cent of the 
youngest cohort. Until the 1960s cohorts, the share of those completing college 
remained below 4 per cent, increasing substantially since then but still remarkably 
lower than the equivalent urban share, at just 16.8 per cent for the 1985–89 cohort. 
As discussed at length in an earlier China Update book (Golley and Kong 2012), 
the dominant educational attainment in rural China is junior high, remaining at 
42 per cent for the youngest cohort. 
Table 6.2 presents our chosen measure of inequality in educational outcomes, 
GE(2), for the national, urban and rural samples (in Column 1) and for each of 
the 10 five-year cohorts (also illustrated in Figure 6.3). Panel A reveals the overall 
downward trend in nationwide outcome inequality beginning with the 1945–49 
cohort, with the only increase coming between the 1960–64 and 1965–69 cohorts. 
These trends broadly mirror the rural ones in Panel C—which is to be expected 
given the dominance of people classified as rural in the sample—and are notably 
higher than the urban measures for all cohorts. The urban measures in Panel B reveal 
a steady decline through to the 1960–64 cohort, fluctuating at low levels thereafter. 
For comparative purposes, Table 6.2 also presents the Gini coefficients as an 
alternative measure of outcome inequality,7 and one that is more easily interpreted. 
Importantly, the trends across birth cohorts are the same as those for GE(2) in all 
three panels, and the values for the rural sample are consistently and substantially 
higher than those for the urban sample, with values lying between 0.09 for the 
youngest urban cohort and 0.59 for the 1945–49 rural cohort. The key point 
here is that the distributions of rural and urban educational outcomes—whether 
described in terms of the population shares in each education level or summarised 
as a scalar inequality measure—are significantly different from each other and vary 
substantially across birth cohorts. 
A further point worth noting is that while lower inequality in the urban sample 
is coupled with higher educational outcomes, this need not necessarily be the 
case. For example, a Gini of zero would be recorded if all individuals had identical 
educational outcomes, whether that was illiteracy or college-level education, while 
if one individual held a PhD, or indeed any positive level of schooling, and the rest 
of the population was illiterate, the Gini would be one. In this sense, it is impossible 
to say categorically that any particular level of outcome inequality is better or worse 
than another. This is what makes measures of inequality of opportunity so valuable, 
as they reflect the part of inequality that is, quite simply, unjust.
7  The Gini coefficient’s lack of additive decomposability is not problematic for examining total inequality 
of outcome; it just means that it cannot be used for the decomposition exercise below. 




























































































































































































































































































Figure 6.3 Inequality of educational outcomes by cohort
Sources: CFPS (2010, 2012) and authors’ calculations.
Table 6.3 presents the results of the regressions based on Equation 6.1, conducted 
for the national sample, and separately for the urban and rural samples. Column 1 
presents the nationwide results, with all coefficients taking on their expected 
signs and being highly significant at the 1 per cent level, with the exception of the 
1950–54 birth cohort dummy. Most notably, urban hukou status is still associated 
with an additional three years of schooling (compared with five years in the raw 
data). It is also clear that better-educated fathers have better-educated children, with 
primary school, junior high and senior high and above associated with (if not directly 
causing) an additional 1.6, 2.2 and 3.2 years of schooling, respectively, compared 
with their illiterate counterparts. Provincial dummies (not reported here for space 
reasons) are all highly significant and negative, with the exception of Shanghai’s 
(which is insignificant), with the years of education attained in Beijing exceeding 
those in Jiangxi, Sichuan and Guizhou by more than three years. The coefficients 
for the birth cohorts reflect the nationwide trends in educational attainment 
illustrated in Figure 6.1—generally rising across birth cohorts, with the exception of 
the 1945–49 and 1965–69 cohorts. 
Columns 2 and 3 use the same set of variables (excluding hukou status) for the 
urban and rural samples, respectively. Most notably, father’s education appears to 
matter more for rural individuals than for urban ones at every level, peaking at an 
additional 3.1 years compared with 2.6 years for senior high school and above. 
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Table 6.3 Determinants of years of schooling: Nationwide, urban and rural
Sample National Urban Rural
Independent variables
Father: Primary school (YES = 1) 1.61*** 0.58*** 1.70***
Father: Junior high (YES = 1) 2.18*** 1.28*** 2.29***
Father: Senior high and above (YES = 1) 3.20*** 2.71*** 3.11***
Hukou at age 12 (Urban = 1) 3.10***
Male (YES = 1) 1.37*** –0.03 1.66***
Parents party member (YES = 1) 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.78***
One or two siblings (YES = 1) 0.04 –0.56*** 0.19
Three or more siblings (YES = 1) –0.42*** –0.73*** –0.32*
Han Chinese (YES = 1) 0.86*** –0.05 0.94***
Birth cohort:
1945–49 –0.34* 0.23 –0.39*
1950–54 0.03 1.56** –0.17
1955–59 1.53*** 2.33*** 1.45***
1960–64 2.89*** 3.07*** 2.93***
1965–69 2.01*** 2.89*** 1.90***
1970–74 2.22*** 3.25*** 2.09***
1975–79 3.03*** 3.45*** 3.05***
1980–84 3.50*** 4.13*** 3.42***
1985–89 4.09*** 4.31*** 4.06***
Provinces Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.21*** 8.85*** 5.34***
Observations 23,601 3,775 19,826
R-squared 0.39 0.32 0.31
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Sources: CFPS (2010, 2012) and authors’ own regressions.
Table 6.4 presents the regression results for each birth cohort separately. What 
is most striking in the nationwide regressions in Panel A is that hukou status is 
a highly significant determinant of educational outcomes for all cohorts, peaking at 
4.5 additional years for urban residents for the 1950–54 cohort and falling to a low 
of 2.3 years for the youngest cohort. Other interesting points include the declining 
advantages of being male, to the point of being insignificant for the two youngest 
cohorts; the consistently positive benefits of having a parent with Communist Party 
membership; and the significantly negative association of educational attainment 
with family size for the 1980s cohorts. 
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Panels B and C reveal some key differences between the urban and rural samples. 
First, gender clearly matters more in rural areas than urban ones, with the male 
coefficient insignificant in the latter from the 1960–64 cohort onwards, and even 
negative for the two youngest cohorts. Second, the schooling advantages associated 
with parents’ Communist Party membership also differ. For example, for the urban 
sample, it is insignificant for the 1950s cohorts (the two main Cultural Revolution 
cohorts), as well as the 1975–79 and 1980–84 cohorts (who would have benefited 
from the introduction of the compulsory education law in 1986), while it is 
significant for most rural cohorts apart from the youngest one (possibly reflecting 
the delayed implementation of the compulsory education law in rural areas). Third, 
ethnic minority status is significant for the rural sample from the 1970–74 cohort 
onwards, while for the urban sample it is insignificant throughout. 
Finally, the coefficients on the dummies for fathers’ education levels vary 
substantially  across birth cohorts and between the rural and urban samples. For 
the urban sample, only the senior high school dummy is consistently significant, 
although notably less so for the oldest cohorts, and reaching a low in magnitude for 
the 1960–64 cohort—the last of the three cohorts directly impacted by the Cultural 
Revolution. The coefficient then rises through to the 1975–79 cohort, declining 
only slightly thereafter but remaining well above those from the pre-reform era, 
confirming the increasing importance of family socioeconomic status during the 
reform period. In contrast, for the rural sample, the coefficients on all levels of 
father’s education tend to be highly significant, with only a few exceptions. Notably, 
father’s education brings a premium that is greater than for their urban counterparts 
in all cohorts, suggesting a higher degree of intergenerational persistence.8 
8  Note that this finding differs from that in Golley and Kong (2012), where we found greater persistence in 
the urban sample. This difference stems from our definition of ‘rural’ here, which includes those people who 
migrated after the age of 12, while in our earlier work these people were classified as ‘urban’. Given that these 
migrants generally have better-educated fathers and higher levels of education themselves (with 27 per cent 
attaining senior high and above, compared with 17 per cent for the rural sample overall), including them in the 
rural sample here results in higher intergenerational persistence.
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Inequality of opportunity
Using the regressions reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, and the method described 
above, Table 6.5 presents measures of both the absolute and the relative indexes 
of inequality of opportunity, IOA and IOR, respectively, along with the inequality 
of outcome index, GE(2). National trends for these three indexes are illustrated 
in Figure 6.4, while Figure 6.5 illustrates IOR for the nationwide, urban and rural 
samples. There are a number of key points.
First, as seen in Figure 6.4, trends in the absolute measure of inequality of 
opportunity, IOA, are quite distinct from those for inequality of outcomes, GE(2); 
for some cohorts they move in the same direction, but, for others, the opposite is 
true. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that the observed reductions in inequality 
of outcome have occurred because of an equalising of educational opportunities. 
More to the point, reductions in inequality of outcome have coincided with increases 
in inequality of opportunity.
Second, the share of inequality of opportunity in total inequality (IOR ) for the 
nationwide sample fluctuates only slightly for the oldest cohorts, ranging from 24.5 
to 32.7 per cent through to the 1965–69 cohort. It is higher than this for every 
subsequent cohort, peaking at 43.1 per cent of total inequality for the 1980–84 
cohort. This confirms that inequality of opportunity has become an increasingly 
important determinant of unequal educational outcomes during the reform 













Figure 6.4 Nationwide trends in inequality of outcome and inequality 
of opportunity
Sources: CFPS (2010, 2012) and authors’ calculations.
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Third, as seen in Figure 6.5, trends in the share of inequality of opportunity are quite 
different in the urban and rural samples—most strikingly, for the three oldest cohorts, 
but also for the youngest two. The downturn for the youngest rural cohort is a positive 
sign that opportunities may be improving for the least disadvantaged Chinese children 














Figure 6.5 Share of inequality of opportunity in inequality of outcome (IOR)
Sources: CFPS (2010, 2012) and authors’ calculations.
And fourth, the nationwide measures of both the absolute and the relative measures 
of inequality of opportunity in Panel A in Table 6.5 are higher than both the urban 
and the rural ones from the 1950s onwards (Panels B and C). The reason for this 
is quite simple: the hukou system, which extends the set of circumstances in the 
national sample beyond those in the urban and rural samples, clearly creates greater 
inequality of opportunity in the process. 
To push this crucial point further, Table 6.6 presents the partial contributions of 
each of the circumstance variables. For example, to calculate the partial contribution 
from hukou status, we assign every individual the ‘average’ value for the dummy 
variable—that is, equal to the proportion of people with urban hukou, rerun the 
regressions to generate new predicted values for years of schooling and then calculate 
the IORP associated with these predictions.
The results are ranked in order of importance, revealing that the largest single 
contributor to inequality of opportunity is hukou status. Both this and father’s 
education play a stronger role than either one’s province or one’s year of birth, which 
is quite astounding. Having parents with Communist Party membership ranks 
above being male, coming from a single-child family or being Han Chinese. Clearly, 
however, each of these factors plays a role in preventing equality of opportunity 
from being achieved in China’s educational outcomes. 
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Conclusions
This chapter investigated trends in educational inequality in China, focusing on the 
contribution of ‘inequality of opportunity’ to these trends. Utilising the CFPS survey 
results for 2010 and 2012, we measured the inequality in individual educational 
outcomes (years of schooling) for the nationwide sample and for separate rural and 
urban subsamples, in aggregate and for each of 10 birth cohorts. Our regressions 
identified the key determinants of these outcomes, all of which, we argued, could be 
classified as ‘circumstances’ that lie beyond the control of each individual, revealing 
important variations in the magnitude and significance of key determinants across 
birth cohorts and between the rural and urban subsamples. These results were used 
to calculate the share of inequality of opportunity in overall educational inequality. 
The lack of equal opportunity for Chinese citizens with regard to their educational 
outcomes was shown to stem primarily from the divisive hukou system, with further 
significant contributions from father’s education level, birth cohort, province, 
parents’ Communist Party membership, gender, family size and ethnicity, in that 
order.
Unequal educational attainments across a diverse population—with diverse 
aptitudes, aspirations and motivations—are to be expected, and there is no sense 
in which our results suggest this should be otherwise. Rather, what matters is the 
extent to which these unequal outcomes are determined by factors for which an 
individual is not responsible and which they cannot change; and there is a very 
clear case to be made for policies that minimise the impact of these factors and 
promote equal opportunity for all. The ethical imperative for the ruling Communist 
Party to address this issue is compounded by the economic importance of finding 
new sources of growth, particularly in the context of an ageing population and 
diminishing workforce.
It certainly does not follow that the coefficients on all of the selected circumstance 
variables should have been insignificantly different from zero. The omission of 
unobserved variables meant that the estimated coefficients were likely to exhibit 
some bias and could not be treated as causal. The most obvious of these was the 
coefficient on father’s education, which likely incorporated not only the omitted 
impacts of his (and the mother’s) income and occupation, but also reflected some 
degree of genetic inheritability, which would and should generate inequality in 
educational outcomes; beyond all others, this coefficient clearly should not be zero. 
This point about causality notwithstanding, the results presented in this chapter 
provide a basis for identifying some reasonable ‘equal opportunity policies’ in 
China’s education sphere. On the rural–urban gap, hukou system reforms that grant 
the children of rural migrant workers access to the urban schooling systems where 
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they live are clearly a step in the right direction. Other equalising measures could 
target a reduction in the private educational costs borne by rural residents who are 
least able to afford them, such as the liangmian yibu (‘the two waivers, one subsidy’) 
program that became national law in 2006, and the forbidding of charges and other 
miscellaneous fees for primary and junior high school. More generally, in a country 
where intergenerational persistence and educational costs are both on the rise, 
policies to facilitate the poorest rural children—and, for that matter, the poorest 
urban children, too—remaining in school for as long as they have the capacity 
and desire to do so, seem eminently reasonable. Making education accessible and 
affordable for all should be the number one priority in this regard.
Another set of policy actions relates to the possibility of using affirmative action 
to address unequal opportunities, by applying different test score standards or 
admission requirements depending on an individual’s circumstances. This has been 
a longstanding practice for China’s ethnic minorities (as discussed in Sautman 1999; 
Yang and Wu 2009), and one that continues to make sense based on our results 
here, particularly given the concentration of ethnic minorities in the country’s 
most remote poor rural areas. One practice that makes less sense would be any 
kind of affirmative action in favour of boys, despite the fact that girls have begun 
to outperform them in recent years—as evidenced by revelations in 2012 that girls 
were required to have higher admission scores than boys for entry into the same 
university courses, a practice that has since been banned. As found in a detailed 
study by Zhang et al. (2012) on this point, this likely reflects the fact that girls study 
harder—and they certainly should not be discriminated against because of that.
China has made remarkable progress in advancing the average level of educational 
attainment during the past seven decades, with considerable expansion of rural 
education programs in recent times. However, the education gaps between children 
living in cities and those in villages, in first-tier metropolitan cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai and the rest of the country, and from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds more broadly remain substantial. 
To successfully transform into a more technology-based economy capable of long-
term sustainable growth, China will require an increasingly skilled labour force. 
Efforts to ensure that all those children who are most capable, rather than just 
those who are most fortunate, can access the quality and quantity of education they 
deserve will raise the likelihood of achieving this development goal. Our results lend 
quantitative support to the necessity of such an effort.
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7. Intangible Capital and China’s 
Economic Growth: Evidence from 
Input–Output Tables
Shenglang Yang and Yixiao Zhou1
Introduction
This study uses data from input–output tables and a methodology adopted from 
Corrado et al. (2009) to provide empirical evidence of the role of intangible capital 
in China according to industrial sector. In so doing, it offers a new methodology 
for measuring the role of intangible capital in a country where data on intangible 
capital are inadequate. It finds that growth in intangible capital explains almost 
20 per cent of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in China over the period 1997–
2012. Moreover, these effects of intangible capital remain robust under various forms 
of sensitivity analysis including bootstrap regressions, the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) 
(2003) approach and changes in the depreciation rate. At the sectoral level, we find 
that research and development (R&D), which embodies innovation, plays a more 
important role in agriculture than do economic competency or computerised 
information, but the role of economic competency is more important in the services 
and light-industry sectors than are R&D and computerised information. 
China has enjoyed rapid growth since its reform and opening-up policies were 
implemented in 1978. China’s real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
1978 was only one-fortieth of the US level and one-tenth of the Brazilian level 
(Zhu  2012). By 2015, however, China had real GDP per capita that was equal 
to almost one-quarter of the US level and at the same level as Brazil.2 Growth in 
total factor productivity (TFP) has played a critical role in China’s growth miracle. 
According to Zhu (2012), positive change in TFP accounts for 78 per cent of the 
growth in China’s GDP per capita between 1978 and 2007. The transition from 
1  We much appreciate the helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter from Ligang Song and the 
conference  participants at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. 
All remaining errors are our own.
2  GDP per capita is calculated using the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach (constant 2011 international 
currency); data are from the World Bank International Comparison Program (www.worldbank.org/en/
programs/icp).
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a planned to a market economy is a major source of TFP growth and has significantly 
improved China’s TFP, but this source of TFP growth cannot last forever as returns 
from earlier reforms are diminishing. 
From 2012, Chinese economic growth has been slowing and has entered a stage 
called the ‘new normal’, the official definition of which is that China will maintain 
stable and relatively lower growth compared with earlier growth rates. What could 
be China’s new source of growth in the new normal? Text on the back of any 
iPhone may provide a hint. It reads: ‘Designed by Apple in California. Assembled 
in China.’ Payments to Chinese workers and the profits of non-Apple companies 
account for only 1.8 per cent and 9.2 per cent, respectively, of the value added of 
an iPhone, while Apple’s profits are 58.5 per cent of the total value added in 2010, 
according to Kraemer et al. (2011). This striking fact has an important implication: 
the distribution of value added in the global value chain favours those who own 
the product design and hold the market power, rather than those who manufacture 
the products. 
Product design and market power embody a broader concept called intangibles 
(Corrado et al. 2009). Intangible capital consists of the stock of non-material 
resources that enter the production process and is important for the creation or 
improvement of products as well as production processes (Arrighetti et al. 2014). 
Intangible capital has been playing an increasingly important role in boosting 
productivity and economic growth since the ‘information technology revolution’. 
In developed economies, the relative use of tangible capital is decreasing while 
the relative use of intangible capital—such as production technologies, product 
design, market power and intangibles embodied in employees and firm structure—
has been increasing (Fukao et al. 2009; van Ark et al. 2009; Marrano et al. 2009; 
Corrado and Hulten 2010; Miyagawa and Hisa 2013; Chun and Nadiri 2016). 
The literature on intangible capital is significant and includes the discussion 
of intangible capital as a source of growth in various countries at national and 
industry levels (Fukao et al. 2009; van Ark et al. 2009; Marrano et al. 2009; 
Corrado and Hulten 2010; Borgo et al. 2013; Corrado et al. 2013; Haskel and 
Wallis 2013; Miyagawa and Hisa 2013; Chun and Nadiri 2016), the discussion 
of intangible capital in the valuation and productivity of firms (Atkeson and 
Kehoe 2005; Tronconi and Marzetti 2011; Arato and Yamada 2012; Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou 2013, 2014; Gourio and Rudanko 2014b; Clausen and Hirth 2016) 
and the discussion of incorporating intangible capital to solve macroeconomic 
puzzles (McGrattan and Prescott 2010, 2014; Goodridge et al. 2013; Gourio 
and Rudanko 2014a). However, studies on intangible capital in China are scarce, 
due both to the lack of data and to the recent importance of intangible capital 
to the economy. Hulten and Hao (2012) calculate the intangible capital of China 
between 2000 and 2008 and conduct growth accounting of national data using 
the income-share method. The authors gather only nine observations, which is not 
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sufficient for a comprehensive analysis. Given China’s shifting growth model and 
the possibility of utilising alternative data sources, it is timely to further investigate 
the role of intangible capital in China’s growth. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first empirical test of how intangibles 
enhance economic growth at the sectoral level in China. In contrast to national-level 
studies, an industry-level study has the advantage of generating more observations 
and thus allows more statistical freedom to analyse how different categories of 
intangible capital impact on economic growth. This will provide a better way to 
assess the role of intangibles in an economy.
We divided 100 sectors from China’s input–output tables for 1997, 2002, 2007 
and 20123 into four subgroups—agriculture, light industry, heavy industry and 
services—to alleviate the problem of parameter heterogeneity between sectors. 
The selected input–output tables are constructed using data from China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), based on input–output surveys, and are relatively reliable. 
The measurement of intangible investment in this study follows the literature in 
capitalising either the intangible intermediates or intangible expenditure. Use of 
intermediates from input–output tables to estimate intangibles is common in the 
literature,4 including in Miyagawa and Hisa (2013), Haskel et al. (2014) and Chun 
and Nadiri (2016).
Unlike Corrado et al. (2009), Fukao et al. (2009) and Hulten and Hao (2012), 
however, this study uses a proxy approach—that is, we use the entries relevant 
to intangible investment as proxies and make the assumption that the ratios of 
intangible investments to the proxies remain constant over time. Using the proxy 
approach and assuming the ratio of true value to proxies is constant over time 
are also common in the literature on intangible capital. For example, Gourio and 
Rudanko (2014b) proxy selling, general and administrative expenses (S&GA) for 
investment in customer capital, while Tronconi and Marzetti (2011) and Eisfeldt 
and Papanikolaou (2014) proxy S&GA for investment in organisational capital. 
Although this assumption is often found to be invalid, it is the best this study could 
adopt based on the available data; and, if this assumption is true, the study will 
avoid the inaccurate measurement problems found in Corrado et al. (2009) and 
Fukao et al. (2009). 
When conducting growth accounting, we adopt the Cobb–Douglas parameter 
estimation based on econometrics instead of income/cost shares, along the lines 
of Niebel et al. (2017). The advantage of this approach is to allow for the existence 
3  The reason we exclude the input–output tables for 1987 and 1992 is that these two tables are inaccurate and 
include few of the intangible intermediates.
4  Intangible investment produced within firms is not reflected in input–output tables; however, as long as the 
ratio of actual intangible expenditure to the intangible expenditure manifest in the input–output tables remains 
constant over time, the coefficients in the empirical analysis will not be biased. 
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of error terms. In contrast, the income-share method used by Corrado et al. 
(2009), Fukao et al. (2009) and Hulten and Hao (2012) may underestimate the 
contribution of resource reallocation to economic growth when the economy is in 
disequilibrium, according to Nadiri (1970). A transitional economy such as China’s 
is likely to remain in disequilibrium over time; therefore, the income-share method 
is not suitable here. Our choice of econometric approach allows for an error term, 
which alleviates the problems arising from disequilibrium. 
Our study also conducts bootstrap regressions to confirm the robustness of the 
results, which is new to the existing literature. Limited by the time span (T = 4), 
the standard generalised method of moments (GMM) approach is not suitable for 
this study. Bootstrap regressions are the only feasible method given data limitations. 
Studies on intangible capital often suffer from small sample size. Bootstrap 
regressions alleviate this problem to some extent. Moreover, the depreciation rate 
of intangible capital is debatable. To confirm the significance of the impacts of 
intangible capital, we will conduct a sensitivity analysis by experimenting with 
various depreciation rates.
This study consists of five sections. In the next section, the methodology of growth 
accounting at the industry level is discussed and a traditional growth accounting 
approach excluding intangible capital is conducted. Section three provides empirical 
evidence of the relationship between intangible capital and TFP. In section four, 
a growth accounting approach incorporating intangible capital is conducted, while 
section five concludes.
How do we conduct growth accounting with 
sectoral data?




In Equation 7.1, Y is GDP, A is TFP and K is capital. If the object is a nation, we take 
the logarithm of both sides and run a regression. The parameters ak and al can be 
estimated in this way. However, with sectoral data, there is a problem: the parameters 
of each industry may vary from one another. If a pooled regression is conducted, the 
heterogeneity of parameters will cause bias of the estimates. Moreover, each industry 
may have its own initial TFP value, which implies different intercepts of various 
industries. To overcome the problem of parameter heterogeneity, we categorise the 
industries according to the similarities of parameters, following previous literature 
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such as Harris and Robinson (2002). In this study, the subgroups are defined as 
follows: light industry, heavy industry, agriculture and services.5 We then assume 
a Cobb–Douglas production function (Equation 7.2).
Equation 7.2
Yit is the value added of sector i at time t ; Ait is the TFP of sector i at time t ; Kit is 
capital according to the traditional definition (excluding most intangibles); Lit is the 
level of labour inputs; and ak and al are the capital and labour elasticities of output, 
respectively. Due to sectoral heterogeneity, the initial values of TFP may be different 
across sectors. We therefore assume Equation 7.3.
Equation 7.3
Ait = Ai0eyt
Taking the logarithm of both sides, we get Equation 7.4.
Equation 7.4
lnYit = lnAit + ak lnkit = al lnLit
Equation 7.4 can be estimated by either the fixed-effects (FE) model or the random-
effects (RE) model, depending on whether Ai0 varies from sector to sector within 
a subgroup. 
A key issue in production function estimation is, however, correlation between 
the unobservable productivity shocks and input levels. An industry responds to 
positive productivity shocks by expanding output and input. Negative shocks lead 
an industry to reduce output and input usage. When true, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimations of production functions are likely to be biased, which leads to 
biased estimates of productivity. Olley and Pakes (1996) develop an estimation 
approach using investment as a proxy for these unobservable shocks. More recently, 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) point out that investment is lumpy. If this is true, the 
investment proxy may not respond smoothly to productivity shocks. Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) suggest that using intermediate inputs can solve this problem. 
5  The list of subgroups is demonstrated in Appendix 7.1.
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Therefore, here we also adopt growth accounting without intangibles6 using the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) approach. The proxy used in this study is the usage of 
electricity, heating, fuel and water intermediates at 1997 constant prices.7
The growth rate of TFP is backed out as Equation 7.5.
Equation 7.5
g_tfp = gy – akgk – algl
Capital and labour inputs at the sectoral level as detailed as those in China’s input–
output tables are not available. Luckily, China’s input–output tables have two 
variables: total wages for labour and capital depreciation. We adjust the nominated 
depreciation of capital to the real depreciation using the Price Index of Investment 
in Fixed Assets from the NBS.
We assume a constant depreciation rate, θ, as is the convention in the existing 
literature (Equation 7.6).
Equation 7.6
θKit = real depreciationit
It is clear that real depreciationit has a strictly linear relationship with Kit and therefore 
is a perfect proxy for capital. As for the quantity of labour, we have Equation 7.7.
Equation 7.7
Total wageit is from China’s input–output table and average wageit is from the China 
Labour Statistical Yearbook (NBS various years); however, the sectoral classifications 
in these yearbooks are not as detailed as those in China’s input–output tables. 
Therefore, the average wage in the upper level of classification is used as a proxy for 
the average wage in individual sectors.8
We substitute Kit in Equation 7.4 with Equation 7.6 (Equation 7.8).
6  This approach allows only one capital variable; however, when incorporating intangible capital, there are at least 
two capital variables. Therefore, we do not conduct growth accounting with intangible capital using the LP 
approach.
7  Deflators are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China and the World Input Output Database 
(www.wiod.org/).
8  The proxy is based on an assumption that the ratio of the average wage in a lower sector to that in the upper-level 
sector remains constant over time. If this assumption holds, the constant ratio becomes a part of the intercept, 
similar to Equation 7.8. The coefficient of the proxy is then the same as the true coefficient.
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Equation 7.8
lnY it = lnA it – akln(θ) + akln Capital_proxyit + al lnL it
It is clear that substituting the capital proxy (real depreciationit) for Kit is appropriate 
because the coefficient of real depreciationit is the same as that of Kit. The depreciation 
rate, θ, becomes part of the intercept. The growth rate of Kit that is used for the 
calculation of TFP is exactly the same as the growth rate of real depreciationit.
Table 7.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in regressions for the 
period 1998–2012. It is clear that the ranges of value added, capital proxy, labour 
and different categories of intangible capital are large. This sample consists of 100 
sectors in China across 14 years and therefore has nearly 400 observations.
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max. Observations
ln(Value added) Overall 15.83 1.21 12.29 19.21 N = 400
Between 1.07 13.10 18.55 n = 100
Within 0.59 12.31 17.94 T-bar = 4
ln(Capital proxy) Overall 13.99 1.30 9.71 18.86 N = 398
Between 1.08 11.35 17.57 n = 100
Within 0.75 9.92 16.87 T-bar = 3.98
ln(labour) Overall 5.39 1.27 1.06 9.72 N = 398
Between 1.22 1.33 9.63 n = 100
Within 0.38 1.71 6.88 T-bar = 3.98
ln(Intangible capital) Overall 13.22 1.85 8.58 17.79 N = 398
Between 1.20 10.57 15.84 n = 100
Within 1.41 10.20 16.97 T-bar = 3.98
ln(R&D capital) Overall 10.22 2.38 2.67 15.65 N = 394
Between 1.68 3.76 13.37 n = 99
Within 1.70 6.57 13.48 T-bar = 3.98
ln(EC capital) Overall 12.93 1.82 8.46 17.65 N = 398
Between 1.18 10.24 15.56 n = 100
Within 1.38 9.82 16.74 T-bar = 3.98
ln(CI capital) Overall 9.94 2.26 1.07 15.55 N = 397
Between 1.86 3.59 14.25 n = 100
Within 1.29 5.86 13.24 T-bar = 3.97
EC = economic competency
CI = computerised information
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The results for growth accounting are displayed in Table 7.2. According to Hausman 
tests, random-effects models are appropriate to study the agricultural and light-
industry sectors, but fixed-effects models are used for the heavy industry and 
services sectors. Both labour and depreciation are highly significant economically 
and statistically, and remain robust when using bootstrap regressions. A 1 per cent 
change in capital stock is associated with a 0.42 per cent, 0.67 per cent, 0.70 per cent 
and 0.64 per cent change in value added in agriculture, heavy industry, light 
industry and services, respectively. A 1 per cent change in labour is associated 
with a  0.57 per  cent, 0.26 per cent, 0.13 per cent and 0.22 per cent change in 
value added in agriculture, heavy industry, light industry and services, respectively. 
The growth rate of TFP is calculated according to Equation 7.5. 
Intangible capital and TFP growth
According to Corrado et al. (2009), intangible investment includes investment 
in computerised information, innovative property and economic competency. 
Traditionally, intangible investment is classified as intermediate or expenditure and 
therefore is not manifest in national accounts. However, investment is the action of 
sacrificing today’s consumption for increasing consumption in the future, according 
to Hulten (1979) and Corrado et al. (2009). Moreover, the effects of the intangible 
expenditure mentioned above last more than one year and those expenses should 
therefore be capitalised. 
We follow the literature to measure intangibles by capitalising the intangible 
intermediates or intangible expenditure. Specifically, this study obtains relevant 
intermediate data from China’s input–output tables and assumes that the ratio 
of the intermediate to the true intangible investment remains constant over time. 
The proxy approach is commonly adopted in measuring intangible investment and 
is well founded—for example, Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) proxy the S&GA for 
customer capital investment, and Tronconi and Marzetti (2011) and Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2014) proxy S&GA for organisational capital investment. Table 7.3 
presents our proxies for intangible investment.
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Table 7.3 Categories of intangible investment
Proxy Comments
1. Computerised information (mainly 
software)










(a) Brand equity (mainly advertising)
(b) Firm-specific resources (organisational 
capital and staff training)
Culture, arts, radio, film 
and television industry 
intermediates
Includes parts of 
advertising expenditure







Includes staff training 
Note: The intangible investment classification follows Corrado et al. (2009).
Source: Authors’ construction.
Following Corrado et al. (2009), intangible investment is deflated to 1997 constant 
prices using the GDP deflator.9 Since the interval of the input–output table is five 
years, we interpolate the missing data within the interval by assuming that the growth 
rate is constant within the five-year interval. The depreciation rate of intangible 
capital is set according to Corrado et al. (2009): 20 per cent for R&D, 33 per cent 
for computerised information, 60 per cent for brand equity and 40 per cent for firm-
specific resources. Based on these, we assume 40 per cent for overall intangibles and 
50 per cent for economic competency intangibles. Intangible capital in 1997 was set 
to zero and therefore 1998 is the first year for which this study calculates intangible 
capital. According to Corrado et al. (2009), the year in which initial capital stocks 
are zero has little effect on growth accounting analysis because the depreciation rates 
are high and much previous capital has been depreciated away by the date we start 
analysis—that is, 1998. Moreover, the amount of intangible capital in China was 
considerably smaller in the 1990s, as manifest by low R&D spending (0.57 per cent 
of GDP in 199610 and unavailable before that) and software use. Therefore, setting 
intangible capital in 1997 to zero will not cause significant problems. 
9  The GDP deflator is obtained from the World Bank.
10  Data obtained from the World Bank.
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Table 7.4 shows the trend of the sectoral average ratio of intangibles to tangibles. 
The amount of tangible capital is derived based on an assumed depreciation rate 
of 5 per cent.11 The amount of intangible capital is calculated using the method 
explained above. Accompanying China’s rapid economic growth over the past 
two decades has been a significant rise in its intangible–tangible ratio. However, 
compared with advanced economies, China’s intensity of intangible capital use in 
production is still low and, therefore, there is plenty of room for catch-up in the 
future. For example, the intangible–tangible ratios of Japan, the United States and 
the United Kingdom in 2007 were 17 per cent, 22 per cent and 24 per cent,12 
respectively. Note that the parts of proxies include expenditure that is not intangible 
investment and excludes those that are produced within firms. This suggests that 
the actual intangible–tangible ratio might be lower or higher than the figures in 
Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 Increasing trend of intangibles in China (RMB thousand)
1998 2002 2007 2012
Sectoral average intangibles 1,573,790 8,880,930 24,017,800 59,924,580
Sectoral average tangibles 216,289,200 333,212,600 697,231,200 1280,413,600
Ratio 0.7% 2.7% 3.4% 4.7%
Source: Authors’ calculations using raw data from China’s input–output tables.
Since TFP is the portion of output for which input cannot account (Comin 2004), 
we should be careful when linking TFP to intangible capital. Change in TFP is 
possibly caused by changes in human capital and institutional quality. The changes 
in human capital and institutions are often not sector-specific, which can be 
controlled for at the national level. To capture human capital and institutional 
quality changes, this study uses two proxies. The first is GDP per capita and the 
second is the time dummy that captures time effects. The positive correlation 
between economic development, human capital and institutional quality has been 
well documented (Weede and Kämpf 2002; Gwartney et al. 2004). The time dummy 
provides a different overall TFP growth rate for each year so we can separate the TFP 
growth at the national level from that caused by the change in intangible capital 
within individual industries. To control for the scale of an industry, the indicator 
of intangible capital is the ratio of intangibles to tangibles instead of the absolute 
amount of intangibles. Table 7.5 demonstrates the relationship between the growth 
rate of TFP and the growth rate of the intangible–tangible ratio. Note two types 
of TFP are used to check the robustness of our results: one is derived from RE/FE 
models and the other is LP derived from the LP models.
11  The most commonly used depreciation rate for the Chinese economy is 5 per cent.
12 Tangible capital data are obtained from the Penn World Table 8.1 (www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/pwt-
releases/pwt8.1) and intangible capital data are from the cross-country intangible investment data website 
(www.intan-invest.net/). 
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Importantly, the growth rate of the intangible–tangible ratio is economically and 
statistically significant across all specifications. A 1 per cent increase in the intangible–
tangible ratio is associated with 0.26 per cent, 0.26 per cent, 0.31  per  cent, 
0.26 per cent, 0.26 per cent and 0.31 per cent growth in TFP according to models 
(1)–(6), respectively. A 1 per cent increase in the intangible–tangible ratio is associated 
with 0.14 per cent, 0.14 per cent, 0.16 per cent, 0.14 per cent, 0.14 per cent and 
0.16 per cent growth in ‘TFP, LP’ according to models (7)–(12), respectively. Growth 
of the intangible–tangible ratio also explains a significant amount of TFP change, 
at 17 per cent according to model (4) and 11 per cent according to model (10).13 The 
significant impact of intangibles on TFP is consistent with the findings of Haskel 
et al. (2014), who regress TFP on intangibles, information and communication 
technology and other variables and find that intangible capital is the only one that 
is significant. With GDP per capita and time effects as the control variables and 
the fixed-effects estimator, the intangible–tangible ratio is still statistically and 
economically significant, which suggests the finding is robust. Based on the above 
evidence, we thus conclude that intangible capital does play a  significant role in 
China’s productivity increase.
Another interesting question to ask is how the contributions of different categories 
of intangible capital to TFP growth differ. Table 7.6 shows the results of the effects 
of different intangible capital on TFP growth. When using the TFP derived from 
RE/FE models, all categories of intangible capital play important roles in the 
growth of TFP, being robust across all models. Specifically, according to model (4), 
a 1 per cent increase in the ratio of computerised information capital to tangible 
capital is associated with 0.08 per cent growth in TFP, 1 per cent growth in the 
ratio of R&D capital to tangible capital is associated with 0.11 per cent growth in 
TFP and 1 per cent growth in the ratio of economic competency capital to tangible 
capital is associated with 0.13 per cent growth in TFP. This is consistent with Chun 
et al. (2012), who find that innovative property is the most significant among all 
sorts of intangible investments when they are used to explain the growth of TFP in 
the Japanese economy. However, when the method of deriving TFP changes from 
FE/RE models to LP models, the results differ. Although the scale of the coefficients 
has not changed dramatically, the statistical significance has. The computerised 
information capital is no longer significant and the economic competency capital 
is insignificant when year effects are not controlled. R&D capital remains generally 
significant. When it comes to the scale of the effects, according to model (8), 
a 1 per cent increase in the ratio of computerised information capital to tangible 
capital is associated with a 0.03 per cent increase in ‘TFP, LP’, a 1 per cent increase 
13 The square of partial correlation coefficient between Δln(TFP)/Δln(TFP, LP) and Δln(Intangible/tangible) is the 
percentage of variance in Δln(TFP)/Δln(TFP, LP) that can be explained by Δln(Intangible/tangible) in a model 
specification. Therefore, the 17 per cent and 11 per cent here are the squares of partial correlation coefficients 
between the two variables of interest in model (4) and model (10).
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in the ratio of R&D capital to tangible capital is associated with a 0.04 per cent 
increase in ‘TFP, LP’ and a 1 per cent increase in the ratio of economic competency 
capital to tangible capital is associated with a 0.11 per cent increase in ‘TFP, LP’.
Table 7.6 Impact of growth of different categories of intangible–tangible ratio 


















Δln(CI/Tangible) 0.07** 0.07** 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Δln(R&D/
Tangible)
0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.04*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Δln(EC/Tangible) 0.08* 0.08* 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.05 0.05 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant –0.05 –0.05 –0.14*** –0.14*** 0.07* 0.07** –0.05 –0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.21 0.21 0.31 0.31
Year fixed effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Number of id 98 98 98 98
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
OLS = ordinary least squares
RE = random effects
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses except OLS; OLS is with robust standard error. 
Cluster robust standard error is unavailable when using FE models due to insufficient rank, so FE 
models are not used. CI is computerised information (mainly software); R&D is innovative property; EC 
is economic competency; TFP denotes TFP derived from RE/FE models; while ‘TFP, LP’ is TFP derived 
from LP models. Number of id refers to the number of individuals within the sample.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Growth accounting incorporating intangible 
capital
According to Corrado et al. (2009), the production function could be written 
as Equation 7.9 when intangible capital is incorporated.
Equation 7.9
Y = AKakIaiLal
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In Equation 7.9, I is the intangible capital stock and ai is the output elasticity of 
intangible capital. When intangible expenditure is viewed as investment, it should 
be counted as value added according to its national accounts identity (Corrado et al. 
2009). Therefore, when conducting growth accounting with intangible capital, an 
even more accurate measurement of intangible investment is required. In this study, 
however, we do not know the ratio of the true intangible investment to proxies. 
One feasible action is to assume 100 per cent as the base case.14
Table 7.7 demonstrates the results of growth accounting incorporating intangible 
capital. The impacts of intangibles on the economic growth of all subgroups are 
economically and statistically significant. A 1 per cent increase in intangible capital 
is associated with 0.16 per cent, 0.22 per cent, 0.14 per cent and 0.24 per cent 
output growth in agriculture, heavy industry, light industry and services, respectively. 
This indicates that intangible capital has become an important source of growth in 
the Chinese economy.
Table 7.7 Results of growth accounting with intangibles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture Heavy industry Light industry Services








ln(Tangibles) 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.29** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.32*** 0.32***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
ln(Labour) 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
ln(Intangibles) 0.16*** 0.15** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 5.68*** 5.65*** 6.56*** 6.56*** 6.36*** 6.36*** 6.09*** 6.09***
(0.38) (0.54) (0.74) (0.83) (0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.68)
Observations 20 20 138 138 144 144 96 96
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93
Number of id 5 5 35 35 36 36 24 24
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
RE = random effects
FE = fixed effects
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, except OLS; OLS is with robust standard error. 
Number of id refers to the number of individuals within the sample.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
14 The value of proportion does not matter for the results. When varying the proportion, the results remain similar. 
For the details of how the proportion is changed, please see Appendix 7.2.
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As mentioned earlier, intangible capital can be divided into computerised 
information, innovative property and economic competency. A question to be 
investigated is whether their roles differ across industries. To answer this question, 




In Equation 7.10, CI is computerised information (mainly software); RD is 
innovative property (R&D); EC is economic competency; and ai1, ai2 and ai3 are 
the output elasticities of the three inputs, respectively. 
Table 7.8 shows the results of growth accounting using the above production 
function.  Not all categories of intangible capital are significant (e.g. economic 
competency within the agricultural sector and R&D within the services sector). 
One reason might be the strong positive correlation between different categories of 
intangible capital due to their co-movement. However, from the results in Table 7.8, 
we are able to obtain some information about the roles of different intangible capital 
in different industries. In agriculture, R&D is significant and positive. A 1 per cent 
increase in R&D capital is predicted to increase a sector’s value added by 0.15 per cent. 
The coefficients of economic competency and computerised information are small, 
which may indicate that their effects are trivial. In heavy industry, all are economically 
and statistically significant. A 1 per cent increase in R&D, economic competency 
and computerised information is associated with 0.13 per cent, 0.11 per cent and 
0.04 per cent growth in value added, respectively. In light industry, both R&D and 
economic competency capital are significant. A 1 per cent increase in R&D and 
economic competency is correlated with a 0.08 per cent and 0.14 per cent increase 
in value added, respectively. The coefficient of computerised information capital is 
insignificant and small. Therefore, economic competency capital is likely to play the 
most important role in China’s light industry of the three categories of intangible 
capital. In services, only economic competency is significant. A 1 per cent increase 
in economic competency capital is associated with 0.25 per cent of value-added 
growth. The coefficients of both R&D and computerised information capital are 
insignificant and small in value, which may imply that economic competency is the 
most important category of intangible capital in the services sector. 
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Table 7.8 Results of growth accounting with detailed intangible capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture Heavy industry Light industry Services








ln(Tangibles) 0.35*** 0.35 0.22*** 0.22** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.08) (0.27) (0.09 (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
ln(Labour) 0.52*** 0.52** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.06) (0.21) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
ln(RD) 0.15*** 0.15 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(EC) 0.02 0.02 0.11*** 0.11** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.05) (0.13) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Ln(CI) –0.06*** –0.06 0.04** 0.04** –0.01 –0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 6.57*** 6.57*** 7.02*** 7.02*** 6.78*** 6.78*** 6.05*** 6.05***
(0.81) (1.70) (0.60) (0.79) (0.39) (0.43) (0.41) (0.67)
Observations 20 20 137 137 144 144 92 92
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Number of id 5 5 35 35 36 36 23 23
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
RE = random effects
FE = fixed effects
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, except OLS; OLS is with robust standard error. 
CI is computerised information (mainly software); R&D is innovative property; and EC is economic 
competency. Number of id refers to the number of individuals within the sample.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Conclusion
Intangible capital and its various forms—technology, product design, marketing 
and organisational development—are the foundation of knowledge economies. 
According to our results, China, a transitional economy, has started to benefit 
from the rapid growth of intangible capital. Using China’s input–output tables for 
various years, this study provides an important insight into the role of intangible 
capital in different industries in the context of an emerging knowledge economy. 
It is specifically found that the growth in intangible capital is significantly associated 
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with TFP growth in China, and explains almost 20 per cent of TFP growth over 
the sample period. The results are generally robust across the different model 
specifications.
This study also reveals the relative importance of different categories of intangible 
capital in different industries. In agriculture, R&D is likely to play a critical role, but 
the role of other intangible capital is relatively trivial. In the heavy-industry sector, 
R&D, computerised information (mainly software) and economic competency 
are all important to growth, but R&D is the most important. While the effects 
of both economic competency and R&D are significant to the growth of light 
industry, R&D is more significant. Last but not least, in the services sector, the role 
of economic competency is critical while those of the other categories are relatively 
unimportant. In other words, the role of R&D is important across all non-service 
industries, while the role of economic competency is paramount across all non-
agriculture industries.
The use of intangible capital in production in China, however, remains relatively 
small compared with that in advanced economies. In 2007, the intangible–tangible 
ratio in China was approximately 3.4 per cent, compared with 17 per cent in Japan, 
22 per cent in the United States and 24 per cent in the United Kingdom. This is 
consistent with China’s role at the assembly end of global value chains and the fact 
that investment in design, intellectual property and branding remains the preserve of 
more developed economies. Given that the productivity boost from China’s reform 
and opening up is diminishing and the country has entered the new normal phase, it 
is clearly time for China to invest in new sources of growth—and intangible capital 
is one of them. 
The transformation from ‘made in China’ to ‘designed in China’ has a long way to 
run, but the shifts in the intangible–tangible ratio identified here suggest that China 
is catching up with frontier economies. Given the gradually increasing intangible 
capital in China, there is every reason to believe that rapid growth in intangible 
capital will become an increasingly important driver of China’s economic growth.
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3 Livestock products Agriculture
4 Fisheries Agriculture
5 Agricultural services Agriculture
6 Coalmining and processing Heavy industry
7 Petroleum and natural gas extraction Heavy industry
8 Ferrous metals mining and processing Heavy industry
9 Non-ferrous metals mining and processing Heavy industry
10 Non-metal minerals mining and processing Heavy industry
11 Processing of petroleum and nuclear fuel Heavy industry
12 Processing of coking coal Heavy industry
13 Manufacture of chemical raw materials Heavy industry
14 Manufacture of fertiliser Heavy industry
15 Manufacture of pesticide Heavy industry
16 Manufacture of organic chemical products Heavy industry
17 Manufacture of rubber Heavy industry
18 Manufacture of plastics Heavy industry
19 Manufacture of cement and asbestos products Heavy industry
20 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products Heavy industry
21 Iron and steel products Heavy industry
22 Smelting of steel Heavy industry
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Name Subgroup
23 Smelting of iron alloys Heavy industry
24 Smelting of nonferrous metals Heavy industry
25 Processing of nonferrous metals Heavy industry
26 Manufacture of boilers, engines and turbines Heavy industry
27 Manufacturer of metal-working machines Heavy industry
28 Manufacture of other general industrial machinery Heavy industry
29 Manufacture of agricultural, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing machinery Heavy industry
30 Manufacture of other special industrial equipment Heavy industry
31 Manufacture of railway equipment Heavy industry
32 Manufacture of automobiles Heavy industry
33 Manufacture of ship equipment Heavy industry
34 Manufacture of other transportation equipment Heavy industry
35 Manufacture of generators Heavy industry
36 Recycling and disposal of waste Heavy industry
37 Production and distribution of electric power Heavy industry
38 Production and distribution of gas Heavy industry
39 Processing and distribution of tap water Heavy industry
40 Construction Heavy industry
41 Processing of crops, cooking oil and stock feed Light industry
42 Manufacture of sugar Light industry
43 Processing of meat Light industry
44 Processing of aquatic products Light industry
45 Processing of other food Light industry
46 Manufacture of alcohol Light industry
47 Manufacture of beverages and tea Light industry
48 Manufacture of tobacco Light industry
49 Manufacture of textiles from cotton Light industry
50 Manufacture of textiles from wool Light industry
51 Manufacture of textiles from fibre and silk Light industry
52 Manufacture of knitted products Light industry
53 Manufacture of textile products Light industry
54 Manufacture of textile, apparel, footwear and caps Light industry
55 Manufacture of leather, fur, feather and related products Light industry
56 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm 
and straw products
Light industry
57 Manufacture of paper and paper products Light industry
58 Printing and recorded media Light industry
59 Manufacture of equipment for culture, education and sports activity Light industry
60 Manufacture of chemical products for daily use Light industry
61 Manufacture of other chemical products Light industry
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Name Subgroup
62 Manufacture of medicines Light industry
63 Manufacture of chemical fibres Light industry
64 Manufacture of glass and glass products Light industry
65 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware Light industry
66 Manufacture of fireproof products Light industry
67 Manufacture of metal products Light industry
68 Manufacture of household electrical appliances Light industry
69 Manufacture of other electrical machinery and equipment Light industry
70 Manufacture of computers Light industry
71 Manufacture of communication and other electronic equipment Light industry
72 Manufacture of other household electronic appliances Light industry
73 Manufacture of electronic elements and devices Light industry
74 Manufacture of measuring instruments Light industry
75 Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sports activity Light industry
76 Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing Light industry
77 Railway transport Service
78 Road transport Service
79 Pipeline transport Service
80 Air transport Service
81 Water transport Service
82 Storage Service





88 Real estate Service
89 Accommodation Service
90 Residential and other services Service
91 Entertainment Service
92 Polytechnic services Service
93 Health care Service
94 Education Service
95 Sports Service
96 Social welfare Service
97 Culture, arts, radio and television Service
98 Research and experimental development Service
99 Geological prospecting Service
100 Public administration and social organisation Service
Source: Authors’ construction.
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Appendix 7.2. Sensitivity analysis
The depreciation rate of intangible capital is often not well grounded, in both this 
study and previous studies. To check the robustness of the results, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted. The changes in parameters in this study are comprehensive 
and occur in two directions: either an increase or a decrease. If the changes in both 
directions make little difference, the contributions of intangible capital to economic 
growth are believed to be robust.
Table 7.A1 Changes of parameters in sensitivity analysis (per cent)
Base case Case
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Proxy ratio 100 50 150
δ(Intangible) 40 60 20
δ(RD) 20 10 40
δ(EC) 50 25 75
δ(CI) 33 11 66
Notes: Proxy ratio refers to the ratio of the actual intangible investment to the proxy; δ is the 
depreciation rate; RD is R&D capital; EC is economic competency capital; and CI is computerised 
information capital (mainly software).
Source: Authors’ construction.
All the sensitivity analysis results are available from the authors. The changes in 
parameters do not change the significance and signs of the intangibles and the 
changes in regression coefficient are small. Therefore, the impacts of intangible 
capital on productivity are considerably robust.





8. China’s Transition to a More 
Innovative Economy: Progress and 
Challenges
Shang-Jin Wei, Zhuan Xie and Xiaobo Zhang1
Introduction
After more than three decades of high growth based on the exploitation of low-wage 
and demographic advantages interacted with incremental market-oriented reforms 
and international openness, China now confronts higher wages and a shrinking 
workforce. Future growth will therefore depend increasingly on innovation and 
increased productivity. We assess the likelihood of China making this transition, using 
matched firm-level data on patent applications, receipts and citations and a survey 
of manufacturing firms. We find that embracing new international opportunities 
and adaptation to rising labour costs are two leading factors in China’s increasingly 
innovative economy. As a result, Chinese exports are increasing in quality; and 
the market share of Chinese exports relative to other countries has increased 
steadily, even after controlling the unit value. We also find, however, evidence of 
resource misallocation in the innovation area: state-owned firms receive a greater 
share of innovation subsidies, but private firms are the more successful innovators. 
The transition to an innovation-led economy would presumably progress even faster 
if this resource misallocation could be tackled. 
Over the period 1980–2015, China’s economy grew at an average annual 
rate of 8.7  per  cent, increasing real per capita income by a cumulative rate of 
1,759 per  cent,  or from $714 in 1980 (in 2011 international purchasing power 
1  We thank Journal of Economic Perspectives editors Gordon Hanson, Enrico Moretti and especially Timothy 
Taylor for very helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful for comments received at seminars/
conferences held at Hong Kong Baptist University, New York University, University of Michigan and University 
of Western Australia, and support from the Natural Science Foundation of China (approval number 71350002), 
the National Science Foundation (approval number 7675172) and the key research base of China’s Ministry 
of Education (14JJD790027). We thank Lea Sumulong and Joy Glazener for excellent editorial assistance and 
Lintong Lin for outstanding research assistance. The chapter represents the personal views of the authors and 
not necessarily those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. A shorter version of the chapter has been 
published as ‘From “made in China” to “innovated in China”: Necessity, prospect, and challenges’ in the Journal 
of Economic Perspectives (31(1): 49–70, 2017). The journal has granted permission to reprint the article here.
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parity (PPP) dollars) to $13,277 in 2015 (based on the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) data). Only one other economy, 
Equatorial Guinea, grew by as much over the same period. 
For 25 consecutive years from 1990, China’s economy grew at more than 6 per cent 
a year. No other country has grown at that uninterrupted rate for even 20 years since 
1980 (the starting year of the WEO database), let alone one-quarter of a century. 
Over the same period, a very short list of economies did grow at or better than that 
rate for some 10–20 years, but these were not consecutive. Those economies are 
Ethiopia (17 years); Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Korea (16 years each); 
Albania and Turkmenistan (15 years); Armenia (14 years); Maldives and Myanmar 
(13 years); Georgia, Chinese Taipei and Thailand (all 12 years); Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania (11 years); and Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Botswana, Iraq, 
Moldova, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan and Vietnam (10 years). 
China’s growth performance is spectacular and exceptional.
That exceptional growth was based fundamentally on a combination of low wages 
and a favourable demographic structure, the potential of which was converted into 
actual growth through a sequence of domestic market-oriented institutional reforms 
and greater openness to trade and foreign investment. That, in turn, supported 
a catch-up process in the direction of the high-income economic frontier (see, for 
example, Fan et al. 2014). When China began its process of reform and opening 
up in 1980, its per capita income of $714 ranked it 136 of the 138 economies 
with sufficient data to be included in the WEO database. Even in 2001, the year 
China acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and after a long period 
of sustained growth, per capita income was still lower than in 77 other countries. 
Throughout the period 1980–2011, the Chinese working-age cohort as a share 
of the total population was unusually high, partly due to rapid fertility declines 
associated with strict family planning policies brought in around 1980. Relatively 
low wages, a large workforce and a favourable dependency ratio formed a powerful 
combination of fundamentals for economic development. Since 2000, accession 
to the WTO and an imbalanced gender ratio in the premarital-age cohort have 
inspired additional entrepreneurship and work effort, which have added perhaps 2 
percentage points to the growth rate (Wei and Zhang 2011b). 
Since 2011, however, the working-age cohort (aged 15–60) has started to shrink 
in absolute size (due in part to the family planning policies of the previous three 
decades). By 2015, China’s income had reached $13,277 (in 2011 international 
PPP dollars), but the average wage rate in current US dollar terms was higher than 
that of most economies outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). China’s economy has now reached another crossroad. 
The importance of these structural shifts helps explain the slowdown in the growth 
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rate of between 6 per cent and 7 per cent since 2014, which will likely moderate 
further even though the economy is otherwise also affected by a cyclical downturn 
(e.g. a relatively weak global economy). 
A country’s potential growth comes from the sum of the growth of its workforce and 
the growth of its labour productivity. The Chinese workforce has been shrinking 
since 2011 (Cai and Wang 2008). Policy changes to extend the official retirement 
age or to encourage more female labour force participation will at best moderate 
the decline in the workforce. The relaxation of the one-child policy in November 
2015 will, over the next decade and a half, make the dependency ratio worse, 
without altering the size of the workforce (no couple can give birth to a 16-year-
old) (Wei 2015). 
Both the Chinese Government and scholars often refer to the challenges facing 
China in the context of a possible ‘middle-income trap’ (among many others, see 
OECD 2013; Ma 2016). The ‘middle-income trap hypothesis’ (MITH) claims that 
only in exceptional cases can a middle-income country ever manage to become 
a high-income economy thanks to the fact that these economies face a uniquely 
challenging growth environment. Contrary to the popular hypothesis, however, 
using a transition matrix analysis and a non-parametric analysis (by regression 
trees), Han and Wei (2015) are unable to support an unconditional MITH, but 
they do identify conditions under which growth may be more likely to stagnate or 
even regress.
Given such factors, growth in labour productivity must become an important driver 
of overall economic growth. In 2015, China’s investment to gross domestic product 
(GDP) ratio, at 43.3 per cent, was already high by international standards, making 
it doubtful continued physical investment would deliver a higher rate of labour 
productivity growth. Moreover, Bai and Zhang (2014) estimated that returns to 
investment have in fact shown signs of decline since 2008. Increased productivity 
could, however, come from reducing resource misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow 
2009), including via further reforms to factor and product markets such as reform 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This area of potential productivity gains is, 
however, also limited. The pace of future reform is unlikely to be as aggressive as in 
the past, partly because many of the low-hanging fruits have already been picked 
and partly because society (read: interest groups) now has greater means to block 
reforms than in earlier decades. An additional potential source of productivity gains 
is the discovery of new products, new uses for existing products, new designs and 
production processes and the conversion of these innovations into new sales or cost 
reductions. 
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In this chapter, we study whether China can transition to a more innovation-driven 
growth model. Specifically, we study three questions. First, how much growth in 
innovation is actually occurring in Chinese firms? We approach this question from 
a comparative perspective and ask how China’s rate of innovation compares with 
that in Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa (the BRICS economies) and also with 
South Korea. India has a lower per capita income than China but is comparable in 
population size, and, like China, it has a diaspora with a strong presence in science 
and technology, academic and elite chief executive officer (CEO) communities in 
the United States. Brazil, Russia and South Korea all have higher income per capita 
than China. South Korea, in particular, has experienced a growth miracle that leads 
China by about 25 years. Its industry includes a string of successful and innovative 
companies, such as Samsung and LG, and, in many ways, it presents a model that 
China wishes to emulate. 
We draw comparison between China and the selected countries using data on patent 
applications by and patents granted to firms both at home and in the United States 
as a proxy for innovative activities. Patent data are sourced from the State Intellectual 
Property Office of China (SIPO), the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). We find evidence that 
China’s performance on innovative activities—as measured by the pace of patent 
applications, patents granted and citations of patents—has been strong, particularly 
recently.
Second, we explore what accounts for the relatively rapid pace of innovation by 
Chinese firms as measured by patent applications. In particular, we explore whether 
this derives from China granting patents using a threshold lower than international 
standards, government subsidies for research and development (R&D) activities 
or disproportionate innovations by state-owned firms that have privileged access 
to resources. Or do Chinese firms embrace the challenge of rising wage costs and 
embark on innovation to adjust to the evolving comparative advantage?
China’s accession to the WTO created greater market access for its exports, enabling 
export firms to better recover the cost of R&D investment, stimulating their 
innovative activities. We use export data to investigate whether Chinese firms have 
converted innovation into quality improvement and increased export market shares 
even in the face of progressively rising labour costs, including in comparison with 
competitor economies. We report evidence that the market share of Chinese exports 
does generally increase, even after controlling for the unit cost of its exports relative 
to those of its competitors. Facing rising labour costs, labour-intensive or routine-
intensive firms have recently become increasingly innovative compared with capital-
intensive firms. We find that, overall, rising wages and expanding markets are the 
two most important drivers of China’s explosion in patents. 
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Third, since a feature of the Chinese economy is the significant presence of SOEs, 
we investigate possible resource misallocation in the innovation space. We find that 
although SOEs have received a relatively high share of government subsidies, their 
performance in innovation is lacklustre compared with that of private enterprises. 
Furthermore, the elasticity of patent filing or patents granted per renminbi (RMB) 
of subsidy is significantly higher for private sector firms than for SOEs. We interpret 
these patterns as reflecting the misallocation of public funds. Interestingly, we also 
find evidence that SOEs often face higher realised tax burdens than private firms 
(the sum of corporate income tax and value-added tax as a share of sales or profits). 
To improve the efficiency of resource allocation, policy reforms should perhaps put 
weight on simultaneous reductions in discretionary subsidies and taxes.
In the next section, we provide an overview of the sources of past economic growth. 
In section three, we examine the pace of innovation in Chinese firms, with particular 
attention to patent data. In section four, we examine the sources of innovation 
growth—in particular, the possible roles of the misreporting of and/or lax approval 
processes for patents, expanding market opportunities, subsidies and tax reductions 
and rising wages. In section five, we implement a robustness check, seeking evidence 
of quality improvement in Chinese exports in an era of rapidly rising local wages. 
In section six, we investigate resource allocation efficiency—especially government 
subsidies to firms of different ownership types—and its role in firms’ innovation. 
We draw our conclusions in section seven.
Sources of historical growth
China’s rapid growth in the past several decades has been driven by two sets of 
factors: 1) market-oriented policy reforms (which allowed market-determined 
output prices and factor prices to progressively replace administrative prices, and 
the introduction and strengthening of property rights) and the policy of opening 
up (reducing barriers to international trade and investment); and 2) economic 
fundamentals—a favourable demographic structure and low initial labour costs. 
Since we have discussed the wage and demographic factors, we will provide 
a brief review of the institutional reforms that allowed firms to use the economic 
fundamentals as a source of growth. 
The Chinese growth miracle started with reform of the rural household responsibility 
system (HRS) in the early 1980s. Under the HRS, farmers were granted land 
cultivation rights so they could make their own production decisions. With better-
aligned incentives, agricultural production and rural incomes increased dramatically 
in the ensuing years (Lin 1992). In just a few years, hundreds of millions of farmers 
were released from their land, providing the non-farm sector with a seemingly 
unlimited labour supply. In the 1980s, China’s labour costs were among the lowest 
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of the developing countries—lower than India and the Philippines. The availability 
of large numbers of low-wage workers ensured China’s growth model in the 
subsequent three decades was based on low-cost production. 
In the 1980s, township and village–owned enterprises (TVEs) grew rapidly thanks to 
abundant labour and rising market demand for daily goods after the successful rural 
reforms. TVEs were largely manufacturing firms in rural areas, and can be regarded 
as a second-best response to the institutional barriers to free relocation of labour 
across space; they provided a way for China to accelerate the movement of labour 
from low-productivity activities in rural areas to higher-productivity manufacturing 
activities before restrictions on internal migration were removed. Because they are 
second-best entities, TVEs also carry their own distortions, as their property rights 
have not always been clearly defined. In the 1990s, the government launched massive 
TVE and SOE reforms in an attempt to give entrepreneurs more incentives. Most 
TVEs were privatised. For SOEs, the government adopted a policy of ‘grasping the 
big, letting go of the small’ by privatising small SOEs and consolidating large ones 
(Hsieh and Song 2015). After the reforms, TVE employment plummeted from 
129 million in 1995 to just 6 million in 2011, while SOE employment dropped 
from 113 million in 1995 to 67 million in 2011. The number of SOEs declined by 
92 per cent, from 744,240 in 1995 to 61,204 in 2014 (Table 8.1). 
Table 8.1 Number of Chinese firms
Year No. of existing 
firms
No. of newly 
established firms
Private (%) SOE (%) Foreign (%)
1995 4,102,757 705,684 74.94 18.14 6.92
1996 4,628,316 676,993 76.71 17.98 5.31
1997 5,029,932 704,512 78.26 16.72 5.02
1998 5,328,497 803,088 80.13 15.67 4.19
1999 5,563,881 838,987 81.18 15.16 3.66
2000 5,752,414 849,768 83.81 12.00 4.20
2001 5,918,494 914,449 86.47 8.57 4.96
2002 6,079,731 1,043,979 88.04 6.82 5.14
2003 6,410,225 1,237,360 89.61 5.59 4.80
2004 6,896,890 1,356,846 91.11 3.96 4.93
2005 7,473,111 1,363,405 91.42 3.40 5.18
2006 8,061,934 1,361,640 92.50 2.83 4.67
2007 8,658,343 1,324,605 92.24 2.72 5.04
2008 9,050,977 1,311,798 92.50 2.74 4.75
2009 9,500,295 1,530,672 95.26 1.63 3.11
2010 10,230,384 1,802,531 96.09 1.24 2.66
2011 11,254,499 2,021,418 96.58 0.95 2.47
2012 12,463,854 2,002,236 96.82 0.9 2.28
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Year No. of existing 
firms
No. of newly 
established firms
Private (%) SOE (%) Foreign (%)
2013 13,544,658 2,611,083 97.69 0.63 1.68
2014 15,300,901 3,681,347 98.35 0.40 1.25
Annual growth rate (%)
1995–2004 5.94 7.53 8.27 –10.54 2.02
2004–2014 8.29 10.50 9.13 –13.89 –5.59
1995–2014 7.17 9.08 8.72 –12.32 –2.06
Source: Tabulated by the authors based on the China Firm Registry Database. 
In the short term, the reform was a painful process; large numbers of urban 
workers had to leave SOEs. Remarkably, the country avoided a big spike in the 
unemployment rate. The key was that the de facto privatisation was accompanied 
by aggressive reforms that lowered the entry barriers for private sector entrepreneurs. 
The inefficiency of the previous centrally planned, state-dominated economic system, 
together with high barriers to entry, meant there was a huge level of unexplored or 
underexplored opportunities for profit-making, and private sector entrepreneurs 
responded quickly. As a result, almost all of the jobs lost from TVEs and SOEs 
were offset by new job opportunities in the private sector. The number of private 
enterprises increased nearly fivefold, to more than 15 million, in the period 1995–
2014 (see Table 8.1). By 2011, 193 million people worked in private enterprises 
(including those who were self-employed)—about three times the workforce in 
SOEs (NBS 2012). Therefore, in terms of employment share by ownership, the 
Chinese economy has clearly come to be dominated by the private sector. Indeed, 
Wei and Zhang (2011b), using firm-level census data for 1994 and 2005, document 
two 70 per cent rules: first, approximately 70 per cent of the growth in industrial 
value added came from private sector firms in this period; second, approximately 
70 per cent of private sector growth in value added came from the increase in the 
number of new private sector firms (the extensive margin), while the remaining 
30 per cent came from the growth of existing firms (the intensive margin).
China also reformed its financial system to provide local governments with better 
incentives to develop their economies. Under the arrangements introduced in the 
early 1980s, local governments and the central government follow a predetermined 
revenue formula (varying across regions as a result of local bargaining power), greatly 
stimulating local officials’ incentive to create a more business-friendly environment. 
The system was reformed further in 1994, with the introduction of a value-added tax 
and a nationally uniform formula with which to divide revenue collection between 
the central and local governments. These reforms empowered entrepreneurs and 
local officials, providing them an impetus to pursue growth.
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From the start of the Deng Xiaoping era in 1979, China adopted a development 
strategy of ‘opening up’ to the outside world. The government set up special zones 
in the coastal provinces to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1980s and 
1990s, and integration with the global economy was accelerated after the country 
joined the WTO in December 2001. As China opened up, the external demand for 
its products increased, which in turn stimulated the growth of private enterprises. 
China’s open-door policy and abundant cheaper labour attracted massive inflows of 
FDI. By 2003, China had become the largest recipient of inward FDI. The openness 
to trade and FDI has facilitated economic growth through many channels and has 
also had important impacts on the rest of the world (see Feenstra and Wei 2010).
As well as extensive growth in firms and augmented input use, knowledge growth 
and productivity improvement are key drivers of economic growth. The increase 
in productivity stems from sectoral innovation and the reallocation of resources 
(mainly labour) from low to highly productive sectors. Innovation and infrastructure 
investment are key pillars of intra-sector productivity improvement. The role of 
innovation in productivity growth has been widely discussed in the literature 
(Romer 1990). China’s rapid build up in infrastructure gives it some advantage in 
improving productivity. Even though its first expressway was not built until 1988, 
China’s total highway length reached 122,300 kilometres by 2015—more than any 
other country. The story of China’s high-speed rail (HSR) is equally, if not more, 
remarkable. Starting from nothing in 2005, its constructed length had surpassed 
19,300 km by 2015. In 2016, a Chinese HSR company went to the United States 
to negotiate building the first HSR in that country.2
As well as productivity growth within a firm or sector, structural change can also 
contribute to economic growth by shifting resources from less productive to more 
productive sectors, such as from the state sector to the private sector or from the 
agricultural sector to non-agricultural sectors (Zhu 2012). It is estimated that 
sectoral productivity increases and structural change accounted for 42 per cent and 
17 per cent of economic growth, respectively, during 1978–95 (Fan et al. 2003). 
Demographic factors were powerful drivers of China’s growth in the past three-and-
a-half decades (and are an important contributor to the recent growth slowdown). 
China’s fertility rate should have dropped over the same period as its per capita 
income rose; however, the actual decline was more pronounced than that suggested by 
international experience because of the family planning policies implemented from 
1979. The sharp decline in the fertility rate means there are fewer young dependants 
to support for a given working-age cohort. The share of prime-age  population in the 
total population rose steadily for three decades, creating a demographic dividend, 
which in turn contributed to economic growth (Cai and Wang 2008). 
2  www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-throws-china-off-high-speed-rail-project-1465465356.
8. China’s Transition to a More Innovative Economy
181
The one-child policy yields an unintended consequence in distorting the sex 
ratio in  favour of boys, meaning that as this generation reaches marriageable 
age, young men face a very competitive environment. To attract potential brides, 
families with sons choose to work harder, save more and take more risks, including 
exhibiting a higher propensity to become entrepreneurs (Wei and Zhang 2011a, 
2011b; Chang and Zhang 2015; Wei et al. 2016). It is estimated that increasing 
competition in the marriage market due to sex ratio imbalances has contributed to 
about 2 percentage points of economic growth per annum (Wei and Zhang 2011b). 
It is important to note that this additional growth is of an immiserising type: social 
welfare is likely to decline even though GDP growth increases. The logic for this is 
explained in Wei and Zhang (2011b): the extra work effort and extra risk-taking 
that produce a higher GDP growth rate are motivated by a desire to improve one’s 
chances (or one’s children’s chances) in the marriage market. Yet, the share of young 
men who will not get married in the aggregate is determined by the sex ratio, and 
not by the economy-wide work effort, risk-taking or GDP growth rate. In this 
sense, the extra work effort and risk-taking are futile; utility-maximising households 
would have happily given up this part of income growth if there were no sex ratio 
imbalance.
For three decades after the start of market-oriented reforms in the country, China 
appeared to have inexhaustible ‘surplus labour’ (low-productivity labour in rural 
areas). Signs of a labour shortage started to emerge, however, in the mid-2000s. 
According to Cai and Du (2011) and Zhang et al. (2011), wages for unskilled 
workers have shown double-digit growth since 2003–04, indicating the country 
might have crossed the so-called Lewis turning point, which means the era of 
surplus labour is over. 
The exact timing of the sharp increase in the wage rate for unskilled workers is 
a subject of debate. Wang et al. (2011) report a turning point as early as 2000. On the 
other hand, Knight et al. (2011) and Golley and Meng (2011), for example, point 
out that barriers to internal migration—especially the rigid household registration 
system that prevents rural households from moving freely to urban areas—allow 
additional scope for rural–urban migration if and when the remaining barriers are 
dismantled. Either way, China is no longer a low-wage country.
Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, external demand for 
Chinese products has weakened. The previous growth model based on exploiting 
cheap labour is no longer viable. As a result of the strict family planning policies 
implemented in the early 1980s, the number of entrants to the labour force fell 
below the number leaving from 2011. The usually favourable dependency ratio 
has become an unusually unfavourable ratio. Facing rising labour costs and weak 
external demand, firms have to make a tough choice: to move in, out, down or 
up. Moving ‘in’ means relocating factories from coastal to inland areas, where 
wages are lower. Given the pace of convergence within the country, this is at best 
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a temporary strategy. Moving ‘out’ means engaging in outbound direct investment, 
combining Chinese knowhow with low wages in other countries. No doubt, some 
Chinese companies are pursuing this strategy. Moving ‘down’ means closing the 
business, which is an option for individual firms, but not for the country as a whole. 
Moving ‘up’ means engaging in innovation and upgrading so firms no longer need 
to depend on low-paid unskilled labour. While firms will employ a portfolio of such 
strategies, a decisive factor for China’s economic future will be whether its firms can 
innovate and upgrade, and how fast they can do so. In the next section, we focus 
on innovation and quality upgrading and ask the question: can China transition to 
become a more innovative economy? 
The pace of innovation as measured 
by growth in patents
Innovation can take the form of commercial secrets or patents, or it can be about 
improving business processes or models, in addition to inventing new products. 
Innovation can also take place outside the commercial space, such as in the cultural 
sphere. Due to data availability, we focus on patents lodged by firms as a measure 
of innovation. 
Alongside rapid economic growth in China, the number of patents has exploded. 
The number of patent applications filed with SIPO leapt from less than 100,000 in 
1995 to more than 2 million in 2014, with an annual growth rate of 19 per cent—
doubling the per capita GDP growth rate in the same period. The annual growth 
rate of patent filings has accelerated from 17 per cent in the period 1995–2014 to 
21 per cent between 2004 and 2014 (see Table 8.2). By 2011, China had overtaken 
the United States as the world’s most prolific patent filer (WIPO 2012). 
Among the three types of patents—invention, utility model and design—the share 
of applications for invention patents (arguably, the most technically intensive) rose 
from 26 per cent in 1995 to 39 per cent in 2014. In 1995, foreign patent filings 
accounted for more than 17 per cent of total applications, but the share of foreign 
filings dropped to a mere 6 per cent in 2014. The latter suggests that indigenous 
innovation has played an increasing role in the Chinese economy. Easy approvals, 
low-quality patent filings, government subsidies, expanded market opportunities 
and responses to rising labour costs have been offered as potential reasons for this 
explosion in Chinese patents. But how do these trends compare with the patent 
gains of the economies noted in the introduction? 
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Table 8.2 Number of Chinese patent applications, 1995–2014
Year Total domestic 
applications











1995 83,045 26 53 21 17 205
1996 102,735 28 48 24 20 201
1997 114,208 29 44 27 21 178
1998 121,989 29 42 28 21 259
1999 134,239 27 43 30 18 383
2000 170,682 30 40 29 18 652
2001 203,573 31 39 30 19 846
2002 252,631 32 37 31 19 1,138
2003 308,487 34 35 30 19 1,368
2004 353,807 37 32 31 21 2,365
2005 476,264 36 29 34 20 3,258
2006 573,178 37 28 35 18 5,293
2007 693,917 35 26 39 15 6,041
2008 828,328 35 27 38 13 7,099
2009 976,686 32 32 36 10 9,766
2010 1,222,286 32 34 34 9 11,703
2011 1,633,347 32 36 32 8 14,937
2012 2,050,649 32 36 32 7 19,627
2013 2,377,061 35 37 38 6 22,008
2014 2,361,243 39 37 24 6 26,356
Annual growth rate of total number of patents in different periods (%)
1995–2004 17 22 11 23 20 31
2004–2014 21 22 23 18 7 27
1995–2014 19 22 17 20 13 29
Sources: Tabulated by the authors based on aggregate online data from SIPO (www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/) 
and WIPO (various years). 
We start by drawing a comparison between the ease of patent approval in China 
and that in other countries. Figure 8.1 shows the patent approval rate in BRICS 
countries, South Korea and the United States. The Chinese ratio of 0.5 is not 
unusually high, ceteris paribus, indicating it is not especially easy to obtain patent 
approval. Approved patents have exhibited a pattern of rapid growth similar to 
that for patent applications. The annual growth rate of patents approved by SIPO 
between 1995 and 2014 is the same as that for patent applications—that is, 
19 per cent (Table 8.3). The number of patents granted by developed countries grew 
by 28 per cent per annum during the same period. It is widely believed that Chinese 
firms, individuals and institutions tend to file high-quality patents in developed 
countries rather than with SIPO. The much more rapid growth in overseas patent 
applications signals an improvement in Chinese patent quality. 
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
184
Figure 8.1 Patent approval rates in BRICS countries, South Korea and the 
United States
Note: The approval rate is defined as grant number in T divided by application number in T–1. 
Source: WIPO (various years).
We investigate whether the rapid growth in patents reflects a low starting base. 
First,  we divide the sample into two periods, 1995–2004 and 2004–14, and 
calculate the annual growth rate for each. If a low initial value is the major cause of 
the phenomenal growth in patents then we would expect to see a lower growth rate 
in the second period, when the initial base was much larger. In fact, we observe that 
the annual growth rate for both patent filings and patent approvals in the second 
period is 4 percentage points higher than in the initial period. 
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Table 8.3 Number of patents approved by SIPO and patents granted 
to Chinese applicants from overseas patent offices, 1995–2014
Year Total domestically 
approved patents












1995 45,064 8 68 25 8 99
1996 43,780 7 62 31 9 97
1997 50,996 7 54 40 9 91
1998 67,889 7 50 43 10 95
1999 100,156 8 56 36 8 126
2000 105,345 12 52 36 10 157
2001 114,251 14 48 38 13 225
2002 132,399 16 43 40 15 334
2003 182,226 20 38 42 18 362
2004 190,238 26 37 37 20 524
2005 214,003 25 37 38 20 539
2006 268,002 22 40 38 16 847
2007 351,782 19 43 38 14 1,013
2008 411,982 23 43 34 14 1,652
2009 581,992 22 35 43 14 2,234
2010 814,825 17 42 41 9 3,434
2011 960,513 18 42 40 8 4,255
2012 1,255,138 17 46 37 7 6,433
2013 1,313,000 16 53 31 6 8,337
2014 1,302,687 18 54 28 7 10,282
Annual growth rate in different periods (%)
1995–2004 17 35 10 23 29 20
2004–2014 21 17 26 18 9 35
1995–2014 19 25 18 20 18 28
Sources: Tabulated by the authors based on aggregate online data from SIPO (www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/) 
and WIPO (various years). 
Second, we look at the trend for foreign citations of patents approved by SIPO to 
gauge the quality of domestically approved patents in China. Although SIPO does 
not count the domestic citations of Chinese patents, patents granted in developed 
countries specify all the patents cited, including those approved by SIPO. Table 
8.4 reports the number of citations of domestically approved invention and utility 
model patents in China from 1995 to 2014. During the period 1995–2004, the 
annual growth rate of foreign citations of Chinese invention patents was 34 per cent, 
and this accelerated to 49 per cent in the second period, 2004–14. The number of 
citations of utility model patents resembles that for invention patents, growing at 
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36 per cent per annum over the whole period. The growth in foreign citations of 
domestic patents even outpaces the growth of domestic patents, which suggests that 
at least a share of the Chinese patents filed are of citable quality internationally. 
Table 8.4 Foreign patents citations on Chinese domestic patents approved 
by SIPO, 1995–2014

























Source: Tabulated by authors based on WIPO (various years).
Third, we compare patents by Chinese firms approved by the USPTO with patents 
by firms from other countries approved by USPTO to investigate whether China is 
an outlier. This could help us to control for differences in quality between patents 
approved by the USPTO and those granted by SIPO. Table 8.5 presents the number 
of patents granted by the USPTO to applicants from BRICS countries, as well as 
from Germany, Japan and South Korea. Of the sampled countries, between 1995 
and 2014, China saw the fastest growth in the number of patents approved by 
the USPTO, with an annual growth rate of 28 per cent. Moreover, as the data in 
Table 8.5 reveal, the gap in the growth rate between China and the other countries 
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has widened over time. The annual growth rate of Chinese patents approved by 
the USPTO in 2004–14 reached 33 per cent, 10 percentage points higher than 
the second-placed country, India. By comparison, patents granted to South Korea, 
Germany and Japan grew by 14 per cent, 4 per cent and 4 per cent per annum, 
respectively, during the period. 
Table 8.5 Total number of patents granted by the USPTO to (corporate) 
applicants from BRICS countries, Germany, Japan and South Korea
Year China Brazil India Russia South 
Africa
Germany Japan South 
Korea
1995 62 63 37 98 123 6,600 21,764 1,161
1996 46 63 35 116 111 6,818 23,053 1,493
1997 62 62 47 111 101 7,008 23,179 1,891
1998 72 74 85 189 115 9,095 30,841 3,259
1999 90 91 112 181 110 9,337 31,104 3,562
2000 119 98 131 183 111 10,234 31,296 3,314
2001 195 110 177 234 120 11,260 33,223 3,538
2002 289 33 249 200 114 11,278 34,859 3,786
2003 297 130 341 202 112 11,444 35,517 3,944
2004 404 106 363 169 100 10,779 35,348 4,428
2005 402 77 384 148 87 9,011 30,341 4,352
2006 661 121 481 172 109 10,005 36,807 5,908
2007 772 90 546 188 82 9,051 33,354 6,295
2008 1,225 101 634 176 91 8,915 33,682 7,549
2009 1,655 103 679 196 93 9,000 35,501 8,762
2010 2,657 175 1,098 272 116 12,363 44,814 11,671
2011 3,174 215 1,234 298 123 11,920 46,139 12,262
2012 4,637 196 1,691 331 142 13,835 50,677 13,233
2013 5,928 254 2,424 417 161 15,498 51,919 14,548
2014 7,236 334 2,987 445 152 16,550 53,849 16,469
Annual growth rate in different periods (%)
1995–2004 23 6 29 6 –2 6 6 16
2004–2014 33 12 23 10 4 4 4 14
1995–2014 28 9 26 8 1 5 5 15
Note: The figures represent the total number of patents granted to applicants from these countries by 
the USPTO. 
Source: Computed by authors based on data from WIPO (various years). 
Assuming that talent is normally distributed evenly across countries, China, as 
the most populous country, enjoys a larger talent pool than other countries when 
it comes to generating innovative ideas. Its rapid growth in patents granted since 
the period of opening up and reform, both domestically and overseas, may have 
something to do with its large population size. To address this concern, we should 
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control for population size when making the international comparisons. Similarly, 
the level of economic development also matters for the total number of patents: 
wealthier countries can afford to devote more resources to R&D and face a stronger 
necessity to innovate than poor countries. Thus, we should also control for per 
capita GDP in our comparisons. 
For international comparison, we include OECD and BRICS countries in our 
sample. We regress the total number of invention patents granted by the USPTO on 
population size (log), per capita GDP (log), country fixed effects, year fixed effects 
and country × year fixed effects. Figure 8.2 plots the estimated coefficients for the 
country × year fixed effects for Japan, Germany, South Korea and BRICS countries 
versus their per capita GDP. The conditional plot reflects the time trend of patents 
approved by the USPTO from applicants in these countries after controlling for 
their population size and level of economic development. As revealed in the figure, 
along with economic growth, China has registered steady growth in invention 
patents, while other countries, with the exception of India, do not exhibit such a 
clear trend. In the sample period, India also displays a positive correlation between 
economic growth and patent growth, but China has come out ahead of India in 
terms of obtaining patent approvals from the USPTO.
Figure 8.2 Invention patents granted by the USPTO for different countries
Note: Conditional plot by controlling for population, population squared and country and year 
fixed effects. 
Sources: Based on data from OECD and, for BRICS countries, from WIPO (various years). 
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To understand the value of patents to innovators, it is useful to look at the frequency 
of citations of a patent by other patent applicants. In Figure 8.3, the total number of 
citations of patents by country in all patents granted by the USPTO in subsequent 
years (forward citations) replaces the total number of patents granted in Figure 8.2. 
Once again, China and India demonstrate a clear upward trend with GDP growth. 
Because China grew faster than India, the growth in citations of Chinese patents 
appears more remarkable in the figure. By comparison, the patterns are not apparent 
for other BRICS countries, Japan, Germany and South Korea. Importantly, if one 
fits a log linear line between patents cited and log income based on other countries’ 
experiences, the graph appears to suggest that China is awarded more patents than 
other BRICS countries (except India) and more than the comparator advanced 
countries when their income level is comparable China’s.
Figure 8.3 Citations of invention patents granted by the USPTO: 
Cross-country comparison 
Note: Conditional plot by controlling for population, population squared and country and year 
fixed effects. 
Sources: Based on data from OECD and, for BRICS countries, from WIPO (various years).
Overall, not only has the number of Chinese patents exploded, but so too has their 
quality, as measured by forward citation statistics. Chinese patent quality exhibits 
remarkable improvement over time, in absolute terms and when compared with 
other BRICS economies and leading patent-filing OECD countries. In short, the 
growth in innovation appears real and robust.
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Sources of innovation growth
What are the sources of China’s rapid growth in innovation as demonstrated by our 
analysis of China’s patent filings? There are several potential factors. Government 
support for R&D, industrial competition, market size and changes in relative prices 
(such as rising wages) have been regarded as the major drivers of innovation. In this 
section, we study each of these factors individually and collectively to explore their 
role in driving China’s recent patent success. 
First, R&D investment is a key input for patents, and the Chinese Government has 
increasingly provided large subsidies to firms in support of their R&D activities. 
To gauge the degree of such subsidies, we merge the Chinese patent database with 
the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises in China (ASIEC). The ASIEC database 
covers all SOEs and above-scale private firms with annual sales exceeding RMB5 
million from 1998 to 2009, including ownership information.3 The patent database 
contains all patents granted by SIPO between 1985 and 2012. R&D data are taken 
from the ASIEC database, which provides firm-level annual R&D subsidy data. 
Figure 8.4 plots the ratio of R&D subsidies to total sales for SOEs and for private 
firms, using data from the ASIEC firm database, and reflects a pattern that is 
similar to that when value added is used as the denominator. What is evident is that 
SOEs received a greater volume of subsidies than private firms across the period 
1998–2007 (the period for which the ASIEC data are available). Even though small 
and medium SOEs were granted more subsidies than their private counterparts, 
they generally performed poorly when compared with private firms in generating 
patents. As shown in Table 8.6, during the period 1998–2009, the number of 
patents granted to private firms grew by an annual rate of 35 per cent, overtaking 
SOEs and foreign firms by 23 and 9 percentage points, respectively. The drop in 
the share of patents held by SOEs is due mainly to the shrinkage of the SOE sector. 
In 1998, SOEs accounted for 30 per cent of the total number of firms in the ASIEC 
database, while they dropped to just 2 per cent by 2009. Because of their massive 
numbers, private firms have become the engine of innovation. 
3  While ASIEC data for 2010–14 float on the grey market, the quality appears suspect. To be conservative, we do 
not use these data in this chapter. 
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Figure 8.4 Ratio of subsidies to sales by firm ownership and size
Note: Firms are divided equally into three groups according to sales: small, medium and large. 
Source: ASIEC database, 1998–2007.
Market size has been regarded as a key driver of innovation in the literature (Acemoglu 
and Linn 2004). In the past decades, the Chinese economy has become increasingly 
integrated with the global economy, particularly since China’s 2001 accession to 
the WTO. When confronted by fierce international market competition, one way 
for export firms to maintain their competitiveness is to innovate. As revealed in 
Table 8.6 and Figure 8.5, China’s exporting firms are indeed more innovative than 
its non-exporting firms. 
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Figure 8.5 Patent intensity by firm’s export status
Note: A firm is defined as an exporter if it exports in a particular year. 
Source: Modified from Xie and Zhang (2015).
Since 2003, real wages in China have grown at a rate of more than 10 per cent 
a year. Some scholars argue that China has now passed the Lewis turning point, 
which means that the era of ultra-low wage production is over (see, for example, 
Zhang et al. 2011). Facing rising labour costs, firms exit the business, relocate to 
areas with cheaper labour and land costs or innovate. The last column of Table 8.6 
reports the share of patents granted to labour-intensive firms in China over time. 
Specifically, such firms increased their share of total patents granted, from 55 per cent 
in 1998 to 66 per cent in 2009. As shown in Figure 8.6, patent intensity—measured 
as the ratio of the number of patents granted to sales—for labour-intensive firms 
has increased, while it declined among capital-intensive firms from 2003 to 2007, 
which is around the time real wages started to spike. Rising labour costs may have 
induced labour-intensive sectors to come up with more innovations to substitute 
for labour. 
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Figure 8.6 Patent intensity by firm’s capital intensity
Note: For each year, we define a firm as capital intensive if the capital–labour ratio is greater than the 
median value. 
Source: Modified from Xie and Zhang (2015).
Of course, the above descriptions are based on bivariate correlations and, as such, 
are only suggestive. To evaluate the relative importance of the contribution of these 
factors to firms’ innovation, we now run multivariate regressions. Since many firms 
do not have patents and the patent count does not follow a log-normal distribution, 
we cannot use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions by taking the log on patent 
count. A common approach in this situation is to use a negative binomial model; 
however, all the observations with zero patents will be dropped when including firm 
fixed effects. We therefore use the hybrid binomial estimation method proposed by 
Allison (2005) as follows: first, we compute the mean values of all the explanatory 
variables, X; second, we create a set of new variables by deducting the mean values 
from the original values of X—that is, X – mean of X; third, we run a random 
negative binomial model on the patent count using these newly created variables 
as independent variables. This method is a hybrid of the fixed effect and random 
effect models, and, importantly, it largely solves the shortcomings of the conditional 
estimated fixed effect negative binomial model, which automatically drops 
observations with zero values for the outcome variable for all years. The equation we 
estimate can be written as Equation 8.1.
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Equation 8.1
Pijt = F(Salesit, Wagejt, Subsidyjt, Tax ratejt, Interest ratejt, Tariffjt, Exportit, HHjt, industry 
or firm fixed effects and year fixed effects)
In Equation 8.1, P is the number of approved patents for firm i in year t ; Sales is 
firm i’s annual sales in year t ; Wage is the average wage at the city–industry–year–
firm ownership level (excluding the firm itself ) in the cell where the firm is located; 
Subsidy is the ratio of subsidies received from the government to total sales at the 
firm level; Tax rate is the sum of income tax and value-added tax payments relative 
to total sales at the firm level in year t ; Interest rate is the ratio of total interest paid 
to the average liability this year and last year at the firm level; Tariff is the weighted 
average of trading partners’ tariff rates, based on matching product-level tariff data 
from the United Nations’ Comtrade database with firm i’s Standard Industrial 
Classification two-digit (SIC-2) code (computed at the industry–year level);4 Export 
is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has positive exports in year t ; and 
HH is the Herfindahl–Hirschman (HH) index at the industry–year level.5 
Many of the regressors are undoubtedly endogenous. In the spirit of an instrumental 
variable approach, we replace the wage rate, subsidy rate, tax rate and interest rate 
from firm–year specific values with the average values of all other firms in the same 
cell of city–industry–ownership type–year. The idea (or assumption) is that the 
average values of all other firms in the same cell will more likely reflect local labour 
market conditions (in the case of wages) or local policy designs (in the case of the 
other three variables). To do this exercise, we also drop all cells with fewer than 
five observations. Note that we regard the tariff variable as exogenous since it is 
the average of trading partners’ tariff rates, which are unlikely to be systematically 
manipulated by individual firms in China.
Table 8.7 reports the hybrid negative binomial regression estimates.6 Several 
findings are apparent from the results. First, firm size, measured by sales, is positively 
associated with the number of patents approved. Unsurprisingly, larger firms tend 
to have more patents approved. Second, exporting firms are more innovative than 
non-exporting firms. We refrain from assigning a causal interpretation to these two 
coefficients; the positive correlations between firm size and level of innovation and 
between export status and level of innovation could reflect causal effects in either 
direction (and probably in both directions) and these are not empirically explored 
herein. We have simply treated these regressors as control variables.
4  We use Standard Industrial Classification two-digit (SIC-2) code mainly to improve the matching rate. 
5  The HH index is calculated via the following steps: 1) for every four-digit industry and year t, compute each 
firm’s market share; 2) for every four-digit industry and year t, sum the square of each firm’s market share. 
The higher the HH index, the lower is the degree of competition. 
6  As robustness checks, we have implemented other specifications as well, such as the fixed effect negative 
binomial model, the random effect negative binomial model and the fixed effect ordinal linear probability 
model. The coefficients for most variables are qualitatively similar and therefore robust. 
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Sales (log) 0.437*** 0.491*** 0.435*** 0.424***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.019)
Export 0.115*** 0.181*** 0.071** 0.157***
(0.022) (0.045) (0.028) (0.036)
Wage (log) 0.082*** 0.224*** 0.137*** 0.072*
(0.027) (0.050) (0.034) (0.042)
Subsidy rate (log) 0.003 0.045*** 0.003 0.010
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Tax rate (log) –0.073*** –0.066** –0.085*** –0.036
(0.017) (0.032) (0.021) (0.027)
Interest rate (log) –0.025** 0.010 –0.042*** –0.036**
(0.010) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016)
Partner tariff –1.048*** –0.843*** –1.123*** –0.482***
(0.078) (0.146) (0.115) (0.118)
HH index 0.143 –0.087 0.541** 0.358
(0.224) (0.425) (0.267) (0.328)
Observations 1,187,140 1,187,140 1,187,140 1,187,140
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 438,522 114,137 270,400 213,959
*** represents 1% significant level. 
Notes: Wage (log), Subsidy rate (log), Tax rate (log) and Interest rate (log) are averages at the city–
industry–firm ownership type–year levels (except for the firm itself). Cells with fewer than six observations 
are dropped. Sales (log) and Export are still firm–year levels. 
Third, lower import tariffs are positively associated with firms’ innovation through 
the expansion of international markets for Chinese products. Because foreign tariffs 
are (largely) exogenous, we interpret this coefficient as reflecting a causal effect: 
the expansion of international markets or export opportunities induces firms to 
be more innovative. Results in Table 8.7 suggest that a reduction by 1 per cent 
in the weighted average of the partner firms’ tariff rates in the relevant industry is 
associated, on average, with a 1 per cent increase in the number of patents granted.
Fourth, in terms of the effects of fiscal subsidies, there is some evidence that invention 
patents are positively associated with R&D subsidies, but the relationships therein 
for utility and design patents are not statistically significant. Since invention patents 
are often regarded as ‘more innovative’ than the other types, one cannot rule out the 
possibility that firms’ innovative activities respond to fiscal incentives.
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Meanwhile, a higher tax rate is negatively associated with innovation; the coefficients 
on the tax rate are negative in all four columns, but statistically significant for all 
patents combined, and individually for invention and utility patents. 
Fifth, higher capital costs as measured by a higher implied interest rate are negatively 
associated with many types of innovative activities; the coefficients on log interest 
rates are negative and statistically significant for all patents, and for utility and 
design patents. 
Finally, there is a robust positive relationship between the wage level and firms’ 
innovation. If our strategy of using the average wages of all other firms in the same 
cell to replace individual firms’ own wages succeeds in removing endogeneity, one 
might interpret the coefficient as saying that firms, on average, rise to the challenge 
of higher labour costs by engaging in more innovation. Of course, innovative 
industries tend to hire more skilled workers than less innovative industries. 
In general, skilled workers earn more than unskilled workers, and thereby could 
produce a positive correlation between average wages and firms’ level of innovation 
at the industry level. Note that our regressions in Table 8.7 include separate firm 
and year fixed effects (therefore subsuming separate industry fixed effects). So the 
endogeneity has to come at the levels of industry–city–ownership–year. Nonetheless, 
to further remove endogeneity, we replace current average wages with those of others 
firms in the same cell by its lagged value, and find qualitatively the same results 
(see Appendix Table 8.A1). As a robustness check, we use the minimum wages at 
the city–year levels to replace the average wage of other firms in the same cell, and 
again find the same qualitative results (see Appendix Table 8.A2). 
An absolute-level wage increase, however, presents a different relative cost shock 
to firms in labour-intensive and other industries. To explore this feature, we now 
add an interaction term between the average wage of other firms in the same cell 
and a dummy indicating that the industry in which the firm operates has a labour 
intensity (labour cost as a share of total cost) above the median at the beginning 
of the sample. Table 8.8 displays the estimation results. The coefficient for the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant among three out of four 
regressions (for total patents, and for invention and design patents). These results 
are consistent with the induced innovation theory that suggests that rising labour 
costs induce labour-intensive firms to become more innovative to survive. The 
results in Table 8.8 are robust to the use of alternative wage variables (either lagged 
wages or legal minimum wages). To save space, the estimates using lagged wages and 
minimum wages are not reported here.
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0.163*** 0.695*** –0.042 0.174***
(0.038) (0.073) (0.052) (0.059)
Sales (log) 0.436*** 0.483*** 0.433*** 0.425***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.019)
Export 0.108*** 0.162*** 0.064** 0.153***
(0.022) (0.045) (0.028) (0.036)
Wage (log) 0.010 –0.101* 0.184*** 0.007
(0.034) (0.061) (0.050) (0.051)
Subsidy rate (log) 0.006 0.044*** 0.008 0.012
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Tax rate (log) –0.068*** –0.032 –0.082*** –0.031
(0.017) (0.033) (0.021) (0.027)
Interest rate (log) –0.022** 0.021 –0.040*** –0.035**
(0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017)
Partner tariff –1.138*** –1.091*** –1.141*** –0.475***
(0.082) (0.148) (0.120) (0.122)
HH index 0.260 -0.090 0.597** 0.456
(0.223) (0.423) (0.265) (0.327)
Observations 1,187,140 1,187,140 1,187,140 1,187,140
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 436,557 114,023 266,115 213,652
** represents 5% significant level
*** represents 1% significant level. 
Notes: Wage (log), Subsidy rate (log), Tax rate (log) and Interest rate (log) are averages at the city–
industry–firm ownership type–year levels (except for the firm itself). Cells with fewer than six observations 
are dropped. Sales (log) and Export are still firm–year levels. The dependent variable is the patent count. 
Hybrid negative binomial regression is used. See Qu et al. (2013) for the definition of labour-intensive 
industries.
Studies (Autor et al. 2003) have shown that computer technology has reduced the 
demand for jobs involving routine tasks. Following Autor et al. (2003), we create 
a dummy variable, ‘routine’, indicating whether an industry involves more routine 
tasks (1) or not (0). We expect to see firms facing rising labour costs and heavily 
involved in routine tasks, which are often done by low-skilled workers, to be more 
innovative for the purpose of substituting technology for labour. Similar to Table 8.7, 
we use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to examine the impact of rising 
wages on routine task–intensive industries by including an interaction term between 
wages and a ‘routine’ dummy. As shown in Panel A of Table 8.9, the coefficient for 
the interaction term is statistically significant in all four regressions. In other words, 
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in the presence of rising wages, the survival of firms (i.e. their ability to continue to 
produce) is linked to enhanced innovation, possibly by those firms taking advantage 
of computer technologies to replace labour in undertaking ‘routine’ tasks. 
Table 8.9 Impact of wages on levels of innovation in routine-intensive 









Panel A: Impact on routine-intensive industries
Wage (log)*Routine 0.490*** 0.992*** 0.237*** 0.759***
(0.048) (0.089) (0.082) (0.072)
Panel B: Impact on sunset industries
Wage (log)*Sunset 0.040 –0.222*** –0.058 0.089
(0.040) (0.072) (0.052) (0.064)
*** represents 1% significant level. 
Notes: Hybrid negative binomial regression estimates. Routine industries are defined according 
to Autor et al. (2003).
When facing rising labour costs, there are two possible routes for labour-intensive 
industries to take. In industries where innovation is possible, firms must innovate 
to survive. In industries in which international experience suggests that innovation 
is difficult (sunset industries), exit or closure is the likely outcome. In the sunset 
industries, with a dwindling market share, firms may be reluctant to make R&D 
investment for fear of failure to recoup the cost. 
We define sunset industries in the case of China as follows: first, we select the top 40 
economies according to GDP in 2000, excluding China. Next, we narrow the list 
by keeping countries with GDP per capita 1.5 times larger than that of China and 
lower than US$12,000 (constant in 2005). The remaining list includes Argentina, 
Brazil, Czech Republic, Mexico, Yemen, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Venezuela and 
Zambia. Third, using these economies as a reference point, we calculate the annual 
growth rate of each industry by country and obtain the aggregate growth rate for 
all countries in the list using GDP as a weight. An industry is defined as a sunset 
industry if its average growth rate during the period 1998–2007 is below the median 
growth rate among all industries. 
Panel B of Table 8.9 shows the estimates for the interaction term between wages 
and the ‘sunset’ industry dummy. The coefficient is statistically negative only in the 
regression on invention patents. Invention patents normally involve more R&D 
input than utility model and design patents. The results are robust when using 
lagged values of minimum wages in the interaction term. When market prospects 
loom large, the surviving firms in the sunset industries are less likely to make large 
investments in R&D, thereby yielding fewer invention patents than other industries. 
Like the economies that are slightly richer than China, firms in the sunset industries 
in China will likely experience slower growth and will eventually be replaced with 
sunrise industries. 
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From quality improvement to export success
A rise in labour costs means a shift in comparative advantage, away from products 
that are intensive in unskilled labour. Chinese firms can maintain or increase their 
shares in the global market only through sufficient increases in productivity or 
product quality to offset rising labour costs. While this exercise does not use patent 
data, one might consider it an examination of quality improvement and innovation 
broadly defined. Here we examine whether the rapid growth in patents and in 
innovation in general has been transformed into export success.
Product quality is not directly observed in standard trade statistics. We measure 
export quality following the methodology originally proposed by Khandelwal 
(2010) and outlined in Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) (Equation 8.2). 
Equation 8.2
In Equation 8.2, i is the exporting country, j is the importing (or destination) 
country, k is the six-digit Harmonised System (HS) product code and t denotes 
year, covering the period 1995–2014. Market shares and unit values are defined in 
Equation 8.3.
Equation 8.3
Since the unit value is influenced by many factors, such as global resource prices, it 
may not purely reflect production quality. To remove the impact of sector-specific 
shocks on unit values, we standardise the unit value by subtracting the median unit 
value at the sector level—that is, Standardised log Unit valueijkt = log Unit valueijkt – 
Median log Unit valueijkt. 
We select the 40 largest economies in our sample as measured by absolute GDP. 
The findings are similar when using different samples, such as G20 economies or the 
top 70 economies measured in GDP. The group of importer countries is the same 
as the exporter countries, except for the BRICS countries, Germany, South Korea, 
Japan and the United States. The product group consists of China’s top 500 export 
products in 2000, according to values. β1it is the coefficient of interest to us.
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We plot the estimated coefficient β1it versus per capita GDP for nine countries of 
interest (Germany, Japan, South Korea, the United States and the BRICS economies) 
in Figure 8.7. Among the countries, China, India and Germany have gained export 
market share as their economies grow. The other three BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia and South Africa), Japan, South Korea and the United States saw a decline in 
export market share during the period. Based on the measure of conditional export 
market share, Chinese product quality has shown a steady improvement. 
Figure 8.7 Export quality: Conditional plot of export market shares 
in selected countries
Note: The sample used in this figure covers G40 countries. 
Source: Data from CEPII’s BACI database (www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=1). 
Misallocation of R&D resources
Because state-owned firms still command non-trivial political weights and absorb 
non-trivial levels of resources, including government subsidies, in this section, we 
study the scope for China to improve the allocation efficiency of its R&D resources 
between SOEs and private firms. 
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Following the SOE reforms in the late 1990s, the share of SOEs in the overall 
number of firms dropped significantly, from 18.1 per cent (or 744,240 SOEs out 
of 4,102,757 firms) in 1995 to 0.4 per cent (or 61,204 out of 15,300,901 firms) 
in 2014 (Table 8.1). Almost all small SOEs were closed or privatised during the 
government’s ‘grasp the large, let go of the small’ program. Most of the surviving 
SOEs are relatively large and are in upstream industries or strategically important 
sectors (Hsieh and Song 2015). They are subject to less competition than private 
enterprises, and, in addition, they receive more financial support from the 
government, such as bank loans and R&D subsidies.  
Moreover, in the aftermath of both the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 
GFC, the Chinese Government launched stimulus packages with massive liquidity 
injections into the economy, which were directed disproportionately to SOEs. The 
more favourable policies and massive stimulus funds have reduced the returns to 
capital of SOEs since 2008 (Bai and Zhang 2014), causing a decline in total factor 
productivity (TFP) in SOEs (Wu 2013) and providing a lifeline for inefficient 
zombie firms (Tan et al. 2016). Although the labour productivity of the remaining 
large SOEs converged to that of private enterprises, SOEs’ returns to capital were 
still much lower than their private counterparts (Hsieh and Song 2015). Overall, 
SOEs lagged behind private firms in TFP (Brandt 2015). 
As reviewed in Boeing (2016), most studies find that the government’s R&D 
subsidies play a positive role in driving firms’ levels of innovation. However, the 
finding does not imply that R&D subsidies have been allocated efficiently. Although, 
on average, SOEs received more R&D subsidies than private firms, private firms 
have experienced much faster growth in the number of approved patents than 
their SOE counterparts during the period 1998–2009, as shown in Table 8.6. This 
suggests that there are misallocations of R&D subsidies between SOEs and private 
enterprises.
As shown in Figure 8.4, SOEs, especially medium-sized and small SOEs, receive 
more subsidies per renminbi of sales than their private sector counterparts. This 
likely reflects subsidies from local governments to the SOEs they own. Large private 
firms and SOEs appear to be treated equally, reflecting both the fact that the central 
government offers less subsidies than do local governments and the fact that large 
private firms are perhaps more effective in obtaining a ‘fair’ share of subsidies. When 
looking at tax rates, we find that SOEs tend to also experience a higher effective tax 
rate [(income tax + value-added tax)/sales] than their private sector counterparts 
(see Figure 8.8). In fact, total taxes net of total subsidies tend to be higher for SOEs, 
and especially for large SOEs (Figure 8.9). 
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R&D (log)*FIE –0.006 –0.006 0.002 –0.014** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
R&D (log)*SOE –0.010** –0.017** –0.004 –0.014
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
R&D (log) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Sales (log) 0.278*** 0.314*** 0.259*** 0.305***
(0.022) (0.040) (0.027) (0.037)
Constant –5.558*** –7.135*** –4.979*** –6.414***
(0.071) (0.118) (0.088) (0.116)
Observations 783,229 783,229 783,229 783,229
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC)
298,065 92,655 190,331 134,819
** represents 5% significant level
*** represents 1% significant level
Note: Wage (log), Subsidy rate (log), Tax rate (log) and Interest rate (log) are averages at the city–
industry–firm ownership type–year levels (except for the firm itself). Cells with fewer than six observations 
are dropped. Sales (log) and Export are still firm–year levels. Since R&D data are available only for 
2005–09, we include only these four years in the sample.
Table 8.10 presents the results of a regression of the patent count on firm R&D 
expenditure by controlling for firm sales, firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. To 
evaluate whether private firms and SOEs have different elasticity regarding R&D 
expenditure, we interact firm ownership with R&D expenditure in the regressions. 
The interaction term between the SOE dummy and the R&D variable is statistically 
negative, indicating that the elasticity of patents granted with respect to R&D 
expenditure is significantly higher for private firms than for SOEs. In other words, 
SOEs have not spent R&D resources as efficiently as have private firms. On the 
surface, there is prima facie evidence that the pattern of subsidies across firms 
represents resource misallocation. The economy-wide innovative outcomes would 
have been higher if the subsidies were more evenly spread across firm ownership.
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Figure 8.8 Tax rate by firm ownership and size
Note: The tax rate is defined as [(income tax + value-added tax)/sales]. According to sales, firms are 
divided equally into three groups: small, medium and large. 
Source: Calculated by the authors based on ASIEC database.
Since subsidies and taxes use different bases, distortions are introduced if one 
renminbi of tax is offset by one renminbi of subsidy. Considering a lower tax rate is 
associated with higher levels of firm innovation, the impact of subsidies is lukewarm 
and private firms use R&D expenditure more efficiently than SOEs, it makes 
economic sense to promote reforms to: 1) simultaneously reduce tax rates and 
subsidies (with zero impact on government net revenue); and 2) provide subsidies 
only in cases where the social returns exceed private returns (such as innovative 
activities), without regard to firm ownership type.
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Figure 8.9 Net tax rate by firm ownership and size
Note: The net tax rate is defined as [(income tax + value-added tax – subsidy)/sales]. According to 
sales, firms are divided equally into three groups: small, medium and large. 
Source: Calculated by the authors based on ASIEC database.
Conclusions
China’s past success in economic growth means that the real manufacturing wage has 
increased by about 14-fold from 1980 to 2015. A shrinking workforce since 2011 
has added to pressure on wages. By implication, China has to move to a growth 
model that is based more on innovation and productivity increases than in the past. 
Can China rise to the challenge?
By examining indicators on patents, our chapter shows that Chinese firms have 
become increasingly more innovative, in absolute terms and also relative to other 
major developing economies and major patent-filing economies. Specifically, the 
growth of patents granted to Chinese firms both at home and in the United States 
compares favourably with the experience of other BRICS countries and leading 
OECD countries, once one takes into account the country’s size and income level. 
Taking advantage of the expanding global market and responding to rising labour 
costs are the two most important drivers of firms’ levels of innovation. 
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Besides the correlation between firm size and level of innovation, and between 
export status and level of innovation, we find a number of patterns. First, expanding 
market opportunities in the form of lower tariffs from trading partners tend to 
promote innovation. Second, firms respond to higher wages by engaging in more 
innovation. This is especially true for firms in labour-intensive sectors and sectors 
with more routine tasks. This pattern suggests some reason for optimism in terms 
of the prospect of Chinese firms becoming more innovative as the country’s income 
continues to rise. Third, Chinese products have taken an increasingly large market 
share after controlling for population size, economy size and the unit values of export 
products. The increasing competitiveness of Chinese products in the international 
market suggests that Chinese products have exhibited quality improvement over time.
There is some evidence that innovation responds positively to subsidies and negatively 
to taxes; however, subsidy allocation appears to be strongly biased in favour of 
SOEs, especially those owned by local governments. Yet, private sector firms exhibit 
a higher rate of innovation per renminbi invested in R&D than SOEs. If subsidies 
are meant to encourage innovation, the economy-wide innovation outcomes would 
have been greater if the bias towards SOEs in subsidy allocation was removed. 
At the same time, the effective tax rate appears to vary not only across sectors, but 
also across firms. Interestingly, SOEs appear to face higher tax rates than private 
firms. Even after subtracting subsidies, SOEs—in particular, large ones—are still 
subject to higher tax burdens than private firms. This creates additional distortions. 
The desired direction of reforms is likely in the form of simultaneous reductions 
in subsidies and taxes and more uniform treatment of firms across ownership type. 
Levelling the playing field for firms of all ownership type, limiting the government’s 
discretion in allocating subsidies for R&D and ensuring private sector firms have 
a fair chance at receiving those subsidies would reduce resource misallocation and 
improve efficiency. This will complement reforms strengthening protection of 
intellectual property rights and to the education system.
Patents are just one form of firm innovation. Some firms keep their business secrets 
and do not file patents for their product or production process innovations. In 
addition, business model innovations have been widely observed, but these types 
of innovation are not discussed in this chapter. More research is needed so that the 
comprehensive contributions of innovation to economic growth can be assessed. 
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Appendix 8.1. Data
The export data come from the BACI database developed by the French Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (Centre for Prospective 
Studies and International Information, CEPII) at a high level of product 
disaggregation. Original data are provided by the United Nations Statistical 
Division’s Comtrade database. BACI is constructed using an original procedure that 
reconciles the declarations of the exporter and the importer. This harmonisation 
procedure considerably extends the number of countries for which trade data 
are available, compared with the original dataset. BACI provides bilateral values 
and quantities of  exports at the HS six-digit product disaggregation for more 
than 200 countries since 1995. It is updated every year. For more information, see: 
www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1. 
The authors tabulated the total number of existing firms and new firms based 
on China’s company registry database. The patent data used for international 
comparison come from WIPO and the USPTO.  
The data used in regression tables are based on a merged firm patent database 
(1998–2009) of the national patent database from SIPO and the database of 
the ASIEC. 
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Sales (log) 0.419*** 0.454*** 0.418*** 0.416***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.016) (0.021)
Export 0.119*** 0.172*** 0.065** 0.161***
(0.025) (0.049) (0.031) (0.041)
Lag wage (log) 0.510*** 0.890*** 0.790*** 0.541***
(0.058) (0.113) (0.074) (0.090)
Subsidy rate (log) –0.007 0.033*** –0.009 –0.003
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010)
Tax rate (log) –0.067*** –0.057 –0.080*** –0.036
(0.020) (0.036) (0.025) (0.032)
Interest rate (log) –0.018 0.017 –0.034** –0.031*
(0.011) (0.021) (0.014) (0.019)
Partner tariff –0.850*** –0.314* –0.666*** –0.454***
(0.091) (0.171) (0.131) (0.140)










HH index 0.238 –0.092 0.622** 0.337
(0.240) (0.429) (0.279) (0.361)
Observations 984,517 984,517 984,517 984,517
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 368,333 99,218 229,716 173,836
* represents 10% significant level
** represents 5% significant level
*** represents 1% significant level
Notes: Wage (log), Subsidy rate (log), Tax rate (log) and Interest rate (log) are averages at the city–
industry–firm ownership type–year levels (except for the firm itself). Cells with fewer than six observations 
are dropped. Sales (log) and Export are still firm–year levels. The value of the wage variable is lagged 
by one year. 










Sales (log) 0.430*** 0.441*** 0.434*** 0.435***
(1.126) (2.186) (1.424) (1.793)
Export 0.104*** 0.172*** 0.065** 0.148***
(2.208) (4.351) (2.772) (3.559)
Minimum wage (log) 0.318*** 0.484*** 0.607*** 0.371***
(4.890) (9.569) (6.354) (7.597)
Subsidy rate (log) –0.003 0.017* –0.005 –0.013
(0.526) (0.978) (0.664) (0.859)
Tax rate (log) 0.050** 0.115*** 0.026 0.053*
(1.994) (3.774) (2.523) (3.130)
Interest rate (log) –0.012 –0.006 –0.040*** 0.014
(1.140) (2.277) (1.407) (1.829)
Partner tariff –9.156*** –6.279** –8.354*** –4.772***
(112.564) (258.170) (184.781) (127.120)
HH index 0.358 0.085 0.486* 0.517
(21.901) (38.670) (26.178) (33.429)
Observations 1,305,376 1,305,376 1,305,376 1,305,376
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 461,094 124,633 283,566 217,422
* represents 10% significant level
** represents 5% significant level
*** represents 1% significant level
Notes: Wage (log), Subsidy rate (log), Tax rate (log) and Interest rate (log) are averages at the city–industry–
firm ownership type–year levels (except for the firm itself). Cells with fewer than six observations are 
dropped. Sales (log) and Export are still firm–year levels. Minimum wages are at the city and year levels.
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9. Productivity, Innovation and China’s 
Economic Growth
Yanrui Wu, Xiumei Guo and Dora Marinova
The role of productivity and innovation in China’s economic growth is fiercely 
debated among economists.1 With the economy currently progressing through the 
middle-income stages, China is forced to confront difficult areas of restructuring, 
and this has intensified that debate. Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
Chinese policymakers opted to make innovation and entrepreneurship new drivers 
of economic growth over coming decades.2 This policy shift has merely intensified 
the debate about and research on productivity growth and innovation in China. 
This chapter presents an updated literature review and provides new estimates of 
productivity growth, innovation and efficiency changes in the Chinese economy. 
In addition, it explores what can be learnt from China’s recent experience and 
how economic growth may be sustained through innovation and productivity 
improvement.
The chapter begins with a brief review of the literature on productivity growth 
analysis, before discussion of the literature on innovation and catch-up. Recent 
extensions in the field are investigated in the third section and new estimates of 
productivity growth at the sector level are reported in section four. Section five 
presents a comparison of productivity performance between coastal and non-coastal 
areas, while section six offers concluding remarks.
Productivity growth analysis
According to the traditional growth accounting framework, economic growth in 
a society arises as a result of changes in production inputs and technological progress 
(Solow 1957). The latter is also known as productivity or total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth. Consider the following Cobb–Douglas production function 
(Equation 9.1).
Equation 9.1
y = Ak αl β
1  For comprehensive literature surveys, see Wu (2011); Tian and Yu (2012); and Zhang (2016).
2  For reviews of China’s innovation capacity and development, refer to Wu (2012); and Fan (2014).
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In Equation 9.1, it is assumed that capital (k) and labour (l ) are employed to 
produce output (y) in the production process; α and β are the capital and labour 
income shares, respectively; and A provides a measure of productivity. Equation 9.1 
can be converted into the following growth rate format (Equation 9.2).
Equation 9.2
In Equation 9.2, the superscript dot indicates the rate of growth and tfp is total 
factor productivity. Equation 9.2 implies that TFP growth is defined as the residual 
of output growth that is unexplained by input changes. Given this equation, 
conventionally, at least three terms—namely, TFP growth, technical change and 
technological progress—are used interchangeably by economists. 
Many authors have followed this practice in their empirical analysis of the 
Chinese economy. For example, Wu (1993) presented a comprehensive survey of 
the relevant literature published up to and including 1992. A follow-up survey 
covering the period from 1993 reported 151 TFP growth estimates for the Chinese 
economy (Wu 2011). Wu (2011) observed substantial variation in the estimated 
TFP growth rates across the 74 studies reviewed, and derived a mean TFP growth 
rate of 3.62 per cent. That rate accounts for about one-third of China’s average rate of 
economic growth during the period under study. Adopting a meta-analysis method, 
the study also demonstrated that the manufacturing sector in China outperforms 
agriculture in terms of TFP growth. An interesting additional observation by 
Wu  (2011) was his claim that English-language journal articles tend to report 
relatively high TFP growth rates compared with those in Chinese. 
Since the review by Wu (2011), more empirical studies have emerged in the literature. 
Zhu (2012) studied the period 1978–2007 and concluded that TFP growth was 
responsible for about 78 per cent of China’s per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth over those years. Morrison (2013) reported annual TFP growth 
rates rose from about 4 per cent in 2000 to a peak of around 9 per cent in 2007. 
From 2008 to 2012, however, Morrison (2013) found that TFP growth showed 
a  sustained downward trend. International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists 
Anand et al. (2014) also observed this inverted-U shaped pattern of TFP growth in 
a comparative study of China, India and economies of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Five (ASEAN-5). In particular, they considered capital utilisation. 
Their argument is that rapidly declining capital utilisation could lead to biased 
estimates of TFP growth. They identified that the observed inverted-U shape in the 
case without considering capital utilisation is much flatter than that with capital 
utilisation being adjusted. 
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Wang et al. (2013) estimated agricultural productivity growth using provincial data 
for the period 1985–2007 and found that TFP growth was responsible for more 
than 50 per cent of China’s agricultural growth, with the coastal regions enjoying 
relatively faster productivity growth than non-coastal areas. They also found, 
however, that TFP growth showed a downward trend over time. Du et al. (2014) 
examined firm-level data for the period 1998–2007 and reported that TFP growth 
tended to decline over time, and approached zero at the end of their sample period. 
They argued that this situation was due to resource misallocation between the state 
and non-state sectors on the one hand, and reduction in technological progress in 
surviving firms on the other. 
More recent studies include Yao (2015), H. Wu (2016) and Mallick (2017). 
Yao  (2015) demonstrated that economic reform and the policy of opening up 
boosted China’s productivity growth significantly, but this growth shows a declining 
trend over time and especially during the GFC. H. Wu (2016), on the other hand, 
found that TFP growth has played a minor role in China’s economic growth, and 
TFP growth had even turned negative during the period 2007–12. Mallick (2017) 
compared China with India and showed that the contribution of TFP growth 
is substantial in China, but tends to decline over time. 
Overall, research findings in the existing literature on the role of TFP in China’s 
economic growth are mixed. But there is one consensus in the literature: most 
authors observed that China’s TFP growth declined during the GFC. Maliszewski 
and Zhang (2015) drew comparison between this decline and that during the East 
Asian Financial Crisis in the 1990s. Lai (2015) claimed this productivity slowdown 
was responsible for China’s slow economic growth in recent years. 
Innovation and catch-up
The conventional concept of TFP growth has been extended to distinguish between 
innovation or technological progress and efficiency change or catch-up since the 
work of Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Battese 
and Corra (1977), to cite a few. In the extended framework, innovation refers to 
the shift of the production frontier while efficiency change captures movement 
towards best practice or the production frontier (Nishimizu and Page 1982; Lau and 
Brada 1990). The sum of the rates of technological progress and efficiency change 
gives the rate of TFP growth. In other words, TFP growth is decomposable into 
two components: technological progress and efficiency change. Since the 1980s, 
a large pool of literature has adopted this concept. Lovell (1996) and Greene (1997) 
provide reviews of that literature. The decomposition method has also been applied 
to analyse productivity growth in the Chinese economy. Wu (1995) was one of the 
earlier studies to use China’s regional data, and showed technological progress to be 
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the main driver of TFP growth in farming and rural and urban industries. He also 
observed variations across sectors as well as among China’s three regions—namely, 
the coastal, central and western regions. Wu (2011) reviewed the earlier literature. 
Recently, Li et al. (2011) investigated the source of TFP growth in Chinese 
agriculture and found significant productivity growth since the 1980s. They pointed 
out that since the 1980s this growth has been driven mainly by technological 
progress. Ma et al. (2013) derived a similar conclusion by analysing micro-level 
data. You  and  Sarantis (2013) observed that rural transformation or efficiency 
improvement has made an important contribution to TFP growth; however, its 
importance has declined over time and that of technological progress has increased. 
Gao (2015) adopted a data envelopment analysis approach and examined agricultural 
TFP by using regional data for the period 1992–2012, reaching a conclusion that 
confirms the findings by Li et al. (2011) and Ma et al. (2013). 
Wang and Szirmai (2013) found that efficiency changes dominated industrial 
productivity growth in the 1980s while technological progress played the major 
role in the 1990s. This is consistent with the conclusion about China’s rural 
sector by You and Sarantis (2013). Zhang et al. (2014) drew attention to the 
declining trend in the contribution of TFP to economic growth during the period 
1978–2012, and raised the important related question of the sustainability of 
economic growth in China. 
More recently, Han and Shen (2015) adopted the data envelopment method and 
showed an annual TFP growth rate of 5.9 per cent over the period 1990–2009. 
This  growth is dominated by the rate of technological progress: 5.5 per cent. 
However, Yu et al. (2015) argued that China’s catch-up process is characterised by 
‘creative restructuring’ (or efficiency improvement) rather than ‘creative destruction’ 
(or innovation). Curtis (2016) argued that relocation of resources could account 
for 21.5 points of TFP growth during 1992–97. In sum, the views of the research 
community as to the role of technological progress and efficiency changes are varied 
overall. However, more evidence appears to support the idea that technological 
progress has dominated TFP growth in the Chinese economy in recent decades and 
that TFP growth tends to decline over time, particularly during the GFC.
Extensions
New growth theory recognises the role of non-traditional production factors such 
as human capital and research and development (R&D) spending in the growth 
process. A stream of literature has adopted new growth theory ideas in case studies 
on the Chinese economy. Wang and Yao (2003) were probably the first to provide 
human capital estimates for the period 1952–99 with incorporated human capital 
growth accounting. They found that rapid human capital accumulation and related 
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productivity growth that arose during China’s reform period (1978–99) made 
a positive contribution to economic growth. Ding and Knight (2011) found a positive 
impact of human capital formation on economic growth. Wei and Hao (2011) 
examined the role of human capital in China’s TFP growth and found a significantly 
positive effect from human capital on provincial TFP growth during 1985–2004. 
The effect of human capital, however, is found to vary between the coastal, central 
and western regions. Luckstead et al. (2014) showed that human capital accounted 
for an average 24 per cent of TFP growth over the period 1952–78 and 42 per cent 
for the period 1979–2000. Chen and Funke (2013) explained how a sequencing 
of physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation and innovation has 
driven China’s growth since the 1980s. 
A secondary body of research explores how additional variables have affected 
China’s TFP growth. For example, Jiang (2011) found a negative relationship 
between regional openness and TFP growth. Later, however, Yu (2015) found 
tariff reduction was responsible for at least 14.5 per cent of China’s economy-wide 
productivity growth. Lin et al. (2011) explored the relationship between foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and regional productivity, concluding that the overall effect 
of FDI on productivity is positive, especially in coastal regions. Hong and Sun 
(2011) support this finding. Choi et al. (2015) considered environmentally sensitive 
productivity growth, the rate of which is found to be low and relatively constant in 
China. They also observed that related productivity growth has been driven mainly 
by innovation.
Hu (2001) analysed firm-level data and found a strong link between private 
R&D and firm productivity. Ljungwall and Tingvall’s (2015) meta-analysis of the 
literature on the effects of R&D spending on economic growth in a large number 
of economies, however, finds that R&D spending in China has weaker impacts on 
economic growth than it does in other economies—both Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries—covered in 
the literature. Their finding is supported to some extent by Boeing et al. (2016), 
who provided micro-level evidence in their finding that a strong increase in patent 
stock is linked with a falling positive or even vanishing influence on TFP in listed 
Chinese firms. Boeing et al. (2016) are, however, disputed by Fang et al. (2016), 
who also used firm-level data. The latter analysis used propensity-score matching 
methods to demonstrate the link between intra-firm increases in patent stock and 
TFP growth.
Finally, scholars have also derived estimates of intangible capital in China and 
examined the related contribution to productivity growth. Intangible capital 
generally refers to knowledge embedded in intangible products or processes (Li and 
Wu forthcoming). Examples include software, R&D, designs and advertising. 
Hulten and Hao (2012) were probably the first to derive these, and they showed 
that about one-sixth of productivity growth was due to intangibles during 2000–08. 
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Li and Wu (forthcoming) looked at the role of intangible capital at the provincial 
level and concluded that TFP growth estimates would be biased if intangibles 
were not considered. They observed the decline in TFP growth during the GFC; 
however, Li and Wu also noticed that both human capital deepening and intangible 
capital deepening played a greater role during the GFC than before it. Fleisher 
et al. (2015) presented evidence at the micro level that showed that investment 
in knowledge capital is productivity enhancing among domestically owned and 
foreign-invested firms. 
Growth accounting estimates
To identify new evidence on productivity growth and technological progress using 
the latest statistics at both the sector and the regional level, we study productivity and 
economic growth sources using a growth accounting framework. The framework we 
adopt takes Equations 9.1 and 9.2 and extends them with the inclusion of a time 
trend in the production function. The coefficient (δ) of the time trend measures 
the rate of technological progress. The difference between TFP growth rates and δ 
gives an indication of efficiency changes ( ). The underlying model is essentially 
a deterministic one (Aigner and Chu 1968). Given this definition, Equation 9.2 
expands as follows (Equation 9.3).
Equation 9.3
To estimate the right-hand side components of Equation 9.3, panel data from 
31 Chinese provinces covering the period 1991–2015 are compiled. The raw 
data are sourced from China’s Statistical Yearbooks (NBS various issues). Output 
(y) is measured by value added in three sectors—agriculture, manufacturing and 
services—at the provincial level. Capital stock (k) estimates are described in Y. Wu 
(2016), who adopted region-specific and sector-specific rates of capital depreciation. 
Both output and capital stock are expressed in constant prices. Labour (l ) is 
measured by the year-end employment numbers because information for the actual 
hours worked is not available. 
In the empirical exercises, period-specific dummy variables are included in the 
production function to capture possible variations in the values of δ, α and β over 
three subperiods: the 1990s, the 2000s and the period of the GFC. This division 
is to ensure that the subsamples have approximately equal size. In addition, the 
three eight-year subperiods coincide with major reform campaigns—starting in 
1992 with Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’, China’s accession into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2001 and the period including and following 
the GFC (since 2008). These major events or policy changes may have led to 
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structural changes in the Chinese economy during the relevant periods. In effect, 
the inclusion of the dummy variables allows for different production frontiers for 
the three subperiods. The computation results use the first set of regression outcomes 
(not reported here due to space limitations) and are summarised in Table 9.1.
From Table 9.1, it is evident that TFP growth has been the dominant driver 
of  economic  growth in China since the 1990s. This relates to the fact that the 
share of TFP growth over output growth ranges from 63 per cent to 93 per cent 
(column ‘TFP/Output’ in Table 9.1). The contribution of TFP to economic growth 
is highest in agriculture, followed, in turn, by services and manufacturing in recent 
years. This presents a sharp contrast to the findings of H. Wu (2016) and Hoffman 
and Polk (2014), with the main difference in the latter being their assumption 
of constant returns to scale by following the conventional growth accounting 
framework proposed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). In fact, the sum of the 
estimated output elasticity with respect to labour and capital in Table 9.1 is well 
below one. Since this implies decreasing returns to scale in all three sectors, growth 
accounting with assumptions of constant returns to scale would in this case inflate 
the contribution of production inputs and hence underestimate the role of TFP 
growth. 
Table 9.1 Calculated growth rates, shares and returns to scale (per cent, 
unless otherwise noted)
Period Output TFP TP EC TFP/Output Scale*
Agriculture
1 5.17 3.90  4.24 –0.33 75.48 0.46
2 4.40 4.05 4.25 –0.19 92.25 0.46
3 4.32 3.90 3.41 0.49 90.30 0.49
Manufacturing
1 13.45 10.87 9.98 0.89 80.82 0.55
2 14.42 11.31 10.56 0.75 78.43 0.53
3 13.74 8.68 8.09 0.59 63.17 0.56
Services
1 13.26 10.95 9.92 1.03 82.58 0.26
2 11.89 9.76 9.19 0.57 82.04 0.25
3 10.77 7.73 7.57 0.16 71.77 0.29
* ‘Scale’ reports the estimated returns to scale and has no unit. 
Notes: Period 1 refers to the years 1992–99, period 2 is the second subperiod (2000–07) and 
period 3 is the third subperiod (2008–15). The values in the columns represent average growth rates 
of provincial value added (output), TFP, technological progress (TP) and efficiency change (EC). 
The numbers in the ‘TFP/Output’ column are shares of TFP growth over output growth. The sum 
of TP and EC may not be equal to TFP due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ own work.
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The results in Table 9.1 suggest that technological progress plays a dominant role 
in productivity growth in all three sectors. The data also suggest that TFP growth 
in China slowed during the GFC, although growth remains relatively high. Other 
researchers have also observed this downward trend (e.g. Wang et al. 2013; Yao 
2015; Mallick 2017). The implications of this slowdown are worth monitoring as 
the global economy recovers incrementally. It is also noted in Table 9.1 that the 
estimated returns to scale in the service sector are much smaller than those in the 
manufacturing sector. Given that services generated more than 50 per cent of 
China’s total GDP in 2016, Liu and Yang (2015) have argued that China’s future 
growth relies on improvement in the performance of productivity growth in the 
service sector. Lee (2016) made a similar argument by examining Korea’s economic 
growth and catch-up process. Lee reckons Korean productivity growth was affected 
by the poor performance in services and China should avoid this by improving 
productivity in the service sector.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the relatively high rates of TFP growth estimated 
in this study are consistent with the findings of others (Table 9.2). Examples include 
Zhu (2012), who reported similar estimates for the Chinese economy, and Gao 
(2015), who investigated the agricultural sector. Brandt et al. (2012) and Ding et al. 
(2016) focused on the manufacturing sector. 
Table 9.2 Selected estimates of TFP growth and its share in output growth 
(per cent)
Sources Years Growth TFP/ 
Output
Sectors
This study 1992–2015 8.9 77.1 Economy wide
1992–2007 9.4 81.1 Economy wide
2000–2015 8.7 75.5 Economy wide
2008–2015 7.9 69.0 Economy wide
Zhu (2012) 1978–2007 78.0 Economy wide
Morrison (2013) 2000–2012 6.0* Economy wide
Han & Shen (2015) 1990–2009 5.9 Economy wide
Ding et al. (2016) 1998–2007 9.6 Manufacturing
Brandt et al. (2012) 1978–2007 8.0 Manufacturing
Yang (2015) 1998–2009 3.8 Manufacturing
Gao (2015) 1992–2012 3.1 79.2 Agriculture
* This growth rate is estimated by using Figure 3 in Morrison (2013).
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Coastal versus non-coastal regions
A major policy focus in China is to reduce regional disparity—in particular, 
unbalanced development between the coastal and the non-coastal provinces. It  is 
therefore of policy relevance to evaluate and contrast the role of TFP growth in 
these two broad regions. For this purpose, the above exercises are repeated to 
allow for regional variations in technology—different values of δ, α and β in 
Equation 9.3—for the three sectors and the two regions (coastal and non-coastal). 
This is achieved through the use of both period-specific and regional dummy 
variables. The estimation results are not listed due to space limitations. Instead, the 
computational findings are summarised in Table 9.3.
Table 9.3 Computational results: Coastal versus non-coastal regions (per cent)
Coastal Non-coastal
Period Output TFP TFP/Output Output TFP TFP/Output
Agriculture
1 4.89 3.64 74.53 5.31 4.32 81.40
2 3.69 3.60 97.55 4.73 4.62 97.61
3 2.71 3.08 113.66 5.09 4.81 94.52
Manufacturing
1 15.84 15.27 96.38 13.40 11.35 84.67
2 14.09 10.64 75.51 14.58 12.24 83.99
3 10.27 4.41 42.96 13.27 8.82 66.51
Services
1 14.07 12.83 91.19 12.88 9.55 74.14
2 12.32 11.06 89.82 11.69 8.86 75.79
3 10.49 8.48 80.90 10.91 7.38 67.65
Note: See the notes to Table 9.1. 
Source: Authors’ own work.
Table 9.3 adds weight to our earlier findings that TFP has played an important role 
in China’s growth in recent decades. Both TFP and economic growth have, as also 
earlier noted, slowed over time. Here we identify, however, that this downward trend 
is much more serious in the coastal regions than in non-coastal areas. The coastal 
areas, China’s traditional manufacturing heartland, recorded the largest fall in TFP 
growth. In contrast, the non-coastal regions have maintained strong growth in 
manufacturing and in turn outperformed the coastal areas in all three sectors during 
the GFC. This is bad news for the coastal regions but good news for the reduction 
of regional disparity in the country. For the coastal regions, however, it is interesting 
to note that the service sector has outperformed the manufacturing sector since the 
onset of the GFC. Since the service sector dominates coastal economies, relatively 
fast growth in services may help economic restructuring in these regions and hence 
contribute to sustainable economic growth. 
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
222
Conclusion
Understanding the role of productivity and innovation in economic growth in the 
case of China is controversial. The debate has attracted more attention since the 
GFC and as China’s economy attempts to shift to new sources of growth. From the 
various methods adopted to analyse related Chinese data at the macro, regional and 
firm levels, the dominant view in the existing literature appears to support the notion 
that TFP has made a significant and positive contribution to economic growth in 
recent decades. Most studies also agree that the rates of both TFP and economic 
growth have slowed in recent years. Whether this downward trend continues has 
important implications for China’s economic development.
This study has presented some new evidence about TFP and economic growth 
by examining the latest regional and sectoral statistics from China. Our estimates 
concur with the existing literature in finding that productivity growth has made 
a positive contribution to economic growth in China. It is specifically found that 
productivity growth is the main driver of economic growth in all three sectors: 
agriculture, manufacturing and services. It is also found that technological progress 
is primarily responsible for TFP growth. 
Though TFP growth tended to fall during the GFC, there are otherwise encouraging 
developments in the Chinese economy. First, the extensive non-coastal areas have 
maintained high growth and have outperformed the coastal regions in all three 
sectors. This is good for the reduction of regional disparity, which has been a major 
policy focus in China for many years. Second, while manufacturing seems to suffer 
the most in the coastal areas, growth in the service sector fell only slightly, and, 
in particular, TFP growth in this sector is still very strong. Since services generate 
more than 50 per cent of the value added in the coastal areas, strong TFP growth 
may help these regions sustain economic growth in the future. Finally, the decline 
in manufacturing and rise in less resource-intensive services may also be a positive 
development for the environment in the coastal areas of China.
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10. Empirical Study of Regional 
Innovation Capability and Economic 
Convergence in China
Chaofeng Yang, Zhiyun Zhao and Zhijuan Zhang
Introduction
Given the correlation of economic activities between regions is becoming stronger, 
this chapter conducts an empirical study of the convergence of real gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita of 31 Chinese provinces and municipalities during the 
period 2001–15, and explores the impacts of innovation capability on economic 
convergence, using the inverse centroid distance among different regions as a weight 
matrix in a spatial econometrics model. The results show that: 1) after considering 
the spatial effect, China’s regional economic development has both conditional 
convergence and absolute convergence; 2) in recent years, the trend of China’s 
regional economic development convergence is becoming more obvious; and 
3) after regional innovation capacity is taken into account, the speed of convergence 
of China’s regional economy will deteriorate.
According to the growth poles theory first proposed by the French economist 
Perroux (1950), it would be ideal but is impossible in reality for a country to achieve 
balanced development. Economic growth usually spreads gradually from one or 
more ‘growth centres’ to other sectors or regions. Therefore, growth does not appear 
in all places, but appears first at some growth points or growth poles at different 
intensities, and these growth points or poles spread out through different channels, 
generating different final influences on the entire economy. 
In the study of modern regional economies, the growth poles theory is used widely 
as the guiding theory for regional development. It is, however, more realistic in 
its description of the process of social development, so it is also widely used by 
many countries, especially developing countries (including China), in strategies 
for economic planning, productivity and regional economic development. Since 
the period of reform and opening up, China has achieved rapid economic growth 
and people’s living standards have improved significantly. However, rapid economic 
growth has not delivered benefits equally to all regions of China, and gaps in regional 
development have gradually increased. Although in recent years, the government 
has adopted macroeconomic policy in an attempt to control this situation, and gaps 
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in regional economic development have narrowed slightly, the overall effect is not 
yet obvious. Moreover, these imbalances in China’s economic development have 
become an increasingly important factor restricting the healthy development of the 
national economy. Since innovation is now sought as a core source of competitiveness 
at the national and regional levels, it is timely to ask whether innovation ability has 
an impact on economic convergence within a country. And, if it does, how should 
the regional distribution of innovative resources be optimised to narrow the gaps 
in regional economic development? 
It is generally believed that the concept of economic convergence is derived 
from the neoclassical growth model proposed by Solow (1956). Since the model 
assumes that the marginal margin of capital diminishes, the underdeveloped areas 
should grow faster than the developed areas under the circumstance of owning the 
same technology. The empirical studies of convergence in advanced economies 
(e.g. Baumol 1986; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) show that the per capita income 
levels of different states within the United States and those of developed countries 
have converged. Researchers such as Romer (1994), Baumol (1986) and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992) have, however, found that the majority of developing countries 
fail to narrow their per capita income gap with developed countries. Carrington’s 
(2003) test results show that there is no convergence among European countries 
in terms of per capita income. 
Tests of intra-country regional economic convergence can be divided into two 
categories. In the first category, the spatial effect is not taken into account. In the 
case of China, most such tests show that there is no global absolute convergence 
but there is conditional convergence. Results of tests of the convergence of China’s 
regional economy in the period 1978–95 by We (1997) show that the overall 
per capita GDP growth in China tends to converge. It has been found from the 
empirical studies of Cai and Yang (2000) and Shen and Jun (2002) that, since the 
period of reform and opening-up, there has been no global absolute convergence in 
China’s regional economy, but there is conditional convergence. Studies by Wang 
and Zhaopan (2002) show that there is club convergence in the country’s three main 
regions: eastern, central and western China. Studies by Lin and Mingxing (2003) 
show that there was conditional convergence in China’s regional economy over 
the period 1981–99, while research by Ren et al. (2014) shows that the marginal 
productivity of research and development (R&D) has significant driving effect on 
regional economic convergence in China.
Tests in the second category of regional economic convergence take spatial 
correlation into account in the empirical model, with most finding there is global 
absolute convergence in China’s regional economies. Lin et al. (2005) adopted 
spatial econometric methods and found there was a trend of absolute convergence 
in China’s regional economies between 1978 and 2002. Wu (2006) found that, 
after taking the spatial effect into account, there was a more significant convergence 
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in the economies of each province and region. Pan (2010) included the spatial 
effect in the convergence test model and found that, within 30 years of the start of 
China’s reform and opening-up period, there were characteristics of global absolute 
convergence. All these studies have achieved rich results and provide important 
implications for follow-up research. 
There are, however, two obvious deficiencies in this research in terms of our interests: 
first, most of the literature uses ordinary least squares (OLS), which neglects the 
spatial effect, to carry out the model estimation, or, where spatial effects were taken 
into account, these studies were too simplistic in selecting spatial weights, which 
often leads to model deviations in actual application, thus resulting in incomplete 
and unscientific results, lacking due explanatory power (Wu 2007: 149–63). Second, 
although the existing literature studies the influence on economic convergence of 
policy and the introduction of new technologies, few regard innovation capacity as 
the explanatory variable of conditional convergence. In view of this and based on 
the framework of economic convergence theory, this chapter expands the economic 
convergence model and uses research methods such as spatial measurement to carry 
out empirical tests and discuss the influence of innovation on economic convergence 
to provide theoretical support for the balanced and coordinated development of 
China’s regional economies and the implementation of national innovation-driven 
development strategies.
Research design
Economic convergence refers to the fact that the growth rate and level of a country’s 
per capita output are negatively correlated, which results in a gradually declining 
trend for the economic gap between two countries. The concept of economic 
convergence can also be used in relation to different regions within a country. 
Economic convergence can be divided into two categories: α convergence and 
β convergence. α convergence refers to the variance of per capita income in 
different regions or the fact that the discrete coefficient tends to decrease over time. 
Macroeconomics focuses on β convergence, and this form is mainly demonstrated 
by the fact that the economic growth rate of backward areas is higher than that of 
developed areas, resulting in the per capita income of the former gradually catching 
up with the latter. If β convergence is conditional on some factors—such as human 
capital, policy variables and infrastructure—it is called conditional β convergence. 
Otherwise, it is absolute β convergence. Innovation, which can improve labour and 
capital productivity, is a major factor in determining long-term economic growth. 
The impact of innovation capacity on the convergence of regional economic growth 
is achieved mainly through the diffusion of innovation. The impetus for regional 
innovation diffusion is the ‘potential difference’ in innovation ability of each region. 
Adjacent regions have some coherence and similarities, so innovation can be spread 
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smoothly between them, which gradually reduces the ‘potential difference’ in 
innovation ability, some level of convergence of innovation ability can be achieved 
and, finally, overall regional economic growth tends to converge under certain 
conditions. Therefore, from this perspective, there is a close relationship between 
regional innovation capacity and the convergence of economic growth. 
Previous empirical studies of economic convergence usually adopt the simplification 
of convergence analysis framework proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) 
as the test model. In this chapter, factors controlling innovation capacity are 
introduced to simplify the model and the test equation of a regional economy’s 
absolute β convergence is shown in Equation 10.1.
Equation 10.1
In Equation 10.1, yi,t refers to the per capita GDP of region i in year t; T is the 
inspection period;  refers to the annual growth rate of real per capita 
GDP in region i from t to t + T; ln(yi,t) refers to the natural logarithm of real per capita 
GDP of region i at period t; α is the constant term; β is the convergence coefficient; 
and εi,t is the random error term. If we add controlling variance (innovation capacity 
in this chapter) in the absolute β convergence model, it will change to Conditional 
β convergence, as shown in Equation 10.2.
Equation 10.2
In Equation 10.2, Pi,t is the variance reflecting the innovation capacity of region 
i in year t. Internationally, cross-country regional innovation capacity depends on 
the potential of producing a series of innovation products, and among them the 
most important factor is R&D stock (Furman et al. 2002). Chinese scholars have 
associated regional innovation capacity with the output of innovation results as 
well as the ability to carry out innovation activities—the most important factor 
in which is the number of patent applications. In recent years, patents, especially 
invention patents, have been playing an increasingly noticeable role in China’s 
regional innovation capacity and economic development and are being taken as 
an indicator of regional innovation capacity. Provinces and cities with high levels 
of regional innovation capacity usually have high numbers of invention patents 
and authorisations. Therefore, in this chapter, the number of invention patent 
applications is used to measure regional innovation capacity.
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We adopt the β convergence test of economic development as noted and measure this 
using the traditional method in which the spatial effect is not considered. Regions 
cannot independently develop their own economy; it is instead typically a process 
closely linked with and affected by the economies of neighbouring regions and those 
further afield. Spatial effects include spatial dependence and spatial variability: the 
former refers to the observed value of a sample region being associated with that 
of other regions; the latter refers to the inhomogeneity of the spatial effect at the 
regional level due to the heterogeneity of spatial units (Anselin 1988). These two 
spatial effects correspond to two spatial measurement models: the spatial lag model 
(SLM) and the spatial error model (SEM). Correspondingly, the SEMs of a regional 
economy’s absolute β convergence and conditional β  convergence are shown in 
Equations 10.3 and 10.4.
Equation 10.3
Equation 10.4
In Equations 10.3 and 10.4, ρ is the spatial lag coefficient that measures the degree of 
spatial interaction between observed values of the weight matrix and W is the spatial 
weight coefficient matrix. The spatial weight matrix is the key to the spatial metering 
model. At present, most research adopts a simple neighbourhood matrix. However, 
economic linkages between adjacent regions are not identical and, generally, the 
degree of interregional interaction is weakened by distance. Given spatial distance 
is generally inversely proportional to the degree of spatial correlation, this chapter 
takes the reciprocal of the straight-line distance between the centroids of different 
regions as the value of the elements in W.
Similarly, the formulas for the SEMs of a regional economy’s absolute β convergence 
and conditional β convergence are Equations 10.5 and 10.6.
Equation 10.5
Equation 10.6
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In Equations 10.5 and 10.6, λ is the spatial error coefficient, reflecting the parameters 
of the spatial correlation between regression residuals, μi,t~N(0,σ2I).
In Equation 10.6, if the estimated value of β is significantly negative, the per capita 
GDP growth rate of a region is negatively correlated with the per capita GDP level 
at the initial stage. If the per capita GDP growth rate in economically backward 
regions is higher than that in developed provinces, there is β convergence of the 
regional economy. The spatial econometric model is no longer suitable for OLS 
estimation and, generally, the maximum likehood (ML) method is used to estimate 
the value of the credible parameter. In addition, according to the estimated value 
of β, the convergence speed, θ, of a region’s per capita GDP can be calculated and 
the semi–life cycle, τ, for convergence can be used to show the time it will take 
economically backward regions to catch up with economically developed regions 
(Equations 10.7 and 10.8).
Equation 10.7
Equation 10.8 
Before using the spatial metering model, it is necessary to first determine whether 
the spatial correlation exists between regional economies, which is usually verified 
by Moran’s I, first proposed by Moran (1950). The expression is Equation 10.9.
Equation 10.9
In Equation 10.9  is the observed 
value of region i; n is the number of regions; and ωij is the spatial weight value of 
region i and region j. If the absolute value of Moran’s I is close to 1, it indicates 
that the spatial correlation of regional innovation capacity is stronger. For the 
selection of spatial lag and SEMs, Anselin et al. (1997) proposed the following 
criteria: if LMLAG (Lagrange Multiplier Lag) is statistically more significant than 
LMERR (Lagrange Multiplier Error) in the spatial econometric model, the SLM is 
selected; if LMERR is more significant than LMLAG statistically, the SEM is chosen.
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The scope of this study is 31 provinces in China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan) and the period studied is 2001–15. All data come from the China Statistics 
Yearbook for the corresponding year (NBS various years) and the per capita GDP 
is the price in 2000.
Estimation results and analysis
Regional per capita GDP spatial correlation test
Moran’s I index can be obtained through calculation according to China’s provincial 
per capita GDP in 2001–15 (see Figure 10.1). Moran’s I indices for regional per 
capita GDP in 2001–15 all pass the significance test below the level of 5 per cent. 
Although there is fluctuation in Moran’s I index, all are above 0.3. This indicates 
that China’s regional economic activities are not in a random state, but, rather, 
demonstrate the phenomenon of clustering in geographical space; and, in our period, 
this agglomeration demonstrates, first, a rising trend, but, later, a diminishing trend. 
In other words, China’s per capita GDP has a strong spatial correlation and provinces 
with a relatively higher level of economic development are adjacent to each other 
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Moran's I Index
Figure 10.1 Moran’s I index of China’s regional per capita GDP, 2001–15
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (various years).
Model and weight selection
For the sake of comparison, this chapter first adopts OLS estimations without 
considering the spatial effect in the test equation of a regional economy’s absolute 
β convergence, and the results are shown in Table 10.1.
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Table 10.1 Regional economies’ absolute β convergence test results 
(not considering the spatial effect)




R2 after adjustment 0.5011
Akai information criterion –18.762
* significant below 5 per cent
Source: Authors’ estimations.
From Table 10.1, we can see that the convergence coefficient is negative, which is 
consistent with the expectation and is significant at the 1 per cent level. The model’s 
fitting coefficient is relatively low, however, indicating that there are problems 
with the model setting or estimation model. The spatial correlation results of the 
model fitting residuals show that there is significant spatial autocorrelation of the 
residual term, the spatial correction coefficient is 0.0281 and the p value is 0.0274. 
This  further shows that the OLS model ignores the spatial correlation between 
regions, which leads to the error in results. The way to address these issues with the 
OLS model is to use a spatial weight matrix.
In the selection of spatial weight, we first use the simple neighbourhood matrix used 
in most studies to correct the OLS model. The spatial model of regional economies’ 
absolute β convergence is estimated by using the spatial dependence extension 
package in R language. The results are shown in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2 Regional economies’ absolute β convergence test results 
(adjacent matrix weight)
Variances Spatial lag model’s 
estimated value





Log likelihood 12.5247 12.8536
Akai information criterion –16.891 –16.763
* significant below 5 per cent
Source: Authors’ estimations.
It can be seen from Table 10.2 that the spatial lag coefficient, ρ, and the spatial 
error coefficient, λ, are not significant when the adjacency matrix is used as the 
weight matrix of the regional economic convergence space measurement model. 
This indicates that the economic development of neighbouring provinces has 
no statistical significance for a province’s own economic development and the 
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spatial autocorrelation of the error term is not strong, so it has little influence on 
the model. At the same time, using the Akai information criterion, the SLM and 
the SEM are –16.891 and –16.763, respectively, which is greater than –18.762 
of the OLS model that excludes the spatial effect. If the neighbouring province 
matrix is used for regional economic convergence, the weight matrix of the 
model reduces its degree of fit. Adjacent matrices assume that the geographical 
proximity in the corresponding value in the weight matrix is 1; otherwise, the 
corresponding value is 0, meaning that the relationship between all adjacent 
areas is simply regarded as the same without affecting all the non-adjacent 
regions. In fact, the economic interrelationships between adjacent regions 
cannot be identical and need to be distinguished; there is still an economic 
interrelationship in non-adjacent areas.
Absolute convergence test of β regional economy
It can be seen from the above test that, since 2001, the spatial correlation of 
the economic development level of Chinese provinces is becoming stronger. 
If spatial correlation between regions is ignored, the reliability of estimated 
results will be affected. If the neighbourhood matrix is adopted as the weight 
matrix for the regional economic convergence spatial measurement model, the 
model cannot be improved. In view of this, in this chapter, the reciprocal of 
the straight-line distance between different regions is used as the weight of the 
spatial econometric model. 
Since the convergence of regional economic development is often staggered over time 
(Chen and Guoping 2006), in addition to examining the economic convergence 
of the entire period, this chapter also divides the period into two (2001–10 and 
2011–15) to examine the economic convergence in different periods. To select the 
appropriate spatial measurement model, this chapter uses the Lagrange multipliers 
to test the applicability of the SLM and the SEM. The results show that LMLAG is 
statistically more significant across the entire examination period and also in each of 
the separate periods, and hence the SLM is selected. The reciprocal matrix of spatial 
distance is used as the weight to estimate the SLM of absolute b convergence for 
regional economies, and the results are shown in Table 10.3.
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Table 10.3 Results of absolute β convergence of regional economies 
(reciprocal weight of spatial distance)
Variances 2001–15 2001–10 2011–15
α 5.6449* 3.9415* 1.0277*
β –0.3706* –0.2143 –0.0898*
ρ 0.7688** 1.1202** 0.5223**
Log likelihood 12.2190 14.5290 35.6480
Akai information criterion –16.438 –21.058 –63.296
* significant below 5 per cent
** significant below 1 per cent
Source: Authors’ estimations.
The Akai information criterion of the SLM is smaller than that of the OLS model 
without considering the spatial effect. This shows that if the reciprocal of spatial 
distance is used as the weight matrix of regional economic convergence, the degree 
of fit for the weight matrix of the model can be improved. The increase in the 
logarithmic likelihood also shows that the model is superior to the regional economic 
convergence spatial model with the adjacent matrix as the weight matrix. The results 
also show that the spatial lag coefficient, ρ, is 0.7688 and the significance test at 
the 5 per cent level shows that there is significant positive spatial autocorrelation in 
interprovincial economic development in China. That is, there is an interprovincial 
spillover effect on economic development: a region’s economic development 
can promote the economic development of adjacent regions. The convergence 
coefficient, β, is –0.3706, which is significant at the 1 per cent level. This shows that 
the speed of economic development in each province is negatively correlated with 
its initial economic level. In other words, the provinces with relatively high levels of 
development will slow their growth rate in the beginning, while the provinces with 
relatively low economic levels will have a higher economic growth rate. 
In sum, the results suggest that regional economic development in China shows 
a general convergence trend from 2001 to 2015. In terms of the results of the 
economic convergence test for 2001–10, the convergence coefficient, β, is not 
statistically significant, indicating that there is no convergence phenomenon in 
China’s regional economic development during this period. However, regional 
economic development is convergent in 2011–15: the convergence coefficient, 
β, is –0.0898, which is significant at the 1 per cent level. 
In fact, in terms of the Gini coefficient, the Tyler index, the variation coefficient, 
the Herfindahl index and other indices that measure the gap in regional economic 
development, there is also a declining trend during the period under examination, 
as shown in Figure 10.2.
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Variation coefficient Herfindahl Index
Figure 10.2 Four indicators of the gap in regional economic development
Note: Indicators are calculated using the R language ineq extension package, and the Herfindahl index 
is on the secondary axis. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (various years).
It can be seen from Figure 10.2 that although the Gini coefficient, the Tyler index, 
the variation coefficient and the Herfindahl index fell as a whole from 2001 to 
2015, they remained relatively stable over the period 2001–06, and thereafter 
demonstrated a declining trend. This validates the empiriral results of this chapter 
from one side. In addition, according to the estimated value of β, it is also possible 
to calculate that the convergence rate of per capita GDP in China from 2001 to 
2015 was 3.307 per cent and the half–life cycle of convergence was 20.95 years, 
which means it will take 20.95 years for economically backward regions to catch up 
with economically developed regions.
The influence of regional innovation capacity 
on economic convergence
In addition to absolute convergence analysis, this chapter introduces regional 
innovation ability to the spatial model and analyses its influence on economic 
convergence. The estimated results of the SLM of the β convergence test of regional 
economic conditions are shown in Table 10.4.
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Table 10.4 Results of the β convergence test of regional economic conditions
Variances 2001–15 2001–10 2011–15
α 4.4207* 2.7380* 1.4669*
β –0.3449* –0.1969 –0.1356*
£ 0.0059** 0.0105 0.0401
ρ 1.3102** 0.6321 0.4528
Log likelihood 13.0045 13.7573 36.2550
Akai information criterion –16.009 –17.515 –62.510
* significant below 5 per cent
** significant below 1 per cent
Source: Authors’ estimations.
The results of the β convergence test of regional economic conditions in 2001–
15 show that the spatial lag coefficient, ρ, is 1.3102 and passes the significance 
test at the 5 per cent level. The spatial lag coefficient of the β convergence of 
regional economic conditions is larger than absolute β convergence, indicating 
that the spread of China’s innovation activities and innovation results helps 
improve the interaction of  provincial economic development. The conditional 
convergence coefficient, β, was –0.3449 between 2001 and 2015, and significant 
at the 1  per  cent level, suggesting that China’s economic development level has 
conditional β convergence in the whole economic space. The regression coefficient, 
£, was 0.0059 and significant at the 5 per cent level, indicating that the economic 
growth rate increase of 5.9 percentage points is associated with a 1 per cent increase 
in innovation capacity. From 2001 to 2010, the convergence coefficient, β, was 
statistically insignificant, indicating there was no convergence phenomenon in 
China’s regional economic development, even if the control factor was added, in this 
period. However, regional economic development in 2011–15 achieved conditional 
convergence; the convergence coefficient, β, was –0.1356, which was significant at 
the 1 per cent level. This shows that, in recent years, China’s radiation and leading 
effects of regional innovation have gradually appeared, which have promoted the 
convergence of regional economic development.
Similarly, according to the estimated value of the conditional convergence 
coefficient,  β, it can be calculated that, after innovation capacity is taken into 
account, the conditional convergence speed of regional per capita GDP is 3.021 
per cent, which is 0.6 per cent slower than the speed of absolute convergence; and, 
in turn, the half–life cycle of the conditional convergence is 22.94 years. In other 
words, after the influence of regional innovation capacity is taken into account 
(and this is slower in economically backward regions), this innovation lag alone will 
add 3.87 years to the time needed to catch up with economically developed regions, 
compared with the result when regional innovation capacity is not considered.
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Results, conclusion and policy recommendations
In this chapter, the inverse distance between different regions is used as the weight 
matrix to analyse the actual per capita GDP of 31 provinces and municipal 
equivalents in China from 2001 to 2015, and the influence of regional innovation 
ability on economic convergence is discussed. The results show that: 1) after 
considering the spatial effect, China’s regional economic development has both 
conditional convergence and absolute convergence; 2) in recent years, the trend 
in China’s regional economic development convergence is more obvious than 
before; and 3) after regional innovation capacity is taken into account, the speed 
of convergence of China’s regional economy deteriorates.
There is absolute convergence in China’s regional economic growth, and this 
conclusion cannot be drawn from the OLS framework. Although from the 
perspective of economic development, absolute convergence is not obvious in the 
short term, in the long term, there is a trend of absolute convergence in China, and 
this trend is becoming increasingly obvious. Therefore, China’s regional economic 
convergence is consistent with the original prediction of the neoclassical growth 
model, rather than the result achieved after controlling the influence of relevant 
variables. This also shows that it is not feasible nor would it be effective for China 
to adopt the growth poles theory to develop its economy. Although geographical 
conditions, resource endowment and other factors may have a negative impact on 
the convergence trend, with the gradual establishment and improvement of the 
market economy, there is still obvious potential for convergence in China’s regional 
economic growth.
China is undergoing economic transformation, so how to control and narrow the 
regional development gap through effective intervention is not only one of the key 
objectives of China’s current macroeconomic regulation, but also an important 
problem that needs to be solved urgently. Romer (1990) and many other researchers 
suggest that the level of human capital is an important factor affecting the rate of 
economic convergence. The research in this chapter shows that innovation ability also 
has a significant impact on the speed of economic convergence. If the spatial pattern 
of the excessive concentration of innovation resources and the serious imbalance 
in innovation capacity cannot be improved, China’s economic development will 
step into the stage of widening regional disparity caused by innovation. Therefore, 
in formulating innovation policy, the Chinese Government should pay attention 
to the spatial interaction mechanism and make full use of the regional innovation 
resource endowment and differences in innovation ability to reduce the gap in 
regional economic development.
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11. China’s Patent Protection and 
Enterprise R&D Expenditure
Zhifeng Yin and Hao Mao
Based on data from the 2013 National Patent Survey of China, this chapter 
studies the causal relationship between patent protection and enterprise research 
and development (R&D) expenditure, and the moderating effect of patent 
motivation, patent accumulation and patent protection model selection on R&D-
promoting effects. The results show: 1) compared with traditional market motives, 
strong patent protection is not associated with R&D expenditure for enterprises 
where motivation is administrative driven or strategy driven; 2) the scale effect of 
patent accumulation has a significant effect on R&D-promoting effects, while the 
facilitation effect of patent structure (represented by the proportion of invention 
patents in the total number of patents) on R&D is not significant; and 3) the use 
of administrative protection has a positive impact on R&D-promoting effects.
Motivation
As an important part of the intellectual property rights system, patent protection 
regulations are responsible for maintaining a balance between the dynamic efficiency 
brought about by incentivised innovation and the static inefficiency brought about 
by market monopolies (Nordhaus 1969; Klemperer 1990). Heated debates have 
been carried out in academia about the effect of patent protection on the ability of 
enterprises to increase research and development (R&D) expenditure and promote 
corporate innovation. Jaffe and Lerner (2006), Boldrin and Levine (2008), Burk 
and Lemley (2009) and other scholars have highlighted that patent protection does 
not promote innovation, but in fact may even serve to suppress it to a large degree; 
overzealous patent protection creates inefficiencies of monopoly in society and also 
limits knowledge sharing. 
From a cross-border perspective, Helpman (1993) found that strict patent protections 
exacerbate the monopoly rights of property owners, weaken R&D incentives and 
slow the pace of global technological progress. Shapiro (2001) further shows that 
overly strong patent protection will increase the cost of learning for developing 
countries and is not conducive to technological catch-up. Scholars holding the 
opposite view acknowledge that there are some problems in the patent system, but, 
on the whole, it is beneficial for encouraging innovation (Gilbert 2011). Yang and 
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Maskus (2001) point out that, with the help of technology licensing and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights 
is conducive to the transfer of production and technological innovation. 
Based on these academic arguments, it appears that there is great theoretical value 
and practical significance in discussing the innovation promotion effects of patent 
protection. Through the construction of an intellectual property protection index, 
Ginarte and Park (1997) found that strict protection of intellectual property rights 
improves innovation and development around the world. Kanwar and Evenson 
(2009) and Chen and Puttitanun (2005) used cross-border macroeconomic data to 
investigate the effects of a country’s patent protection on its R&D expenditure and 
innovation output, and found a positive correlation between them. Based on micro 
data, Mansfield (1986) points out that the impact of patent protection on enterprise 
R&D varies by industry. Yin et al. (2013) examined mechanisms via which enhanced 
protection of intellectual property rights serves to promote innovation output in a host 
country—either through increasing R&D expenditure or through foreign technology 
spillovers—and found that the mechanism to promote R&D input was significant. 
The existing research has important referential value for understanding the effects of 
patent protection, but there are still many gaps in the literature. Whether through 
using simultaneous equations or using the lag phase of the level of patent protection 
(Chen and Puttitanun 2005; Kanwar and Evenson 2009) to analyse the relationship 
between patent protection and innovation, studies so far have not handled the 
endogeneity problem well. The degree of patent protection has a self-correlation 
and, although empirical strategies can reduce the endogeneity problem somewhat, 
resulting in a two-way causal relationship, the policy effect may be influenced by 
correlated unobservable factors such that a convincing causal relationship cannot be 
fully rendered. From a research design and data information perspective, a survey 
questionnaire offers a better way to avoid two-way causality and, at the same time, 
isolate the effect of patent protection on enhancing R&D. In the survey, one can 
ask enterprises questions such as: ‘If patent protection is enhanced, will you increase 
R&D expenditure?’ This retrieves first-hand research data. However, because such 
methods usually have a high implementation cost and time requirement, there 
have been few attempts in the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea or other 
countries to investigate innovation and national patent protection through surveys. 
We have also not yet found any international literature on the effect of patent 
protection on innovation that uses survey data as its main subject for analysis. 
In this regard, with assistance from the State Intellectual Property Office of China 
(SIPO), which organised a nationwide large-scale patent survey platform, this 
chapter uses a unique patent survey dataset from China to study the innovation 
promotion effects of patent protection. Our goal is to better understand the causal 
effects of patent protection on innovation and the heterogeneity effects among 
firms with different motivation, patent structure and protection approaches. 
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This chapter enriches the existing literature in two ways: first, it identifies the role 
of patent protection in causally enhancing enterprise R&D expenditure, based on 
the question proposed in the questionnaire about whether the strength of patent 
protection impacts on corporate R&D expenditure; and second, based on patent 
motive, patent structure and protection approaches, it explains the structural 
differences in the effects of strong patent protection on R&D promotion in 
enterprises with different characteristics and innovation activities. This research will 
therefore attempt to provide the scientific basis for strengthening patent protection 
policies in China. At the same time, it will provide a useful reference for enterprises 
to give full play to the facilitation effect of strong patent protection on innovation. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section two discusses research design, 
section three illustrates the empirical results and section four presents conclusions 
and policy suggestions.
Research questions and design
The innovation incentive effect of patent protection is influenced by a country’s 
economic development, technology accumulation and national policy 
(Maskus 2000; Chen and Puttitanun 2005). For innovation latecomer countries, 
it might be helpful to use the patent system to stimulate innovation for economic 
transformation. Based on accumulated theories and market practices from 
developed economies, strong patent protection is linked with enhanced technology 
appropriability1 and increased innovation-derived income, and thereby incentives 
are offered towards encouraging greater corporate R&D. The related incentive 
effects of patent protection can, however, fall or shift more categorically as a result of 
certain factors. Maskus (2000), for example, pointed out that the strength of patent 
protection and economic development exists in a U-shaped relationship in that 
only when per capita income reaches the middle-income development level will the 
facilitation effect of intellectual property protection be notably manifested. Before 
reaching that income level, the increase in patent protection intensity may have an 
uncertain effect on economic growth and R&D expenditure. Similarly, Chen and 
Puttitanun (2005) show that a country’s patent protections depend on the level of 
non-monotonic development first decreasing, then increasing, which is determined 
by the trade-off between encouraging domestic innovation and imitating foreign 
technologies. Therefore, we need to study whether patent protection will promote 
innovation in enterprises; but we also need to examine the heterogeneous effect 
under different situations. 
1  Technology appropriability can be defined as the ability of an innovator to profit from innovation or to 
internalise the benefits of innovation after solving technical-level issues in technological innovation.
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The perspective of strategic connections between the creation, application, protection 
and management of intellectual property rights of enterprises, and the activities that 
affect their innovation process, suggests that such moderate factors should at least 
include the motivation in applying for a patent, the size and quality of the patent 
and the approach taken to protect patent rights. Accordingly, we arrive at three 
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
Differences in motivations for applying for or maintaining a patent will have 
different effects on R&D promotion. 
Policy-driven and strategic market motivations will, for example, reduce the 
incentive effect of patent protection. Lin (2003) argued that the Chinese 
Government is accustomed to allocating resources through administrative authority 
to enterprises that have been given priority to develop, and to push for reform 
through administrative orders. When it comes to patents, government policy also 
has a strong influence on the behaviour of enterprises. When an enterprise submits 
an application for a patent, but does not intend to commercialise that patent and 
instead is motivated to acquire some qualification or to meet rigid government 
requirements, this will inevitably reduce the incentive effect on R&D of strong 
patent protection. In addition, with the enhancement of patent tools under market 
competition, the patent system will also become alienated. Research by Harabi 
(1995), Arundel (1995), Cohen and Goto (2002) and Blind et al. (2006) has 
shown that, in a competitive market environment, when enterprises apply for and 
maintain patents, this is not limited to using patents to expand the market, protect 
innovation, prevent technology from being imitated or other traditional functions. 
Enterprises driven by strategic ‘non-implementation’ patent motivations may seek 
to block competitors, promote and enhance their corporate image or create patent 
thicket standards,2 and so on. Compared with traditional patent enforcement 
motives (such as the industrial use of patents), non-implementation motives place 
more emphasis on outcomes such as patent advocacy, access to bargaining chips and 
other strategic tools, and these may serve to inhibit the facilitative effect of patent 
protection on R&D development.
Hypothesis 2
The number of patents and their structural quality will be positively correlated with 
the facilitation effect of patent protection on R&D. 
2  Patent thicket refers to the scenario in which firms need to acquire access to dozens, hundreds or even thousands 
of overlapping patents to actually commercialise new technology.
11. China’s Patent Protection and Enterprise R&D Expenditure
249
The number of patents is an important indicator of innovation ability. With the 
growth of patent accumulation, enterprises can obtain more favourable market 
competition, status, benefits of scale in research costs and prospectively higher 
operational profits, and thus maintain a virtuous cycle between the scale of patent 
numbers and sustainable R&D innovation. Patent structure refers to the proportion 
of invention patents, utility models and designs.3 Research by Kim et al. (2012) 
found that the utility model system is an effective learning process during the 
technological catch-up phase. Through a historical overview, Maskus and McDaniel 
(1999) also found that during the process of technological catch-up in Japan, the 
utility model system brought about by technology spillover effects was significant. 
It is, however, obvious that the utility model is of lower quality than an invention 
patent and is not conducive to enterprises that are trying to reach the technological 
innovation frontier. Regarding this point, research by Kim et al. (2012) and Beneito 
(2006) demonstrated that if an enterprise wants to realise higher technical abilities, 
it should invest in invention patents and not utility models. Accordingly, we infer 
that the optimisation of the enterprise’s patent structure (that is, a higher proportion 
of invention patents among all patents) will bring about a greater incentivising effect 
on R&D.
Hypothesis 3
If enterprises can utilise (administrative and judicial) protection systems to establish 
and enforce patent protection rights, the positive effect of patents on R&D will be 
more significant. 
China’s patent protection system is unique in having a ‘double-track’ feature via 
which enterprises can choose either administrative protection or judicial protection 
to carry out their protection rights. Although there is still some controversy in 
academic circles about which of the two should be dominant, the patent-related 
community generally accepts the relative advantages and complementarities of the 
two. As a private right, patent rights support legal institutional protection, while 
administrative enforcement influences the cost of enforcing patent infringement 
and is characterised by being simple, fast and efficient. A sound system of 
administrative enforcement can substantially shift the cost of patent infringement 
while significantly reducing the cost of having protection rights. In this regard, we 
expect that if companies can make full use of both mechanisms of protection then 
strengthening patent protection will have a greater effect on R&D growth.
3  There are three types of patent in China: invention patents, utility models and designs. Unlike invention patents, 
utility models and designs require no substantive examination at the patent office for them to be granted.
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We test these three hypotheses using the National Patent Survey dataset from the 
most recent such survey, in 2013.4 The nationwide survey has been carried out 
annually since 2008. The survey sample frame for 2013 was based on domestic 
patents granted in 2012. Sampling proportional to size methodology is used, 
supplemented by quota sampling. The sample frame for the 2013 survey included 
777,308 patents, and the survey covered 65 cities in 26 provinces (including 
autonomous regions and municipalities). In 2013, there were 11,141 patentees and 
9,161 enterprises in the survey; 33,667 patents were selected, of which 22,615 were 
corporate patents. The final response rate was 87.7 per cent, of which 93.7 per cent 
were valid questionnaires. 
The survey itself examined whether the impact of patent protection is related to 
R&D expenditure, via the following question from the Enterprise Questionnaire 
of the 2013 National Patent Survey: ‘What is the impact on your R&D expenditure 
if patent protection is enhanced?’ Response options included: ‘Increased R&D 
expenditure due to increased protection’, ‘Reduced R&D expenditure with 
enhanced protection’, ‘No significant impact’ and ‘Unclear’. The survey also 
asked a range of questions that would elicit information to help shed light on 
the variability of policy effects (discussed in detail later), as well as variables 
that reflect the basic characteristics of the surveyed enterprise, such as location, 
ownership, size, corporate qualifications (that is, whether it is an intellectual 
property enterprise recognised by the government at the provincial level or above, 
whether it is a high-tech enterprise, whether it is a central government–affiliated 
enterprise), and so on.
We used the multiple regression method to test whether hypotheses 1–3 are 
valid. Since the explanatory variable is a rank variable that reflects the size of the 
facilitation effect of patent protection on R&D, we used an ordered probit model for 
regression analysis (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Long and Freese 2006). The specific 
model was designed as follows. Suppose that the R&D facilitation effect produced 
by patent protection depends on a series of factors captured in vector X. There is 
a potential policy-promoting effect, y*, on the basis of each firm’s characteristics. 
Suppose y* = Xβ + ε, and ε follows the standard normal distribution. There are two 
critical values, a1 and a2, and a1 < a2. When y* is less than or equal to a1, y is equal 
to 1; when y* is greater than a1 and less than a2, y is equal to 2; when y* is greater 
than a2, y is equal to 3. Specifically, we let Φ be the standard normal distribution 
function and we then have the following regression equations (Equations 11.1–3).
4  The survey in 2013 contained the key information needed for this study, such as a firm’s response to stricter 
patent protection in terms of R&D expenditure, as well as information used for capturing the firm’s patent 
motive, patent structure and protection approaches.
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Equation 11.1
p(y = 1|X) = p(y* ≤ a1|X) = Φ(a1 – Xβ) 
Equation 11.2
p(y = 2|X) = p(a1 < y* ≤ a2|X) = Φ(a2–Xβ) – Φ(a1–Xβ)
Equation 11.3
p(y = 3|X) = p(y* > a2|X) = 1 – Φ(a2–Xβ) 
Among these, y is the rank variable of the effect of patent protection on promoting 
R&D, and X includes the following:5 the variables reflecting hypothesis 1, 
including the market motivation of the enterprise’s patent maintenance behaviour 
and intensity of strategic patent use; two variables reflecting hypothesis 2, including 
the enterprise’s number of patents and patent structure; and variables reflecting 
hypothesis 3—namely, the enterprise’s choice for patent rights protection and 
confidence in the enforcement of patents protection. At the same time, combined 
with the data availability and drawing on the conclusions of previous research, in our 
regression we also controlled for some of the variables that reflect the qualifications of 
the enterprise, such as whether it was a government-recognised intellectual property 
enterprise, a high-tech enterprise, publicly listed or a centrally affiliated enterprise. 
Variables like the province of the enterprise’s location and the industry to which it 
belonged are also controlled.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics of the key variables
Table 11.1 shows the descriptive statistics attached to the main variables used in 
this analysis. Unless otherwise stated, the variables in the table are taken from the 
corresponding response data from relevant questions of the 2013 National Patent 
Survey. Variables not directly derived from the questionnaire or that need to be 
structured through a specific process included market-based patent maintenance 
motivation, intensity of strategic patent use, number of valid patents, proportion 
of invention patents, administrative protection of patent rights, judicial protection 
of patent rights and the level of confidence in patent law enforcement.
5  How these variables are constructed will be discussed in detail in section four.
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Table 11.1 Descriptive statistics of the main variables (no. = 4,067)




Rdy Degree of facilitation of patent protection 
on R&D (1–3)
2.48 0.61 1 3
dum_mark Market-based patent maintenance 0.79 0.41 0 1
fss_r Intensity of strategic patent use 0.56 0.25 0 1
Totpatg No. of valid patents (1 = above median) 0.60 0.49 0 1
inv_sharg Percentage of invention patents  
(1 = above median)
0.55 0.50 0 1
dum_adm_bh Administrative patent protection 0.83 0.38 0 1
dum_law Judicial patent protection 0.15 0.36 0 1
Xzbhxx Confidence in patent law enforcement 0.31 0.46 0 1
Own Ownership (1–3) 1.32 0.67 1 3
scale1 Size (1 = medium–large) 0.69 0.46 0 1
Zcqy Intellectual property recognised (1 = yes) 0.34 0.47 0 1
Gxqy High-tech (1 = yes) 0.70 0.46 0 1
Ssqy Publicly listed (1 = yes) 0.13 0.33 0 1
Zyqy Centrally owned (1 = yes) 0.07 0.25 0 1
Note: 1, 2 and 3 in the first variable, ‘Rdy’, refer, respectively, to: decreased R&D expenditure, no 
significant or clear impact on R&D expenditure and increased R&D expenditure. 1, 2 and 3 in the 
variable ‘Own’ refer, respectively, to domestic-owned enterprises, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan–
owned enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises.
We use the two variables capturing market-based motivation and the intensity of 
strategic patent use to characterise an enterprise’s motivation for applying for or 
maintaining a patent. Among the two, the market-based motivation is defined based 
on the enterprise patent questionnaire in the National Patent Survey, for which the 
reasons enterprises could choose for maintaining their patents included ‘to increase 
economic profits and reduce production costs’, ‘to use the patent as exchange for 
capital or as a bargaining chip’ and ‘to protect the enterprise’s technology’. If an 
enterprise chose at least one of these options, they were defined in our study as 
exhibiting market-based patent maintenance behaviour and were labelled 1; 
otherwise, they were labelled 0. The intensity of the strategic use of patents in our 
study was defined according to the survey question about why the enterprise applies 
for its patent. In response to the information provided by an enterprise when applying 
for a patent, we count the number of non-traditional patent implementation 
motives6 selected, except for those in the questionnaire who chose ‘using patents 
to seize or expand the market’ and ‘to prevent imitation of enterprise technology 
6  Non-traditional patent implementation motives include ‘to meet government qualifications’, ‘to obtain 
grants and subsidies’, ‘to complete patent assessments’, ‘to enhance corporate social influence’ and ‘to block 
competitors’.
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by others’, which were considered the traditional patent implementation motives. 
We then divide the number of non-traditional motivations by the total number of 
options the enterprise chose to capture the intensity of strategic patent use.
The number of valid patents and the ratio of invention patents accounted for 
the two variables used to describe the characteristics of enterprise patents. Based 
on the name of the enterprise, the number of patents that are ‘in force’ for the 
enterprise as of the end of 2012 is calculated from the SIPO patents database; the 
variable ‘Totpatg’ is labelled 1 if the number of valid patents is above the sample 
median; otherwise, it is labelled 0. Similarly, based on the name of the enterprise, we 
obtained the number of invention patents that are ‘in force’ as of the end of 2012, 
calculated the proportion of invention patents in the total number of patents in 
force and defined enterprises above the median as 1, otherwise 0, thus constructing 
the ‘inv_sharg’ variable.
We used administrative patent rights protection, judicial patent rights protection 
and confidence in patent law enforcement to reflect the features of patent protection 
behaviour. For administrative patent rights protection, we use the response data for 
the following question: ‘Through which means do you want to protect the patent 
rights of your enterprise?’ Enterprises were limited to two responses from a list of 
choices.7 Enterprises choosing ‘report to the patent administration authority by 
calling 12330’ or ‘hope that the patent management authorities take the initiative 
to investigate and deal with the claimed violations’ were defined as being inclined 
towards the administrative protection of patents and were labelled 1; otherwise, they 
were labelled 0. Similarly, the judicial patent rights protection variable was based 
on how enterprises answered the above question. If one of their two responses was 
‘go directly to court for litigation’, they would be defined as being inclined towards 
using the judicial system to protect their patents and were labelled 1; otherwise, they 
were labelled 0. We constructed the confidence variable by including the responses 
to the question: ‘What is the most striking impression of how administrative law 
enforcement resolves patent disputes in your enterprise?’ Responses were limited to 
three choices and if one of those was ‘administrative mediation can resolve disputes’, 
those enterprises were defined as having confidence in administrative enforcement 
and were labelled 1; otherwise, they were labelled 0. The statistical results in Table 11.1 
show that the variables fall within a reasonable range. Furthermore, we calculated 
the correlation coefficients for the main explanatory variables and found that the 
pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables were less than 0.3, suggesting 
that the subsequent regression was less adversely affected by multicollinearity. 
7  The choices include ‘report to the patent administration authority by calling 12330’, ‘hope that the patent 
management authorities take the initiative to investigate and deal with the claimed violations’, ‘settled through 
negotiation’, ‘go directly to court for litigation’ and ‘other’.
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Distribution of the effect of patent protection 
on R&D expenditure
Table 11.2 shows the statistical distribution of the effect of patent protection on R&D 
expenditure. The results show that 52.5 per cent of enterprises believe that patent 
protection will enhance their own R&D expenditure, while 29 per cent believe that 
enhancing patent protection has no significant impact on their R&D expenditure. 
This suggests that other incentives—such as trade secrets and government subsidies 
other than factors of the patent system itself—also play a role (Wright 1983; Teece 
1986; Gallini and Scotchmer 2002). The strategic patent application behaviour and 
the substitution system render the facilitative effect of patent protection on R&D 
relatively insignificant. At the same time, 11.9 per cent of enterprises believe that the 
effect of patent protection on R&D expenditure is unclear.8
Table 11.2 Distribution of the effect of patent protection intensity 
on R&D expenditure
Effect of patent protection on promoting R&D Sample size Proportion (%)
Patent protection increased R&D expenditure 4,484 52.46
No significant impact 2,478 28.99
Unclear 1,019 11.92
Patent protection decreased R&D expenditure 566 6.62
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Structural differences in the effect of patent protection 
on promoting R&D
Column 1 in Table 11.3 examines the role of market-based motivation and intensity 
of strategic patent use on R&D promotion. The regression results show that 
enterprises with market motivation have more favourable evaluations of the effect 
of patent protection on R&D promotion than their counterparts. This relates to 
the fact that the patent behaviour of Chinese enterprises has been influenced by 
public targets and incentives. Enterprises that maintain patents to ‘meet government 
qualifications’, ‘obtain grants and subsidies’ or ‘complete patent index assessments’ 
are not as sensitive to patent protection as those that maintain patents to ‘increase 
economic profits and reduce production costs’ or ‘protect the technology of the 
enterprise’. Since the enhancement of patent protection can significantly increase 
the patentability of a technology, the enterprises that follow marketisation principles 
8  In our analysis, we classify ‘no significant impact’ and ‘unclear’ as one category, and define it as ‘no significant 
impact’. The conclusion is robust even after removing the ‘unclear’ sample.
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can more deeply actualise the important role of increasing patent protection with the 
goal of increasing the market value of their patents. Therefore, the incentive effect 
of patent protection on R&D is found to be more significant in such enterprises.
The empirical results also show that the stronger the strategic motivation of 
enterprises, the lower will be the enterprise’s evaluation of the facilitative effect 
of patent protection on R&D. In other words, benchmark non-strategic motivations 
can enhance the effects of patent protection more than nascent strategic motivations. 
For example, enterprises that apply for patents for strategic use will be more likely to 
apply from a defensive stance, such as being influenced by propaganda, as opposed 
to those seeking to apply for patents for their industrial use. These patents are driven 
by a market strategy and do not carry any direct implementation characteristics. 
Although it helps enterprises secure a certain position in the market, the incentive 
effect on R&D is still limited.
Column 2 examines the moderate effect of the total number of patents, plus the 
ratio of invention patents in the total, on R&D promotion. The empirical results 
show that there is a significant positive correlation between the total number of 
patents and the facilitative effect of patent protection. The higher the number of 
patents accumulated by an enterprise, the more patents are applied to the patent 
portfolio and the greater will be the facilitative effect of patent protection on R&D 
promotion. At the same time, the proportion of invention patents is positively 
correlated with the effect of patent protection, but it is not statistically significant. 
These results show that the utility model still constitutes an important model of 
technological innovation within China’s enterprises, and high-level inventions that 
incentivise greater R&D are concentrated in special industries and specific samples. 
They are not yet significantly reflected in the overall sample. For innovation to help 
upgrade China’s industrial structure, there is a need to use multiple and different 
innovation models, while taking advantage of the roles of inventions, utility models 
and designs.
Column 3 examines the relationship between the choice of using either the 
administrative or the judicial system to protect patent rights and the enhancement 
of R&D. The regression results show that enterprises that choose the administrative 
protection system are more inclined to believe that intensified patent protection 
can promote their R&D expenditure than the enterprises that do not adopt the 
administrative system as their main line of defence. At the same time, compared 
with enterprises that do not use the judicial system as the main way to protect patent 
rights, these enterprises show greater incentive to increase R&D. Administrative 
protection and judicial protection are the two formal systems of patent protection 
in China that constitute an important institutional basis for enhancing the effect 
of patent protection on R&D promotion. Both increase the flexibility of choices 
available to the patent holder in the process of enforcing rights and both promote 
the development of patent protection, but on different dimensions. At the same 
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time, from the point of view of trusting law enforcement, enterprises that believe 
in the ability of administrative patent law enforcement to resolve patent disputes 
are more inclined to think that patent protection has a strong incentivising effect 
on R&D. The full potential of any facilitative effect of patent protection on R&D 
rests on the basis of confidence in administrative protection and flexibility on behalf 
of the patent holder or applicant.
Table 11.3 Analysis of structural differences in the effect of patent protection 
on promoting R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market-based patent maintenance 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.28***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Intensity of strategic patent utilisation –0.19** –0.16** –0.17**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)




Invention patents (1 = above median) 0.03 0.02 –0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Administrative protection 0.13*** 0.12** 0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Judicial protection 0.08 0.07 0.12*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Confidence in patent law enforcement 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.26***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.23***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Foreign 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Medium–large size 0.11** 0.09** 0.10** 0.07 0.09*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Intellectual property recognised 0.07 0.08* 0.08* 0.04 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
High-tech 0.08* 0.05 0.10** 0.08* 0.09*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Publicly listed –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 –0.07 –0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Centrally affiliated 0.07 –0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
cut1_cons –6.01*** –5.94*** –5.57*** –5.42*** –5.24***
(0.24) (0.32) (0.15) (0.27) (0.27)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cut2_cons –4.56*** –4.50*** –4.12*** –3.95*** –4.01***
(0.24) (0.33) (0.13) (0.27) (0.27)
Pseudo r2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04
Log likelihood –3,520.53 –3,548.13 –3,435.15 –3,404.13 –2,962.72
No. 4,171 4,169 4,071 4,067 3,627
* p < 0.1 significance level
** p < 0.05 significance level
*** p < 0.01 significance level
Notes: An ordered probit model was used. All regressions control for provincial and industrial fixed 
effects. The base group of enterprise ownership are domestic-owned enterprises; the base group of 
size are small and micro-enterprises; the base group of intellectual property qualification are enterprises 
without intellectual property rights acknowledged by the government above the provincial level; the base 
group of high-tech enterprise qualification are non-high-tech enterprises; the base group of publicly 
listed enterprises are unlisted enterprises; the base group of centrally affiliated enterprises are non-
centrally affiliated enterprises. Robust standard error shown within parentheses.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Column 4 discusses the moderate effect on promoting R&D of patent motives, 
the number and structure of patents and approaches to protection. Regression 
results show that these factors are robust in their correlation with the effect of patent 
protection on R&D. The corresponding economic explanation is the same as that 
discussed separately, so we will not repeat it here. Finally, given the questionnaire 
options of ‘unclear’ and ‘no significant impact’ were put into one category when 
constructing the patent protection R&D facilitation effect variable, ‘unclear’ could 
contain a lot of noise. Therefore, in column 5, the sample that answered ‘unclear’ 
was removed. The empirical results confirm that the basic conclusion is consistent 
with previous ones, showing that the conclusions for hypotheses 1–3 are robust.
It is worth mentioning that there are significant correlations between some factors 
in the control variables and effects on R&D promotion. In contrast, Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan–owned enterprises, large and medium-sized enterprises and 
high-tech enterprises were more inclined to believe that increased patent protection 
would significantly enhance their R&D expenditure. Listed companies and centrally 
affiliated enterprises do not demonstrate stronger belief that patent protection 
will enhance R&D expenditure compared with non-listed companies and non-
centrally affiliated enterprises. The economic explanation is that the competitive 
advantage of centrally affiliated enterprises is likely to come from trade and resource 
monopoly, rather than technological innovation, so the evaluation of the incentive 
effect of patent protection on R&D is limited. Meanwhile, listed enterprises cannot 
genuinely have technological innovation and corresponding R&D expenditure as 
prerequisites for the realisation of capital and operational growth, so the incentive 
effect of patent protection on R&D is also limited there.
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Conclusion and policy suggestions
Using data from the 2013 National Patent Survey, this chapter reveals the impact 
of patent protection on R&D expenditure through the study of the survey question 
‘How does stricter patent protection affect R&D expenditure in your enterprise’, 
and  subsequently analysed the effect of patent protection on R&D facilitation. 
We  then discussed the three main structural differences in how the relationship 
between patent protection and R&D expenditure is manifested in Chinese 
enterprises: as patent motives, the number and structure of patents and the selected 
method of patent rights protection. The main conclusions are as follows.
First, the implementation of national patent protection policies is found to be 
positively and significantly associated with enterprise expenditure on R&D. The 
survey data we examined identified some 52.5 per cent of enterprises believed 
that stricter patent protection would increase their R&D expenditure, whereas 
29 per cent of enterprises believed that increased patent protection would have no 
significant impact on their R&D expenditure.
Second, the facilitative effect of patent protection on R&D differs structurally 
among the motives behind patent application, the number and structure of 
patents and the method of patent protection. Compared with traditional market 
motivations, strong patent protection does not have the effect of increasing R&D 
expenditure for administrative-driven and strategic-driven models. If the enterprise 
depends on market forces to apply patents then patent protection is conducive 
to maintaining strong incentives for R&D expenditure; on the other hand, if the 
enterprise applies the patent for administrative purposes, the incentive effect will 
be limited. At the same time, patent applications driven by strategic motives to 
some extent curb the facilitative effect of patent protection on R&D. This shows 
that if the purpose of applying for and maintaining a patent is to use the ‘patent 
formation as exchange for capital’ and ‘to enhance corporate social influence’, rather 
than ‘to increase economic profits and reduce production costs’, patent protection 
will greatly reduce any facilitative effects on R&D expenditure. Patent protection 
also increased the effect of R&D facilitation for enterprises that have accumulated a 
relatively high number of patents. Patent structure, which is represented by the ratio 
of invention patents in the total, did not play a significant role in promoting R&D 
expenditure. Compared with protecting patent rights through non-administrative 
channels, a decision to use the administrative protection of patent rights resulted in 
a higher evaluation of the facilitation effect of patent protection on R&D. Moreover, 
if enterprises have sufficient confidence in the administrative protection of patent 
rights, their evaluation of a positive effect of patent protection on R&D expenditure 
will also be higher.
In light of these results, we present the following three policy suggestions.
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First, special attention should be given to the motivation behind patent applications. 
Patents are no longer a straightforward defensive method of protecting innovation, 
but are now also used as commercial tools. Strong patent protection here is not 
associated with increased R&D expenditure where the motivations for the patent 
are administrative and strategic, both of which reduce the innovation incentive 
effect of the patent system. Second, enterprises should strive to achieve balance 
between patent quantity and quality and to gradually establish a high-quality 
growth model. Currently, patent quantity and quality management revolve around 
the goal of ‘quantity first then quality’. In general, R&D expenditure in the majority 
of Chinese enterprises remains limited, and the most common patent structure 
is the utility model. Also, there is a lack of will for continuous expenditure on 
R&D in companies with a favourable (high) invention patent structure. However, 
international experience suggests that upgrading a country’s patent profile must 
rely on high-end inventions. A reasonable patent structure and the necessary R&D 
expenditure are the core elements of increasing corporate innovation capacity. 
Therefore, China needs to utilise multiple innovation models and the role of various 
types of patents, while establishing a more rational orientation for its national 
patent policy.
Finally, China’s unique ‘double-track’ judicial and administrative patent rights 
enforcement and protection mechanism should be strengthened to enhance 
innovators’ level of confidence in enforcement. We found that administrative 
protection and the ability of enterprises to successfully use administrative enforcement 
have a positive impact on subsequent R&D expenditure. Administrative enforcement 
is the consolidation and expansion of the private rights of intellectual property and 
constitutes a safeguard of these rights. Nonetheless, both judicial protection and 
administrative enforcement support China’s innovation-driven development strategy. 
Therefore, the government needs to take advantage of the dual aspects of  judicial 
protection and administrative enforcement to strengthen property rights.
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12. Specialist Communities in China’s 
Aerospace Technology and Innovation 
System: The Cultural Dimension
Alanna Krolikowski
Introduction
Only two decades ago, China was a marginal player in the global aerospace industry. 
Today, the pace of China’s space programs is unparalleled and it has joined the 
sector’s leading ranks. China is the only country after the Soviet Union/Russia and 
the United States to independently send humans into orbit and a rover to touch 
down on the Moon. A Chinese station will likely soon be only the only long-term 
human habitat circling the Earth alongside the International Space Station. Within 
a decade, China could become only the second country in history to land a person 
on the Moon’s surface. China already has the world’s largest radio telescope and is 
building more large instruments. The country’s advances in aeronautics are no less 
striking. A Chinese firm has disrupted the regional jet market and is poised to enter 
the large civil aircraft market, challenging the Airbus–Boeing duopoly. Chinese 
firms already produce advanced military aircraft that fly sensitive missions. 
A permissive cause of these developments has been the growing wealth of the 
Chinese state. Top leaders have declared a political and ideological commitment 
to science and technology (S&T) modernisation since at least the era of Deng 
Xiaoping. Yet,  as  recently as the mid-1990s, advocates of aerospace projects 
struggled to persuade top leaders that their efforts were worth a share of scarce 
public funds and fought for the very survival of their programs (Li 2013). Only 
in the past two decades have the central government’s swelling coffers allowed the 
administrations of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping to direct substantial resources towards 
these initiatives (Suttmeier 1980; Liu et al. 2011), as shown in China’s accelerated 
increase in expenditure on research and development (Figure 12.1). 
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Figure 12.1 China’s expenditure on research and development (renminbi)
Source: NBS (2017). 
While the central government’s material support has made the pursuit of aerospace 
capabilities possible, it does not explain how these capabilities were achieved. 
A  substantial body of scholarship in S&T studies demonstrates that there are 
multiple pathways to technical achievement and innovation in the aerospace sectors 
(Zeitlin 1995; Montresor 2001; Keller and Samuels 2003; Pekkanen 2003; Hughes 
2004; Pavelec 2004; Hickie 2006; Palmer 2006; Jeon 2010). Diverse configurations 
of policies, institutions and programs can produce engineering success. And, 
indeed, China’s aerospace sectors illustrate that the country’s innovation system 
accommodates a diversity of approaches to pursuing ambitious technology goals. 
This chapter examines why and how China’s central government has pursued 
contrasting innovation strategies for developing national capabilities in two adjacent 
sectors with comparable features: civil commercial aircraft manufacture and civil 
commercial spacecraft manufacture. The approach to the former sector has stressed 
drawing in foreign knowledge and systems and embedding Chinese firms in global 
value chains, while the approach to the latter has prioritised developing indigenous 
technology to enhance national autonomy. 
To grasp how the strategies in the two sectors diverged, it is helpful to keep in 
view the broader changes that have transformed China’s science, technology and 
innovation system over the past four decades. These changes have allowed distinct 
communities of specialists to coalesce and influence the design and implementation 
of major innovation strategies. These communities have become powerful shapers 
of long-term policy in their respective domains and their policy input helps account 
for the variation in the strategies adopted for aircraft and spacecraft manufacture. 
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The first part of this chapter surveys the institutional changes that have transformed 
China’s technology and innovation system and, within it, the aeronautic and space 
sectors. The second part discusses the culturally distinct specialist communities that 
have emerged in these two sectors and how they have shaped policymaking to allow 
for the adoption of distinct sectoral strategies. 
The institutional setting
China’s pool of scientists and technologists is enormous and growing as a share 
of the country’s workforce (Figure 12.2). Scholars have documented and debated 
the transformation of this stock of human capital, examining not only the input 
of newly skilled workers, but also their organisation into new structures (Saich 
1989; Dickson 1998; Suttmeier and Cao 1999; Liu and White 2001; Huang et al. 
2002; Cao 2003; Sleeboom-Faulkner 2006; Appelbaum et al. 2011). These studies 
examine how the reform and development of key institutions have structured the 










Figure 12.2 Researchers in research and development in China
Source: World Bank (2017). 
Often, these institutional changes have created conditions in which the impact on 
innovation of other inputs has been enhanced. The transformations have allowed 
China’s aerospace S&T establishment to make improved use of resources and 
more effectively seize opportunities presented by expanded government aerospace 
procurement and the technological upgrading of the broader economy. These 
trends—most apparent since the 1990s—include the institutionalisation of S&T 
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activities, the specialisation of the S&T establishment into distinct functional and 
sectoral elements and the professionalisation of its workforce. The discussion below 
delineates the broad contours of these transformations as they have occurred across 
a range of sectors, including aeronautics and space. 
Institutionalisation
‘Institutionalisation’ here refers to the process of creating and developing stable 
formal organisational and other processes for the implementation of S&T policies 
and programs. Since 1978, China’s innovation system has transformed from ad hoc, 
reactive and highly politicised project-driven decision-making and implementation 
to a system characterised by systematic, stable and coherent institutional mechanisms 
for developing and implementing major long-term S&T strategies and, within 
them, medium- and short-term policies and programs (Suttmeier 1980; Simon and 
Goldman 1988; Saich 1989; Cheung 2011). 
This institutionalisation of S&T activities has occurred alongside, and in a mutually 
supportive fashion with, the institutionalisation of processes across other areas 
of policymaking within the Chinese state (Liu and White 2001). These include 
the broad domains of economic reform, public sector governance and defence 
modernisation. 
Several features of this institutionalisation appear to have significantly enhanced 
the performance of technology-intensive equipment manufacturing industries, such 
as the manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft. Long-term strategies have provided 
stability and predictability in policies and programs. Systematic channels for the 
communication of expert advice to decision-makers have improved the quality of 
policymaking. The state’s supervision of state-owned industrial groups has been 
refined and harmonised. The interface between equipment manufacturers and end 
users has improved. These features of the new institutional environment have also 
intensified interaction between specialists from different work units within the same 
sector, fostering the emergence of sector-wide specialist communities.
Specialisation
As the innovation system has grown, it has also differentiated internally. Since 2000, 
new research and development (R&D) initiatives have proliferated, absorbing the 
swell of personnel and resources. These initiatives take the form of diverse projects, 
funds, regional development pushes and the building of institutions and facilities 
across almost every major segment of S&T. The areas affected are diverse, ranging 
from nuclear engineering and shipbuilding to artificial intelligence. 
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Today, the national innovation machine is active in almost every major area of 
S&T  that has an impact on economic or defence modernisation. Organisations 
dedicated to specific technical areas are now established across countless segments 
of S&T. They have multiplied and expanded in scope (Figure 12.3). Certain large 
entities have also differentiated internally into subentities that focus on specific 
production segments or technical areas. In other words, expansion and diversification 
at the systemic level have co-occurred with specialisation or re-specialisation at 
the level of sectors, firms and units within them. Like broad institutionalisation, 
the proliferation of dedicated new entities has fostered the emergence of specialist 
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Figure 12.3 Research and development institutions in China
Source: NBS (2017). 
Professionalisation
Another factor contributing to the development of high-technology capabilities is 
the professionalisation of the S&T workforce. In the late 1980s and beyond, major 
technology programs were led and sometimes created from scratch by elite scientists 
and engineers. The contributions of these figures, though monumental and enduring 
in their own right, depended on their personal status and connections to political 
and military leaders and factions. In general, S&T programs were subject to shifting 
political winds—encountering adoption, funding and support or fiscal neglect, 
postponement and termination as they fell in and out of favour with non-technical 
decision-makers (Schneider 1988; Chang 1996; Feigenbaum 2003; Handberg and 
Li 2007; Schmalzer 2008; Andreas 2009). 
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Since the 1980s, however, management at the higher echelons of this workforce 
has undergone three changes that have mitigated political interference, personalistic 
authority and erratic management. 
The first is depoliticisation. Direct, politically motivated interference by top leaders 
in specific S&T personnel appointments and activities (Schneider 1988; Handberg 
and Li 2007; Andreas 2009; Hu 2009; Luk 2015) all but disappeared by the end 
of the Hu administration. Even under the politicised anticorruption campaign 
of  President Xi Jinping, which has targeted many large state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in high-technology sectors, aircraft and spacecraft manufacturers appear to 
have eluded significant leadership changes or other disruption. Today, at least within 
the aerospace sectors, major decisions appear to reflect not struggles over power and 
privilege within the state, but technical, fiscal or other factors. 
The second change is de-personalisation. The fate of an S&T program is far less 
closely tied with the professional or political fortunes of a single influential figure or 
group than it was only two decades ago (Lu 2005a; Li 2013). A class of scientific and 
technical elites has risen (relatively more) meritoriously to program management 
and other administrative roles (Cao 2004). Within programs, leadership changes 
are now more standardised. Personal attention from high-level leaders to S&T 
programs remains a feature of the system (Besha 2010; Cheung 2016), as indicated 
by President Xi’s continuing personal visits to key facilities, but no major aerospace 
program has recently suffered because of an influential individual’s fall from grace. 
The third change is routinisation. More robust mechanisms for proposing, adopting 
and implementing S&T projects developed under former president Hu and persist 
today. The initiation of a program requires multiple layers of review before it reaches 
high-level decision-makers.1 Most programs are proposed at the top of a sectoral 
or subsectoral hierarchy on the basis of goals identified in the long-term central 
government plans (Liu et al. 2011). When this involves the acquisition of a large 
system, as in the case of a large defence aircraft program, leaders of the procuring 
units must translate goals set out in high-level strategies into concrete program 
objectives and, in turn, specific system requirements (Puska et al. 2011).
The processes of institutionalisation, specialisation and professionalisation have 
reshaped the setting for innovation, laying the foundations for more complex 
and demanding S&T activities. These changes have also fostered the formation 
of specialist communities in particular sectors, to which we now turn. 
1  Interviewee 43-42-18, interview with space expert from Chinese research institution, 2010.
12. Specialist Communities in China’s Aerospace Technology and Innovation System
269
Specialist communities
A specialist is an individual professional in a given technology sector who possesses 
subject-matter expertise that those outside their sector lack. A specialist community 
is a collective of professionals active in a given sector who share not only this 
specialised technical knowledge, but also other basic assumptions about technology 
and the world around it (Rouse 1993). Experts within a sector often come to share 
a given world view comprising basic philosophical commitments. These assumptions 
are so widely accepted that they do not require explicit articulation. Because of their 
often tacit nature, these assumptions are sometimes called ‘background knowledge’ 
(Adler 1992; Adler and Pouliot 2011). These tacit understandings form the bedrock 
of a specialist community’s culture. Members express and reinforce their background 
knowledge in a wide range of daily professional practices, including habits of 
speech and writing (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Sectoral experts’ shared background 
knowledge, expressed in common practices, constitutes their community’s specialist 
culture (Rouse 2003). China’s S&T establishment comprises countless specialised 
sectors—from biotechnology to nanotechnology—whose experts form distinct 
specialist communities.
Elements of the specialist culture shared among members of such a community 
may transcend national boundaries, language barriers and occupational differences. 
Scientists, engineers, technicians, investors, lawyers and insurers often belong 
to a  single specialist community. Websites, textbooks, academic journals, trade 
magazines and conference presentations carry representational practices across 
continents, diffusing them throughout a transnational specialist community, even 
while its members remain dispersed. What we observe, then, is not a peculiar 
‘Chinese’ culture of science, technology and innovation, but many specialist cultures 
that exist within China’s S&T establishment and transcend its borders. In aerospace, 
for example, Chinese specialists’ practices and understandings reflect their exposure 
to Soviet/Russian, US and European counterparts (Krolikowski 2015). 
Within every high-technology sector, certain experts do not share the community’s 
dominant stock of background knowledge and practices. In spite of these dissidents, 
a mainstream specialist culture is usually discernable within a community. When 
specialists differ on the mere specifics of policies or programs, rather than their basic 
direction, their disagreement is usually predicated on their common acceptance 
of more fundamental assumptions about their sector and their work. 
Experts draw on this specialist culture when they describe and define their sector 
and its policy needs to policymakers. When specialists represent their sector in 
speech or writing, they rely on a set of representational practices—or habits of 
expression—shared within their community. These discursive acts reflect and 
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convey the underlying philosophical assumptions tacitly shared within the specialist 
community. Representational practices are important because they ‘anchor’ other 
practices, such as programmatic and regulatory practices (Swidler 2001). 
Specialist communities shape the S&T system because they discursively constitute 
distinct sectors as sites requiring particular types of policies. In the process of depicting 
their sector to policymakers, specialists also impart philosophical assumptions that 
tacitly lend support to some policy measures over others. Sectoral specialists define 
their sectors as objects of policy. Their acts of speech and illustration are not merely 
representational, but also productive of their sectors and technologies (Rouse 1993; 
MacKenzie 2006). 
China’s innovation system is home to specialist communities that play these roles. 
Within the aerospace sectors, at least five conditions help form and maintain tight-
knit specialist communities:
1. Barriers to the free circulation of ideas between sectoral experts and outsiders 
foster an insular specialist culture. Examples include secrecy rules and the 
program specificity of technical knowledge, both of which characterise work in 
the defence-industrial conglomerates to which China’s aerospace firms belong.2 
2. Barriers to the entry and exit of individual professionals preserve a specialist 
community’s internal culture. China’s aeronautic and space specialists tend to 
spend their entire careers within their sector, as do their counterparts in many 
countries, in part because programs have long lifetimes and because attractive 
opportunities outside a few large industrial groups are scarce.3 
3. Sectors dominated by large firms and organisations, such as the behemoth 
aerospace industrial groups, are more likely to have robust internal cultures 
than sectors fragmented into many smaller entities. Large organisations provide 
conduits for the maintenance and propagation of such cultures. 
4. Hierarchical structures nurture the emergence and consolidation of specialist 
cultures within organisations. Hierarchies supply role models and reward 
individuals for the correct performance of a community’s cultural practices. 
Large SOEs feature such structures.
5. Organisations within which professional training and interaction take the 
form of master–apprentice relationships—for example, supervisor–student, 
laboratory director–technician, administrative patron–client—are effective 
at socialising new entrants into their culture (Chang 1996; Qiu 2009; Wang 
2011). The aerospace industry features such interactions.4 
2  Interviewee 25-43-20, interview with space expert from a space-sector operational organisation, 2010.
3  Interviewee 20-36-42, interview with space expert from Chinese research institution, 2010.
4  Interviewee 25-43-20. 
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Scientists and engineers in policymaking
Specialist communities are worth examining because they are the actors most 
directly responsible for China’s scientific and technological output. They also have 
an impact on policies and programs, which ultimately shape the long-term prospects 
for Chinese innovation. Several conditions grant scientists and engineers unique 
roles in policymaking.
Scientists and engineers form a reservoir of technical expertise for policymakers to 
consult. Policymakers rarely have any direct experience of the particular sector at 
stake when devising innovation strategies, so they rely on specialists to interpret 
these for them. Policymaking bureaucracies tap experts to monitor trends, define 
problems and policy options and make recommendations. Decision-makers draw 
on specialist insights when they adopt, evaluate and reform policy for a given 
technology sector. 
Mechanisms exist to channel expert advice to high-level political decision-makers 
(Halpern 1988). Experts brief leaders, write reports and present at conferences for 
policymakers who prepare plans and strategies for the sector (Halpern 1988; Zhu 
2009).5 
Since the 1950s, individual elite scientists and engineers have had the ear of senior 
Chinese leaders, such as Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen (Feigenbaum 2003; Besha 
2010; Li 2013). Some have cultivated and used this influence to pursue major S&T 
projects of their own design and initiative.
Scientific and technical elites derive power and influence from their very status 
as experts. This is true almost everywhere, but especially so in post-Mao China’s 
technocratic context (Cheng and White 1990; Hua 1995; Greenhalgh 2003). 
Historically, this status has afforded aerospace experts substantial policy influence, 
extending even into domains far outside their area of formal training, such 
as agriculture and family planning (Chang 1996; Greenhalgh 2005).
These factors combine to give China’s aeronautic and space experts significant input 
into and influence over policymaking in their sectors. 
5  Interviewee 40-27-18, interview with space expert from Chinese research institution, 2010; Interviewee 24-19-
41, interview with export control specialist at a Chinese think tank, 2010.
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Aeronautic and space specialists
Aeronautic and space experts have sometimes wielded this influence as individuals 
or interest groups. However, they have had the most enduring and far-reaching 
impact as specialist communities shaping the landscape within which innovation 
projects take place. China’s aeronautic and space experts belong to distinct specialist 
communities, each of which is held together by a particular internal culture. 
As aeronautic and space experts represent their sectors to policymakers, they also 
implicitly convey distinct policy prescriptions, helping to shape overarching sectoral 
innovation strategies. 
The central government’s strategies for developing the nation’s aeronautic and space 
sectors differ markedly. The approach to developing aircraft manufacture has been 
premised on trade and industrial collaboration with foreign firms since at least 
the early 1990s. In contrast, the strategy for the spacecraft sector has prioritised 
autonomously developing critical systems at home and the domestic vertical 
integration of the national industrial base for several decades, since at least the 
time of the Sino–Soviet split. To a large degree, these differences reflect the distinct 
opportunities for trade and foreign collaboration available to Chinese firms and 
agencies, which have been far more numerous and substantial in aeronautics than 
in space. However, a close reading of specialist pronouncements reveals that the 
distinct approaches adopted in each sector long predate Chinese firms’ differential 
access to international technology. This situation suggests that aeronautic and space 
specialists have understood and depicted the international landscapes before them 
in fundamentally different ways for several decades. 
Aeronautic specialists and policy
Within China, aeronautic specialists are found in a range of organisations spanning 
SOEs in the defence sector—namely, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC) and its arm’s-length civil subsidiary, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation 
of China (Comac)—government agencies, the military and technical universities 
(Deng et al. 1988; Allen et al. 1995; Goldstein 2006; MIIT 2009; Cliff 2010). 
China’s aeronautic experts belong to a larger transnational community of aircraft 
technology specialists, sharing its basic assumptions and discursive practices. Like 
their counterparts in other countries, China’s aeronautic specialists tend to regard 
aircraft technologies as intrinsically global products (Y. Zhang 2007). Experts define 
modern aircraft as comprising elements designed and made in different countries. 
They describe global production networks as the most advanced and self-evident 
mode of manufacture for this industry. These ideas are rooted in a benign view 
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of the international political economy and world markets. As aeronautic experts 
explain it, competition between firms and national industries drives innovation and 
benefits consumers (Chen 2008). 
That understanding finds parallels in aeronautic experts’ depictions of global 
aviation activities and the physical environment of flight. Aeronautic engineers 
tend to envision global airspace as a single transboundary domain. They describe air 
transportation systems and infrastructure as ideally and naturally forming a seamless 
global whole that transcends national borders. This view of the aviation environment 
extends to experts’ representations of aircraft operations, regulation and production, 
all of which require transnational integration in a similar manner (Y. Zhang 2007). 
These ideas shape Chinese aeronautic specialists’ shared expectations of how their 
national industry should evolve. Leading experts consistently explain that, like 
the world’s leading airplane manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing, China’s national 
champions should establish global supply chains and facilities to support client 
airlines all over the world (Zhang 2008; AVIC 2015). These experts also represent 
offset arrangements with firms in other countries whose airlines will buy their 
aircraft as a natural part of this evolution.6 
These views are consistent with other, more fundamental understandings shared 
by Chinese and international aeronautic specialists. Their perspectives on global 
trade and transnationally distributed production rest on what could be termed 
an ‘economic’ or instrumental philosophy of technology. In this understanding, 
technical artefacts, such as airliners and aircraft engines, reflect the demands of their 
social context and the choices of their designers and makers (Y. Zhang 2007; Chen 
2008). Aeronautic technology does not evolve according to a logic of its own, but 
rather develops in response to market pressures, client demands and other human 
or social factors (Qi and Cheng 2006). Engineers and inventors are the shapers of 
these devices, which they tailor to meet the needs of their time and place (Yao 1996; 
Liu 2007). 
These understandings reach the high-level policymakers who decide long-term 
innovation and industrial strategies for the aircraft sector. Aeronautic experts 
convey their ideas through the analyses and other technical input they supply to 
policymakers. When experts represent their sector as endowed with specific features, 
they implicitly prescribe national policies consistent with these characteristics. 
When aeronautic experts depict their industry and technologies as inherently 
global, they represent their sector as one requiring policies that foster trade, 
transnational industrial integration and intergovernmental civil cooperation 
(Guo 2000; Lu 2005b). These include measures to facilitate the transboundary sale 
6  Interviewee 18-00-18, interview with senior Chinese aircraft industry professional, 2010.
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of aircraft articles and investment in aircraft facilities, to harmonise global standards 
for products and to support partnerships with leading foreign firms (Yu 2009; 
Mecham and Anselmo 2011). When aircraft items are represented in this way, an 
insistence on developing and using indigenous technology for the sake of achieving 
national technological autonomy appears counterproductive and self-limiting. 
Instead, experts’ depictions prioritise easing the inbound and outbound movement 
of aeronautic articles to China, attracting optimal foreign partners and, ultimately, 
ensuring the embedding of Chinese firms in global value chains (Frenken 2000; 
Bowen 2007; Raska and Krolikowski 2013).
These representations in turn support a sectoral strategy with particular features. 
First, a goal of China’s aeronautics strategy has been to integrate Chinese firms into 
transnational industrial networks at optimal nodes (Grevatt 2012). This approach 
obviates the total vertical integration of aircraft manufacture within domestic firms 
(Tyroler-Cooper and Peet 2011). The strategy does not aim at straightforward 
import substitution, as indicated by the long-term targets of between 10 and 
30 per cent indigenous content on the ARJ21 and C919 domestic airliner programs 
(Lu 2005a).7 Instead, inserting Chinese firms into transnational networks requires 
their selective specialisation in high value-added products for both domestic and 
global markets, alongside the importation and outsourcing of other components 
and services (Perrett 2009b). The desired end goal is a qualified substitution of high 
value-added imports with indigenous products in combination with imports and 
foreign-based industrial collaboration in selected areas (Perrett 2009a; Anselmo et al. 
2011). For example, one long-term objective is to develop select national capabilities 
in commercial aircraft engine manufacture (Central People’s Government 2009). 
In this vision, AVIC will develop the regionally and globally distributed production 
processes of today’s global top-tier aircraft manufacturers (AVIC 2015). Within this 
sectoral strategy, the measure of success is twofold: both the technological output 
and the export success of Chinese firms matter. For these experts, producing viable 
aircraft domestically is a priority of this approach, but emphasis is also placed on 
making AVIC entities into profitable, competitive export-oriented businesses.8 The 
result is a sectoral strategy with particular features that remains largely uncontested, 
even while markedly different policies are adopted in the adjacent space sector. 
Space specialists and policy
China’s space experts belong to their own distinct community and work across 
a vast range of institutions comparable to those found in the aircraft industry. These 
include two large state-owned defence-industrial groups, the Chinese Aerospace 
7  ibid.
8  ibid.
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Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the Chinese Aerospace Science 
and Industry Corporation (CASIC), several government agencies, military entities 
and technical universities and research institutes (Sun 2007a; Ma 2011). 
China’s space experts share a specialist culture with space experts in other countries 
(Miller 2002), but their world view is unlike that of aeronautic specialists. When 
space experts look beyond their own borders, they see a hierarchical system 
of competing national industrial bases, each one’s position dictated by its mastery 
of critical technologies.9 State power and the strength of industry are intertwined 
in this view, so industrial capabilities remain divided by national boundaries.10 
The natural state of affairs in the space sector is for firms to engage in research, 
development and production activities within the borders of the country in which 
they are headquartered and with partners from the same country or, at most, close 
allies. National industrial bases compete on all fronts. 
In these experts’ depictions, the prognosis for the global space sector is its inevitable 
and persistent fragmentation into distinct national industrial bases. Given the sector’s 
strategic role, a rising power must assure its independent access to and utilisation of 
the space environment by developing an industry of its own (Huang 2006, 2007). 
These ideas imply a theory of world politics within which technological factors decide 
interstate struggles for security and dominance. To space experts, technological 
breakthroughs are the engines of world history. Advances in space systems are 
chief among these, bringing revolutionary changes to international politics and 
other social phenomena (Liu et al. 1996; Chang 2004). For example, in this view, 
the advent of space weapons has transformed the international system, creating 
runaway dynamics that governments and militaries cannot control (Zhang 2005; 
Huang 2006; Dai 2007; Peoples 2008a). Thus, unlike aeronautic experts, space 
specialists express deterministic and structural assumptions about space technology 
and its impact on society (Liang 2002; Dai 2007; Ma 2008; Peoples 2008b). While 
recognising that technological change has many sources, space experts assume that at 
least one of them is a momentum internal to technology itself (Huang 1999). They 
often represent technical processes as eluding human control. Technological change 
proceeds according to its own internal logic, which largely resists management by 
humans (Xu 2007). Technology advances and the social environment responds 
(Liu et al. 1996). 
This hostile landscape in view, Chinese specialists have interpreted the tightening 
in 1999 of US restrictions on exports of space items to China as part of a US 
strategy to suppress China’s peaceful rise (Liao 2006; Ning et al. 2006). In this 
understanding, tight US controls on space exports to China have not only denied 
9  Interviewee 19-36-43, interview with space expert from an academic institution, 2010.
10 Interviewee 25-43-20.
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it trade opportunities, but also serve a larger US strategy to block China’s national 
rejuvenation: a ‘space containment policy’ targeting China’s core development 
and security interests (Zhang 2003; Communist Party Member 2008). This ‘space 
embargo’ constrains China’s economic advance by excluding it from world markets 
for high-technology goods and, worse, stifles its societal and defence modernisation 
(Ma 2008). These depictions underpin and rationalise policies to rapidly and 
autonomously develop capabilities in civil, commercial, military, and intelligence 
space (Liao 2006; Sun 2006, 2007b; Q. Zhang 2007). 
The long-term ideal, then, is national control over critical processes in satellite and 
launch vehicle manufacture and operation (State Council 2006). This goal demands 
the near-total vertical integration of manufacture within a national system of firms. 
The objective of sectoral policy is building a holistic industrial base within China, 
while selectively pursuing international cooperation projects where they bring 
significant benefits, but carry few risks (Q. Zhang 2007; Leading Party Group of 
CASC 2009). Foreign partners’ inputs can supplement, but not substitute for or 
interfere with, homegrown capabilities (Liang 2002; Lan 2007). Success for CASC 
and CASIC means mission success and its corollary, technological achievement 
(Guo 2007). Business performance is a distantly secondary objective.11 Reforms of 
these conglomerates serve the objective of enhancing their technological output, 
rather than their profitability or corporate governance for its own sake. Exports are 
sought and represent industrial achievements, but they are not fundamental goals of 
the overarching sectoral development strategy.
Table 12.1 Technological development and innovation strategies in China’s 
aerospace sectors
Feature Aeronautics Space
Expected structure of 
global industry
Transnational industrial integration International industrial fragmentation
Form of industrial 
structure sought
Import substitution goals qualified, 
not absolute
Vertical integration is not the end goal
AVIC to enter global industry at 
particular nodes
Total in-country vertical integration 
National control over all critical 
elements and processes, from R&D 
through to operations





AVIC to produce in global networks
Expect offsets, localisation of 
manufacturing in client states
Seek stable supply chains—a means 
to this are international standards
Foreign inputs supplement, but never 
substitute for, homegrown inputs
Vision of success for  
major firms
Exports matter: AVIC’s success 
measured in terms of both 
technology output and business 
performance
Success for CASC and CASIC 
means mission success and 
technological achievement; business 
performance is secondary
11 Interviewee 25-43-20.
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Through their representations, China’s aeronautic and space specialists constitute 
their sectors as objects requiring specific policies. In the aeronautic sector, these 
policies foster global trade and cooperation. In the space sector, they constrain trade 
and cooperation, while prioritising the development of indigenous capabilities 
(Table 12.1). 
Conclusion
China now has perhaps the world’s most rapidly advancing space program and is 
poised to enter the technologically demanding large-carrier segment of the global 
aircraft industry. Within this evolving innovation system, clusters of experts, sharing 
specialised knowledge and a particular specialist culture, have coalesced. These 
communities are significant actors within the S&T system and shapers of innovation 
policy. 
China’s specialist communities exert a diffuse and indirect impact on long-term 
innovation strategies. Experts participate in policymaking as authorities on their 
subject matter and technical domain. In the process, they perform representational 
practices that produce their sectors as specific sites for state action. These practices 
communicate not only experts’ technical knowledge, but also their tacit policy 
recommendations. They reflect the specialist community’s culture. Aeronautic 
and space experts illustrate these processes. Through their representations, these 
specialists create the enabling conditions for the innovation strategy adopted in 
each sector. Aeronautic specialists represent their sector as requiring an approach 
that draws in foreign knowledge and systems and embeds Chinese firms in global 
value chains. In contrast, space experts depict their sector as demanding a strategy 
that prioritises developing indigenous technology to enhance national autonomy. 
These specialists thus define the range of policies and outcomes that policymakers 
in each sector consider plausible and feasible, in the process setting the parameters 
on what kind of innovation strategy is possible in their domain. Through their 
representational practices, specialists produce agreement on the ends and means 
of policy. 
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Farms: Implications for Rural Land 
Reform in China
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Introduction
Agricultural productivity in China has experienced a rapid growth over the past four 
decades. Between 1978 and 2013, agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) grew 
at an average rate of 2.86 per cent a year, which is more than three times the global 
average of 0.95 per cent (Fuglie and Rada 2015). The rapid increase in agricultural 
productivity has lessened the negative effects of constrained supply of inputs (such 
as land and water) and adverse seasonal conditions, and contributed to a dramatic 
expansion of agricultural output. Since the late 1970s, the real gross output value 
of Chinese agriculture has increased by a multiple of 4.6, from US$129.6 billion 
in 1978 to US$594.9 billion in 2013 (in the 2004–06 constant price), with total 
input increasing by just 66.7 per cent over the same period. Increased agricultural 
productivity has also released rural labour, facilitating rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation in China through rural–urban migration. By 2015, about 
270 million rural migrants (around 31.7 per cent of the rural population) moved 
into Chinese cities, providing an abundant labour supply to support urban industrial 
development.
While this accomplishment is impressive, agricultural productivity growth in China 
has more recently hit a bottleneck. Previous challenges have intensified and new 
challenges have emerged. For example, for decades, overuse of fertiliser and crop 
chemicals has gradually degraded land and slowed the yield growth of major crops 
(Zhang et al. 2013; Lu et al. 2015). Furthermore, rising wages and rural labour 
shortages have increased the cost of agricultural production, which continues to rely 
primarily on the use of labour-intensive technologies (Huang 2013; Han 2015). 
A more pressing problem is that falling average farm size (in terms of land area 
operated) has restricted farmers utilising advanced technologies (such as minimum-
tillage and no-tillage methods) that are embodied in large plant and machinery 
(Sheng and Chancellor 2017). Estimates based on annual rural household surveys 
by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture show that the average size of farms in China 
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declined from 0.73 hectare in the early 1980s to 0.53 ha in 2003 (NBS 1985–2005; 
Huang and Ding 2016a). As a consequence, growth in selective crop productivity 
fell between 2005 and 2014: to 70 per cent for wheat, 73 per cent for maize and 
51 per cent for barley of the long-term growth rate since 1961 (FAO 2017).
In recognising the importance of sustainable agricultural productivity growth for the 
realisation of long-term food security, the Chinese Government has, over the past 
13 years, initiated a series of institutional reforms to promote the mechanisation 
of agricultural production and to encourage the adoption of advanced production 
technologies (Huang and Yang 2017). Major policy changes include a shift from 
taxing to subsidising agriculture (Tao and Qin 2007; Liu et al. 2012), an increase 
in public investment in agricultural research and development (R&D) (Huang and 
Rozelle 2014; Babu et al. 2016) and gradual market reform and trade liberalisation 
(Park et al. 2002; Huang and Rozelle 2006; Huang et al. 2009). The most notable 
change, however, relates to land reforms since 2014 that confirm the ‘property right of 
land contract’ for farmers. The purpose of this reform was to resolve the issue of small 
farm size, with the new institutional arrangement allowing legal transfer of operational 
rights to land. This was expected to accelerate land consolidation between medium 
and small farm operators and thus promote agricultural mechanisation in rural China.
It has been argued in the literature that assisting small landholders to either move 
up or move out of farming can help to improve industry-level mechanisation and 
agricultural productivity (e.g. FAO 2015; IFPRI 2015). The underlying assumption 
is that larger farms have greater willingness and capacity to invest in advanced 
capital equipment compared with their small counterparts, and thus can realise 
additional productivity gains through increasing returns to scale and access to new 
technology embodied in plant and machinery (Sheng et al. 2016). Consolidation of 
farmland via the market, however, remains challenging, even in developed countries 
with more transparent procedures and relatively lower transportation costs. This is 
because of the many market, legislative and institutional barriers that smallholders 
must overcome, as well as the uncertainties and transaction costs caused by cultural 
factors and the preferences of small landholders. It is noted that the issue of small 
farm size extends far beyond China: in 2012 more than 50 per cent of farms in 
the United States were categorised as small, defined as those having sales value and 
operational land scale below the bottom 20 per cent of the average (Key 2017). 
Identification of alternative ways to solve small-scale farming efficiency challenges 
is of broader public interest, especially for China, where more than 50 per cent 
of farms operate on less than 1 ha of land.
This chapter explores institutional innovation arising from the recent development 
of capital markets (namely, capital outsourcing) and the related potential for 
promoting the agricultural mechanisation of small farms in China. We argue 
that, under certain institutional arrangements, contract mechanisation services 
(in particular, capital outsourcing) can substitute for farmers’ own investment in 
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plant and machinery. This, in turn, can improve the capital–labour ratio of medium 
and small farms, complementing previous land consolidation reform in China 
to improve industry-level agricultural productivity. To justify this argument, we 
analyse the trend of industry-level agricultural productivity in China since 1978 
and link this to agricultural capital equipment and average farm size, investigating 
the interaction between land reform and contract mechanisation services and 
their impact on farm productivity. Our discussion provides indirect evidence that, 
under certain conditions, small household farms can significantly increase their 
capital–labour ratio in production through contracting in mechanisation services. 
Without incurring the sunk costs related to investment in expensive yet efficient 
capital equipment, these small farms are now able to explore the productivity 
benefits from increasing returns to scale and adopting new technology. Moreover, 
contract mechanisation services can also facilitate land consolidation and change 
the way in which small farms optimise their production procedures. This provides 
useful insights for China and other countries attempting to improve agricultural 
productivity of their small household farms. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two describes the trend 
of agricultural productivity growth in China over the past three decades and links 
recent stagnation in productivity growth to the small size of a large share of China’s 
household farms. Section three discusses historical land reforms and their impact on 
farm size in rural China, and raises the question of whether allowing ‘land contract 
rights’ to be legally transferred through markets could facilitate long-term land 
consolidation and productivity growth for small farms. Section four analyses the 
development of contract mechanisation services, their potential role in substituting 
for farmers’ own investment in plant and machinery and their impact on levels 
of industry mechanisation. Section five reviews the literature exploring the impact 
of contract mechanisation services on farm size and household production in China, 
and points to its potential role in resolving the issue of small farm size. Section six 
provides the conclusion.
Agricultural productivity, capital investment 
and small-farm issues 
Agricultural productivity in China grew rapidly after the household responsibility 
system (HRS) reform in 1978. As an institutional innovation to solve 
incentive  problems inherent in the collective production system under people’s 
communes, the HRS significantly raised agricultural productivity through 
contracting cultivated land to farm households in each village (Huang and Yang 
2017). Compared with the pre-reform period of 1961–78, when agricultural 
TFP rose by a mere 0.66 per cent a year, the growth rate increased by a multiple 
of more than 4 per cent per annum, to 3.08 per cent annually, during the early 
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reform years, 1979–84, and by 2.95  per  cent a year during the later reform 
period, 1985–2013 (Figure 13.1). Over the period 1961–2013, the growth of 
agricultural TFP contributed more than half of China’s annual real output growth 
(4.3 per  cent)—a  rate that was much higher than those of most developed and 













































































Figure 13.1 Output, input and TFP index in Chinese agriculture, 1961–2013


























Figure 13.2 Comparison of agricultural TFP growth in China and the rest 
of the world, 1961–2013
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Sheng and Song (2017).
Underlying this rapid productivity growth is a dramatic change in the structure of 
agricultural output and input. Between 1989 and 2014, real total agricultural output 
in China increased from US$129.6 billion to US$594.9 billion (at the 2004–06 
constant price)—an annual growth rate of 4.5 per cent. The proportion of cereals in 
total agricultural output, however, has declined, from 33.6 per cent to 23.5 per cent. 
The proportion of vegetables, fruits and nuts, on the other hand, increased, from 
1  Note that the comparison of agricultural TFP between countries needs to be approached with some caution 
because developing countries such as China, Korea and those in Latin America have come from a low base since 
1961 compared with the United States, Canada and Australia, which have had access to capital for some time 
and have operated within very different regulatory and market environments.
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8.2 per cent to 19.2 per cent, as did the proportion of livestock and meat products in 
total agricultural output, from 25.6 per cent to 29.3 per cent. The shift in agricultural 
production towards higher-value and higher-protein products in particular reflects 
dramatic improvement in the production efficiency of coarse grains relative to other 
products, and was partly driven by changing food demand. On the input side, both 
capital and intermediate inputs increased significantly, substituting for land and 
labour in production. Between 1978 and 2014, real total inputs into agriculture in 
China have grown at the rate of 1.58 per cent a year; machinery units (measured 
by using the number of 40-horsepower tractor equivalents) and fertiliser usage grew 
at the rate of 6.23 per cent a year and 4.19 per cent a year, respectively. The latter 
helped to compensate for the decline in labour usage (–0.6 per cent a year) and 
























































































Figure 13.3 Change in input components of agricultural production 
(US$ million at 2004–06 price)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Fuglie and Rada (2015).
At the industry end, it is widely believed that agricultural productivity growth and 
input–output structural adjustment in China were driven by ongoing technological 
progress and its diffusion between farms (Huang and Yang 2017). In the technology 
diffusion process, increasing investment in new plant and machinery is regarded 
as an essential channel through which farm households improve their level of 
mechanisation and gain access to the embodied technology. Between 1978 and 
2013,  the power of plant and machinery per capita in agricultural production 
increased from 3.5 kilowatts (kW) to 44.7 kW, with an annual growth rate of 
6 per cent a year (MOA various issues). Using capital equipment to replace labour 
has allowed farms not only to increase the efficiency of some primary inputs such 
as land and labour, but also to expand their TFP and profitability. As such, a strong 
positive relationship is observed between industry-level agricultural productivity 
(i.e. yield, labour productivity and TFP) and capital equipment per capita over the 
past three decades (Figure 13.4). 

































Figure 13.4 Relationship between the capital–labour ratio and agricultural 
productivity, 1961–2013
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Fuglie and Rada (2015).
Although the capital–labour ratio in Chinese agriculture has significantly increased 
over time, it is still much lower than that in developed countries such as the United 
States, the European Union (EU), Australia and Japan (Figure 13.5). In 2013, 
China’s level of capital equipment per capita in agriculture was only one-twentieth 
that of Australia, one-forty-seventh of the United States and one-seventy-sixth of 
that in Japan (Fuglie and Rada 2015). In addition, a majority of the plant and 
equipment (more than 85 per cent) used in China’s agricultural production was 
smaller and less efficient than that used in developed countries (MOA various years). 
This relatively low capital–labour ratio and inferior capital equipment prevented 
Chinese agriculture from further improving its industry-level productivity. A critical 
issue for policymakers, therefore, is to encourage investment in agricultural capital 




















Figure 13.5 Relationship between logarithm of yield and capital–labour ratio 
between countries, 1961–2013
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Fuglie and Rada (2015).
13. Mechanisation Outsourcing and Agricultural Productivity for Small Farms
295
Theoretically, large farms have a higher propensity to invest in larger and more 
advanced equipment than their smaller counterparts. This is not only due to lower 
budget constraints for capital investment, but also because the average sunk costs of 
capital investment will decline as output increases. The willingness and ability of small 
farms to make capital investment are, in contrast, restricted by their lesser financial 
capacity and limited scope for increasing returns to scale and obtaining gains from 
adopting new technologies. This logic applies even more so when increased R&D 
costs result in more expensive and more efficient new capital equipment over time. 
In China, agricultural production is based on farming households tending to 
a  small piece of land that is rented from the local rural community. The average 
size of Chinese household farms is less than 1 ha (just less than 40 per cent of the 
global average for small farms), and, moreover, until 2004, was in continual decline 
(Huang and Ding 2016a). While a number of exceptionally small farms are able to 
achieve high productivity, the majority rely on intensive use of self-employed labour 
as a substitute for capital. Moreover, much of what capital plant and machinery is 
used in production is outdated and inefficient. This constrains the industry from 
improving mechanisation levels and from realising higher levels of productivity 
growth. To eliminate these obstacles to agricultural mechanisation and productivity 
growth, it is essential to resolve the investment problem related to small farm size.
Land policy, farm consolidation 
and transformation
In the agricultural development literature, the effect of farm size (i.e. land size) 
on agricultural capital investment and productivity has long been debated. Many 
studies have found an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in 
developing countries, including in India, Vietnam and some African countries 
(i.e.  Sen 1962, 1966; Lipton 1993; Dyer 1996; Deininger and Byerlee 2012). 
There is also evidence that small may not necessarily be beautiful, especially when 
ongoing technological progress changes methods of agricultural production and 
management. For example, small farms may face increasing challenges in meeting 
the structural change of agricultural demand and may also be reluctant to make 
related capital investments in newly developed production technology (Hazell 2005; 
Huang et al. 2008). Small farms also lack the capacity to cope with opportunities 
and risks arising from volatile market and climatic conditions (HLPE 2013). 
To deal with these issues, a general consensus among economists and policymakers 
is to transform small farms into large farms (or consolidate agricultural industry) 
by assisting small farms either to move up or to move out of the farming sector 
(IFPRI 2015; FAO 2017). 
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Although the principal need to resolve the challenges of small farms is clear, 
it is difficult to implement in practice, especially in developing countries where 
agricultural  product and factor markets are usually incomplete. In China, the 
transformation of small farms is constrained especially by the way in which 
agricultural land is allocated through leasing and related institutional arrangements. 
Initiated by the HRS in 1978, cultivated land has been contracted to individual 
households in each village based on the number of people and/or units of labour in 
the household (equity). As an institutional innovation to resolve incentive problems 
inherent in the previous collective production system under people’s communes, 
the HRS succeeded in raising agricultural productivity in the early reform period 
(1978–84), but it also shifted land-use rights from a collective-based system to 
a family-based one. Since land-use rights (which are separate from landownership) 
are not transferable after initial allocation, the average operational scale of farms is 
constrained by the amount of land initially allocated to each household. An estimate 
based on rural household surveys showed that the average size of farms in China 
was  0.73 ha in the early 1980s (NBS 1985–2005), which declined to 0.61 ha 
until 2013.
Another feature of the land reforms introduced in 1978 that affected the operational 
scale of farms and farmers’ decisions about capital investment relates to the insecure 
tenure of land contracts. In the early 1980s, land contracts lasted for only three years 
or less. The short duration of land contracts offered no confidence or incentives for 
farm operators to make long-term production and investment plans. To improve 
security of tenure, a new policy was proposed in 1984 to increase the contract 
duration to 15 years, although it was ‘never seriously publicized or implemented’ 
(Zhu and Prosterman 2007). In 1993, the central government issued a further 
directive, which extended land contracts to a continuous and fixed term of 30 years. 
However, this new term was not embodied in formal law until 1998, when the 
government also initiated a massive campaign to publicise the policy (Zhao 2015). 
These policies generally did little to change farmers’ incentives for investment, 
since village officials (the government) held the privilege (under the regulation) to 
periodically redistribute land among households in the middle of these fixed terms 
(Kung and Liu 1997; O’Brien and Li 1999; Pastor and Tan 2000).
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a majority of rural land was reallocated by village 
leaders using administrative methods, although the frequency of land reallocations 
varied between villages (Brandt et al. 2002; Krusekopf 2002). According to surveys 
conducted in the 1990s, by 1996, two-thirds of Chinese villages had reallocated 
land using administrative methods, often in the middle of land contract terms 
(Brandt et al. 2002). By 2002, 207 of 244 villages in the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
National Fixed-point Survey (NFS) had reallocated land, and the average number 
of reallocations each village conducted between 1980 and 2002 is two (Zhao 2015). 
While the exact procedure by which land is redistributed differs between villages 
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(Figure 13.6), the most common practice is for village leaders to redivide all village 
land into bundles with equal distribution of land-quality types, and to distribute 
the bundles to households based on their population and agricultural labour force. 
Since land redistribution does not necessarily reflect land-use efficiency, but rather 
seeks to maintain a relatively egalitarian distribution of land, the average operational 
scale and land size of farms over the period have declined. By 2003, average land 
areas operated per farm had decreased to 0.53 ha, which was 72.6 per cent of that 
in 1980 (NBS 1985–2005). 
Figure 13.6 Variations in instances of land reallocation
Source: Zhao (2015).
In 2003, the National People’s Congress decided to enact the Rural Land 
Contracting Law (RLCL) with the aim of improving security of tenure. Differing 
from previous laws, the RLCL was devoted entirely to clarifying the relationship 
between collective landownership and farmers’ use of land, and enforced the 
contractual arrangements between the two parties (Prosterman et al. 2006). 
In particular, it explicitly prohibited land reallocation by village officials throughout 
farmers’ 30-year terms of land usage. The frequency of land reallocations has since 
significantly decreased. On average, only 2 per cent of villages conducted annual 
reallocations between 2003 and 2006, compared with a yearly average of about 
9 per cent before 2003 (Zhao 2015). However, the RLCL still did not allow farm 
households to exchange land-use contracts via the market. Therefore, the reform 
helped to improve the security of tenure of land contracts under the HRS, but 
did not facilitate land transfers between households or land consolidation within 
China’s agricultural industry. 
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From 2000, China’s urbanisation process accelerated, with more and more rural 
migrants driven to the cities by the prospect of higher wages. By 2010, around 160 
million rural migrants had moved into urban regions in China (Meng and Zhang 
2010) and the proportion of labour in agriculture decreased from 49.1 per  cent 
in 2003 to 31.4 per cent in 2013 (NBS 1978–2014). The rapid decline in the 
rural labour supply raised the returns to labour relative to the amount of land in 
agricultural production, but did not proportionally increase farm size because of 
the current arrangements for land allocation. Between 2003 and 2013, the relative 
productivity of labour to land increased by 66.3 per cent, while the average farm size 
(measured by land area per household) increased by only 15.1 per cent (Figure 13.7). 
Although land transfers have accelerated since 2000, most of these were between 
relatives and friends within a village (Huang et al. 2012). By the end of 2013, some 
53 million (23 per cent) rural households had rented out their land, accounting 
for 26 per cent of total agricultural land under the HRS (MOA 2014). However, 
average farm size remained at 0.61 ha per farm for rural households and 0.78 ha for 
all agricultural business (Huang and Ding 2016a). This farm size remained too small 
to benefit from the productivity gains available from the use of larger and more 





























Figure 13.7 Relationship between relative labour–land productivity and farm 
size, 2000–13
Notes: The share of cultivated land per household is 93 per cent of the total land. The estimates of 
farm size exclude those households whose members remained in rural areas but were fully engaged 
in non-farm rural employment. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from NBS (1978–2014).
Finally, in terms of the distribution of farm size, a majority of farm households 
operate on a small piece of land, although there appears to be rapid growth in 
medium and large-scale farms. By the end of 2013, the share of farm households 
operating on more than 70 ha of land in the total number of farms in north-
east and northern China (where average farm size is 1.73 ha, around three times 
the national average) was still less than 0.02 per cent. Based on estimates using 
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a farm operations survey by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) 
at the Peking University, more than 90 per cent of farm households in north-east 
and northern China operated on less than 3 ha, among which around two-thirds 
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Figure 13.8 Distribution of farm size (by land area) in north-east and northern 
China: 2003, 2008 and 2013 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Huang and Ding (2016a).
To encourage land transfers between farm households to improve land consolidation, 
in 2015 China’s State Council amended the national Land Law by formally separating 
land operation rights from land contract rights. The directive, for the first time, allowed 
land contract rights to be legally transferred through market mechanisms. Following 
the directive, a series of institutional innovations—including establishing land transfer 
service centres to promote land rental and policy support for land consolidation—
has been developed to assist small farms to enlarge their operational scale through 
market transactions (Huang and Ding 2016a). Over time, this kind of institutional 
arrangement will gradually support land contract consolidation among those farmers 
who decide to stay in farming and will also improve land distribution and land-use 
efficiency. This is, however, dependent on whether market failure in the transformation 
of farm operations (such as high land transaction costs; as in Kimura et al. 2011) can be 
dealt with appropriately. It is recognised that achieving land consolidation via market 
transactions that produce larger farming operations, which in turn utilise heavy plant 
and machinery, is a process that may require more time. 
Agricultural mechanisation and contracting 
capital services 
As discussed in section three, land transformation and consolidation can help 
to  improve farm productivity by changing the willingness of household farms to 
make capital investment. When farms operate on a relatively larger piece of land 
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(or become larger), they are more willing and able to pay the sunk costs for capital 
investment, and thus can benefit from increasing returns to scale and advanced 
technology embodied in new plant and machinery. Moreover, the larger the farm 
size, the higher will be the mechanisation level and productivity. If the literature 
(i.e. Sheng et al. 2016; Foster and Rosenzweig 2017) proposing this connection 
is correct, the positive relationship between farm size and productivity can also be 
interpreted as a consequence of market failure or a mismatch in capital markets due 
to the non-divisible capital supply, and cannot be accessed by a large number of 
individual small landholders (or farms). 
Although enlarging farm size can moderate this problem, the mismatch between 
the capital demand of small household farms and capital supply from industrialised 
production can still exist, and even tends to rise over time as ongoing technological 
progress makes advanced capital equipment more efficient but also more expensive. 
To resolve this conflict, institutional innovation in outsourcing capital services 
may offer a more efficient solution than land consolidation. Specifically, a market-
based capital service provider can pool the demand for mechanisation services from 
individual small farms, and raise funding to purchase the corresponding equipment, 
matching demand with the capital supplier. Via this process, each party minimises 
their costs, and farms of different size will gain access to the same capital equipment 
and embodied technology without incurring the associated large financial outlays 
that would otherwise be required to individually purchase capital equipment. When 
market-based contracting of mechanisation services becomes a close substitute 
for individual farmer’s investment in plant and equipment, small farms might be 
expected to catch up with their larger counterparts in terms of productivity. This 
implies that using market-based mechanisation services to substitute for individual 
farm-level investment could be an alternative and more effective way to improve the 
capital–labour ratio and productivity of small household farms.
For decades after the process of opening up and reform began in 1978, the adoption 
of advanced production technology (measured using the mechanisation level of 
agricultural production) in China was positively correlated with levels of per capita 
capital equipment. Between 1980 and 1990, the mechanisation level of agricultural 
production stayed at a relatively low level, with the proportions of farmland 
ploughed, sown and harvested using machinery around 28.8 per cent, 9.4 per cent 
and 5.4 per cent, respectively (Figure 13.9). This can be attributed to the fact that 
agricultural production over that period relied on labour-intensive technology. 
As more and more rural labour moved to urban areas, a rapid increase in agricultural 
investment raised the capital–labour ratio and improved the mechanisation level of 
agricultural production in China. Throughout the period 1990–2003, the numbers 
of tractors, attached equipment and total machinery power per capita increased by 
two times, four times and 90 per cent, respectively (Figure 13.10). As a consequence, 
the mechanisation level of agricultural production—measured using the proportion 
of farmland mechanically ploughed, sown and harvested—more than doubled 
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by 2003. From 2003, the mechanisation level of agricultural production in China 
increased more quickly, as per capita capital equipment accelerated, with a further 
increase in capital investment and a decline in rural labour supply. By 2014, more 
than half of all cultivated land was mechanically sown and harvested and around 












Figure 13.9 Farmland ploughed, sown and harvested using machinery, 
1979–2013 (per cent)























































































































Figure 13.10 Agricultural tractors, attached equipment and total machinery 
power per capita in China, 1978–2014
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from NBS (1978–2014).
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Although the capital–labour ratio in agricultural production has been increasing 
since the 1980s, the structure of capital equipment (in terms of its per-unit 
size) has changed over time alongside farm size. Between 1980 and 2003, 
the share of total engine power of large tractors in total engine power declined 
from 60 per  cent to 20 per  cent, while average farm size declined from 0.73 ha 
to 0.53 ha (Figures 13.11a–b and 13.12). Over this period, the increase in total 
capital equipment came mainly from increased investment in small tractors and 
equipment (Figures 13.11a and 13.11b). When average farm size began to increase 
after 2003, however, the total amount and proportion of large tractors and attached 
equipment also started to increase. Growth in the use of small tractors and attached 
equipment, however, began to slow after 2010, implying that the growth in use of 
large tractors and attached equipment had by then become a driver of growth of total 
capital equipment. This, in turn, implies that the capital structure of agricultural 
production in China has, since around 2010, been characterised increasingly by 
larger plant and equipment as farm size increases, suggesting an increase in capital 
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Figure 13.11a Engine power of large tractors and equipment in use, by size: 
1978–2014 (billion watts)
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Figure 13.11b Total agricultural machinery in use, by size: 1978–2014 (million)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from NBS (1978–2014).
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Figure 13.12 Average farm size in China, 1985–2013
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Huang and Ding (2016b).
In addition to increased farm size, another important factor contributing to the 
shift in capital structure in China’s agricultural production towards large and 
more efficient plant and equipment after 2003 is rapid development of rural 
socialisation services (mainly mechanisation services).2 Between 2008 and 2013, 
the total number of communities that provided mechanisation services to farm 
households increased from 8,600 to 42,000—an annual growth rate of 37.2 per cent 
(Figure  13.13). At the farm level, there were 168,600 professional agencies that 
provided mechanisation services to farm households in rural China, and more than 
12.4 per cent of farm households (5.24 million of 42.4 million) that owned large 
plant and machinery provided mechanisation services to the market by 2013. This 
generated total revenue of RMB510.8 billion and total profit of RMB195.6 billion 
that year. The rapid development of a contract market for capital equipment–related 
services not only enabled small household farms to access the capital services of 
large plant and equipment as their large counterparts increased their productivity, 
but also incentivised capital equipment holders to invest further in large plant and 
machinery. As a consequence, the relative demand for large and efficient tractors 
and  equipment compared with small and less efficient ones increased rapidly 
over time. 
2  It is also argued that government subsidies for large plant and equipment are another important driver 
of investment in large plant and machinery (He et al. 2010).


























Figure 13.13 The number of communities providing mechanisation services in 
China, 2008–13
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from NBS (1978–2014).
Although contracted mechanisation services have gradually become an important 
channel for the promotion of agricultural production mechanisation in China, their 
impact on total demand for and supply of agricultural capital equipment remains 
negligible. This is mainly because both land consolidation and average farm size 
are restricted by high land transaction costs resulting from existing institutional 
arrangements. In particular, the proportion of market-based contract mechanisation 
services in total contract mechanisation services is small. By 2013, the total number 
of market-based contract mechanisation service providers accounted for less than 
0.4 per cent of the total number of mechanisation service providers (168,600 
out of 425.6 million), among which less than 20 per cent were large machinery 
holders (with current value of plant and machinery of more than RMB500,000) 
(Figure  13.14). Increased policy support from the central government since 
2014, however, is expected to double the total number of market-based contract 
mechanisation service providers by 2020 (MOA 2014). Yet, there is still a long way 
to go before such market-based services can play an important role in substituting 
for farm-level investment.










Figure 13.14 Structure of contract mechanisation services, 2013
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from NBS (1978–2014).
Land consolidation and contract mechanisation 
services: Piece up together
Although land consolidation and contract mechanisation services may help to 
resolve some of the challenges presented by small-scale farming in China, they 
are only in a preliminary stage of development, providing different prescriptions 
for and mechanisms by which to effect on-farm capital equipment use and 
therefore productivity. Two questions thus arise: 1) Which is more efficient—
land consolidation or contract mechanisation services? 2) What is the relationship 
between land consolidation and contract mechanisation services? To answer these 
questions, we review three groups of existing studies that analyse the farm size–
productivity relationship and its underlying determinants in China, and use findings 
from these studies to shed light on this issue.
The first body of literature examines the relationship between farm size (in particular, 
land size) and productivity, which provides useful information to understand the 
relative contribution of land consolidation to solving small farm–related challenges. 
Following the literature examining the inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity (Assuncao and Ghatak 2003; Deininger and Byerlee 2012), Chen et 
al. (2010) examine the relationship between farm size and productivity in China 
using farm-level household survey data between 1995 and 1999. Their study found 
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that total farm output in China declined with cultivated land area, and this could be 
attributed to local administrative land distribution policies, uneven off-farm work 
opportunities and heterogeneity in land quality. More recently, Huang and Ding 
(2016b) re-examined the relationship between farm size and productivity by using 
farm-level and paddock-level data for the grain industry in north-east and northern 
China between 2003 and 2013. They provided some evidence of an inverse-U-
shaped relationship between farm size and the yield or profitability of the rice, wheat 
and maize industries in China over the past decade (Figures 13.15 and 13.16), with 
the optimum land size per farm being 7–15 ha. 
Figure 13.15 Farm size–crop productivity in China, 2013 (hectares)
Source: Huang and Ding (2016b).
Figure 13.16 Farm size–profitability relationship in China
Source: Huang and Ding (2016b).
Findings from empirical studies examining the farm size–productivity relationship 
generally suggest that small household farms in China may not benefit from 
continuing to enlarge their scale of operations. Although this finding about the 
optimal land size for farm households in China from previous studies is questionable 
(since the authors did not properly consider the role of increased capital equipment in 
the farm size–productivity relationship), it highlights the fact that land transactions 
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and consolidation are not sustainable in the long run. It is not known, for example, 
how quickly land reform could shift the size of most household farms to 7–15 ha 
(under the current institutional arrangement) and this size, moreover, is probably 
still too small for farm households to apply new cropping technology (the adoption 
of minimum-tillage and no-tillage practices requires a minimum of 1,000–2,000 ha 
of land to apply the traffic control technology) and harvest the increasing returns to 
scale. In that sense, we can reach a caveat that land reform will facilitate land transfer 
and consolidation and help to enlarge the operational scale of farms, but it may not 
necessarily resolve the fundamental issue of small farm size.
Rather than focusing on farm size, a second body of literature (e.g. Yang et al. 2013; 
Zhang et al. 2017) points out that contract ‘mechanised harvesting service clusters’ 
could change the agricultural production of small farms. As the authors argue, a lack 
of specialisation in labour and capital in particular stages of agricultural production 
restricted the productivity improvement of small farms in China. To overcome 
this constraint, small farms could fragment their production process into different 
stages (as in industrial production and trade) by outsourcing certain stages—for 
example, those requiring specialised skills such as harvesting and sowing—provided 
that proper institutional arrangements were in place. The findings of Yang et al. 
(2013) and Zhang et al. (2017) for the first time draw attention to another option 
that farms could adopt to compensate for the lack of individually owned labour 
and capital for production efficiency improvement: cross-regional mechanisation 
services from related service providers. They tested their argument using a case study 
of Peixian in Jiangsu province. 
Although the mechanism proposed in Yang et al. (2013) and Zhang et al. (2017) 
does not solve the main problem when agricultural production is broken into stages, 
and does not seem to be associated only with small farms, it provides an alternative 
way to think about improving the productivity and profitability of small household 
farms. In other words, if capital (or labour) services are divisible and separable from 
their ownership through the market-based contract system to fit the particular size 
of farms (Figure 13.17), it is no longer necessary to consolidate cultivated land 
to enlarge farm size (to equip better capital or labour services). In such a process, 
institutional innovation is essential to erase market failure caused by high transaction 
costs associated with dividing capital services and allocating them between farms. 
While outsourced mechanisation services currently account for only a small 
proportion of total agricultural capital services, a range of farmer cooperatives have 
begun providing access to capital services across China’s provinces in recent years, 
reflecting the increasing market demand from small farms in Chinese agricultural 
production (Zhang et al. 2017) and its potential for future development.
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Figure 13.17 Cost per hectare and area harvested of using contracted 
services from combined service enterprises
Source: Zhang et al. (2017).
Finally, a third body of literature analyses the relationship between land consolidation 
and contract mechanisation services. While contract mechanisation services allow 
small farms to catch up with large farms in terms of capital equipment and thus 
reduce the productivity gap between farms of different size (Sheng and Chancellor 
2017), they do not necessarily halt the process of farms becoming larger. In most 
cases, contract mechanisation services in fact help to facilitate land transfer and 
consolidation, since farms with superior capital equipment are more likely to 
efficiently manage larger areas of land. Huang and Ding (2016a) demonstrated that 
grain farms in China’s north-east and north contracting these types of mechanisation 
services were around 0.12 ha larger than those not using mechanisation services 
between 2003 and 2013. Moreover, cooperative or company farms were more likely 
than household farms to preserve this relationship, when other farm and region-
specific factors were accounted for. This implies that contract mechanisation services 
tend to facilitate land consolidation in the Chinese grain industry.
13. Mechanisation Outsourcing and Agricultural Productivity for Small Farms
309
Conclusions
The limited size of household farms in China and in many other developing 
countries has long been regarded as one of the major constraints on agricultural 
productivity growth. As an alternative to the conventional recipe in the literature 
of facilitating land consolidation, this chapter points to the prospect of improving 
the capital-to-labour ratio of household farms through outsourcing mechanisation 
services to resolve the issue of small farm size. As a substitute for individual farm 
investment, market-based capital outsourcing would allow small household farms 
to access new production technologies embodied in plant and equipment in ways 
their larger counterparts do and also to capitalise their production process without 
incurring the corresponding sunk costs. Under certain conditions, the outsourcing 
of mechanisation services can improve the mechanisation and productivity levels of 
agricultural production as effectively as land consolidation, but without the huge 
social and economic costs. In addition, since precision farming technology would 
improve yields from damaged soil, previous land damage can be overcome with the 
superior technology available through capital outsourcing.
By outsourcing labour and power-intensive production processes (such as 
harvesting), some household farms in China have maintained their competitiveness 
despite their small size and fragmented land (Huang and Ding 2016a; Zhang et al. 
2017). Although promising in theory, market-based outsourcing of mechanisation 
services is constrained by market friction, high transaction costs and various 
institutional barriers, and therefore is only in its preliminary stages in rural China. 
By the end of 2013, less than 1 per cent of agricultural capital equipment in Chinese 
agricultural production came from market-based outsourcing of mechanisation 
services. Asymmetric information between mechanisation service providers and 
potential users prevented them from meeting the increasing demand for modernised 
agricultural production. In turn, institutional innovation is required to reduce 
market transaction costs to facilitate the use of outsourced mechanisation services, 
as well as land consolidation reform, to deal with the issue of small farm size in 
agricultural production. 
The Chinese experience provides some useful policy implications for developing 
new initiatives to improve agricultural productivity in developing countries such as 
India and Indonesia, where agricultural production is populated with a large share 
of smallholder farms. Since labour and capital services are divisible, farm size is no 
longer a limiting factor for scaled production if optimal use of capital equipment 
can be achieved through the outsourcing of mechanisation.
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14. Technological Progress in 
Developing Renewable Energies
Kejun Jiang
Recent developments in renewable energy 
in China
General picture
China is now a leading player in renewable energy development. Annual capacity 
increases for renewable energy in China account for one-third of the global total. 
Industry growth has been especially strong since 2011, with annual growth in wind 
energy of 22 per cent and 110 per cent for solar energy. Since 2015, China has been 
the world’s largest consumer of modern renewable energy. Figure 14.1 illustrates the 
growth in installed capacity of renewable energy in hydropower, wind power, solar 
photovoltaic (PV) and biomass in China for the 15 years after 2000.
Figure 14.1 Newly installed capacity for selected renewable energy 
generation in China (gigawatts (GW))
Source: CEC (2017).
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Figure 14.1 also draws attention to the importance of policy in promoting the 
development of renewables in China. After feed-in tariffs (FITs) were announced, 
wind power and solar power started to expand by largely increasing their annual 
newly installed capacity.
As an important player in the renewable energy market, China is the leading 
country,  followed by United States, Brazil, Germany and Canada. China has 
more than one-quarter of the world’s total installed renewable power capacity, of 
some 500 gigawatts (GW). More than half of this, about 296 GW, is hydropower. 
In terms of non-hydro capacity, the countries with the greatest installed capacity are 
China, the United States and Germany, followed by Japan, India, Italy and Spain 
(Figures 14.2 and 14.3).
Global new investment in renewable power and fuels increased to US$285.9 billion 
in 2015 (not including large hydropower projects that exceed 50 megawatts 
(MW)), which is 5 per cent higher than in 2014 and exceeds the previous record of 
US$278.5 billion, set in 2011 (Ren21 2016).
Of the total of US$285.9 billion, China’s share of investment was 
US$102.9 billion—up 17 per cent year-on-year and accounting for 36 per cent 
of the global total. Most of China’s renewables investment was in asset financing, 
with US$5.5 billion invested in small-scale projects. Wind power led investments in 
utility-scale projects, of US$47.6 billion, while US$44.3 billion was put into solar 
power. Offshore wind energy had a breakthrough year in China, with nine projects 
financed with an around US$5.6 billion. The country also put large investment in 
large hydropower; 16 GW of new projects started construction during the year, 
a large portion of which was large hydro. 
Overall, this was equivalent to more than one-third of global renewable energy 
installations in 2015, and generated 3.5 million jobs. In addition, employment 
in large-scale hydropower in China supported around 440,000 direct jobs, most 
of which were in construction.
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Figure 14.2 Global and selected countries’ renewable power capacity
Source: Ren21 (2016).
Figure 14.3 Global and selected countries’ installed capacity of hydropower
Source: Ren21 (2016).
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Progress in 2016
Based on information from the China Electricity Council (CEC), in 2017, China’s 
national electricity demand reached 5919.8 terawatt-hours (TWh)—5 per cent 
more than in the previous year. Of this, electricity demand from primary industries 
was 107.5 TWh, the growth rate of which was 5.3 per cent. Electricity consumption 
of secondary industries was 4,210.8 TWh, up by 11.2 per cent year-on-year. Finally, 
tertiary industries consumed 796.1 TWh of electricity, up 10.8 per cent on 2015.
In 2016, additional installed national power generation capacity reached 120.6 
GW, an increase that was 11.23 GW less than the previous year’s increase. In 2016, 
newly installed capacity for thermal power was 48.36 GW (18.42 GW less than the 
previous year), 34.59 GW for solar power (20.79 GW more than the previous year), 
11.74 GW for hydropower (2.01 GW less than the previous year), 18.73 GW for 
wind power (12.67 GW less than the previous year) and 7.2 GW for nuclear power 
(1.08 GW more than the previous year).
By the end of 2016, the total installed capacity of power plants with individual 
capacity of more than 6 MW reached 1,332.11 GW. The capacity of grid-connected 
wind power reached 148.64 GW, grid-connected solar power reached 77.42 GW 
and grid-connected biomass energy reached 12.14 GW. Total national renewable 
energy capacity reached 570.31 GW, accounting for 34.7 per cent of China’s total 
power capacity.
Non–fossil fuel energy sources accounted for 36.7 per cent of China’s total power 
capacity by 2016. Specifically, national power generation from renewable energy 
reached 1,552.6 TWh (or 480 million tonnes of coal equivalent (TCE)), accounting 
for 25.9 per cent of total national power generation. For power plants with individual 
capacity of more than 6 MW, non–fossil fuel sources generated 1,765.8  TWh 
(550 million TCE), or 29.5 per cent of the total national power generation from 
these types of plant.
In 2016, influenced by the benchmark electricity price, solar power capacity 
increased sharply, with new capacity reaching 34.24 GW—up by 126 per cent year-
on-year. In the same year, newly increased capacity for solar PV power stations was 
29.98 GW, up by 118 per cent compared with 2015. Newly increased capacity 
of distributed solar PV power was 4.26 GW, up by 200 per cent compared with 
2015; and all together total installed solar PV power capacity was 77.42 GW, up by 
79 per cent against 2015, and accounting for 4.7 per cent of the total power capacity.
In 2016, total solar power curtailment1 reached 74 TWh, up by 53 per cent, the 
rate of curtailment was 11 per cent, down by 0.3 per cent compared with last year. 
1  Curtailment means that renewable energy power plants such as solar PV, wind power and hydropower could not 
make power generation due to grid dispatch, even though there is solar, wind and water flow available for power 
generation. This normally happens when there is low electricity demand, some power plants have to reduce their 
output, grid dispatch will decide which power plant has to shut down or lower its output.
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The same year, newly increased capacity for biomass energy was 1.821 GW, for 
agro-forestry biomass it was 0.746 GW, for waste-to-energy it was 1.057 GW, 
while for biogas it was 19 MW.
Finally, by the end of 2016, total power capacity for biomass energy reached 
12.14  GW, agro-forestry reached 6.05 GW and waste-to-energy generation 
reached 5.74 GW. In 2016, biomass power generation reached 64.7 TWh, up by 
20.1 per cent, while forestry residue and agricultural biomass reached 31.6 TWh.
Technological progress
The rapid development of renewable energy in China has benefited from strong 
policy support and technological progress (particularly in wind turbines, solar and 
hydro), which have significantly reduced the costs of these sources.
Wind power
Technological progress for wind power has been concentrated in changes in turbine 
size, turbine safety and efficiency. China is a leading producer of wind turbines 
globally, followed by the European Union (EU) and the United States, with 
manufacturing distributed among relatively few companies. In 2015, by some 
estimates, China’s Goldwind surpassed Vestas of Denmark to become the world’s 
largest supplier of wind turbines—the first time a Chinese company has held this 
spot. Almost all of Goldwind’s recent growth (and that of other Chinese companies) 
has come from the domestic market, although Chinese companies are increasingly 
active in new global markets.
One of the major factors in reducing the cost and increasing the efficiency of wind 
turbines is increasing the generation capacity per unit. In 2009, the global average 
capacity per wind turbine unit was 1,599 kilowatts (kW); in China it was 1,360 kW, 
in the United States 1,500 kW and 2–3 MW in Europe. By following the lead of 
international wind turbine manufacturers, China’s producers have increased their 
unit capacity and are now catching up with their global competitors. In general, the 
scaling up of wind power plants and price decreases for materials have seen the cost 
of wind power plants fall significantly over the past decade. In China, in 2015, there 
was 30.8 GW of new wind power capacity, with total installed capacity more than 
145 GW—a level greater than that of the entire European Union (Ren21 2016). 
In 2015, new capacity connected into the national grid was 33 GW and started 
receiving the FIT premium, with approximately 129 GW considered officially grid-
connected. 
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Significant growth was expected in anticipation of reduced FIT levels (as of 
1 January 2016), but even amid China’s economic slowdown, the market surpassed 
expectations. The market was also driven by the Chinese Government’s push to 
improve energy security and reduce coal consumption due to growing concerns 
about climate change and air pollution. Wind energy generated 186.3 TWh of 
electricity in China during 2015, accounting for 3.3 per cent of total electricity 
generation in the country (up from 2.8 per cent in 2014) (Ren21 2016).
Across China by province, at the end of 2015, Inner Mongolia had 18.7 per cent 
of China’s total wind power capacity, followed by Xinjiang (12.5 per cent), 
Gansu (9.7 per cent) and Hebei (7.9 per cent). Since the first three of these areas are 
far from China’s major population centres, difficulties continued in the transmission 
of this power—a challenge compounded by slow growth in electricity demand 
(0.6 per cent), which led to significant grid curtailment. Curtailment rose in 2015 
to an average 15 per cent, up from 8 per cent in 2014, with 33.9 TWh of potential 
generation kept from the grid. In addition, many turbines sat unused, awaiting 
completion of long-distance transmission capacity, which is also the reason some 
wind power companies have begun building farms in the east and south of the 
country, where average wind speeds are lower and land is more expensive, but where 
the turbines are closer to the sources of demand, enabling them to be connected 
to existing grid infrastructure.
Wind power curtailment in China cost the industry an estimated US$2.77 billion 
(RMB18 billion) in 2015. To reduce curtailment, the Chinese Government has 
urged regions in the northwest of the country to attract more energy-intensive 
industries and to use wind power for heating (with the added benefit that it can 
displace coal), among other options. Meanwhile, new transmission capacity is 
under construction and new pumped-hydro storage facilities are being planned. 
Curtailment challenges could also be seen in other regions—for example, in the 
United States, curtailment is down dramatically in Texas following the completion 
of new transmission lines. In 2015, projects were in the planning stage or underway 
across the globe to strengthen and expand transmission capacity to efficiently move 
wind-generated electricity to where it is needed.
In 2015 and 2016, newly installed wind power plants were mainly using 1.5–2 MW 
units. Larger wind turbines were used mainly in offshore wind farms, with the 
leading manufacturers in Europe and the United States. Siemens, MHI Vestas and 
Adwen are working to develop wind turbines with a capacity of 8 MW. Chinese 
companies such as Mingyang are working on units of 6.5–7 MW.
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Based on planning in the ‘Made in China 2025—Energy Equipment’ strategy 
announced by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
the  Ministry of Industry and Information (MII) and the National Energy 
Administration (NEA) of China, the focus of future research and development 
(R&D) will be 10 MW offshore wind turbines with a centre height of 100 to 200 m.
One challenge for the wind energy sector is low wind speed. In China, 68 per cent 
of the total land area experiences low wind speeds, concentrated in central-eastern 
and southern parts of the country, which are also areas of high population density. 
Low-speed turbines could run with wind speeds of less than 6.5 metres per second 
(m/s) or even lower than 5 m/s. With no such kind of technology in other countries, 
Chinese manufacturers are leading the way in this technology. Since 2015, there has 
been a greater focus on developing low-speed turbine technologies, both in China 
and internationally.
By 2014, China had 25.8 GW of low-speed wind power plants installed and grid 
connected, and the NEA has approved 74.25 GW for development. The first low-
speed wind power plant in China was constructed in January 2011 in Lai’an county 
in Anhui province, with installed capacity of 200 MW and average wind speeds of 
5.8 m/s. The plant has 132 wind turbines, each with 1.5 MW of capacity. As with 
the Lai’an site, most of China’s low wind speed areas are hilly or even mountainous 
and generally complex landscapes, which require more careful site design and 
higher investment than other areas. At the same time, most low-speed plants are 
in southeastern China and are therefore close to centres of consumption. Because 
the utilisation rate for wind turbines is relatively high, there is less problem with 
curtailment, which is a positive factor for achieving profits from low-speed wind 
plants. For low-speed plants to be profitable, they need to generate 1,800 to 2,000 
equivalent hours per year. While  wind turbine blades are becoming longer, it is 
important to ensure the security and reliability of these power plants.
Plate 14.1 shows the Fenghuangshan wind power plant, developed in 2016, which 
experiences average wind speeds of less than 6 m/s. In 2016, power generation from 
Fenghuangshan was 171.6 gigawatt-hours (GWh), the wind turbine utilisation rate 
was 98.74 per cent and the average wind speed was less than 6m/s. The area is prone 
to freezing weather and frequent thunderstorms, so the turbine manufacturers had 
to make technical revisions to respond to these threats.
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Plate 14.1 Fenghuangshan wind power plant
Source: www.chinadevelopment.com.cn/news/ny/2017/02/1121750.shtml.
China is also home to offshore wind power generation, with offshore installed 
capacity  reaching 1.627 GW in 2016, an increase from just 900 MW in 
2015.  In  2016, newly installed offshore wind capacity in China accounted for 
26.7 per cent of the global total. Also in 2016, China surpassed Denmark to become 
the third-largest generator of offshore wind power, after the United Kingdom (5.516 
GW) and Germany (3.3 GW).
With more than 18,000 km of coast line, China has potential to generate far 
greater amounts of offshore wind power than the current 750 GW. Jiangsu, Fujian 
and Guangdong provinces have the greatest potential for offshore wind power. 
In 2006, the first offshore wind power plant in China, Rudong, was developed in 
Zhejiang province.
Development of offshore wind power is growing at a steady pace and is expected 
to accelerate in the future. China’s total installed grid-connected capacity from 
offshore wind power is forecast to be 30 GW by 2020. Plants in Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Shandong and Fujian provinces are expected to have 25.8 GW of offshore 
wind power installed by 2020, while in Liaoning, Hebei, Guangdong, Guangxi and 
Hainan provinces, 9.2 GW of offshore wind energy is planned for 2020. This will 
mean a total of more than 35 GW of offshore wind power installed by 2020.
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The unit capacity of offshore wind turbines has increased, from 2 MW to 4 MW, 
5 MW and even larger units. In 2015, among all installed wind turbines, those 
with a capacity of 2.5 MW accounted for 18.48 per cent, 3 MW 17.74 per cent 
and 4 MW 34.69 per cent. In 2017, most offshore turbines are 4 to 6 MW units. 
Offshore turbines must be resistant to corrosion and able to withstand especially 
high wind speeds—factors that must be incorporated into their design. Engineering 
modelling and analysis tools are required to lower the costs of offshore facilities and 
to design the next generation of large-scale turbines optimised for operation in the 
marine environment.
In May 2014, the total capacity of offshore wind power in China was 565 MW, 
which increased to about 900 MW in 2015. This is, however, less than one-fifth of 
the earlier target (Figure 14.4). The development of offshore wind power in China has 
been slower than expected due mainly to the lack of experience of domestic turbine 
manufacturers. As a result, local developers must use foreign products, with Siemens 
the largest supplier of offshore wind turbines in China. Other limiting factors are 
the huge investment needed and the associated risks of offshore development, which 
discourage private companies.
Figure 14.4 Planned and realised installed offshore wind power capacity 
in China
Source: CEC (2017).
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Another key factor in reducing the cost and extending the scale of wind power 
generation is improving the onsite installation of wind farms. Chinese companies 
are now leading the world for wind installation, both onshore and offshore.
Wind power costs in general have shifted over time. Since 2008, there has been a 
cost reduction of about 35 per cent. In 2016, the average cost for onshore wind 
power was about RMB7,000 per kilowatt-hours (kWh). For example, for low-speed 
wind power plants in southern China, the cost for turbines is about RMB4,000/kW, 
with construction costs of RMB4,000–4,500/kW.
By 2016, the investment cost for establishing wind farms in China was the lowest in 
the world, at US$1,050/kW, compared with US$2,500/kW in Japan and US$1,600/
kW in the United States and Europe. In some areas with good wind conditions and 
relatively high costs for fossil fuel–fired power plants, wind power already competes 
on cost with new coal-fired thermal power, including in Australia, Chile, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Turkey and South Africa.
The cost of wind power generation includes the costs of the turbines, base and 
installation, connection with the grid and ongoing operation costs. For example, for 
a low-speed wind farm in southern China, the cost of wind turbines is RMB4,000/
kW, the installation cost is RMB4,000–4,500/kW, operation costs are RMB120–
130/kW, labour costs are RMB30/kW with other material costs of RMB70/kW. 
Such  a wind farm could be RMB0.51 to RMB0.54 per kWh levelised cost of 
electricity (LCOE) by setting a discount rate of 8 per cent, which is lower than the 
FIT, making the plant profitable. In northern China, however, construction costs 
are lower, but, due to curtailment, the equivalent utilisation hours will also be lower. 
If the investment cost is RMB7,500/kW, the LCOE is RMB 0.57/kWh, which is 
higher than the local FIT, meaning it will be difficult to make the plant profitable.
Future cost reductions for wind power will be found mainly in lowering the overall 
cost and increasing power output by, for example: 1) increasing the performance 
and lowering the cost of turbines; 2) improving turbine module design and lowering 
the cost of installation; 3) increasing turbine blade diameter, which increases its 
efficiency; 4) increasing turbine reliability; and 5) lowering the cost of operation 
and maintenance. There is some potential to reduce the cost of material, which 
would lower the cost of turbines. Improved wind forecasting would also increase the 
reliability, and therefore lower the cost of wind power.
Future wind power development will include increasing the unit capacity of turbines, 
increasing the efficiency of wind capture and conversion, increasing the quality of 
components and the efficiency of component transportation and increasing the 
adaptability of turbines to different environments.




China is the world’s leading country for both solar PV and solar thermal energy, 
with  more than 400 solar PV companies alone. Solar water heating is also used 
extensively, with a total installed capacity of 290 GWh at the end of 2014, 
accounting for about 70 per cent of the total global installed solar thermal capacity. 
In 2016, newly installed solar capacity in China reached 34.59 GW, with total solar 
grid-connected capacity reaching 77.42 GW.
The Chinese Government has continually raised installation targets to increase 
renewable generation, address the severe pollution problems and promote the 
domestic manufacturing industry. In 2015, China added an estimated solar PV 
capacity of 15.2 GW for a total approaching 44 GW, overtaking long-time leader 
Germany to become the top country for cumulative solar PV capacity, with about 
19 per cent of the global total. The provinces of Xinjiang (2.1 GW), Inner Mongolia 
(1.9 GW) and Jiangsu (1.7 GW) were the top markets for the year, with much of 
this capacity located far from the country’s main population centres. However, six 
provinces in the eastern and central regions each had more than 1 GW of solar PV 
capacity at 2015. Large-scale solar PV power plants accounted for 86 per cent of 
total capacity, with the remainder in distributed rooftop systems and other small-
scale installations (Ren21 2016).
In support of the development of the solar sector, various solar PV subsidies have 
been introduced over the past decade. The ‘Golden Sun’ program was initiated in 
2009, providing capital subsidies for solar PV installations through to 2011 on 
a project-by-project basis. Off-grid (stand-alone) installations receive 70 per cent 
capital subsidies while grid-connected installations receive 50 per cent subsidies. 
Qualifying grid-connected installations, however, must have a peak capacity 
of 300 kW or larger. There are also program caps, which limit the overall quantity 
of systems installed; under the terms of the program, installations in any given 
province are limited to a total of 20 MW.
Almost 300 projects have been proposed under the Golden Sun program, totalling 
640 MW and entailing about RMB20 billion (US$2.9 billion) in investment. 
As a separate part of the program, the Ministries of Finance and Construction are 
providing subsidies of RMB15 per watt (US$2.20/W) for grid-connected solar PV 
and RMB20/W (US$2.90/W) for building-integrated PV. Eligible installations 
must be 50 kW or larger and must utilise solar PV modules achieving minimum 
efficiency levels (16 per cent for monocrystalline, 14 per cent for polycrystalline and 
6 per cent for amorphous). In 2010, the subsidy levels were reduced to RMB13/W 
(US$1.90/W) for grid-connected modules and RMB17/W ($2.50/W) for building-
integrated modules.
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With parallels to the early development of the wind power industry, the government 
initiated a new competitive bidding program for solar PV projects in 2009.
This program is creating new benchmark tariffs for solar PV (so-called approved 
price levels) on the basis of competitive bidding. One example was a bidding process 
in Dunhuang, in Gansu province, in 2009 for two 10 MW projects. Bid prices 
ranged from aslo was RMB0.69/kWh (US$0.10/kWh) and resulted in an approved 
price of RMB1.09/kWh (US$0.16/kWh). Another approved price was RMB1.15/
kWh (US$0.17/kWh) in April 2010 for four projects in Ningxia totalling 40 MW.
Finally, at the provincial level, there are also cases of preferential tariffs for solar 
PV, such as those in Zhejiang and Jiangsu. In Zhejiang in 2009, the tariff was set 
at a premium of RMB0.70/kWh (US$0.10/kWh), added to the province average 
coal power generation price, which was RMB0.46/kWh (US$0.07/kWh), thus 
producing a total tariff of RMB1.16/kWh (US$0.17/kWh). Jiangsu set preferential 
tariffs significantly higher than Zhejiang, and also established a range of tariffs 
according to technology type: RMB2.1/kWh (US$0.31/kWh) for ground-based 
systems, RMB3.7/kWh (US$0.54/kWh) for roof top systems and RMB4.3/kWh 
(US$0.63/kWh) for building-integrated systems (all prices at 2009 levels). Jiangsu 
also slated tariffs to decrease progressively, to RMB1.7/kWh for ground-based 
systems, RMB3/kWh for rooftop systems and RMB3.5/kWh for building-integrated 
systems in 2010, and to RMB1.4/kWh for ground-based systems, RMB2.4/kWh 
for rooftop systems and RMB2.9/kWh for building-integrated systems in 2011.
The rapid increase in solar PV capacity in China has, however, caused problems 
with grid congestion and interconnection delays. Curtailment started to become 
a  serious challenge in 2015, with particularly high rates in the northwestern 
provinces of Gansu (31 per cent over the year) and Xingjiang Autonomous Region 
(26 per cent), and a national average of 12 per cent. By year’s end, insufficient grid 
capacity was a significant hurdle for new plants, and investors were growing wary of 
the sector due to delays in subsidy collection and problems with solar panel quality. 
To address challenges related to curtailment, the Chinese Government has asked 
top solar-producing provinces to prioritise transmission of renewable energy, build 
more transmission capacity and attract more energy-intensive industries to increase 
local consumption. Against these transmission and curtailment challenges, solar 
PV generated 2 TWh of electricity in China during 2015—up about 57 per cent 
from 2014. Chinese companies have also flocked across the border, to Pakistan 
in particular, where China played an increasingly important role in that country’s 
renewable energy expansion, including in solar PV.
Given the rapid pace of expansion and incentive schemes, many of China’s solar 
product manufacturers experienced low profit margins, excess production capacity 
and significant debt. For example, Tianwei in 2015 defaulted on an interest payment 
for a domestic bond and then collapsed, while, in 2017, Yingli required a government 
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bailout and, in 2016, Hanergy came under investigation by Hong Kong’s Securities 
and Futures Commission. In general, power production curtailment and delays in 
subsidy payments have forced some developers in China to sell off projects and halt 
further development.
The expansion of renewable energy became one of seven categories of business to 
receive special attention, including loans and tax incentives, under China’s five-year 
plans, especially the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for industry development. The result was 
the creation of the world’s largest solar manufacturing industry—which has become 
the price leader in most aspects of the global market, beginning with cheaper solar 
panels. Another result, however, was that China led the creation of a worldwide 
glut. There were roughly two panels being made for every one ordered by an overseas 
customer. Between 2008 and 2013, China’s fledgling solar-electric panel industry 
confronted world prices that had dropped by 80 per cent—a stunning achievement 
even in a fiercely competitive high-tech market. 
China’s environment is well suited to an advanced solar industry, with some 
70 per cent of the most suitable areas concentrated in the western and northern 
provinces. The annual solar energy received by China’s land surface is estimated 
to be equivalent to 4.9 trillion tonnes of standard coal. Moreover, China has large 
areas of desert suitable for hosting concentrating solar power (CSP) stations. 
It has 2.64 million sq km of arid and desert land, where solar energy resources are 
abundant. In Xinjiang alone, there are 1.11 million sq km of desert land. 
Prominent projects include the first phase of the Qinghai Delingha Solar Thermal 
Power Generation Project, which will use Bright Source Energy’s proven solar tower 
technology to produce clean, reliable solar electricity for more than 452,000 homes. 
Located in Qinghai province in northwestern China, the Delingha project will have 
six 135 MW CSP tower plants, with the first phase including two 135 MW solar 
plants with up to 3.5 hours of thermal energy storage. It is expected construction 
will be completed in 2017.
Meanwhile, China is home to the world’s largest solar park, which the US National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has published satellite images 
of (Plate 14.2). Also in Qinghai province, the plant has a startling scale of some 
850 MW. Landsat 8 satellite images taken in January 2017 capture the four million 
solar panels installed at the site, which cover an area equivalent in size to Macau.
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Plate 14.2 Satellite image of Delingha solar PV project in Qinghai province
Source: NASA image. Available from: www.pv-magazine.com/2017/0202/nasa-images-show-
stunning-progress-of-chinas-vast-850-mw-longyangxia-solar-park/.
Plate 14.2 comprises two images: the view on the left is from April 2013, while the 
image on the right shows how the plant looked in February 2017. The Delingha 
plant became the largest solar power plant in the world, surpassing the 648  MW 
Kamuthi Solar Power Project in Tamil Nadu, India. China is also currently 
constructing an even larger installation, in the Ningxia autonomous region, with 
a capacity of 2 GW.
CSP is still in the early stages of commercial application in China. It is closely 
related to traditional methods of power generation, which helps to lower the risk 
of technological development. China has established ambitious goals for CSP 
deployment and, despite a slow start, it remains a particularly exciting concept with 
thermal storage applications, especially given the country’s strong commitment to 
diversifying and decarbonising its energy mix. 
Solar thermal plants can harness solar energy by using molten salt as a heat-transfer 
medium, which improves the efficiency of the power generation system by providing 
higher temperatures and a more stable medium. Old CSP systems used oil or water as 
the medium, but oil could not reach high temperatures and, while water was easy to 
turn into steam, it had to be contained at high pressure. China’s first molten salt solar 
thermal power plant has started to send electricity to the grid. The Tianjin Binhai 
Concentrating Solar Power Investment Co. Ltd said its 50 MW molten salt trough 
project in Akesai in northwest China’s Gansu province demonstrates the maturity of 
the commercial development of solar thermal technology. The company will carry 
out large-scale production with the technology in 2018, when it is scheduled to 
produce facilities with 200 MW of annual solar power output. The Akesai plant 
was among 20 demonstration solar thermal plants listed for construction by China’s 
NEA in 2016 as the government eyes off the potential of renewable energy.
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The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–15) called for the installation of 1 GW by 2015 
and 3 GW by 2020 of CSP plants. Plants either being planned or under construction 
include the following:
1. 1 MW Badaling Pilot Project—a collaboration between the Institute of 
Electrical Engineering (IEE) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS).
2. 12 MW (short-term)/300 MW (long-term) collaboration between Xinjiang 
Qingsong Building Materials and Chemicals (Group) Co. and Guodian 
Xinjiang Company.
3. 50 MW project in Tibet by Huaneng Tibet Company.
4. 100 MW project in Sichuan’s Ngawa Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
Prefecture (Aba) by Tianwei New Energy.
5. 50 MW project (to be determined) by China Huadian Corporation.
6. 100 MW project in Golmud by GD ENERGY.
7. 100 MW project in Ningxia by Beijing Control Technology Co. Ltd.
8. 100 MW project (to be determined) by Avic Xi’an Aero-Engine (Group) Ltd.
9. 100 MW project (to be determined) by Guangdong Kangda.
10. 100 MW project in Gansu by SETC Tianjin.
11. 1,000 MW project in Qinghai by Lion International Investment Ltd.
12. 2,000 MW project in Shaanxi by Shandong PenglaiDianli and eSolar.
CSP is planned to reach 5 GW of electricity generation by 2020, which is more 
than the total global installed capacity of CSP in 2015. Construction of the 50 MW 
Qinghai Delingha facility commenced in late 2015. The facility, which will be the 
country’s first commercial CSP plant, is expected to come online in 2017. Additional 
facilities totalling several hundred megawatts are in various stages of construction, 
although timelines for completion remain unclear.
Another utilisation of solar energy is for water heating. China dominates the global 
market for solar water heating, accounting for more than 70 per cent of the world 
total. China was the largest market by far in 2015, with gross additions of 30.45 GW 
thermal (GWth) (43.5 million sq m of panel area)—21 times more capacity than 
was added in second-placed Turkey. At year’s end, China’s cumulative capacity in 
operation was an estimated 309.4 GWth, or about 71 per cent of the world’s total. 
China’s market contracted for the second consecutive year—falling 17 per cent in 
2015 after an 18 per cent drop in 2014—due to the slowdown in the construction 
industry and the weaker national economy.
Solar water heaters utilise various technologies, such as vacuum tubes, heat pipe solar 
tubes, flat plate collectors and solar cylinders. Vacuum tubes continued to dominate 
the Chinese market in 2015, accounting for 87 per cent of added capacity; however, 
flat plate collectors were still popular, especially for roof and facade integration in 
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urban areas. Heat pipe solar tubes are the most advanced option, but also the most 
expensive. In China, solar thermal systems for use in multi-family houses and in the 
tourism and public sectors accounted for 61 per cent of the newly installed collector 
area in 2015.
Producers and cost changes
China has been the world’s largest manufacturer of solar panels since 2008 and, since 
2011, has produced the majority of the world’s PV systems on an annualised basis. 
Industry projections estimate that, by the end of 2017, China will have enough 
manufacturing capacity to produce 51 GW of photovoltaics a year. Domestic 
demand in China was around 34 GW in 2016—more than twice as much as global 
production in 2010, of 24 GW.
The industry is dominated by several major manufacturers, including CHINT 
Group Corporation, JA Solar Holdings, Jinniu Energy, Suntech Power, Yingli, 
China Sunergy and Hanwha Solar One. Several manufacturers are confronting 
challenges of large debts. 
Within 10 years, the cost of solar PV panels in China dropped significantly, from 
above RMB50 per watt to RMB4/W, while system costs reduced from RMB60/W 
to RMB7/W, a decrease rate of more than 85 per cent. With the reduction in 
investment costs, the cost of solar PV power generation also reduced, by 76 per 
cent, which increased market competitiveness.
The main driver of such cost reductions is the scaling up of solar PV power via 
technological innovation. Rapid increases in the market boost manufacturing 
volumes while lowering production costs. Technological innovation created new 




Hydropower in China is still the cheapest source of power generation, and hydro-
electricity is the most cost-effective and stable form of renewable energy. This allows 
developers to install hydro-electric power without the need for considerable FITs. 
Hydropower also benefits from flexibility, with plants able to adjust their output 
quickly in response to changing energy demands over certain periods.
From 2010 to the end of 2016, newly installed capacity for hydropower in China 
reached 103.48 GW, following year-on-year growth of 8.1 per cent. Of this, newly 
installed large hydropower accounted for 80.76 GW, small hydro for 16.6 GW 
and pumped storage hydro for 6.12 GW. Total capacity for hydropower reached 
14. Technological Progress in Developing Renewable Energies
331
319.54 GW, accounting for 27 per cent of the global total. Of that total, large 
hydro contributed 221.51 GW, small hydro 75 GW and pumped storage hydro 
23.03 GW. Hydropower generation in China produces 1,100 TWh, accounting 
for 19.4 per cent of total national power output and 73.7 per cent of non–fossil 
fuel power generation. Of the 10 largest hydropower stations in the world, five 
are in China. Half of all hydropower units with capacity above 700 MW globally 
are operated by China Three Gorges Corporation.
Moreover, many additional hydro projects are under construction in China 
(Table 14.1). Newly started construction capacity is 20.9 GW in 2015, which is the 
highest level in history.
Table 14.1 Hydropower projects under construction in China
Type River/grid Power station
Regular hydropower Jinsha River Wudongde, Liyuan, Suwalong, Ahai, Ludila, 
Longkaikou, Guanyinyan
Yalongjiang River Lianghekou, Yangfanggou
Daduhe River Shuangjiangkou, Houziyan, Huangjinping, Angu, 
Zhentouba, Shaping second level
Yellow River Liujiaxia(extension), Huangfeng




North China Grid Fengning, Wendeng, Yimeng
East China Grid Jixi, Jinsai, Chuanglongshan
Middle China Grid Tianchi, Panlong
Northeast China Grid Dunhua, Huanggou
Southern China Grid Qiongzhong, Shenzhen, Meizhou, Yangjiang
Source: NDRC (2007).
Although hydropower is an efficient type of renewable energy from a production 
and FIT perspective, it also presents some challenges, including long development 
periods, associated social displacement and environmental concerns, as well as 
the increasing difficulty of accessing potential development sites. These factors 
suggest that China’s investment in hydropower will decline after 2020. The 
social and environmental consequences of large hydropower installations present 
another challenge. Almost 1.5 million people were displaced for the construction 
of the Three Gorges Dam. Migration is becoming a key issue in the development 
of hydropower and will complicate future development of the sector. 
The major international providers of hydropower equipment are GE (United 
States), Andritz Hydro (Austria) and Voith Hydro (Germany), each with roughly 
equal market share. Together, they account for about half of the global industry. 
Other notable manufacturers include Harbin (China), Dongfang (China) and 
Power Machines (Russian Federation).
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A slowdown in the development of hydropower in China and market saturation 
are inspiring Chinese corporations to increase their involvement in hydropower 
projects around the world. Their involvement has included both construction and 
operation, with a particular focus on Africa, South Asia and South America. In early 
2016, China Three Gorges Corporation acquired two hydropower plants in Brazil, 
becoming that country’s second-largest private power producer.
Based on the newly published Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for hydropower development 
in China, the target for installed hydropower capacity is 380 GW, of which 340 
GW is normal hydropower and 40 GW is pumped hydro storage. Annual power 
generation will be 1,250 TWh, accounting for more than 50 per cent of total non–
fossil fuel power generation.
Total hydropower resources available for development are 660 GW, with annual 
power generation of about 3,000 TWh. There is uneven distribution, with 
70 per cent of hydropower resources in the south-west of the country.
In terms of technological developments, China is the world leader in developing 
hydropower, from planning, design and construction to equipment manufacture, 
operation and maintenance. 
In recent years, major technological progress in hydropower has included 
construction of a 300-m-high arch dam in complex geological conditions, a super 
high core rockfill dam with gravel soil, a 35-m-wide underground hydropower 
house and multiple deep-ground water headrace tunnels. The 800 MW Francis-type 
hydropower turbine and 350 MW pumped hydro power units with 500 m head 
could be manufactured in China. Constructed in the past few years were the world’s 
highest concrete double-curvature arch dam (Jinping First-Grade Hydropower 
Station), deep–long tunnel hydropower (Jinping Second-Grade Hydropower 
Station), the world’s third-largest hydropower station (Luoxidu Hydropower 
Station) and a hydropower station in complex geological conditions (Dagangshan 
Hydropower Station).
Newly announced hydropower development plans for China focus on development 
of a grid and transmission system because of the uneven distribution of hydropower 
resources throughout the country. Based on current planning, more than 100 GW 
of  hydropower will ultimately be transmitted from the west of the country to 
the east. 
There are nonetheless challenges confronting the hydropower sector in China. 
Environmental issues are receiving increased public attention, making it more 
difficult to implement new projects. It is becoming more difficult to forcibly 
relocate populations away from potential hydro project areas. New hydro projects 
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are therefore tending to move towards remote regions and areas of low economic 
development. In such areas, hydropower is seen as a means of developing the local 
economy, and low population density also reduces migration costs.
Biomass
Biomass energy refers to energy from agricultural residues and waste, forestry 
products and waste, bioethanol, biodiesel and biogas from animal husbandry 
and municipal waste. China has large biomass energy potential. For a long time, 
the government promoted traditional biomass utilisation including of straw and 
firewood for energy generation in rural areas. High-efficiency biomass stoves, 
biomass-heated beds and biomass digesters were supported by rural energy policies 
for decades. Policies for modern biomass energy utilisation were initiated from 
2005. By 2010, the total installed capacity of biomass power generation in China 
had reached 5.5 GW. The annual utilisation rate of densified biofuels had been as 
high as 1 million tonnes and that of biogas 19 billion cubic metres; the utilisation 
rate of ethanol fuel from non-grain raw materials reached 2 million tonnes and that 
of biodiesel reached 200,000 tonnes (State Council 2011). 
Since 1995, China has included biomass energy in its national five-year plans. In the 
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000), the development of highly efficient anaerobic 
technology for treating high-concentration organic wastewater and urban garbage 
was listed as a key science and technology program. During the Tenth Five-Year 
Plan (2001–05), development planning for the agricultural biomass energy industry 
was introduced. Each plan since the Eleventh Five-Year Plan has contained special 
planning for the biomass energy industry. 
A scheme for the comprehensive utilisation of crop straws during the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan (2011–15), issued in 2011, points to further development of output 
generation from this source. It was planned to achieve a straw utilisation rate of 
more than 80 per cent and straw energy utilisation rate of 13 per cent by 2015. 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan targets for renewable energy development and biomass 
energy development, issued in 2012, stipulated that, by 2015, the annual utilisation 
rate of biomass energy would exceed 50 million TCE. When total installed capacity 
of biomass power generation reaches 13 GW and related annual power generation 
is up to about 78 TWh, the annual biomass supply will be up to 22 billion cu m, 
densified biofuel will be 10 million tonnes and biological liquid fuel 5 million 
tonnes. Planning for biomass energy in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan is under way.
On the one hand, the development and utilisation of biomass energy offer potential 
to replace thermal energy sources and therefore better protect the environment. 
On  the other hand, the costs of development and utilisation are so far unable 
to compete with those of traditional energy sources. This has led the Chinese 
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Government to adopt a series of incentive measures for enterprises and users to ease 
this cost burden and directly subsidise the development and utilisation of biomass 
energy. The main measures include front-end incentives to encourage development 
of the biomass energy production chain and market back-end incentives to stimulate 
sales and use, as well as some indirect incentives to promote the development of 
the whole industry.
In China, biopower capacity reached 10.3 GW in 2015, an increase of 0.8 GW over 
the previous year. Generation was up 16 per cent compared with 2014, to around 
48.3 TWh. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan set a target of 13 GW by 2015, but actual 
installed capacity for biomass power generation has not reached that target. Factors 
that have restricted progress include high prices for feedstock, poor coordination 
among projects and technical operating difficulties.
China, the world’s third-largest ethanol producer, produced an estimated 
2.8  billion  litres in 2015—a 14 per cent decrease. China increased ethanol 
imports during that year but added no new production capacity, in part because 
of a moratorium on maize-based ethanol production. Asia’s other major producer, 
Thailand, saw its ethanol production rise by 10 per cent, from 1.1 billion litres in 
2014 to 1.2 billion litres in 2015. China’s biodiesel production is estimated to have 
increased substantially—by an estimated 24 per cent—to 0.35 billion litres in 2015 
(Ren21 2016).
Based on the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan’s goals for renewable energy, the target 
for  2020 for total installed capacity of biomass power generation is 30 GW; 
the annual utilisation rate of densified biofuel will be 50 million tonnes, biogas 
44 billion cu m, non-grain raw material fuel ethanol 10 million tonnes and biodiesel 
2 million tonnes.
Other renewables
The countries with the largest direct-use geothermal power capacity are China 
(6.1 GW), Turkey (2.9 GW), Japan (2.1 GW), Iceland (2 GW), India (1 GW), 
Hungary (0.9 GW), Italy (0.8 GW) and the United States (0.6 GW). In line with 
installed capacity, China utilised the most direct geothermal heat (20.6 TWh).
China is also developing ocean-energy technologies—both tidal and wave energy. 
In 2015, there were 10.7 MW of capacity installed, including several projects in 
development. The Jiangxia tidal power plant was upgraded in 2015, from 3.9 MW 
to 4.1 MW. Among new development projects is the 100 kW Sharp Eagle wave 
energy converter, which was deployed in 2015. China’s experience to date is that 
the country’s current tidal technologies exhibit significantly lower cost structures 
than its wave energy projects, but all are limited by immature technology and lack 
of experience and supporting infrastructure.
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Policy development
Development of new and clean sources of renewable energy in China is a key 
strategic measure for fostering emerging industries of national importance. It is 
also promoted as part of national action towards protection of the environment, 
responses to climate change and achievement of sustainable development. China 
worked to increase the shares of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 
11.4 per cent and installed generation capacity to 20 per cent by the end of 2030.
Against the background of a global energy crisis, local air pollution and climate 
change, the development of renewable energy utilisation technology has important 
practical and long-term significance for replacing fossil fuels and realising the 
sustainable development of humanity. China’s energy security has become an 
increasingly prominent issue, environmental constraints have increased and the 
situation for energy savings and emission reductions is grim. In this context, 
the  government has prioritised adjustment of China’s energy structure and 
development of alternative, green, clean, low-carbon renewable energy sources. 
Biomass energy—with plentiful resources and stable supply—can substitute for coal, 
oil and gas in huge quantities. It can also significantly reduce pollution and achieve 
near-zero emissions of carbon dioxide. In recent years, therefore, governments at 
all levels in China have increased their focus on renewable energy and introduced 
a series of policies and measures for the sector. 
The basic framework of China’s renewable energy development policies include the 
Renewable Energy Law, a medium- and long-term development plan for renewable 
energy and each five-year plan as the short-term plan to attract producers and users 
to participate in the development and utilisation of renewable energy through the 
establishment of a series of effective incentive mechanisms.
Legal basis
The Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China was issued in 2005 
and formally implemented on 1 January 2006. This is the first energy law in China 
and indicates the importance the Chinese Government has placed on renewable 
energy.
The Renewable Energy Law was revised at the end of 2009 and the new edition was 
implemented on 1 April 2010. The amendment established the Renewable Energy 
Development Fund to be collected by additional charging from grid on electricity, 
to support the development of renewable energy. 
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Target system
The Chinese Government’s plan for medium- and long-term renewable energy 
development aimed to increase renewable energy’s share of total energy consumption 
to 10 per cent in 2010 (from 7.5 per cent in 2005) and to 16 per cent by 2020. 
The  plan  treats wind power generation as a key renewable energy source and 
sets medium and long-term wind power development goals through to 2020 
(Table 14.2).
The plan places emphasis on the development of renewable energy, including wind, 
solar, hydro, biomass, biogas, densified biofuel and biological liquid fuel. Table 14.2 
shows the targets set in the plan according to the requirements of China’s economic 
and social development and biomass energy utilisation technology. 
Table 14.2 Renewable energy development targets for China
2005 2010 2020
Renewable energy’s share of 
total energy consumption
7.2% 10% 16%
Annual renewable energy 
consumption
160 m TCE 270 m TCE 530 m TCE
Renewable energy’s share 





117 GW 180 GW 300 GW
Wind power generation 
capacity
1.26 GW 5 GW 30 GW
Biomass power generation 
capacity
2 GW 5.5 GW 30 GW
Annual methane gas 
consumption
8b cu m 19b cu m 40b cu m
Photovoltaic power generation 
capacity
70MW 300MW 1.8GW
Solar water heaters’ heat 
collection area
80b sq m 150b sq m 300m sq m
Annual bioethanol 
consumption
1.02 m t 2 m t 10 m t
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With the progress of renewable energy technology and strong government policies, 
renewable energy development in China, especially wind and solar power generation, 
has always exceeded its targets, meaning these targets undergo constant revision. 
Table 14.3 presents the revised targets. 
Table 14.3 Revised targets for renewable energy in China
Year Target
2009 80 GW of wind by 2020
2010 150 GW of wind, 20 GW of solar by 2020
2013 Twelfth Five-Year Plan: 20 GW of solar PV, 150 GW of wind by 2015
2013 35 GW of solar PV by 2015
2016 250 GW of wind, 100 GW of solar by 2020
Source: Author.
The 2005 Renewable Energy Law authorised feed-in tariffs for wind power based 
on ‘government guided’ prices, which have evolved year-by-year with competitive 
bidding for wind power capacity, resulting in standardised or ‘approved’ prices, 
generally on a province-by-province basis.
According to Article 14 of the Renewable Energy Law, grid enterprises (State Grid) 
should sign FIT agreements with renewable energy power plant companies that 
have received permission from the government.
FITs were implemented in China as early as 2003 in support of the deployment 
of wind power. At first, the tariff amount was determined on a case-by-case basis 
through bidding or negotiation. However, this arrangement created intense 
competition among large state-owned renewable power generators, which issued 
speculative bids that were often insufficient to actually implement the project. 
This practice was considered harmful to the long-term sustainability of the wind 
power industry.
In response, the NDRC set baseline prices for wind tariffs in August 2009. 
The minimum tariff ranged from RMB0.51/kWh to RMB0.61/kWh, depending 
on the location of the wind farm, with four classes of wind resource ranking.2 In 
2011, the NDRC set the national solar FIT at RMB1/kWh for projects started in 
2011 or later. To support the FITs, the NDRC established a renewable electricity 
surcharge in 2006, of RMB0.001/kWh. The surcharge was increased to RMB0.004/
kWh in 2009 and again, to RMB0.008/kWh, in 2011, to support the increasing 
demand for FITs following rapid growth of renewable energy. Despite the eightfold 
rate hike, the surcharge remains low by international standards: with an average 
residential electricity price of RMB0.52/kWh, the surcharge is 1.5 per cent of 
2  In order to process benchmark prices for wind power generation, four classes of wind power generation areas 
were defined based on the wind resource, they are Class I to IV. 
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the total electricity price. In comparison, Germany’s renewable energy surcharge 
reached €0.053/kWh (RMB0.43/kWh) in 2013, or 20 per cent of the total 
electricity price. China’s low renewable electricity surcharge is important for the 
sustainable development of renewable energy because it leaves sufficient room for 
future expansion of FITs.
Finally, there are new provincial-level solar PV preferential tariffs. Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu have established province-wide preferential tariffs for solar PV. In Zhejiang, 
the tariff was set as a premium of RMB0.70/kWh (US$0.10/kWh) added to the 
province-average coal power generation price, which was RMB0.46/kWh in 2009 
(US$0.07/kWh), thus producing a total tariff of RMB1.16/kWh (US$0.17/kWh). 
Jiangsu set preferential tariffs significantly higher than Zhejiang, and also established 
a range of tariffs depending on technology type: RMB2.1/kWh (US$0.31/kWh) for 
ground-based systems, RMB3.7/kWh (US$0.54/kWh) for rooftop and RMB4.3/
kWh (US$0.63/kWh) for building-integrated systems (all prices at 2009 levels). 
Jiangsu also slated its tariffs to decrease progressively, to RMB1.7/kWh for ground-
based systems, RMB3/kWh for rooftop and RMB3.5/kWh for building-integrated 
systems in 2010, and to RMB1.4/kWh for ground-based systems, RMB2.4/kWh 
for rooftop and RMB2.9/kWh for building-integrated systems in 2011. These 
preferential tariffs were not, however, considered nationally ‘approved’ prices, which 
means the money to cover them will have to come from the provincial rather than 
the national budget.
During 2012–15, it was announced that all new solar projects without state subsidies 
would be included in Jiangsu’s PV subsidy policy, based on the national uniform 
electricity price. The policy would be implemented for the integrated operation of 
ground-based, rooftop and building-integrated systems with the electricity price of 
RMB1.2/kWh in 2014 and RMB1.15/kWh in 2015.
In December 2016, the NDRC released the lower FIT for new projects in 2017. 
For wind power, the tariffs are 15 per cent, 10 per cent, 9 per cent and 5 per cent 
lower for the four classes of wind resource rankings, giving rates of RMB0.40/
kWh, RMB0.45/kWh, RMB0.49/kWh andRMB0.57/kWh, respectively. For solar 
power, the FIT reductions are 19 per cent, 15 per cent and 13 per cent for the 
three solar resource rankings,3 to rates of RMB0.65/kWh, RMB0.75/kWh and 
RMB0.85/kWh, respectively. The subsidy for distributed solar power remains at 
RMB0.42/kWh. The FITs for offshore wind and tidal zone wind power also remain 
unchanged, at RMB0.85/kWh and RMB0.75/kWh, respectively.
3  Similar to the wind resource ranking, there are also three classes of solar power generation regions based on the 
resource of solar energy, from Class I to III, to decide the benchmark prices for solar power generation.
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Based on a recent announcement by the NEA, power companies will be required to 
source more than 15 per cent of their power from renewable energy generation, not 
including large hydro. This is another signal to promote further renewable energy 
development. 
Future development of renewable energy
The goal of keeping the rise in global temperature to 2°C and China’s own air quality 
targets are powerful push factors for the transition of energy systems. Based on the 
study by the Integrated Policy Assessment Model for China (IPAC) modelling team, 
energy transition in China alone could support the global climate change target, 
concurrent with improving air quality. Figure 14.5 presents primary energy demand 
under the global 2°C target.
Figure 14.5 Primary energy demand in China under the global 2ºC target
Source: Jiang et al. (2013).
By 2050, renewable energy will account for 33.8 per cent of total primary energy 
demand in China—an increase from 11.4 per cent in 2015. Installed capacity 
of  renewable energy will increase to 289 GW by 2050, while power generation 
from renewable energy will be 571 TWh by 2050 (Figures 14.6 and 14.7).
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
340
Figure 14.6 Installed capacity in China under the 2ºC scenario
Source: Jiang et al. (2013).
Figure 14.7 Power generation in China under the 2ºC scenario
Source: Jiang et al. (2013).
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15. The China Interbank Repo Market1
Ross Kendall and Jonathan Lees2
The market for repurchase agreements (‘repo’) is an important source of short-term 
funding for financial institutions operating in China. It is used by the People’s Bank 
of China (PBC) to manage domestic liquidity conditions through its open market 
operations, and it is likely to become more important over time as a channel for the 
transmission of monetary policy. This chapter outlines the key features of Chinese 
repo markets, first focusing on the interbank market, and then discussing recent 
developments and their impact on the bond market. We highlight that lower and 
less volatile repo rates over the past couple of years have contributed to greater risk-
taking in financial markets and that policy settings in China have been dynamic in 
shaping and responding to these developments.
Introduction
A repo is an agreement between two parties under which the cash borrower sells 
or pledges a security (usually a fixed-income security) to the cash lender, with the 
collateral bought back or released from the pledge at a later date. Repos are therefore 
economically equivalent to secured loans and are an important part of short-term 
funding markets in many economies. 
In China, a repo can be conducted as an exchange-traded transaction on the 
Shanghai  or Shenzhen stock exchanges or ‘over the counter’ in the interbank 
market. The exchange-traded market has grown rapidly in recent years; however, the 
interbank market—in which a range of bank and non-bank financial institutions 
are active—is the more significant market, with higher turnover and outstanding 
lending balances than the exchange-traded repo market (or the unsecured interbank 
lending market) (Figures 15.1 and 15.2). The People’s Bank of China (PBC) also 
uses the interbank market to adjust domestic liquidity conditions via open market 
operations. There is around RMB5 trillion (US$720 billion) of lending outstanding 
in China’s interbank repo market, which is around one-third of the size of the 
US repo market.3
1  A version of this article was also published in the June 2017 edition of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
Bulletin.
2  The authors are from the International Department of the RBA. The views expressed in this chapter are those of 
the authors and should not be attributed to the RBA. The content of this chapter was finalised on 21 April 2017.
3  The size of the US repo market is slightly more than US$2 trillion, based on 2016 data on outstanding repurchase 
agreements from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Primary Dealer Statistics database.
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Figure 15.1 Chinese repo turnover (annual, by market)


















Figure 15.2 Lending balance outstanding (by market)
Sources: CEIC Data; National Interbank Funding Center.
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This chapter focuses on the interbank repo market in light of its systemic importance 
as a major source of short-term funding, the significant role it plays in the PBC’s 
liquidity management and the fact that the PBC views it as an emerging channel 
for the transmission of monetary policy in China. We outline the key features of 
the market through the lens of the major cash lenders and borrowers, and go on to 
discuss recent developments in the repo market, focusing on the build-up of risks 
and changes to the PBC’s liquidity management framework.
Ownership of collateral
As in major repo markets around the world, in China’s interbank repo market 
bonds with low credit risk account for the majority of collateral used. In recent 
years, Chinese government bonds, together with bonds issued by China’s policy 
banks, have accounted for nearly 90 per cent of repo collateral (Figure 15.3). 
PBC bills historically accounted for a large share of repo collateral, but their usage 
has declined as the stock of outstanding PBC bills has fallen.4 Other instruments 
(mostly corporate and local government bonds) have accounted for just over 10 per 




















Figure 15.3 Collateral used in repurchase agreements (interbank, pledged 
collateral, percentage of monthly turnover by value)*
* Six-month rolling average. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations; CCDC; CEIC Data.
4  There are currently no PBC bills outstanding, with the last remaining bills having matured in 2016. 
5  In the pledged interbank market, collateral must meet the requirements specified by the cash lender, but is 
otherwise generic. That is, cash lenders are not able to request specific or ‘special’ securities as collateral, as is the 
case in most major markets.
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Repos in the Chinese interbank market are generally conducted on a ‘pledged’ basis 
rather than on an ‘outright’ basis as is common in other major markets (Figure 15.4).6 
Under an outright repo transaction, the ownership of collateral is transferred to 
the cash lender for the length of the transaction. In contrast, in a pledged repo 
agreement, ownership of the collateral remains with the borrower but is pledged 
to the cash lender such that the borrower cannot use it for any other purpose until 














Figure 15.4 Chinese interbank repo market (monthly turnover)
Sources: CEIC Data; National Interbank Funding Center.
As ownership of the collateral is not transferred to the cash lender in a pledged repo 
transaction, the lender cannot use (or ‘rehypothecate’) the collateral during the term 
of the transaction. This has several important implications for the structure of the 
market in China. First, it precludes the inter-dealer broker model prevalent in other 
major repo markets. In this model, a dealer acts as an intermediary by lending cash 
to one counterparty in exchange for collateral, and uses that collateral to borrow 
cash from another counterparty, taking a spread between the two trades as profit. 
6  Pledged agreements accounted for 95 per cent of turnover (by value) in 2016.
7  China Central Depository & Clearing (CCDC), a state-owned entity responsible for the registration, custody 
and settlement of most fixed-income securities in China, is responsible for ensuring that the pledged securities 
it holds are not used for any other purpose, including being pledged as collateral to another repo, until the 
transaction has been unwound.
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While market participants may act as an intermediary on an opportunistic basis, the 
process of on-lending funds in the pledged interbank repo market in China requires 
substantially more collateral than in repo markets where collateral ownership 
is transferred outright. 
Second, pledged repos are less flexible than outright repos. For example, bond dealers 
and investors commonly use repo markets to fund bond positions. This  involves 
purchasing a bond outright and using it as collateral in a repo transaction to borrow 
the cash needed to fund the bond purchase. Net cash flows are thus zero but the 
investor gains exposure to the bond. In an outright repo market, the investor can 
unwind their bond position during the term of the repo by borrowing an equivalent 
bond under a second repo transaction and selling it outright.8 This creates a short 
position that offsets the original long position. However, this is not possible in 
a pledged repo market as the collateral is not available to be sold. Consequently, 
to retain the ability to exit their positions when desired, bond investors using pledged 
repo markets to fund their positions are likely to have a preference to borrow cash 
for shorter terms relative to equivalent investors funding their positions through 
outright repo markets. Indeed, in the case of China, the use of overnight repos in 
the pledged repo market increased dramatically during 2015 alongside an increase 
in the bond–repo carry trade (discussed below).
Finally, the inability to rehypothecate collateral reduces the scope for market 
participants to profit from interest rate differentials. This may go part of the way to 
explaining the steep slope of the Chinese repo curve, particularly the spread between 
overnight and seven-day repo rates, which is persistently large (Figure  15.5). 
In an outright repo market, participants could take advantage of an interest rate 
differential such as this by lending cash at the seven-day rate and using the collateral 
received to borrow at the lower overnight rate. In a pledged repo market, these 
market participants would need to post their own collateral, increasing the cost 
of the trade.
8  In most major markets dealers may also exit a bond position by substituting collateral or they may use open-
ended repos in which the date of the second leg is not specified at the commencement of the transaction. These 
approaches are not possible in the pledged interbank market.
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Figure 15.5 Chinese interbank repo rates (by tenor)*
* Fixing repo rates published by the National Interbank Funding Center, calculated as the median rate 
of trades during the morning of each trading day. M = quarter ending March, J = quarter ending June, 
S = quarter ending September, D = quarter ending December.
Source: CEIC Data.
Cash lenders
Large Chinese commercial banks have historically been the major suppliers of cash 
in the interbank pledged repo market (Figure 15.6). In particular, the large state-
owned commercial banks account for a substantial share of lending. This reflects 
their large retail deposit bases and relatively conservative balance sheet management, 
which have resulted in more funds being available to lend in the repo market.9 
In contrast with the large national banks, small and medium-sized banks (labelled 
‘other commercial banks and cooperatives’ in Figure 15.6) have been net borrowers 
in the repo market (discussed below), although they are also responsible for 
a substantial share of lending. The scale of these institutions’ involvement in both 
the borrowing and the lending sides of the market may be indicative of on-lending 
activity, whereby institutions take advantage of opportunities to borrow cash at 
a lower rate than that at which they can lend. However, it is also likely to reflect the 
diversity of institutions within this group.
9  Data on repo activity by ‘national commercial banks’ from CCDC cannot be split further between the large 
state-owned commercial banks and the smaller ‘joint-stock banks’, but data on the source and use of funds in 
the domestic banking system from the PBC suggest that the ‘four large’ state-owned commercial banks account 
for the majority of repo lending by this category of bank.
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Another significant source of funds in the interbank repo market are China’s policy 
banks, whose activity is recorded in the ‘special members’ category (Cruz et al. 
2014). Policy banks play a quasi-fiscal role in channelling government funding 
to infrastructure and development projects, and also play a significant role in the 
financial system. Of the three policy banks, the China Development Bank (CDB) 
appears to be the most active in the repo market, with net lending by ‘special 
members’ in the pledged repo market closely aligning with figures on repo lending 


















Figure 15.6 Outstanding repo lending balance (interbank, pledged collateral, 
by type of institution)*
* Six-month rolling average 
** Relabelled from ‘special members’ in source data 
Sources: Authors’ calculations; CCDC; CEIC Data.
Policy banks’ lending in the repo market has increased rapidly since early 2014, 
tripling in the space of two years and making them systemically important 
participants in the market. A large increase in policy banks’ funding over recent 
years, via both bond issuance (the traditional funding source for policy banks) and 
the PBC’s Pledged Supplementary Lending Facility (launched in 2014 to provide 
low-cost funding to policy banks to support development lending), has contributed 
to an increase in their capacity to lend. It is possible that policy banks’ increased repo 
activity could have been part of a state-led push to reduce volatility in repo rates 
(see ‘Recent developments and their implications’ below).
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
350
The PBC’s lending in the interbank pledged repo market, via its open market 
operations, has also increased rapidly over the past couple of years.10 This reflects the 
PBC’s preference to manage liquidity conditions through more active use of open 
market operations rather than through changes to reserve requirement ratios, as well 
as the decline in the PBC’s foreign currency reserves since 2014, which has required 
offsetting liquidity injections. Like policy bank activity, this increase in the PBC’s 
activity in the repo market is likely aimed at reducing the volatility of repo rates. 
Asset managers use the repo market for liquidity management purposes and have 
increased their share of lending over recent years as the value of assets under 
management has grown.11 However, these institutions individually account for only 
a small share of outstanding lending, and their cash lending in the interbank repo 
market is considerably smaller than their borrowing (discussed below).
Cash borrowers
Smaller banks (‘other commercial banks and cooperatives’ in Figure 15.7) and asset 
managers account for most of the borrowing in the interbank pledged repo market, 
with smaller banks accounting for around half of outstanding borrowing. These 
banks have smaller retail deposit bases than the large state-owned commercial banks 
and, as a group, have been expanding their balance sheets rapidly over recent years, 
resulting in an increased reliance on wholesale funding such as repo (RBA 2016).
In recent years, asset managers have increased their borrowing in the interbank 
pledged repo market and now account for a significant share of outstanding 
borrowing. This increase has occurred alongside a sharp increase in the value of 
these funds’ assets under management, partly reflecting the generally less restrictive 
regulation of some types of fund management companies compared with banks’ 
activities. Asset managers are likely to have increased their borrowing in the repo 
market in recent years to engage in the bond carry trade (discussed below).
10 PBC repo lending and borrowing figures are calculated from PBC open market operations. Lending to or 
borrowing from the PBC is not captured in the data for other institutions, or in the aggregate turnover 
or balances data. 
11 For the purpose of this chapter, we group together institutions recorded as fund institutions, insurance 
institutions, securities companies and non-bank financial institutions as asset managers.
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Figure 15.7 Outstanding repo borrowing balance (interbank, pledged 
collateral, by type of institution)*
* Six-month rolling average 
Sources: Authors’ calculations; CCDC; CEIC Data.
The borrowing by financial institutions in the ‘national commercial banks’ category 
of Figure 15.7 captures borrowing by ‘joint-stock’ banks (which are smaller than 
the large state-owned banks that are major suppliers of funds), as well as borrowing 
by the large state-owned banks for the purpose of on-lending. The interest rates on 
repo agreements in the interbank market are differentiated based on both the quality 
of collateral offered and the perceived creditworthiness of the borrower (Shevlin 
and Chang 2015).12 Larger state-owned banks are perceived as having the highest 
credit quality, so borrow at lower rates than smaller banks, while asset managers 
typically borrow at higher rates than the smaller banks. Higher-rated institutions 
such as the national commercial banks can take advantage of their creditworthiness 
by borrowing at relatively low rates and on-lending at higher rates to smaller 
(less  creditworthy) institutions for profit. Figure 15.8 shows net lending in the 
pledged interbank repo market by type of institution, thereby abstracting from on-
lending activities and differences within groups, and hence showing the ultimate 
suppliers and users of funds. In net terms, the policy banks and the PBC are larger 
suppliers of funds than the national commercial banks, while smaller banks and 
asset managers are net borrowers.
12 All else being equal, the credit quality of the borrower should matter more under a pledged repo system, to the 
extent that it is more difficult for the lender to acquire the collateral that has been pledged in the event of a 
default. The only reported instance of default in China’s interbank repo market that we are aware of involved 
the failure to repay an overnight repo of less than RMB50 million (US$7 million) in March 2017 (Bloomberg 
News 2017). This reported default has not been officially confirmed. 






















Figure 15.8 Net outstanding repo lending balance (interbank, pledged 
collateral, by type of institution)*
* Six-month rolling average 
** Relabelled from ‘special members’ in source data. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations; CCDC; CEIC Data.
Recent developments and their implications
The reduction in the volatility of repo rates
The volatility of Chinese repo rates declined significantly during 2015 and has 
generally remained low since then, notwithstanding an increase since the second 
half of 2016 (discussed below; Figure 15.9). One factor contributing to lower 
volatility was the introduction of reserve averaging for banks in September 2015 
(IMF 2016).13 However, the increased involvement of policy banks and the PBC in 
the repo market indicates a broader policy objective by the Chinese authorities to 
dampen volatility. A working paper co-authored by the chief economist of the PBC’s 
research bureau in early 2016 supports this assessment. Specifically, it recommends 
shifting monetary policy from the current approach (focused on quantitative lending 
targets, ‘window guidance’ and central guidance of benchmark lending and deposit 
rates) towards an interest rate corridor approach and improving the transmission 
13 The rule change allows banks to report a required reserve ratio up to 1 per cent lower than the compulsory ratio 
set by the PBC on any given day, as long as they meet the requirement on average during an assessed period.
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from short-term rates (particularly the seven-day repo rate) to other rates in the 
economy (Ma et al. 2016). In addition, a February 2017 article from PBC Assistant 
Governor, Zhang Xiaohui, reiterated these goals. It stated that the transmission 
from short-term rates (especially the seven-day repo rate and the rates on the PBC’s 

























Figure 15.9 Chinese repo rate (seven-day repo fixing rate, daily)
Note: Red dots indicate PBC seven-day open market operation rates on repos (prior to 2012) 
and reverse repos (since May 2012). 
Sources: Authors’ calculations; CEIC Data.
Policy banks increased their lending in the interbank pledged repo market from 
early 2014, with their share of outstanding loans rising from around 20 per cent 
to almost 40 per cent by early 2015. In early 2016, the share of policy and central 
bank lending grew further as the PBC increased its activity in the repo market 
(Figure 15.10). At the same time, the PBC started managing liquidity more actively, 
increasing the size of injections and withdrawals and moving from bi-weekly open 
market operations to daily open market operations (Figure 15.11). This enabled the 
PBC, like other central banks, to more effectively mitigate short-term fluctuations 
in liquidity conditions—for example, arising from large tax payments or seasonal 
demand for cash. 
14 There have also been numerous reports from market analysts discussing the shift towards an interest rate corridor 
system, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2016) has highlighted this shift and encouraged further 
progress in its recent communications.
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Figure 15.10 Policy bank and PBC repo lending (interbank, pledged collateral)*
* Six-month rolling average. 
















Figure 15.11 PBC liquidity injections and withdrawals (open market 
operations, net)
Source: Bloomberg.
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The bond carry trade
The structural decline in the volatility of repo rates has given rise to a consistent 
spread  between yields on short-term repos and long-term bonds. This spread 
facilitates the bond ‘carry trade’—a leveraged bond investment in which the investor 
receives the higher long-term interest rate, but pays the lower shorter-term rate 
(that is, the investor buys a bond and pledges it in exchange for cash through the 
repo market). Reports suggest that the low level and low volatility of repo rates 
have indeed led to an increase in leveraged bond investments (see, for example, 
Bloomberg News 2016; Dongming 2016; Xinhua Finance Agency 2016) and PBC 
commentary has noted risks to financial institutions related to maturity mismatch 
(Zhang 2017).
In the case of investments in long-term bonds funded via short-term repo, the trade 
is subject to refinancing risk whereby the interest differential earned on the trade is 
eroded or becomes negative if repo rates increase. The carry trade is also subject to 
the risk of capital losses, as investors would rarely hold a long-term bond funded via 
repo to maturity. This risk is magnified by the leveraged nature of the investment, 
with the result that investors funding positions through the repo market are highly 
sensitive to moves in bond yields.
The widest and most consistent spread has been between overnight repo and long-
term bonds (Figure 15.12). This has likely contributed to the sharp increase in 
overnight repo turnover that occurred from early 2015 alongside growth in repo 
borrowing by smaller banks and asset managers (Figure 15.13). On the investment 
side, liquidity as measured by bid–ask spreads improved steadily over the same 
period, with the carry trade increasing bond trading volumes in an environment of 
low and stable interest rates. However, to the extent that carry trade supports bond 
market liquidity, it can be expected to deteriorate quickly when interest rates rise. 
There was some evidence of this in the December quarter of 2016, when bid–ask 
spreads widened alongside increases in repo market volatility and bond yields. More 
generally, the build-up in leveraged bond investments appears to have increased the 
sensitivity of the bond market to volatility in repo rates. For example, in 2013, large 
increases in repo rates had little impact on the bond market, while a relatively minor 
pick-up in the level and volatility of repo rates in late 2016 contributed to a material 
increase in yields.








































Figure 15.13 Repo turnover (interbank, monthly, pledged collateral, by tenor)
Sources: Authors’ calculations; CEIC Data; National Interbank Funding Center.
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Part of the pick-up in the level and volatility of repo rates over the second half of 
2016 has reflected the increased share of borrowing by asset managers over this 
period (in addition to changes to the PBC’s liquidity operations, discussed below). 
On average, asset managers likely borrow at a higher rate than banks, contributing 
to a rise in average repo rates as these institutions’ share of turnover increases, and 
higher volatility to the extent that the rates at which these institutions can borrow 
are more sensitive to changes in credit risk appetite.15 In December 2016, repo 
rates rose substantially as the premium paid by asset managers to borrow relative 
to banks increased sharply in response to concerns regarding the use of informal 
repo agreements known as ‘dai chi’ by some interbank repo market participants 
(discussed further below). 
The ‘dai chi’ market
Dai chi (which translates as ‘holding something on someone’s behalf ’) is the practice 
of selling a bond in exchange for funds and buying the bond back later at a price and 
time agreed at the start of the trade. Dai chi agreements are economically equivalent 
to a repo agreement, but do not take place via the interbank market trading system 
and are often informal in nature.16 Due to this informality, some transactions 
undertaken in this market may not be legally enforceable—for example, dai chi 
agreements have reportedly been struck using instant messaging services. 
There are several reasons that market participants may elect to transact in the dai chi 
market instead of the formal interbank market. Dai chi transactions can be used to 
remove assets from balance sheets for the period of the loan, circumventing regulatory 
limits on leverage. Dai chi also allows collateral rehypothecation, facilitating greater 
flexibility and leverage than pledged repo. 
Though few data are available on this informal market, the practice is reportedly 
widespread. The president of China Central Depository & Clearing (CCDC) has 
estimated that the value of outstanding dai chi could be as high as RMB12 trillion 
(US$1.7 trillion), which would make it twice as large as the interbank repo market 
(Dong 2016; Hong 2017). Without knowing the types of collateral used, the 
enforceability of contracts or the creditworthiness of the institutions involved, it 
is difficult to make an assessment of the risks involved with this activity. However, 
the informality of the dai chi market suggests that risks are likely higher than in the 
15 Asset managers are likely perceived as having higher credit risk, so are likely to pay a higher rate than banks 
(Shevlin and Chang 2015). Data from the Monthly Bulletin on Pledged Repo retrieved from chinamoney.com.cn/
english (the website of the China Foreign Exchange Trade System, which processes interbank repo transactions) 
show that the average repo rate for ‘other’ institutions is consistently higher than for any type of Chinese bank 
(although this does not account for potential differences in the average term of repo funding between different 
types of institution).
16 The information on the dai chi market is based on Dong (2016); Moriyasu (2016); BIS (2017); Hong (2017); 
Long (2017).
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
358
formal repo market. Moreover, there is likely to be some degree of overlap between 
participants in the formal and informal repo markets, such that risks that manifest in 
the dai chi market could spill over into the interbank and exchange-traded markets. 
For example, in mid-December 2016, Sealand Securities announced that 
two former directors had forged RMB16.5 billion (US$2.4 billion) in dai chi 
contracts in transactions with a number of other financial institutions. Sealand’s 
announcement cast doubt over whether the firm would buy back the bonds being 
held in relation to the fraudulent transactions, which at the time were carrying 
mark-to-market losses of around RMB1 billion (US$145 million), or 7 per cent 
of the firm’s shareholder equity.
The announcement resulted in volatility in interest rate markets. In the formal repo 
market, cash lenders became reluctant to provide funding to non-bank financial 
institutions, with the spread between interest rates paid by these institutions and 
those paid by banks increasing sharply.17 In the bond market, yields rose significantly 
and bid–ask spreads widened.18 However, this dislocation was short-lived as the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission was reported to have stepped in to force 
a resolution, and large Chinese banks reportedly increased their lending in the 
repo market via ‘X-repo’. X-repo is a repo facility launched by the PBC in 2015 
to anonymously match interbank repo lenders and borrowers, with standardised 
collateral and haircut requirements. Lending through X-repo ensured access to 
financing for non-bank financial institutions that were unable to borrow via 
traditional repos due to the spillover of credit concerns from the dai chi market into 
the interbank market.
Extension to the term of the PBC’s market operations
The increased use of leveraged bond purchases and informal repo markets has 
increased the level of risk in China’s financial system. In an apparent response to 
these risks, in August 2016, the PBC started augmenting its standard seven-day 
open market operations with 14-day and 28-day terms. While there was no official 
comment on the change in approach at the time, there were widespread reports 
(see, for example, Reuters 2016) that the PBC was trying to reduce the extent of 
leveraged bond purchases by encouraging less use of overnight repos and greater use 
of (more expensive) longer-term repos. 
17 The gap between a measure of the seven-day repo rates that includes borrowing by all types of financial 
institutions and one that includes only borrowing by deposit-taking institutions spiked to around 100 basis 
points in late December from a normal range of around 10 to 30 basis points.
18 Trading was also suspended in Chinese government bond futures, which reached their daily down limit.
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In February, PBC Assistant Governor Zhang noted that the change to the PBC’s 
open market operations had the practical effect of mitigating financial institutions’ 
maturity mismatch and liquidity risks (Zhang 2017). Repo turnover declined 
following the change, with some investors in the bond carry trade likely to have 
been deterred by the resulting increase in the level and volatility of repo rates 
(see Figure 15.12). 
Conclusion
Repo markets in China have expanded rapidly in recent years. This is consistent with 
the broader development of China’s financial markets and provides financial market 
participants the depth and liquidity necessary to effectively manage their short-term 
assets and liabilities. Moreover, the PBC views the repo market’s development as 
supporting further moves towards a short-term interest rate targeting monetary policy 
framework in the future. However, as in other financial markets, the expansion of 
short-term funding markets can give rise to financial stability risks, especially where 
these markets are informal in nature. It appears these risks have risen with the growth 
in China’s repo markets, and the policy landscape is responding to these risks. 
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16. China’s Evolving Role in Global 
Production Networks: Implications 
for Trump’s Trade War
Prema-chandra Athukorala1
Introduction
The early literature on China’s rise as an export powerhouse widely interpreted 
the shift in its export composition away from standard labour-intensive products 
towards ‘high-tech’ product lines within global production networks as an indication 
of China becoming an advanced-technology superpower. It was predicted that the 
sophistication of China’s export basket was rapidly approaching the level of those of 
most advanced industrial nations (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Rodrik 2006; Yusuf et 
al. 2007). China’s perceived export prowess, coupled with the rapid increase in intra-
regional trade within China-centred production networks, led to the view that East 
Asia was becoming a self-contained economic entity with potential for maintaining 
dynamic growth independent of the economic outlook for the traditional developed 
market economies (Yoshitomi 2007; Park and Shin 2009; Kohli et al. 2011). 
Subsequent studies, which analysed trade data by taking into account cross-border 
linkages within global production networks, challenged this view (Bergsten et al. 
2006; Schott 2008; Athukorala 2009; Roach 2014; Yao 2009; Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon 2012). These studies demonstrated that the interpretation of China’s 
global economic integration in earlier studies had missed the fact that China was 
engaged predominantly in the final assembly stages of East Asia–centred global 
production networks of vertically integrated global high-tech industries. Even though 
East Asian economies had become the major suppliers of parts and components for 
assembly operations in China, most destinations for finished products remained 
markets outside the region. It was, therefore, too early to proclaim that China and 
East Asia were decoupling from the global economy.
The purpose of this chapter is to revisit this debate by extending the period covered 
to more recent years. The analysis is motivated by a sizeable recent literature on the 
deepening of China’s engagement in global production sharing. There is evidence 
coming from firm-level studies that firms engaged in final assembly in China have 
1  The author is grateful to Arianto Patunru for valuable comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
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begun to procure inputs from domestic sources (Upward et al. 2013; Yang and 
Hayakawa 2015; Yang and Tsou 2015; Kang and Shen 2016; Kee and Tang 2016; 
Kong and Kneller 2016). According to these studies, the process of industrial 
deepening has been underpinned by the relocation of manufacturing facilities to 
China by foreign component-producing firms to supply the rapidly expanding final 
assembly activities in China. There is also evidence of a notable decline in the share 
of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in domestic manufacturing as a result of the 
rapid expansion of the operations of local firms, a number of which have become 
significant global players (Lardy 2014). Closely linked with the shift in ownership 
structure are some signs of Chinese firms moving gradually from a strategy of pure 
imitation to one of innovation (Wei et al. 2017; Yip and McKern 2016). These 
structural changes could presumably have led to a greater propensity to procure 
inputs domestically; however, so far no attempt has been made to examine whether 
these structural changes in domestic manufacturing have begun to change the 
patterns of China’s engagement in global network trade. Filling this knowledge 
gap is important for broadening our understanding of China’s engagement in the 
global economy. 
A clear understanding of the emerging patterns of China’s trade is particularly 
relevant for the current debate on the possible implications of the ‘trade war’ declared 
by US President Donald Trump on Sino–US trade relations and the global economy 
at large. A recent trade modelling exercise predicts that the implementation of the 
proposed 45 per cent US tariff would cut Chinese exports to the United States by 
73 per cent (Guo et al. 2017). Based on an interview with several China experts, 
Wu (2017) reports anecdotal evidence of possible export contraction of similar 
margins. These predictions are based on the conventional notion that trade takes 
place in goods that are produced from start to finish in a given country (horizontal 
specialisation). 
The validity of these predictions is, however, questionable, given that ‘global 
production sharing’—splitting the production process into discrete activities that 
are then allocated across countries—has become a prime mover of global trade and 
China’s global economic integration. Modern international trade driven by global 
production sharing creates interdependence among countries in a way that old-
fashioned horizontal approach to trade fails to capture. The goods a country exports 
are often produced with imported parts and components and the goods it imports 
often contribute to the expansion of domestic production and indirectly induce its 
own exports. These intricate complementarities between trade and production have 
direct implications for both President Trump’s ability to implement punitive tariffs 
and the economic impact if the protectionist threat becomes a reality.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview 
of China’s emergence as a global export powerhouse. This is followed by an analysis 
of the emerging patterns of China’s engagement in global production sharing, 
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focusing on both its changing commodity composition and the geographic profile 
of trade. The fourth section examines the implications of the emerging patterns of 
China’s engagement in global production networks for Sino–US trade relations in 
the context of the current debate about the implications of punitive tariffs proposed 
by the Trump administration. The final section summarises the key findings and 
offers some policy suggestions.
China in global production networks
The rise of China as a major trading nation is one of the most momentous 
developments in the post–World War II era, surpassing even the stunning rise 
of Germany and  Japan. Total merchandise exports from China increased from 
US$8 billion (around 1 per cent of global exports) in 1978, when the country’s 
liberalisation process began, to US$408 billion (7.7 per cent of global exports) in 
2000 and to more than US$2 trillion (14.1 per cent) in 2015.2 In 2004, China 
overtook Japan to become the third-largest exporter in the world after the United 
States and Germany, and, in another three years, it became the second-largest 
exporter, surpassing the United States. Since 2009, China has been the world’s 
largest exporting nation. China’s ratio of exports to gross domestic product (GDP) 
currently stands at 33 per cent compared with an average level of 10 per cent for 
other major economies such as the United States, India and Brazil (World Bank 
various years). 
China’s phenomenal export expansion has been underpinned by a dramatic shift in 
the commodity composition of its exports, away from primary products and towards 
manufactured goods. The share of manufactures in China’s total merchandise exports 
increased from less than 40 per cent in the late 1970s to more than 90 per cent from 
the late 1990s, compared with a global average of 70 per cent. China accounted 
for more than half of the increase in total global manufacturing exports between 
1990 and 2015. Integration of domestic manufacturing within global production 
networks has been the prime mover of China’s rise as an export powerhouse during 
this period.
2  The data reported in this chapter are in current US dollars and are taken from the UN Comtrade database 
(comtrade.un.org/), unless otherwise stated.
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
366
In terms of organisational structure, production networks take two major forms: 
buyer-driven production networks and producer-driven production networks.3 
Until the early 1990s, the expansion of manufacturing exports from China took 
place predominantly within buyer-driven production networks. China’s export 
composition during this period remained heavily concentrated in traditional labour-
intensive manufactures such as apparel, footwear, toys and sporting goods. Hong 
Kong manufacturing firms, which relocated their plants to the newly established 
special economic zones (SEZs) in the Chinese mainland, played a pivotal role in 
linking China to these production networks (Song and Sung 1995; Roach 2014). 
Since then, there has been a palpable shift in China’s export composition, away from 
conventional labour-intensive products and towards assembly operations within 
producer-driven production networks—in particular, those within the broader 
category of machinery and transport equipment. Within a few years, the increase in 
the rate of China’s market penetration into global machinery trade turned out to be 
faster than that for traditional labour-intensive manufacturing. Export expansion 
was underpinned by a notable increase in the entry of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) to set up assembly plants in China. The share of MNE subsidiaries in 
manufacturing exports from China increased from about 10 per cent in the early 
1990s to over 60 per cent in 2010 (Lardy 2014). 
Successfully linking a developing country to global production networks requires 
policy reforms to create a business environment conducive to export-oriented 
production. However, combining economy-wide reforms with public policies 
specifically designed to attract MNEs to set up production bases is vital, particularly 
in the case of production sharing within producer-driven networks. 
The main drivers of China’s emergence as the premier global assembly centre 
were its ample supply of relatively cheap and trainable labour, trade liberalisation 
and trade-related infrastructure provision through the establishment of SEZs. 
In terms of labour supply, China had the specific advantage of the availability of 
supervisory manpower to complement the vast pool of unskilled workers. Assembly 
processes within production networks require much greater numbers of middle-
level supervisory workers (in addition to the availability of trainable low-cost 
3  Buyer-driven networks are common in diffused-technology consumer goods industries (such as clothing, 
footwear, travel goods and toys). The ‘lead firm’ in such a network is the international buyer (large retailers 
such as Walmart, Marks & Spencer, H&M) and production sharing takes place mostly through arm’s-length 
relationships, with global sourcing companies (value chain intermediaries) playing a key role in linking 
producers and lead firms. Producer-driven networks are common in vertically integrated global industries such as 
electronics, electrical goods and automobiles. In these networks, the ‘lead firm’ is a multinational manufacturing 
enterprise (such as Intel, Motorola, Apple and Samsung) and production sharing takes place through the lead 
firm’s global branch network and/or its close operational links with established contract manufacturers. There 
is, therefore, a close link between trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) within these networks. On the 
analytical distinction between these two variants of production networks, see Gereffi (1999).
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unskilled  labour) than is required in traditional labour-intensive manufacturing.4 
Under global production sharing, developed countries normally shift to developing 
countries the low-skill-intensive parts of the value chain; however, these low-skill 
activities can be more skill intensive than even the most skill-intensive activities in 
the developing country (Feenstra 2010). 
If the costs of service linkages associated with production sharing—the costs of 
connecting and/or coordinating activities into a smooth sequence to produce the 
final good—had outweighed the gain from the favourable labour market conditions 
(Jones and Kierzkowski 2004), participation in global production sharing would 
not have occurred. These extra costs include transportation, communication and 
related tasks involved in coordinating production activity in a given country with 
what is being done in other countries within the production network. The SEZ-
centred trade and foreign investment policy reforms in China were successful in 
meeting this requirement.
In addition to these factors, a significant reduction in ‘country risk’ as a result of 
the end of the Cold War5 and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001 provided a setting conducive to the smooth functioning of China-
centred production networks. Country risk is a key determinant of whether a firm 
outsources its production processes to another country, either by setting up an 
affiliated company or by establishing an arm’s-length relationship with a local firm. 
This is because supply disruptions in a given overseas location could disrupt the 
entire production chain, and it is impossible to fully offset these risks by writing 
complete contracts (Spencer 2005; Helpman 2006).
Trade patterns
To explore the magnitude and patterns of trade arising from cross-border production 
networks, it is necessary to separate parts and components (henceforth referred to 
as ‘components’) from final (assembled) products traded within global production 
networks in reported standard (customs records–based) trade data. The methodology 
4  See Steve Jobs’s discussion with former US President Barack Obama on Apple’s assembly operations in China 
in Isaacson (2011: 546): ‘At that time, Apple had 700,000 factory workers employed in China, and that was 
because it needed 30,000 engineers on-site to supervise those workers. If you could educate these engineers, he 
said, we could move more manufacturing plants here.’
5  Country risk considerations during the Cold War are considered a possible reason US electronics MNEs 
favoured Singapore (and subsequently Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) in which to establish assembly 
plants in the initial stage of their overseas operations (in the 1960s and 1970s), while bypassing South Korea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong (in particular, Hong Kong, a country that followed almost laissez-faire economic policy 
throughout)—countries that were more familiar to them (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon 2014).
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for data compilation is descried in Appendix 16.1. In the following discussion, 
‘global production network (GPN) products’ refers to the sum of components and 
assembled products. 
Exports of GPN products from China increased from US$47 billion in 1992–
93 to US$1.5 trillion in 2014–15,6 when these products accounted for more 
than 70  per  cent of China’s total manufacturing exports (Figure 16.1). Within 
GPN products, assembled products account for a larger share than components 
throughout the period. This pattern reflects China’s dominant role as an assembly 
centre within global production networks. However, components also account for 
a sizeable share and that share has increased in recent years, reflecting deepening 
































































Figure 16.1 China’s manufacturing exports, 1992–2015 (US$ billion)
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
From the early 1990s, China’s share of global network products remained above its 
share of total global manufacturing exports (Figure 16.2) and the difference became 
prominent after about 2005. In 2014–15, China accounted for 27 per cent of total 
global network product exports in the world compared with an 18 per cent share in 
total world manufacturing exports. Shares of both final assembly and components 
were notably higher than the aggregate global export share.
6  To minimise possible random shocks and measurement errors, two-year averages are used in intertemporal 
comparisons throughout this section.











































































Figure 16.2 China’s share in global manufacturing exports, 1992–2015 (per cent)
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
Product composition 
China’s share of products exported within producer-driven networks in total GPN 
product exports increased from 52.1 per cent in 2000–01 to 74.2 per cent in 2014–
15 (Figure 16.3; Table 16.1). Information technology products (automated data-
processing machines, telecommunications and sound recording instruments and 
electrical machinery) are the prominent export products within this category. These 
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Buyer-driven 
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Figure 16.3 Producer-driven, buyer-driven and total global network exports 
from China, 1992–2015 (US$ billion)
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
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Table 16.1 Commodity composition of China’s exports within global 
production networks, 2000–01 and 2014–15 (per cent)1






2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15
(a) Exports within producer-driven 
networks
72.0 85.3 34.8 64.5 52.1 74.2
Chemicals (5) 0.3 0.7 - - 0.1 0.3
Power-generating machines (71) 4.05 5.6 0.25 0.5 1.65 2.7
Specialised industrial 
machines (72)
1.15 2.0 0.8 3.7 1.6 3.0
Metal-working machines (73) 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6
General industrial 
machinery (74)
4.35 8.1 1.8 7.2 3.95 7.6
Automated data-processing 
machines (75) 
18.0 14.9 5.7 15.9 12.1 15.7
Telecommunications and sound-
recording instruments (76)
18.7 22.3 6.1 8.7 13.9 14.6
Electrical machinery (77) 18.8 22.0 6.75 10.1 11.5 16.2
Road vehicles (78) 2.8 6.1 3.8 4.6 3.45 5.3
Other transport equipment (79) 0.5 0.4 2 4.1 1.4 2.5
Professional and scientific 
instruments (87)
0.5 1.2 3.4 7.2 2.1 4.6
Photographic apparatus (8) 1.65 0.8 3.3 1.9 2.7 1.4
(b) Exports within buyer-driven 
networks
27.95 14.7 65.2 35.5 47.9 25.2
Textiles (656–7) 28.15 14.2 0 - 10.1 5.9
Apparel and clothing 
accessories (84)
0.25 0.5 40.7 24.4 28.1 13.1
Footwear (85) - - 10.75 7.3 6.9 4.1
Travel goods (83) - - 3.8 3.8 2.4 2.1
Total (a + b) 100 100 100 100 100 100
1 Two-year averages
2 Commodity codes of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) are in parentheses.
- Zero or negligible
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
The shift in product composition towards products within producer-driven networks 
from those within buyer-driven networks seems to reflect a widening of the domestic 
production base rather than China losing international competitiveness in products 
traded within buyer-driven networks. As can be seen in Table 16.2, China’s shares 
of global exports of most products at the two-digit Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) level have increased during this period, notwithstanding the 
widely perceived decline in China’s international competitiveness owing to rising 
domestic wages. Interestingly, world market shares of buyer-driven exports have 
recorded notable increases, even though their production is considered relatively 
more labour intensive. China accounted for a staggering 49.2 per cent of world 
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market share in apparel in 2014–15, up from 30.9 per cent in 2000–01. The world 
market share of footwear and travel goods increased from 21.9 per cent to 
40.5 per cent between the two periods. Within producer-driven exports, automated 
data-processing machines (SITC 75) and telecommunications and sound-recording 
instruments (SITC 76) showed the fastest rates of global market penetration: in 
2014–15, China accounted for 49.2 per cent and 36.1 per cent, respectively, of 
total global exports of these products. Interestingly, China’s world market share has 
increased in both components and final assembly within producer-driven production 
networks, reflecting consolidation of China’s role within global production sharing. 
Table 16.2 China’s share of global network trade, 2000–01 and 2014–15 
(per cent)1
Products2 Parts and 
components
Final assembly Total global 
network products
2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15
(a) Exports within producer-driven 
networks
5.85 17.8 13.65 16.2 3.7 11.5
Chemicals (5) 1.8 12.1 - - 1.8 11.9
Power-generating machines (71) 2.25 9.1 6.0 8.5 1.15 4.8
Specialised industrial 
machines (72)
2.0 8.4 6.0 9.7 1.6 7.2
Metal-working machines (73) 2.4 9.1 6.15 8.1 1.75 6.5
General industrial 
machinery (74)
3.8 13.4 10.8 16.3 2.8 9.8
Automated data-processing 
machines (75) 
11.1 29.9 39.8 71.3 7.7 49.28
Telecommunications and sound 
recording instruments (76)
12.5 46.3 37.3 35.4 8.3 36.1
Electrical machinery (77) 5.0 19.2 18.8 30.6 3.35 12.9
Road vehicles (78) 2.1 8.6 5.35 3.7 1.2 4.0
Other transport equipment (79) 1.2 2.9 3.3 11.1 1.6 7.5
Professional and scientific 
instruments (87)
2.3 10.5 10.1 16.1 3.9 13.3
Photographic apparatus (88) 9.5 18.5 12.8 13.3 5.5 12
(b) Exports within buyer-driven 
networks
12.9 32.1 33.8 46.2 19.7 39.6
Textiles (656–7) 13.6 34.5 17.3 - 13.6 34.8
Apparel and clothing 
accessories (84)
- - - 48.1 30.9 49.2
Footwear (85) 8.7 20.6 25.6 42.6 21.9 40.5
Travel goods (83) 0 0 16.5 41.8 23.7 41.6
Total (a + b) 6.5 22.4 16.7 27.6 5.1 17.6
1 Two-year averages
2 SITC commodity codes are in parentheses. 
- Zero or negligible
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
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There are at least four possible explanations for this across-the-board increase in 
global market penetration of manufacturing exports from China. First, even though 
the average domestic manufacturing wage has significantly increased, China’s 
manufacturing wages are still much lower than those in the United States and other 
mature industrialised economies (Table 16.3). For instance, in 2014, the annual 
average wage for manufacturing workers in China was only one-fifth of that in 
the United States and most other developed countries. Allowing for other factors 
(discussed below), these ‘international’ wage differences are presumably a significant 
determinant of China’s attractiveness as a location within production networks. 
Second, there is still some slack in the labour markets in China’s interior provinces 
and producers therefore have the option of relocating production within the 
country in response to labour scarcity and rising wages in the coastal provinces. 
Large firms located in industrial centres also have the option of using subcontracting 
arrangements with township and village-owned enterprises (TVEs) as a cushion 
against increasing wages (Athukorala and Wei 2017). Third, increases in labour costs 
may have been more than balanced by reductions in service linkage costs resulting 
from trade and investment policy reforms and, more importantly, improvements in 
provision of trade-related infrastructure. Finally, as already noted, compared with 
many countries, China has the advantage of being able to meet labour requirements 
(unskilled labour and supervisory manpower) for large-scale assembly operations 
within global production networks. 
Deepening of production sharing
As noted at the outset of this chapter, there is some scattered evidence that China’s 
manufacturing base has deepened over the years, with an increase in domestic 
production of components within global production networks. Has this structural 
change gained enough significance over time to be reflected in China’s trade data? 
Two data series compiled to shed light on this issue are plotted in Figure 16.4: the 
ratio of components exports to imports and the ratio of components imports to 
exports of assembled products. The former series indicates China’s integration into 
global production networks as a supplier of components; the latter indicates the 
degree of dependence of final goods assembly in China on imported components.














United Kingdom 61,958 70,400
United States 77,055 87,021














- Data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
Notes: Data for the United States relate to US affiliates of foreign MNEs in US manufacturing. 
For other countries, the data are for foreign affiliates of US MNEs.































































Figure 16.4 China: Imports of parts and components relative to exports 
of parts and components and assembled products (per cent)
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
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China’s exports of components amounted to only about 60 per cent of its imports 
of  components in the early 1990s. This share increased continuously during the 
ensuing years. In 2013–14, components exports exceeded imports by almost 
25 per  cent. Imports of components as a percentage of assembled goods exports 
increased from 38 per cent in the mid-1980s to more than 90 per cent by 2005. 
This was the period of rapid structural transformation from buyer-driven exports 
to producer-driven exports. This ratio has since come down, reaching 60 per cent 
by 2014–15. The data clearly indicate, therefore, that China’s engagement in global 
production sharing has deepened over the past two decades.7 
Geographic profile
Data on the destination-country and source-country composition of China’s 
GPN exports and imports are summarised in Tables 16.4 and 16.5, respectively. 
A number of interesting developments relating to China’s geographic patterns 
of engagement in global production networks can be observed.
Table 16.4 Destination-country composition of China’s global network exports, 
2000–01 and 2014–15 (per cent)*
Parts and components Assembled products Total GNP products
Country/country groups 2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15
Japan 19.4 9.4 15.3 7.1 17.8 8.1
South Korea 4.5 7.1 2.8 4.8 3.8 5.7
Taiwan 5.9 2.7 3.9 2.6 5.0 2.6
South-East Asia 11.5 11.5 8.6 12.5 10.1 11.9
South Asia 2.4 5.0 2.6 4.2 2.5 4.6
India 0.4 3.1 0.5 2.4 0.5 2.7
West Asia 1.8 4.3 2.5 5.0 2.1 5.7
Central Asia 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.7
Oceania 1.1 1.6 1.7 2.5 1.4 2.1
Australia 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.2 1.8
NAFTA^ 28.8 27.0 31.7 25.3 29.6 24.1
United States 27.1 23.4 29.7 22.2 27.7 22.7
Canada 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4
European Union (EU) 21.1 18.9 21.4 19.9 21.2 19.5
Non-EU Western Europe 0.4 0.3 1.6 0.6 1.0 0.5
Russian Federation 0.1 2.1 0.4 2.3 0.3 2.2
Africa 1.6 3.5 3.2 4.6 2.3 4.1
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
2.3 6.9 4.4 7.9 3.3 8.5
7  Constantinescu et al. (2014) also report a decline in the ratio of components imports to total manufacturing 
exports from China, from about 55 per cent in the mid-1990s to about 35 per cent in 2012. However, without 
looking at what has been happening to component exports, they erroneously interpret these figures as indicative 
of ‘diminishing fragmentation of the production process’ (pp. 40–1). 
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Parts and components Assembled products Total GNP products
Country/country groups 2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014–15
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Memorandum items
Developed countries# 70.1 52.0 70.3 50.0 69.7 50.2
Developed countries 
excluding Japan
49.3 42.6 54.9 43.0 51.9 42.8
Developing countries# 29.9 48.0 29.7 50.0 30.3 49.8
* Two-year averages
^ North American Free Trade Agreement
# Based on the UN Standard Country Classification.
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
Table 16.5 Source-country composition of China’s global network imports, 
2000–01 and 2014–15 (per cent)*
Parts and components Assembled products Total GNP products
Country/country groups 2000–01 2014–15 2000–01 2014-–5 2000–01 2014–15
Japan 28.5 22.2 28.8 12.8 28.8 15.5
South Korea 8.2 14.1 5.3 19.4 6.7 17.7
Taiwan 16.2 11.4 12.4 19.6 14.3 17.2
South-East Asia 8.7 14.9 3.5 12.9 6.8 13.5
South Asia 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
India 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
West Asia 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Central Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oceania 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1
Australia 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
NAFTA^ 15.3 10.0 16.4 12.8 15.1 11.4
United States 14.0 9.3 17.4 11.9 15.0 10.6
Canada 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
European Union (EU) 20.5 24.2 28.5 19.2 24.3 21.1
Non-EU Western Europe 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.2
Russian Federation 1.1 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.1 0.1
Africa 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
0.3 1.2 0.1 1.8 0.2 1.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Developed countries# 64.5 55.4 77.2 44.4 70.4 47.6
Developed countries 
excluding Japan
35.6 34.1 48.4 31.6 41.6 32.4
Developing countries# 35.5 44.6 22.8 55.6 29.6 52.2
* Two-year averages
^ North American Free Trade Agreement
# Based on the UN Standard Country Classification.
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
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On the export side, there has been a notable decline in China’s share of GPN 
products  destined for developed countries, from 69.7 per cent in 2000–01 to 
50.2 per cent in 2014–15. Exports to Japan recorded the sharpest decline, from 
17.8 per cent to 8.1 per cent between the two periods. Developed countries other 
than Japan accounted for 42.8 per cent of China’s total GPN product exports, 
compared with 51.9 per cent in 2000–01. The United States remains the largest 
market for both components and assembled products, accounting for more than 
one-fifth of Chinese exports.
While China’s market shares in all developing countries/regions, other than Taiwan, 
have increased across the board, its degree of export penetration in Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean and West Asia (the Middle East) was much sharper, 
though starting from a low base. The share of Chinese exports destined to the East 
Asian developing countries (South Korea, Taiwan and the countries of South-East 
Asia) has increased at a slower rate, from 21.5 per cent in 1992–2003 to 20.5 per cent 
in 2013–14, compared with the share of exports to other developing countries, 
which increased from 21.5 per cent to 28.6 per cent. 
On the import side, the share accounted for by developed countries in GPN exports 
has declined at a much faster rate—from 70 per cent in 2000–01 to 47.6 per cent 
in 2014–15—compared with what we observed for the export side. However, there 
are notable inter-country differences. The major winners of market share in China 
are South Korea and Taiwan and the countries in South-East Asia, with South Korea 
recording the biggest gain. By contrast, Japan’s share has declined sharply, from 
28.8 per cent in 2000–01 to 15.5 per cent in 2013–15. The data clearly show the 
heavy concentration of China’s components imports from neighbouring East and 
South-East Asian countries (including Japan). The share accounted for by these 
countries in total components imports increased from 53 per cent to 62 per cent 
between 2000–01 and 2014–15.
Production sharing and Sino–US trade relations
China’s exports to the United States are dominated by manufactured goods, with other 
(primary) products accounting for less than 5 per cent of total merchandise exports 
(Figure 16.5a). GPN products account for the bulk of manufactured goods, with their 
share increasing from 45 per cent in 2000–01 to over 65 per cent in 2015–16. 
The share of manufactured goods in China’s imports from the United States 
(US exports to China) declined from 78 per cent in 2000–01 to 61 per cent in 
2015–16. The share of GPN products in total manufacturing exports declined from 
73 per cent to 49 per cent between these two periods. In recent years, the annual 
rate of increase in China’s imports has been much slower than the rapid increase 
in China’s exports to the United States (Figure 16.5b).
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Figure 16.5a China’s exports to the United States, 2000–16 (US$ billion)
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Figure 16.5b China’s imports from the United States, 2000–16 (US$ billion)




























Figure 16.5c China’s trade surplus with the United States, 2000–16 (US$ billion) 
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
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These patterns are consistent with our observation in the previous section 
of deepening  GPN production bases in China. With the rapid expansion of 
manufacturing production in China—a process in which US MNEs play 
a significant role—the share of manufacturing in Chinese imports from the United 
States has declined over time. In particular, given the expansion of components 
production in China, firms engaged in assembly operations appear to procure inputs 
from domestic Chinese sources. 
The changing export and import patterns of Sino–US trade relations are vividly 
captured in China’s trade surplus with the United States, which is the focal point 
of that country’s China-bashing (Figure 16.5c). Manufacturing trade accounts 
for almost all of China’s trade surplus with the United States. GPN product trade 
accounted for more than two-thirds of the surplus over the past decade, compared 
with about 50 per cent during the preceding decade. The actual impact of GPN 
product trade on the widening trade surplus could be much larger than is depicted 
in these data: the trade data decomposition procedure used in this study does not 
cover the entire GPN product trade (see Appendix 16.1).8
GPN product imports to the United States increased fivefold (from about 
US$50 billion to more than US$300 billion between 2000 and 2015). Throughout 
this period, components, which are mostly inputs to US manufacturing, have 
accounted for an average of 45 per cent of these imports (Figure 16.6a). 
Contrary to popular perceptions based on sensational media stories about massive 
procurements by Walmart and other US retail stores, standard consumer goods 
(apparel, footwear, toys and so on) account for a small share of China’s total GPN 
product exports to the United States. Over the past decade, products traded within 
producer-driven production networks have accounted for more than 85 per cent 
of GPN product trade between the two countries (Figure 16.6b). This is because 
most US MNEs in vertically integrated global industries have shifted final assembly 
processes to China while retaining mostly product design, global marketing and 
other headquarters functions in the United States.
8  The focus of this chapter is solely on the record trade surplus, which is the focus of the current debate on Sino–
US trade. The issue of the extent to which this is a reflection of shifting production bases from other countries 
to China as part of the ongoing process of global production sharing is beyond its scope. On this issue, see 
Athukorala and Yamashita (2009) and Koopman et al. (2012).





















Parts and components 
Final assembly
Total GPN exports 
Figure 16.6a Shares of exports of parts and components and final assembly 
products in total GPN product exports, 2000–16 (US$ billion)























Figure 16.6b Shares of buyer-driven and producer-driven products in GPN 
product exports, 2000–16 (US$ billion)
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org/).
The debate about the widening Sino–US trade imbalance has mostly, if not entirely, 
focused on China’s exports to the United States. Ignored in the debate is the 
importance of China for US MNEs as a base for expanding their exports to the 
rest of the world. In 2013, the latest year for which the relevant data are available, 
the value of goods exported to the rest of the world by US MNE affiliates in China 
was US$37.5 billion, which was almost three times the value of their exports to the 
United States (US$13.6 billion) (Table 16.6).
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Table 16.6 Sales values for US multinational enterprises operating in China, 
2013 (US$ billion)
Goods and services Goods
Total sales 261.8 217.7
Local sales 206.7 166.6
Exports
To the United States 15.4 13.6
To other countries 39.7 37.5
Source: US BEA (2016).
The discussion in this section supports the view that the widening trade imbalance 
is essentially a structural phenomenon driven by the process of global production 
sharing, from which both economies benefit. Protectionist policies would hurt 
manufacturing production, resulting in job losses in the United States, and 
hinder the global operations of US MNEs on the back of China’s emergence as 
a manufacturing giant.
Given this intricate interdependence between the two countries, President 
Trump’s attempt to impose punitive tariffs on China is bound to face formidable 
opposition from major business interests in the United States. So far, his attempt 
to ‘bring factories home’ has not materialised beyond the highly publicised cases 
of Ford Motors and Carrier Corp. abandoning their plans to set up production 
plants in Mexico. There is anecdotal evidence that US MNEs are already back to 
their usual practice of ‘going global’ after a pause in the immediate aftermath of 
Trump’s election victory (Krugman 2017; Black 2017).
Even if punitive tariffs were eventually imposed, the impact on trade flows within 
global production networks may not be as damaging as commonly thought. 
There is evidence that global production sharing considerably weakens the link 
between relative prices and trade performance, particularly when it comes to trade 
in components (Swenson 2000; Arndt and Huemer 2007; Burstein et al. 2008; 
Feenstra 2010; Athukorala and Khan 2016). Production units of the value chain 
located in different countries normally specialise in specific tasks, which are not 
directly substitutable for tasks undertaken elsewhere. Substitutability of components 
obtained from various sources is, therefore, rather limited. Also, the establishment 
of overseas production bases and related service links entails high fixed costs, making 
relative price/cost changes less important in business decision-making. 
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Concluding remarks
This chapter has examined the implications of the evolving role of China in East 
Asia–centred global production networks for regional and global integration of the 
Chinese economy. Consolidation of its role within Asia-centred global production 
networks has been the prime mover of China’s rapid export growth. The deepening 
of production bases within global production networks is evident from the notable 
decline in components imports relative to total processed products exported from 
China and from its emerging role as a net exporter of components. 
China’s reliance on its East Asian neighbours for components supply has significantly 
declined in recent years, reflecting deepening of China’s engagement in production 
networks. China is also emerging as a significant supplier of components within 
production networks in East Asia and beyond. The shares of components exports 
to China in total manufacturing exports (to the world) of neighbouring East Asian 
countries are much smaller than commonly thought. Moreover, in recent years, 
there has been a notable decline in these shares as the input requirements of final 
assembly in China are increasingly being met through domestic sourcing.
There has been a notable geographic diversification of final assembly exports 
from China, but Western countries still account for a sizeable share. The shares 
of developing countries have generally increased across the board. The degree of 
China’s market penetration in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and West 
Asia (the Middle East) was much sharper, although starting from a low base, than 
that in East Asia. Therefore, there is no evidence of an East Asia bias in China’s 
evolving export patterns. There is also no evidence that China’s rise is reshaping 
East Asia as a self-contained economic entity with potential for maintaining growth 
dynamism independent of the developed economies.
The evidence in this chapter supports the view that, in a context in which global 
production sharing is becoming a symbol of economic globalisation, the real story 
behind the Sino–US trade gap is much more complicated than what is revealed by 
standard trade-flow analysis. The widening trade imbalance is basically a structural 
phenomenon driven by the process of global production sharing and the pivotal 
role played by China within East Asia–centred global production networks. Initially, 
China predominantly engaged as the main point of final assembly in Asian production 
networks, based on its ample supply of labour and moves taken by US firms to 
supply high-end components from their Asian bases to China. As the production 
base became more deeply rooted, China’s dependence on imported components 
diminished and China has now become an important supplier of components to the 
United States and other countries. 
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The global competitiveness of US MNEs depends on their ability to use China 
as the production base for supplying the rest of the world. Given this intricate 
interdependence between the two countries, President Trump’s attempt to impose 
punitive tariffs on China is bound to face formidable opposition from major 
business interests in the United States. Even if the punitive tariffs were eventually 
imposed, the impact on trade flows within global production networks may not be 
as damaging as commonly thought because global production sharing considerably 
weakens the link between relative prices and trade performance. 
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Appendix 16.1. Trade data compilation
Following the seminal paper by Yeats (2001), it has become common practice to use 
data on parts and components to measure GPN product trade. However, there has 
been a remarkable expansion of production sharing, from parts and components 
to also encompass final assembly. Moreover, the relative importance of these two 
tasks within production networks varies among countries and over time in a given 
country, making it problematic to use data on the parts and components trade as 
general indicators of the trends and patterns of GPN product trade over time and 
across countries. In this study, we define GPN product trade as incorporating both 
components and final (assembled) goods exchanged within production networks.
The data used in this study, for all countries except Taiwan, are compiled from the 
UN Comtrade database. The data for Taiwan (a country not covered in the UN 
trade data reporting system) come from the database of the Council of Economic 
Planning and Development, Taipei. The data are compiled at the five-digit level of 
the SITC, based on SITC Revision 3. 
Parts and components are delineated from the reported trade data using a list compiled 
by mapping parts and components in the intermediate products subcategory of 
the UN Broad Economic Classification (BEC) with the SITC.9 It is important to 
note that parts and components, as defined here, are only a subset of intermediate 
goods, even though the two terms have been widely used interchangeably in the 
9  The lists are available from the author on request.
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recent literature on global production sharing. Parts and components—unlike 
standard intermediate inputs such as iron, steel, industrial chemicals and coal—are 
‘relationship-specific’ intermediate inputs; in most cases, they do not have reference 
prices are more demanding of the contractual environment (Hummels 2002; Nunn 
2007). Most (if not all) parts and components also do not have a ‘commercial life’ 
of their own unless they are embodied in a final product. 
There is no hard and fast rule for delineating final goods assembled within global 
production networks from the standard trade data. The only practical way of doing 
this is to focus on the specific product categories in which GPN product trade 
is heavily concentrated. Once these product categories are identified, approximate 
trade in final assembly can be estimated as the difference between parts and 
components, which are directly identified based on our list, and the total trade of 
these product categories. 
Guided by the available literature on production sharing, we identified 14 product 
categories: power-generating machinery (SITC 71), specialised industrial machines 
(SITC 72), metal-working machines (SITC 73), general industrial machinery 
(SITC 74), office machines and automatic data-processing machines (SITC 75), 
telecommunications and sound recording equipment (SITC 76), electrical 
machinery (SITC 77), road vehicles (SITC 78), other transport equipment 
(SITC 79), travel goods (SITC 83), apparel and clothing accessories (SITC 84), 
footwear and sport goods (SITC 85), professional and scientific equipment 
(SITC 87) and photographic apparatus (SITC 88). It is reasonable to assume that 
these categories contain virtually no products produced from start to finish in 
a given country. Of  these, SITC 83, SITC 84 and SITC 85 can be classified as 
products predominantly traded within buyer-driven production networks, with the 
rest belonging to producer-driven production networks. The difference between the 
value of total exports of these categories and the value of total parts and components 
falling under these categories was treated as the value of final assembly. Admittedly, 
however, the estimates based on this list do not provide full coverage of final assembly 
in global trade. For instance, outsourcing of final assembly does take place in various 
miscellaneous product categories, such as clothing, furniture, sporting goods and 
leather products. It is not possible to meaningfully delineate parts and components 
and assembled goods in reported trade in these product categories because they 
contain a significant (yet unknown) share of horizontal trade.
A number of recent studies have analysed trade patterns using ‘value-added’ trade 
data derived by combining the standard trade data with national input–output tables 
(Johnson 2014 provides a survey). The underlying rationale is that, in a context of 
rapidly expanding cross-border trade in components driven by global production 
sharing, the standard (gross) trade data (trade data based on customs records) tend 
to give a distorted picture of the bilateral trade imbalances of a given country and 
the geographic profile of its global trade linkages (Lamy 2013). This approach is, 
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however, not relevant for the present study, which aims to examine patterns and 
determinants of global production sharing. The pertinent approach is to analyse 
data on the reported (gross) exports, separated into parts and components and final 
assembly. Trade and industry policies have the potential to influence only a country’s 
engagement in a given slice of the value chain; domestic value adding evolves over 
time as the country becomes integrated into the value chain.
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17. China’s Overseas Direct Investment 
and Reverse Knowledge Spillovers
Chunlai Chen
Introduction
Since the launch of its ‘go global’ strategy in 2001, China’s outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) has increased dramatically. China’s global OFDI stock increased 
from US$32.69 billion in 2001 (UNCTAD 2003) to US$1.01 trillion in 2005 
(UNCTAD 2016). Drivers of outbound investment by Chinese multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are diverse. Alongside market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and 
resource-seeking, one of the main motives of Chinese MNEs is strategic asset–
seeking, the aim of which is the acquisition of advanced technology, production 
knowhow, modern management skills and internationally recognised brands in 
support of the long-term economic development of China (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; 
Liu and Scott-Kennel 2011). 
A growing body of literature explores China’s OFDI; however, previous studies have 
focused mainly on either the motivations of Chinese MNEs to conduct OFDI or 
the location determinants of host countries that make them attractive to Chinese 
investors (e.g. Liu et al. 2005; Buckley et al. 2007; Cheung and Qian 2009; 
Tolentino 2010; Wei and Alon 2010; Cheung et al. 2012; Kolstad and Wiig 2012; 
Amighini et al. 2014; Chen 2015a). Unfortunately, empirical studies of the impact 
on China’s economy of this rising OFDI are limited. Moreover, empirical studies 
of the impact of reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI on China’s economic 
growth are rare. It therefore remains unknown whether OFDI flows from China 
have generated any reverse knowledge spillovers for the Chinese economy, thus 
contributing via this channel to China’s economic growth.
This chapter aims to investigate empirically the impact of reverse knowledge spillovers 
from OFDI on China’s economic growth. It specifically seeks to investigate whether 
there are reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI arising from provincial firms and 
from central government–controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) impacting on 
provincial economic growth. 
Analysis of a panel dataset of China’s 30 provinces over the years 2004–14 finds that, 
after controlling for the impact of knowledge spillovers from inward foreign direct 
investment (IFDI) on provincial economic growth, OFDI from both provincial 
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firms and SOEs is associated with a positive and statistically significant effect on 
China’s provincial economic growth through reverse knowledge spillovers to 
China’s economy. Overall, the study provides strong empirical evidence that OFDI 
contributes to China’s economic growth.
The chapter makes two contributions to the literature. First, this study investigates 
the impact of both IFDI and OFDI on provincial economic growth in China, adding 
to the empirical evidence on their impact on economic growth in host and home 
countries. Second, this study explores how China’s OFDI from provincial firms 
and SOEs affects provincial economic growth. These findings are important for 
policymakers, especially in developing economies, in designing and implementing 
policies to facilitate and enhance the diffusion of knowledge spillovers from IFDI 
and OFDI to host and home economies. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section refers to the literature 
to discuss the theories and channels of reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI; 
section three presents the framework for our analysis and empirical model, describes 
the data and specifies the variables; section four presents the regression results, while 
section five provides the conclusion and policy implications. 
Reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI: 
Theory and literature
The term knowledge spillover refers to the flow of knowledge that takes place 
without any business transactions occurring (Griliches 1992). FDI is one of the 
most important means by which international knowledge spillovers take place 
(e.g. Dunning 1993; Dunning and Lundan 2008). Spillovers from IFDI are regarded 
as an important source of knowledge in developing countries (e.g. Javorcik 2004; 
Kneller and Pisu 2007; Sheng et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2013). 
In the theoretical literature (e.g. Hymer 1976; Dunning 1977, 1980, 1988, 1993, 
2000; Caves 1996), through ownership advantages and firm-specific intangible 
assets, IFDI can bring to host countries a package of capital, advanced technology 
and knowhow, modern enterprise management and mature marketing skills, well-
organised international distribution channels, coordinated relationships with 
suppliers and clients, good reputation and other intangible assets. IFDI can therefore 
generate knowledge spillovers to the host country’s domestic firms. Knowledge 
spillovers arising from IFDI can be horizontal—within the same industry and arising 
through demonstration effects, labour movement and information flows. But IFDI 
can also impose competition on domestic firms. On the one hand, competition can 
force local firms to increase their adoption of advanced technology and to be more 
innovative so as to use existing resources more efficiently, thus increasing efficiency 
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and productivity. On the other hand, it can crowd local firms out of the product 
market, and also offers completion in local labour and resources markets (e.g. Aitken 
and Harrison 1999; Hu et al. 2005; Chen 2011, 2015b; Fu 2011; Sheng et al. 2011; 
Chen et al. 2013). The net effects of horizontal knowledge spillovers from IFDI on 
domestic firms are inconclusive (Gorg and Greenaway 2004). 
Knowledge spillovers arising from IFDI can also be vertical, via forward and 
backward industrial linkages within the supply chain (e.g. Javorcik 2004; Kneller 
and Pisu 2007; Sheng et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2013). When IFDI firms supply better 
intermediate inputs for their customers, or when they transfer knowledge to their 
suppliers for better quality inputs and on-time delivery, the positive spillovers from 
IFDI will contribute to domestic firm productivity in downstream and upstream 
industries. 
What about the potential for reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI back to 
home-country economies? Theoretically, reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI 
can take place in three phases. In the first phase, a subsidiary acquires and absorbs 
host-country-specific knowledge either directly through cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) or indirectly through reverse knowledge spillovers, such as 
demonstration effects, labour mobility, vertical industrial linkages and external 
network linkages with universities, research institutions and business associations in 
the host country. During the second phase, the acquired knowledge is transferred 
from the subsidiary to the parent company directly and through intra-firm labour 
mobility. During the third phase, the acquired foreign knowledge spills over or is 
transferred to home-country domestic firms or other knowledge recipients and 
is indirectly absorbed by the home economy. 
It is reasonable to assume that the channels for reverse knowledge spillovers 
and knowledge spillovers from IFDI to host-country domestic firms are similar. 
The discussion below focuses on the key channels for reverse knowledge spillovers 
from home-country MNEs to home-country domestic firms, the first two of which 
are demonstration effects and imitation. If home-country MNEs acquire advanced 
knowledge abroad, transfer it back to their headquarters and apply the new techniques 
in their production at home, other domestic firms may also benefit by learning from 
and imitating that knowledge through demonstration effects. However, if home-
country MNEs and other domestic firms are in the same industry, demonstration 
effects can also create competition between them. This increased competition not 
only will induce home-country domestic firms to imitate the advanced technology 
and production techniques of home-country MNEs to ensure their own survival, 
but will also force the domestic firms to undertake innovation to improve their 
performance and use existing technology more efficiently (e.g. Blomström and 
Kokko 1998; Aitken and Harrison 1999; Chen et al. 2013). 
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A second channel for reverse knowledge spillovers from MNEs to their home 
economy is labour mobility. Returnees who were employed in subsidiaries abroad 
and acquired advanced foreign knowledge during those assignments may contribute 
to the knowledge creation and innovation of their parent MNEs and home 
economy. Returnees may also bring important external networks that facilitate the 
continuation of knowledge exchange. Thus, home-country domestic firms profit 
not only from product or process-related information, but also from the employee’s 
country-specific knowledge, which can be used to open up new export markets. 
Therefore, the labour mobility of returning employees of home-country MNEs can 
also add to the aggregate knowledge stock in the home economy. Filatotchev et 
al. (2011) find that the reverse flows of highly skilled Chinese labour provide an 
important channel of knowledge transfer to the Chinese economy. Dai and Liu 
(2009) use a dataset of Chinese small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and find that 
returnee entrepreneurs are able to develop a competitive advantage by applying the 
intangible assets they acquired abroad. More importantly, they also find that local 
entrepreneurs can benefit from returnee entrepreneurs through the establishment of 
close business linkages. 
The third channel for reverse knowledge spillovers from home-country MNEs to 
the home economy comprises backward (from home-country MNEs to home-
country suppliers) and forward (from home-country MNEs to home-country 
customers) linkages.
Backward linkages of home-country MNEs may benefit the home economy in 
several ways. First, home-country MNEs may increase the efficiency and product 
quality of their home-country suppliers by imposing higher requirements for 
quality and on-time delivery. If home-country MNEs are willing to provide 
assistance to their home-country suppliers to upgrade production management or 
technology, the latter may be able to enhance their production and management 
techniques, and may receive support towards the improvement of product quality 
or the introduction of innovations (e.g. Lall 1980; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; 
Javorcik 2004; Kneller and Pisu 2007). Second, the competition among home-
country domestic firms to become suppliers for the home-country MNEs may 
further increase their efficiency—for example, if they are urged to use their resources 
more efficiently or to adopt new technologies or production processes (Crespo and 
Fontoura 2007; Herzer 2009). Third, the business linkages with export-oriented 
home-country MNEs may provide home-country suppliers with information 
about foreign market conditions—for example, consumer tastes, design, packaging, 
product quality requirements and the regulatory environment (Blomström and 
Kokko 1998). This knowledge in turn may help home-country suppliers to establish 
their own direct exports to foreign markets. Fourth, by increasing the efficiency and 
product quality of their home-country suppliers, home-country MNEs may extend 
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the benefits to other home-country downstream producers, who produce end-user 
consumer goods, as cheaper and more technologically advanced intermediate inputs 
become available (Kugler 2006; Blalock and Gertler 2008). 
Home-country MNEs can also diffuse the acquired foreign knowledge to the 
home economy through forward linkages if they are suppliers of intermediate 
goods in their home economy and if they sell their advanced intermediate goods to 
downstream home-country firms. First, such downstream firms may become more 
productive as a result of gaining access to new, improved or less costly intermediate 
inputs produced by home-country MNEs in the upstream sector (Javorcik 2004). 
Second, the purchase of intermediate goods from home-country MNEs may be 
accompanied by provision of complementary services that may not be available in 
connection with imports (Javorcik 2004). Overall, home-country MNE suppliers 
may increase the home-country pool of knowledge by providing new intermediate 
goods that were not previously available in their economy. 
Therefore, at a theoretical level, OFDI can generate reverse knowledge spillovers on 
home-country economies, thus increasing productivity and promoting economic 
growth. However, empirical studies of the impact of reverse knowledge spillovers 
from OFDI on home-country productivity and economic growth have been limited, 
especially for developing countries. 
Among the existing empirical studies, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and 
Lichtenberg (2001), using country-level data, analyse the impact of OFDI—in 
particular, technology-sourcing FDI—on the home-country productivity of 13 
industrialised economies. They find that total factor productivity (TFP) is increased 
in cases where OFDI is directed towards research and development (R&D) intensive 
countries. Herzer (2010), using cross-country data for 50 countries, finds that OFDI 
positively affects economic growth in the home economies. 
Driffield et al. (2009), using industry-level data on OFDI from the United Kingdom 
to a heterogeneous sample of host locations with varying labour costs and R&D 
intensity, find that OFDI in high-cost and high R&D-intensive host countries as 
well as in low-cost and low R&D-intensive locations increases TFP in the United 
Kingdom. Therefore, they conclude that not only technology-sourcing FDI but 
also efficiency-seeking FDI positively influences home-country domestic TFP. 
Similar evidence is also found in Driffield and Chiang (2009), who, using industry-
level data, explore the productivity effect of Taiwan’s OFDI in Mainland China 
between 1995 and 2005. They find that Taiwan’s labour productivity is positively 
influenced by OFDI flows to Mainland China and conclude that the productivity 
gains are due to vertical or efficiency-seeking FDI, which relocates low value-added 
activities to Mainland China, which has lower labour costs than Taiwan. Therefore, 
both studies—Driffield et al. (2009) and Driffield and Chiang (2009)—show 
that productivity gains do not necessarily depend on technology-sourcing FDI. 
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Given that firms also relocate fewer value-added activities to low-cost locations and 
retain high value-added activities at home, home-country productivity may also be 
increased through efficiency-seeking FDI even without reverse knowledge transfers 
taking place. 
A number of studies used firm-level data to investigate the impact of the reverse 
knowledge spillovers from OFDI on the productivity of home-country domestic 
firms but reached mixed results. An empirical study based on firm-level data for Irish 
OFDI, conducted by Copenhagen Economics (2007), finds that OFDI has positive 
productivity effects for Irish MNEs; however, there is no evidence of productivity 
spillovers to domestic firms in the Irish economy, regardless of whether these are 
direct competitors or whether they belong to the MNE’s vertical value chain. One 
of the reasons only the investing MNEs benefit may be the fact that productivity 
gains stem from cost reduction due to the access to cheaper inputs, which are, 
however, accessible only to the MNEs and are not transferable back to the home 
economy (Copenhagen Economics 2007). Vahter and Masso (2007) found a similar 
result. Based on firm-level data from Estonia, Vahter and Masso find that OFDI 
has a positive impact on Estonian MNEs’ productivity; however, they reveal a lack 
of general statistical evidence of productivity spillovers via OFDI to other firms in 
the home economy. In contrast, Castellani and Zanfei (2006), using firm-level data 
from Italy, find that Italian domestic firms significantly benefit from spillovers from 
Italian MNEs in the form of increased productivity.
Unfortunately, empirical studies analysing the impact of reverse knowledge spillovers 
from OFDI on home-country productivity and economic growth from developing 
countries are very limited. Among the few studies, Herzer (2011), using a sample 
of 33 developing countries for the period 1980–2005, finds a positive and long-run 
relationship between OFDI and TFP in the home economy. In the case of China, 
Zhao and Liu (2008), using national-level data, investigate China’s OFDI and reverse 
R&D spillovers and find that OFDI promotes productivity increases in China by 
transferring technological spillovers from host countries to the home base. Zhao et 
al. (2010), using data for Chinese OFDI directed to developed countries for the 
period 1991–2007, investigate the impact on China’s productivity of technology-
sourcing OFDI. The findings show that Chinese OFDI in developed economies 
has a significant effect on China’s TFP, and increased efficiency induced by OFDI 
through demonstration and imitation channels is a greater source of productivity 
growth than technology change. 
The empirical studies mentioned above deliver interesting insights into the 
dynamics  between OFDI activity and home-country economic development. 
However, there are some shortcomings. For example, previous studies of the 
impact of OFDI on China’s economy do not control for the impact of IFDI in 
the empirical models when investigating reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI 
on home-country productivity and economic growth, which could produce biased 
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estimates. Therefore, studies of reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI are far from 
conclusive and more are needed, especially for developing countries, to provide 
a comprehensive understanding of the impact of OFDI on the economic growth 
of home countries. 
Framework of analysis and empirical model
The basic model 
We estimate the impact of OFDI on China’s provincial economic growth by 
specifying an aggregate production function as follows (Equation 17.1).
Equation 17.1
In Equation 17.1, Yit is the real gross domestic product (GDP) of province i in year 
t; Ait is the TFP level of province i in year t; LBit is the total labour input of province 
i in year t; DKit is the domestic capital stock of province i in year t; and FKit is foreign 
capital stock (IFDI) of province i in year t, which captures the contribution of IFDI 
as capital input to provincial economic growth.
To investigate the impact of reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI on provincial 
economic growth, we need to control for the impact of knowledge spillovers from 
IFDI. As noted in section two, since IFDI brings to the host country a package 
of firm-specific intangible assets, it could also generate knowledge spillovers that 
increase the productivity and efficiency of local firms, thus contributing to the 
host country’s economic growth. Following Chen (2011, 2013), we assume that 
the higher the share of IFDI stock in a province’s total capital stock (IFDIS/PTK ), 
the higher will be the spillover effects from IFDI on the economic growth of that 
province. 
OFDI can also increase the home country’s economic growth through reverse 
knowledge spillovers, such as demonstration and imitation effects, labour 
movement and vertical industrial linkages. Chinese MNEs undertaking OFDI can 
be categorised into two groups: central government–controlled SOEs and provincial 
firms. SOEs dominate China’s OFDI, accounting for 68.4 per cent of China’s total 
OFDI stock by the end of 2014. However, since 2010, provincial firms have rapidly 
increased their OFDI flows and, in 2014, surpassed the OFDI flows from SOEs 
(MOFCOM 2014). Although China’s OFDI stock is still dominated by SOEs, the 
importance of provincial firms in China’s OFDI has been increasing. To investigate 
the impact of OFDI on provincial economic growth, we investigate the impact of 
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OFDI by provincial firms and by SOEs. We assume that each province has equal 
opportunity to receive reverse knowledge spillovers from the OFDI of SOEs. We 
expect also that the higher the share of provincial OFDI stock in provincial total 
capital stock (POFDIS/PTK ), and the higher the share of SOEs’ OFDI stock in 
national total capital stock (SOEOFDIS/NTK ), the higher will be the impact on 
provincial economic growth of reverse knowledge spillovers from provincial OFDI 
and SOEs’ OFDI. 
With the above propositions, Ait can be defined as Equation 17.2.
Equation 17.2
In Equation 17.2, Ait is the TFP level of province i in year t; Bit is the residual TFP 
level of province i in year t; IFDIS/PTKit–1 is the share of IFDI stock in provincial 
total capital stock in province i in year t–1, which captures the impact on provincial 
economic growth of knowledge spillovers from IFDI; POFDIS/PTKit–1 is the share 
of provincial OFDI stock in provincial total capital stock of province i in year t–1, 
which captures the impact on provincial economic growth of reverse knowledge 
spillovers from provincial OFDI; SOEOFDIS/NTKt–1 is the share of SOEs’ OFDI 
stock in national total capital stock in year t–1, which captures the impact on 
provincial economic growth of reverse knowledge spillovers from SOEs’ OFDI.
Incorporating Equation 17.2 into the aggregate production function Equation 
17.1—by taking the natural logarithm of the variables of labour (LB), domestic 
capital (DK ) and foreign capital (FK ) and rearranging the items on the right-hand 
side, with the addition of a constant term (β0) and an error term (Eit)—we obtain 
empirical regression Equation 17.3.
Equation 17.3
LnYit = β0 + β1LnLBit + β2LnDKit + β3LnFKit + β4IFDIS/PTKit–1 + β5POFDIS/PTKit–1 
+ β6SOEOFDIS/NTKt–1 + eit 
This empirical model allows us to test the impact on provincial economic growth 
of knowledge spillovers from IFDI as well as the reverse knowledge spillovers from 
OFDI. First, if the coefficient β4 is positive and statistically significant, there is 
evidence that IFDI is correlated with positive impacts from knowledge spillovers 
on the home country’s provincial economic growth. Second, if the coefficient β5 
is positive and statistically significant, there is evidence that provincial OFDI is 
correlated with impacts from reverse knowledge spillovers on the home country’s 
provincial economic growth. Third, if the coefficient β6 is positive and statistically 
significant, there is evidence that SOEs’ OFDI is correlated with impacts on the 
home country’s provincial economic growth from reverse knowledge spillovers.
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Equation 17.3 is the form of an augmented production function model that we will 
use to estimate the impact on China’s provincial economic growth of knowledge 
spillovers from IFDI and reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI. 
Data and variable specification
The data for provincial GDP (Y ) and provincial total capital stock (PTK ) measured 
in RMB1 billion at 1978 prices are from Wu (2009).1 The data for China’s national 
total capital stock are calculated by summing provincial total capital stock measured 
in RMB1 billion at 1978 prices. Labour (LB) is the total number of employed 
persons in each province measured in one million persons.2 
Calculating the IFDI stock and the share of IFDI stock in provincial 
total capital stock 
Foreign capital stock (FK ) is measured as the IFDI stock of each province, which 
is calculated in several steps. First, the US dollar value of annual FDI inflows3 is 
converted into renminbi (RMB) value by using the annual average official exchange 
rate. Second, the RMB value of annual FDI inflows is deflated into the real value in 
1978 prices. Third, a 5 per cent depreciation rate is assumed for IFDI stock. Finally, 
IFDI stock is accumulated successively at year’s end measured in RMB1 billion 
in 1978 prices. 
The domestic capital stock (DK ) of each province is obtained by deducting the IFDI 
stock (FK ) from the provincial total capital stock. 
Given the IFDI stock and total provincial capital stock, the share of IFDI stock in 
provincial total capital stock (IFDIS/PTK ) for each province is calculated and is 
used to capture the knowledge spillover effects from IFDI on provincial economic 
growth. It is reasonable to assume that FDI inflows and knowledge spillover effects 
from IFDI on the local economy have a time lag, so a one-year lag is applied to 
IFDIS/PTK in the model. 
1  Wu uses the conventional perpetual inventory method by employing the recently released national accounts 
figures to derive a capital stock series for China’s 31 provinces and three economic sectors for the period 1977–
2009, updated to 2014.
2  Data for labour are collected from NBS (various issues). 
3  Data for FDI inflows are from, before and including 2005, NBS (various issues); after 2005, PBS (various 
issues).
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Calculating the OFDI stock and the share of OFDI stock in total 
capital stock 
Methods for calculating the provincial OFDI stock (POFDIS ) and SOEs’ OFDI 
stock (SOEOFDIS ) are the same as those for calculating the IFDI stock (IFDIS ) 
discussed previously. Data for OFDI flows from provincial firms and from SOEs are 
taken from the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Investment (MOFCOM 
2003–14).
Given the provincial OFDI stock (POFDIS ) and the provincial total capital stock, 
the share of provincial OFDI stock in provincial total capital stock (POFDIS/PTK) 
is calculated. It is thereafter used to capture the impact on provincial economic 
growth of reverse knowledge spillovers from provincial OFDI. The share of SOEs’ 
OFDI stock (SOEOFDIS ) in national total capital stock (SOEOFDIS/NTK ) is 
similarly calculated and used to capture the impact on provincial economic growth 
of reverse knowledge spillovers from SOEs’ OFDI. We also assume that OFDI flows 
and the reverse knowledge spillovers attributed to OFDI experience a time lag, so 
the value of POFDIS/PTK and SOEOFDIS/NTK is lagged by one year in the model.
In our estimations, we use the provincial OFDI stock (POFDIS ) and the SOEs’ 
OFDI stock (SOEOFDIS ) as alternative measures of OFDI as a robustness check to 
investigate the impact on China’s provincial economic growth of reverse knowledge 
spillovers from OFDI. 
Regression results and explanations
The empirical study in this chapter utilises a province-level panel dataset of China’s 
30 provinces4 covering the period from 2004 to 2014.5 First, we study the impact on 
provincial economic growth of reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI using the 
share of provincial OFDI stock in provincial total capital stock (POFDIS/PTK ) and 
the share of SOEs’ OFDI stock in national total capital stock (SOEOFDIS/NTK ) 
to capture OFDI. For robustness, we also investigate the impact on provincial 
economic growth of reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI using provincial 
OFDI stock (POFDIS ) and the SOEs’ OFDI stock (OSEOFDIS ) as the variables 
of OFDI. 
Table 17.1 presents the estimation results from Equation 17.3 by using the share 
of provincial OFDI stock in provincial total capital stock (POFDIS/PTK ) and the 
share of SOEs’ OFDI stock in national total capital stock (SOEOFDIS/NTK ) as 
the independent variables of OFDI. Column 1 reports the random-effects model 
4  Tibet is excluded from the dataset because of a lack of data.
5  Data for provincial outward FDI flows are available only after 2003.
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estimation and column 2 reports the fixed-effects model estimation. The Hausman 
test results suggest that a fixed-effects approach is preferred. The estimation results 
of both models reveal that IFDI and OFDI are associated with positive and 
statistically significant impacts from knowledge spillovers on provincial economic 
growth. Because the fixed-effects model has eliminated the province-specific and 
time-invariant factors that may have impacts on provincial economic growth, our 
interpretation is based on the results from the fixed-effects model estimation. 
Table 17.1 Estimation results of the impact on provincial economic growth 
of IFDI and OFDI











































*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The share of OFDI stock in total capital stock is used 
as the OFDI variable. Hausman test: Chi2 (6) = 70.35 and Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, preferring the fixed-
effects model.
Source: Author’s estimation.
The regression results from the fixed-effects model estimation show that domestic 
capital input (DK ) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level 
while labour input (LB) is positive but not significant. This suggests that domestic 
capital is important to economic growth relative to labour in China’s provinces. 
The variable of foreign capital (FK ) is positive and statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level, which provides empirical evidence that FDI as a capital input has 
directly contributed to host-province economic growth.
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Turning to the main variables of interest: first, the variable of the share of IFDI 
stock in provincial total capital stock (IFDIS/PTK )—the knowledge spillovers from 
IFDI—is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding 
offers some empirical evidence that IFDI has contributed to China’s economic 
growth through positive knowledge spillovers to the local economy. This finding 
is consistent with the results of previous empirical studies (e.g. Chen 2011, 2013, 
2014).
Second, the variable of POFDIS/PTK—the reverse knowledge spillovers from 
provincial OFDI—is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This 
implies that provincial OFDI is positively associated with knowledge spillovers to 
the home-province economy, thus promoting provincial economic growth. 
Third, the variable of SOEOFDIS/NTK—the reverse knowledge spillovers from 
SOEs’ OFDI—is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, which 
implies that SOEs’ OFDI is associated with positive knowledge spillovers to the 
home country’s economy, thus promoting economic growth across all provinces in 
China.
For a robustness check, we replace the variables of POFDIS/PTK and SOEOFDIS/
NTK with the variables of POFDIS and SOEOFDIS, respectively, in Equation 
17.3 and rerun the regressions. Table 17.2 reports the estimation results. Column 
1 reports the random-effects model estimation and column 2 reports the fixed-
effects model estimation. The Hausman test results suggest a fixed-effects model is 
preferred.
The estimation results of both models suggest that IFDI and OFDI are associated 
with positive and statistically significant knowledge spillover effects on provincial 
economic growth. Again, because the fixed-effects model has eliminated the 
province-specific and time-invariant factors that may have impacts on provincial 
economic growth, our interpretation will be based on the results from the fixed-
effects model estimation. 
The regression results from the fixed-effects model estimation show that capital input 
(DK ) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level while labour input 
(LB) is positive but not significant. The variable of foreign capital (FK ) is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. These results are consistent with 
the regression results reported in Table 17.1.
The variable of IFDIS/PTK is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level, supporting our earlier finding that IFDI is associated with positive knowledge 
spillover effects on the local economy, thus promoting host-province economic 
growth. 
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Table 17.2 Estimation results of the impact on provincial economic growth 
of IFDI and OFDI (OFDI stock)











































*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The OFDI stock is used as the OFDI variable. 
Hausman test: Chi2 (6) = 56.67 and Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, preferring the fixed-effects model.
Source: Author’s estimation.
Now, turning to the variables of main interest, the regression results find that the 
variables POFDIS and SOEOFDIS are positive and statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level. The results reveal that both OFDI from provincial firms and OFDI 
from SOEs are correlated with positive reverse knowledge spillover effects on the 
local economy, thus contributing to provincial economic growth. These results are 
consistent with the regression results reported in Table 17.1, which suggest that our 
estimation results are robust. 
Referring to the discussion in section two of this chapter, the positive impact 
of provincial OFDI and SOEs’ OFDI on China’s provincial economic growth 
could be the result of reverse knowledge spillovers from home-country MNEs to 
the home-country economy. These reverse knowledge spillovers may come from 
demonstration and imitation effects, the movement of labour, vertical industrial 
linkages, information flows, promotion of local firms’ exports and the facilitation of 
industrial restructuring and technological upgrading of home-country economies, 
thus increasing the productivity and efficiency of local firms and promoting growth 
of the home-country economy. This finding provides strong empirical evidence that 
OFDI has contributed to China’s economic growth through positive impacts on the 
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local economy from reverse knowledge spillovers. OFDI could be a new source of 
economic growth in China in the current environment of deepening globalisation 
and accelerating industrial restructuring and technological upgrading at home.
Conclusion
The main aim of this study is an empirical investigation of the impacts of reverse 
knowledge spillovers from OFDI on China’s provincial economic growth. The study 
finds that OFDI from both provincial firms and SOEs has generated positive and 
statistically significant impacts on provincial economic growth. This positive impact 
could be the result of reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI to the home country’s 
provincial economy through demonstration and imitation effects, labour movement, 
backward and forward industrial linkages, information flows, promotion of local 
firms’ exports and the facilitation of industrial restructuring and technological 
upgrading in the home-country economies, thus increasing the productivity and 
efficiency of local firms and promoting growth of the home economy. The study also 
finds that IFDI has generated positive and significant impacts on the local economy 
from knowledge spillovers, thus promoting provincial economic growth. 
The findings of this study imply that China can gain a lot from OFDI. Given that 
OFDI brings benefits to the home-country economy through reverse knowledge 
spillovers, facilitation of exports and acceleration of industrial restructuring and 
technological upgrading, thus contributing to economic growth, the Chinese 
Government should consider implementing policies to encourage and facilitate 
OFDI and to enhance knowledge spillovers from OFDI to China’s economy. This 
includes policies to develop a more open and market-oriented OFDI regime, policies 
to encourage R&D and technological development to increase the ownership 
advantages of Chinese domestic firms and policies to encourage interaction between 
Chinese MNEs and domestic firms to enhance and accelerate the diffusion of 
positive reverse knowledge spillovers from OFDI to China’s economy.
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18. Promoting the Belt and Road 
Initiative by Strengthening ‘5 + 1’ 
Cooperation1
Biliang Hu, Qingjie Liu and Jiao Yan
Introduction
The concept of ‘5 + 1’ refers to cooperation between the five countries of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Armenia—and China under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
Commonly abbreviated as ‘5 + 1’, this initiative deepens China’s connectivity with 
the emerging entity of the EEU, which was officially launched on 1 January 2015.
The process of advancing the idea of the EEU began in January 2010, when Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan formed a customs union. On 29 May 2014, Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan signed the ‘EEU Treaty’ in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. 
Finally, on 1 January 2015, the EEU was officially launched, with the medium-term 
goal of realising the free flow of goods, services, capital and labour between member 
countries by 2025, and, ultimately, a union similar to the European Union (EU). 
On 2 January 2015, Armenia also joined the EEU. Kyrgyzstan, which had originally 
planned to join in May 2015, joined on 12 August that year. 
Also in May 2015, China and Russia formally signed an agreement stipulating they 
would cooperate in the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and in building 
up the EEU to stimulate regional economic growth, strengthen regional economic 
integration and safeguard regional peace and development. 
Proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the BRI aims to build 
a prosperous Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road together 
with the countries in the BRI region. This initiative now includes 65  countries 
(see Appendix Table 18.A1) with a total population of nearly 4.6 billion (62 per 
cent of the global population), 40 per cent of the global land area and 31 per cent 
of aggregate gross domestic product (GDP).  
1  This research is financially supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and 
Beijing Normal University’s Interdisciplinary Research Project ‘Paths and Implementation of Promoting the 
Belt and Road Construction through International Cooperation’.
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For a number of reasons explained in this chapter, the ‘5 + 1’ initiative is key to the 
success of the BRI. And there remains substantial scope to enhance infrastructural 
and trade-related cooperation in particular. In this chapter, we first set out three 
areas that explain that importance: geography, resources and Sino–Russian 
relations. Thereafter, we explore the underlying economic trends and issues among 
‘5 + 1’ countries, and finally discuss ways to promote cooperation between the 
two initiatives.  
‘5 + 1’ cooperation and the BRI
Cooperation between China and the EEU is important to the promotion of  the 
BRI  because of the unique position of EEU countries geographically, in  terms 
of natural resource endowment advantages and the importance of Sino–
Russian relations.
Geographical position
The BRI is one of the most important contemporary initiatives in China. Building 
an effective ‘5 + 1’ platform is key to the incremental implementation of the BRI. 
On the one hand, the EEU sits geographically within the hinterland of the Eurasian 
landmass, which acts as a hub connecting East Asian and European trade and 
transportation. Thus, construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt requires China 
to work with Russia and Central and West Asian countries to build links along the 
Silk Road. The five countries of the EEU are therefore pivotal to extending the Silk 
Road Economic Belt westward and northward. 
The BRI comprises six economic corridors, three of which link directly to EEU 
member countries: the China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor; the New 
Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, which passes through Kazakhstan and 
Russia, and will eventually reach all the way to the Netherlands; and the China–
Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, which stretches from the autonomous 
region of Xinjiang in China’s west through to the five countries of Central Asia, 
including the EEU’s Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These three economic corridors 
are fundamental to the promotion and success of the implementation of the BRI. 
Through ‘5 + 1’ cooperation, moreover, the relationship among the EEU countries 
may be strengthened via the promotion of infrastructure construction that serves 
to connect the economic artery of Eurasia with logistics and transport corridors, 
in  the process promoting free trade, capital flows and communication among 
countries as well as between people of the region.
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Resource advantages
The basic geographic, economic and demographic statistics of the ‘5 + 1’ countries 
define their importance among those of the BRI. According to World Bank 
data, in  2015, the 64 countries within the BRI (excluding China) comprised 
40.5 million  square kilometres. The land area of the five EEU countries alone is 
19.5 million sq km—48 per cent of the total land area of 64 BRI countries. Their 
total GDP in 2015 (current US dollars) was roughly US$12 trillion, of which the 
EEU members contributed US$1.7 trillion, or some 14 per cent of the total. Among 
the 64 countries (excluding China), however, the EEU members’ proportion of total 
population was only 5.6 per cent. In other words, with less than 6 per cent of the 
total population, the EEU accounted for nearly 15 per cent of GDP of the BRI 
countries (excluding China).
The EEU countries are also relatively rich in arable land. Data from the World 
Bank2 reveal that the total area of cultivated land in the 64 BRI countries (excluding 
China) is 575 million hectares, of which the EEU makes up 159 million ha, or 
27.63 per cent of the total. Russia’s total arable land was 122 million ha, ranking it 
third in the world (after India and the United States); Kazakhstan had 29.4 million 
ha, ranking it 12th in the world, but fifth among 64 BRI countries.
Figures 18.1 and 18.2 illustrate per capita arable land and the distribution of water 
resources in the BRI countries, respectively. In terms of per capita arable land 
resources, Kazakhstan and Russia, respectively, have 1.7 ha and 0.9 ha per person, 
ranking them second and sixth in the world, respectively, and top two of the BRI 
countries. Belarus’s per capita arable land area is 0.6 ha, ranking it sixth among 
the BRI countries. This richness in land resources suggests that Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan have great potential for agricultural development. In the case of 
Kazakhstan, its President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has pointed out his country’s 
agricultural potential directly—and his hopes that China will increase its investment 
in agriculture there (Zhao 2015). Former Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan 
Oraz Jandosov put forward a similar view in a BRI lecture on 11 December 2016 
at Beijing Normal University’s Emerging Markets Institute (Ye 2016).
2  data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2.
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Figure 18.1 Per capita arable land area of BRI countries (hectare per person)
Source: Based on the data from the World Bank: data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2.
Figure 18.2 Per capita water resources of BRI countries (million cubic metres 
per person)
Source: Based on the data from the World Bank: data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.K3.
EEU countries are also rich in water resources. Specifically, BRI countries held 
12.4  trillion cubic metres of useable water in 2014, of which EEU countries 
held 4.5  trillion cu m, or 36 per cent of the total.3 In 2014, Russia’s freshwater 
resources were as high as 4.3  trillion cu m, or 30,000 cu m per capita—a total 
volume second only to Brazil globally and second among the 64 BRI countries 
(excluding China), behind Bhutan.
3  data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.K3.
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Data from the World Energy Statistics Yearbook (BP 2016) suggest that the total 
energy output from fossil fuels in the 64 BRI countries (excluding China) in 2015 
was 4.76 billion tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), of which the production of the five 
EEU countries was 1.4 billion toe, or 28.93 per cent of the total. Russia’s output 
of 1.2 billion toe was, of course, far ahead of the other countries, and was followed 
by Kazakhstan’s output of 136 million toe.
In 2015, Russia’s oil production was 541 million toe, accounting for 12.4 per cent 
of global output. This placed Russia third in the world in terms of total oil 
production, after Saudi Arabia (569 million toe) and the United States (567 million 
toe) (Figure 18.3). Although Africa is also an important oil-producing area, its oil 
production was only 298 million toe in 2015—less than half that of Russia. 
Figure 18.3 Distribution of total oil production of BRI countries (100 million toe)
Source: Based on the data from the World Energy Statistics Yearbook (BP 2016): www.bp.com/
statisticalreview.
Russia’s natural gas production in 2015 was 516 million toe, accounting for 
16.1 per cent of total global output—close to the production of the entire Middle 
East (556 million toe) and second only to the United States (705 million toe), 
ranking it second in the world (BP 2016). Figure 18.4 provides the distribution 
of natural gas production of BRI countries (toe).
In sum, EEU countries are richly endowed in agricultural, energy, water and 
other  resources. China is home to a huge domestic market and also capital, 
and  therefore it and the EEU countries have significant potential to cooperate 
under the BRI framework.
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Figure 18.4 Distribution of natural gas production of BRI countries (toe)
Source: Based on the data from the World Energy Statistics Yearbook (BP 2016): www.bp.com/
statisticalreview.
Sino–Russian relations
It is in the common interests of China and Russia to maintain good bilateral relations, 
and it is also of great significance to the implementation of the BRI. As an important 
neighbour of China, Russia shares with it a border of 4,300 kilometres. The BRI 
runs through the Eurasian landmass, an area in which Russia is a global power. 
China plans to work with relevant countries to build up the China–Mongolia–
Russia Economic Corridor, the New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor 
and the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor as an important part of 
strengthening cooperation with these countries, and particularly with Russia.
Under the current complicated international situation, the best choice for both 
China  and Russia is to integrate the construction of the BRI and of the EEU. 
In the joint statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation 
signed on 25 June 2016, the two countries clearly stressed that the signing of the 
Sino–Russian joint declaration on 8 May 2015 to integrate the construction of the 
EEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt is of great significance. The comprehensive 
partnership between China and Russia should be open and transparent, while 
focusing on the interests of both sides, and should accept the gradual participation 
of member countries of the EEU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Global Financial 
Network 2016).
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Trends in ‘5 + 1’ trade and investment relations
The ‘5 + 1’ cooperation also contributes to interregional economic and trade 
cooperation. In the context of globalisation, countries around the world are, 
in  general, deepening economic ties and social connectivity. Regional economic 
integration provides effective institutional infrastructure to improve the region’s 
competitiveness. Four of the EEU member countries were states of the former 
Soviet Union, but gained their independence in 1991: Kazakhstan on 16 December, 
Armenia on 21 September, Kyrgyzstan on 31 August and Belarus on 25 August. 
China has worked to establish close relations with all of them, and economic 
and trade cooperation will be among the most important areas to further these 
relationships.
Recent relative weakening of trade ties
Trade tightness among the countries is important for future trade development, 
so we use the trade tightness index to measure the trade dependence of the EEU. 
In general, the higher the trade density, the closer are the trade ties between the two 
countries. The basic formula for calculating the degree of trade dependence is as 
follows (Equation 18.1).
Equation 18.1
In Equation 18.1, Wij refers to the trade tightness of country i with its trading 
partner, country j; Xij are the exports of country i to country j; Xi are the total 
exports of country i; Yj is country j’s total imports; and Yw is total global imports. 
Based on this formula, and using trade data from the United Nations Statistical 
Office,4 we can establish the trade relations of any one of the five EEU countries 
with the other four members (here we use the term trade connectivity index, which 
refers to the level of trade relations between countries; the highest is 100, while the 
lowest is zero). The results are shown in Appendix Table 18.A2. To more clearly 
highlight the trends found in our results, we also present the numbers as Figure 
18.5, based on Appendix Table 18.A2.
4  comtrade.un.org/data/.
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Figure 18.5 Trade tightness between one EEU country and the other four 
EEU countries 
Source: Based on data in Appendix Table 18.A2. 
In terms of the trade connectivity index, Figure 18.5 highlights that Belarus trades 
most tightly with the other four EEU countries. Its index peaked at 67.8 in 2001, 
and experienced a rapid decline afterwards, but Belarus is still the country with the 
highest degree of tightness among the EEU countries. Overall, the value of trade 
of the five EEU countries showed a declining trend, with Kazakhstan falling from 
26.1 in 2001 to 7.9 in 2015, a fall of 70 per cent; Belarus fell from 67.8 to 28.97, 
or 57.3 per cent; Armenia and Russia fell by 49 per cent; and Kyrgyzstan fell by 
28 per cent. 
In general, and as Figure 18.5 reveals, there have been varying degrees of decline. 
This is partly explained by the strong convergence in industrial structure among 
the countries—that is, the trade complementarity between these countries has 
diminished over time. According to the estimation of Li Jianmin (2014), the degrees 
of trade complementarity between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are all below 
0.5, which is very low, so that the share of trade among these countries (internal 
trade) is generally lower than the proportions in their total trade (Table 18.1). 
This simply implies that there is huge potential for these countries to connect to 
countries outside the EEU, such as China, through improvements in transportation 
infrastructure and so on; and, therefore, these countries would benefit greatly from 
the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt.
According to the data released on the website of the Eurasian Economic Commission,5 
Table 18.1 shows that total internal trade in the EEU in 2015 accounted for only 
13.5 per cent of total trade volume, but the trade volume of countries outside 
the EEU accounted for 86.5 per cent of their total trade volume; external trade 
was 6.4 times that of internal trade. This indicates that EEU member countries 
5  www.eurasiancommission.org.
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barely meet the demand for their products and market on average; however, nearly 
90 per  cent of  the goods in the markets of the five countries were satisfied with 
their trade partners outside the EEU. In terms of the import and export trade 
volume of the member countries, Russia’s trade is the most dependent on countries 
outside the EEU (91.9 per cent); only 8.1 per cent comes from internal EEU trade. 
For Kazakhstan, the proportion of external trade was 79.2 per cent. Overall, the five 
EEU countries have a proportion higher than 50 per cent.
Table 18.1 Comparison of internal trade with external trade of the 
EEU countries, 2015
Trade volume inside the EEU to total 
trade volume (%)









13.5 10.8 18.0 86.5 89.2 82.0
Russia 8.1 8.4 7.7 91.9 91.6 92.3
Belarus 49.5 41.2 56.8 50.5 58.8 43.2
Kazakhstan 20.8 10.7 36.1 79.2 89.3 63.9
Kyrgyzstan 44.3 32.2 49.3 55.7 67.8 50.7
Armenia 26.3 15.9 31.1 73.7 84.1 68.9
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission (www.eurasiancommission.org).
Table 18.2 Trade between EEU member countries, 2015
Percentage of trade volume (US$100 million)
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Kyrgyzstan
Armenia - 0.07% 0.01% 2.82% 0.001%
Belarus 0.333 - 1.26% 57.14% 0.15%
Kazakhstan 0.056 5.724 - 33.45% 1.9%
Russia 12.742 259.282 151.786 - 3.2%
Kyrgyzstan 0.005 0.69 8.636 14.544 -
- not applicable 
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission (www.eurasiancommission.org).
From Table 18.2, we find that more than 90 per cent of the total trade volume 
of US$45.4 billion in 2015 was between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and, 
within that, mainly between Russia and Belarus, and Russia and Kazakhstan. 
The trade volume between Russia and Belarus was US$26 billion, accounting for 
57.14 per  cent of total trade within the EEU; the trade volume between Russia 
and Kazakhstan was US$15.2 billion, or 33.45 per cent of total trade within 
the EEU. In  third place, the trade volume between Kyrgyzstan and Russia was 
US$1.5 billion, or 3.2 per cent, followed by the trade volume between Armenia and 
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Russia of US$1.3 billion, or 2.82 per cent. In addition to trade with Russia, trade 
between the other four member  countries was less than US$1 billion, especially 
between Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, which was only US$500,000 in 2015 and only 
0.002 per cent of the trade between Russia and Belarus. According to the relevant 
research, the main reason for this is a relatively high degree of industrial structure 
homogeneity between the EEU member countries. Exports are essentially resource 
and energy products, while imports are largely mechanical and electrical products, so 
the trade demand between each country is weak, and, in terms of competition with 
the relative high quality of the international market, there is intense competition 
between each EEU country (Jin 2016).
China is the EEU’s most important trade partner
Since the independence of EEU member countries, their trade with China has 
maintained a positive growth trend. According to trade data released by the United 
Nations Statistics Office, 12.5 per cent of the EEU’s total trade in 2014 was with 
China, making China the union’s largest foreign trade partner (Table 18.3). Due 
to the decline in commodity and raw material prices in recent years, the volume 
of foreign trade in the EEU also declined in 2015; however, according to statistics 
from the Eurasian Economic Commission, China still accounted for 13.61 per cent 
of the EEU’s total foreign trade in 2015, meaning it remained the largest trading 
partner. As for bilateral trade, China is also Russia’s largest trading partner, and the 
second-largest trade partner of Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (Zhang 2016).
Table 18.3 The top-five commodity trading partners of EEU countries





2014 China 480 606 12.5
Germany 392 377 8.9
Italy 528 149 7.8
Netherlands 784 61 6.1
Ukraine 229 136 4.2
2015 China 351 438 13.6
Germany 269 241 8.8
Netherlands 470 37 8.7
Italy 306 103 7.1
Turkey 208 56 4.6
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission (www.eurasiancommission.org).
According to the Eurasian Economic Commission, total trade value among the 
five EEU members in 2015 was US$45.4 billion, but  total imports and exports 
with countries outside the EEU were as high as US$579.5 billion in the same year 
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(US$374 billion in exports and US$205.4 billion in imports). Among the top-five 
trading partners of the EEU, the total trade with China was US$78.9 billion (of 
which US$43.8 billion was imports from China and US$35.1 billion was exports 
to China), accounting for 13.61 per cent of total imports and exports between EEU 
countries and all countries outside the EEU, making China the biggest trading 
partner, followed by Germany, with a trade value of US$51 billion, accounting for 
8.81 per cent. Trade between the Netherlands and the EEU accounted for 8.7 per 
cent of the total, just less than Germany, and ranking it in third place. In fourth 
and fifth place were Italy and Turkey, respectively, whose shares were 7.1 per cent 
and 4.6 per cent, respectively. According to statistics from the Eurasian Economic 
Commission, until November 2016, China continued to be the EEU’s largest 
trading partner, with 15.4 per cent of the total trading value among all countries 
outside the union. 
If we look over a longer period, the overall commodities trading volume showed an 
upward trend between China and the five EEU countries from 1992 to 2016: from 
1992 to 2005, there was relatively slow growth; from 2006 to 2008, the growth was 
rapid; and, because of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the volume fell after 2009. 
From 2010 to 2014, high growth continued, increasing 53.43 per cent. In the past 
two years, the impact of falling commodity prices, such as for crude oil, has seen the 
trade volume decrease slightly.
China–EEU investment relations
China’s direct investment in EEU countries continued to grow over the years, rising 
from only US$97 million in 2003 to US$22.8 billion in 2015—an increase of 235 
times (Figure 18.6). Specifically, China’s direct investment in Kazakhstan increased 
from US$20 million in 2003 to US$5.1 billion in 2015; its foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Kyrgyzstan increased from US$16 million to US$1.1 billion, in Russia it 
increased from US$62 million to US$14 billion and in Belarus and Armenia it rose 
from almost zero to US$476 million and US$7.5 million, respectively, in 2015. 
We can see that China’s direct investment in Belarus has seen the largest increase, 
especially since the establishment of the China–Belarus Industrial Park in Minsk, 
the Belarus capital, which is not only the largest overseas industrial park in which 
China has invested, but also the largest foreign investment project in Belarus. The 
China–Belarus Industrial Park is playing an important role in promoting cooperation 
between China and EEU countries. With the construction of the Moscow–Kazan 
High-Speed Railway, the China–Belarus Industrial Park, the China–Kazakhstan 
Border Cooperation Zone and so on, economic and trade relations between China 
and EEU countries will be further strengthened.
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Figure 18.6 China’s direct investment in EEU countries, 2003–15 
(US$100 million)
Source: MOFCOM et al. (2016).
Infrastructure: The BRI and ‘5 + 1’ cooperation
The EEU area is a key land-based transport hub connecting East Asia and Europe. 
Achieving infrastructure interoperability and improving the level of infrastructure 
in the five member countries will create an economic artery connecting the Eurasian 
landmass.
Transportation infrastructure construction
China is now the biggest commodity trading country in the world, and 90 per cent 
of Chinese exports and imports are realised through sea transportation.6 In the case 
of trade with European countries, about 75 per cent of commodities are transported 
via ocean shipping.7 Ocean shipping is normally much slower than rail transport, 
and, in the case of trade between Europe and China, rail transport takes only 50 per 
6  wenku.baidu.com/view/ba13796eff00bed5b8f31d39.html?re=view.
7  www.360doc.com/content/15/0419/12/91243_464334719.shtml.
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cent of the time of transportation by sea,8 with more or less the same transportation 
costs (Li 2015). It is therefore important for China to use more rail transportation 
than ocean shipping, which would also benefit European countries. 
On 19 March 2011, the Chongqing–Europe International Express Railway was 
officially opened, which kicks off the operation of China–Europe Express Railways 
(Figure 18.7). The Chongqing–Europe Railway runs from Chongqing City in 
China, via Xi’an and Lanzhou, to Alashankou (Alataw Pass) within China. Beyond 
the Alataw Pass, the railway crosses Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland, before 
arriving in Duisburg in Germany. This line is the southern channel of the Eurasian 
Land Bridge, which stretches for 11,179 km. The construction of the Chongqing–
Europe Railway route is being undertaken jointly by six countries along the line—
China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany—and it will become one 
of the main routes of the China–Europe Express Railways system.
Figure 18.7 China–Europe Express Railways: Chongqing–Europe line, 
Wuhan–Europe line and Chengdu–Europe line 
Source: finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-10-18/doc-ifxwvpqh7761641.shtml.
China–Europe Express Railways passes through three EEU countries—Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan—with trains running from Chinese cities such as 
Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing and Chengdu to various European cities. Figure 
18.7 shows three of these important lines. According to statistics from the China 
Railway Corporation, from the successful opening of China–Europe Express 
Railways in March 2011 until June 2016, 1,881 trains passed through the EEU 
countries, realising a total of US$17 billion in import and export value during this 
time (Sina Online 2016). China–Europe Express Railways directly supports the 
promotion of trade between China and Europe, and it has become an important 
part of the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt.
8  www.china.com.cn/news/2017-04/19/content_40649951.htm.
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As the main countries of the EEU, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus will also 
be important in building up the Silk Road Economic Belt. The EEU countries 
have also put forward ideas for building Eurasian transport corridors, including 
the Far East region development strategy proposed by Russia, the ‘Bright Road’ 
infrastructure development strategy proposed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan’s railway 
construction strategy, along with the BRI, which focuses very much on infrastructure 
interconnection; all of these therefore have strong complementarity. 
Energy infrastructure
At present, although Russia and Central Asian countries are among the big oil and 
natural gas producers in the world and China is a big oil and natural gas importer, 
they do not have much of a voice in the energy arena. Western developed countries 
have placed economic sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine crisis, and China’s oil 
imports have long been from the ‘turbulent arc’ of the Middle East, which constantly 
threatens China’s oil security (Figure 18.8). To address this situation, promoting 
‘5 + 1’ cooperation through the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt to 
facilitate the establishment of an energy community is a viable option, and energy 
infrastructure construction has become the primary task.
Figure 18.8 Sources of China’s oil imports
Source: BP (2016).
The China–Central Asia gas pipeline starts on the border of Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, on the right bank of the Amu Darya (Amu River), crosses Central 
Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan and enters China east of Horgos, thus forming 
the ‘West–East natural gas transmission’ corridor. The natural gas pipeline is about 
10,000 km long, with 8,000 km of that inside China, 188 km inside Turkmenistan, 
530 km in Uzbekistan and 1,300 km in Kazakhstan. As of December  2016, 
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all  three sections of the line—China–Central Asia gas pipeline A, B and C—
operated successfully. The D line is being laid, and will be completed in 2020, with 
a total length of 1,000 km and capacity to deliver 30 billion cu m of gas annually 
(Table 18.4). Assuming that China consumed 400–420 billion cu m of natural gas 
in 2010, completion of the D line will meet more than 20 per cent of the country’s 
domestic demand for natural gas (Ma and Wei 2017). The four China–Central Asia 
gas pipeline sections will form an artery of gas transport from Central Asia to China.
Table 18.4 China–Central Asia natural gas pipeline construction
Line Source country Pipe length (km) Gas delivery per 
year (billion cu m)
Start of operations
Line A Turkmenistan 1,830 30 December 2009
Line B Uzbekistan 1,830 30 October 2010
Line C Uzbekistan 1,830 25 May 2014
Line D Turkmenistan 1,000 30  2020
Source: news.cnpc.com.cn/system/2014/09/15/001507242.shtml.
A total of 2,018 km of pipeline lies outside China, 64.42 per cent of which passes 
through Kazakhstan (an important EEU member), representing almost two-thirds 
of the total length of China’s overseas pipelines; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
account for 9.32 per cent and 26.26 per cent of the total, respectively. It is clear that 
promotion of ‘5 + 1’ energy infrastructure cooperation between China and the EEU 
is essential to smooth construction of the China–Central Asia natural gas pipeline.
China and Kazakhstan have already worked closely together on energy infrastructure 
construction. The China–Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline is the first such transnational 
pipeline and is of strategic significance for both countries, transporting crude oil 
directly from Kazakhstan to the Chinese consumer market without crossing a third 
country. The China–Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline begins in Kazakhstan’s western 
Atyrau District and crosses into China via the Alataw Pass. The first phase of the 
project was completed in May 2006 and the second phase was put into operation 
in 2009, and was included in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan’s focus on energy transport 
construction (State Council of China 2013). In 2015, the pipeline transported 
10.8 million tonnes of crude oil to China, the volume having exceeded 10 million 
tonnes for five consecutive years—for a total of 56.8 million tonnes from 2011 to 
2015. From July 2006 to the end of 2015, the pipeline transported 87.2 million 
tonnes of crude oil to China from Kazakhstan, playing an important role in China’s 
quest for energy security (China Petroleum News Center 2016).
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Promoting policy coordination through ‘5 + 1’ 
cooperation
We have discussed how to promote the construction of the BRI through ‘5 + 1’ 
cooperation in terms of trade, investment and infrastructure construction. 
Establishing an effective cooperation mechanism to coordinate all aspects of the 
BRI is essential. In light of one of the author’s recent field surveys in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan—two EEU countries—combined with our discussion above, we propose 
the following important policy coordination to strengthen ‘5 + 1’ cooperation and 
further promote the BRI.
The first area is funding. We suggest the following actions: 
1. Encourage Chinese financial institutions to provide finance to the five EEU 
countries—in particular, to support qualified Chinese private companies to 
open financial businesses in those countries. 
2. Establish a number of special funds through policy coordination. China has 
already set up the Silk Road Fund to support the BRI, but relying solely on state 
funding will not be enough. At present, China and the EEU countries have 
large volumes of private capital looking for investment opportunities, so  the 
establishment of special funds would help attract private sector funding.
3. Issue special bonds to support important infrastructure projects.
4. Consider a special BRI international board on the Chinese stock exchange to 
raise funds for companies investing in countries along the BRI, particularly the 
EEU members. 
5. In recent years, there has been widespread exchange rate instability among the 
EEU countries. Since the renminbi has been defined as a special drawing rights 
(SDR) basket currency, meaning it can be used for international settlement and 
exchange, it is possible to build a financial stability zone based on the renminbi 
in the BRI and especially in the Silk Road Economic Belt, therefore helping 
maintain regional financial stability. 
A second avenue for deepening cooperation is through investment policy 
coordination. Through field surveys, we found that the EEU countries have 
interests in establishing closer investment partnerships with China; Kazakhstan’s 
demands are particularly apparent. In fact, the Kazakh Government and the 
Chinese Government have had some good communication relating to investment 
policy coordination—with, for example, the two countries signing an agreement 
on investment cooperation for 2016–22. However, some Chinese businesspeople 
told the authors that it was sometimes difficult to obtain a visa for Kazakhstan even 
for investment purposes, thus policy coordination in this area will be good for both 
sides in terms of increasing Chinese investment in Kazakhstan. 
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A third vehicle via which EEU relations can be deepened is enhanced trade policy 
coordination. Since China and Russia have signed an agreement to promote ‘5 + 1’ 
cooperation at the highest levels of leadership, we propose the formation of a ‘5 + 1’ 
free-trade agreement (FTA) as soon as possible. This would be good not only for 
promoting the BRI, but also to drive trade prosperity and economic growth for the 
five EEU countries.
Finally, the ‘5 + 1’ countries could also increase industrial policy coordination. 
The  five EEU countries have industrial advantages in agriculture, energy and 
minerals, but the manufacturing industry is underdeveloped and industrialisation is 
lagging behind. Further coordination of industrial policy would directly contribute 
to the promotion of complementary development between China and these 
countries in relevant industries, to promote regional economic prosperity.
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Appendix 18.1
Table 18.A1 Basic information about 65 BRI countries, 2015






1 China 11,007.70 1,371.220 9.3882 
2 Russian Federation 1,331.21 144.097 16.3769 
3 Mongolia 11.74 2.959 1.5536 
4 Singapore 292.74 5.535 0.0007 
5 Brunei Darussalam 12.93 0.423 0.0053 
6 Thailand 395.17 67.959 0.5109 
7 Malaysia 296.28 30.331 0.3286 
8 Indonesia 861.93 257.564 1.8116 
9 Vietnam 193.60 91.704 0.3101 
10 Philippines 292.45 100.699 0.2982 
11 Myanmar 62.60 53.897 0.6531 
12 Cambodia 18.05 15.578 0.1765 
13 Laos 12.37 6.802 0.2308 
14 Timor-Leste 1.44 1.245 0.0149 
15 Afghanistan 19.33 32.527 0.6529 
16 Nepal 21.19 28.514 0.1434 
17 Maldives 3.44 0.409 0.0003 
18 India 2,095.40 1,311.051 2.9732 
19 Pakistan 271.05 188.925 0.7709 
20 Bangladesh 195.08 160.996 0.1302 
21 Sri Lanka 82.32 20.966 0.0627 
22 Bhutan 2.06 0.775 0.0381 
23 Saudi Arabia 646.00 31.540 2.1497 
24 United Arab Emirates 370.30 9.157 0.0836 
25 Oman 69.83 4.491 0.3095 
26 Israel 299.42 8.380 0.0216 
27 Kuwait 114.04 3.892 0.0178 
28 Qatar 164.64 2.235 0.0116 
29 Bahrain 31.13 1.377 0.0008 
30 Iran 425.33 79.109 1.6286 
31 Turkey 717.88 78.666 0.7696 
32 Iraq 180.07 36.423 0.4343 
33 Jordan 37.52 7.595 0.0888 
34 Lebanon 47.08 5.851 0.0102 
35 Egypt 330.78 91.508 0.9955 
China’s New Sources of Economic Growth (II)
428






36 Yemen 37.73 26.832 0.5280 
37 Syria n.a. 18.502 0.1836 
38 Palestine 12.68 4.422 0.0060 
39 Belarus 54.61 9.513 0.2029 
40 Georgia 13.97 3.679 0.0695 
41 Azerbaijan 53.05 9.651 0.0827 
42 Ukraine 90.62 45.198 0.5793 
43 Armenia 10.53 3.018 0.0285 
44 Moldova 6.57 3.554 0.0329 
45 Poland 477.07 37.999 0.3062 
46 Czech Republic 185.16 10.551 0.0772 
47 Slovakia 87.26 5.424 0.0481 
48 Hungary 121.72 9.845 0.0905 
49 Latvia 27.00 1.978 0.0622 
50 Lithuania 41.17 2.910 0.0627 
51 Slovenia 42.77 2.064 0.0201 
52 Estonia 22.46 1.312 0.0424 
53 Croatia 48.73 4.224 0.0560 
54 Romania 177.95 19.832 0.2300 
55 Bulgaria 50.20 7.178 0.1086 
56 Albania 11.40 2.889 0.0274 
57 Serbia 37.16 7.098 0.0875 
58 Macedonia 10.09 2.078 0.0252 
59 Bosnia and Herzegovina 16.19 3.810 0.0512 
60 Montenegro 3.99 0.622 0.0135 
61 Kazakhstan 184.39 17.544 2.6997 
62 Turkmenistan 35.85 5.374 0.4699 
63 Uzbekistan 66.73 31.300 0.4254 
64 Kyrgyzstan 6.57 5.957 0.1918 
65 Tajikistan 7.85 8.482 0.1400 
Source: World Bank statistical database (data.worldbank.org).
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Table 18.A2 Trade connectivity index between EEU member countries, 2001–15
Year Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia
2001 19.66 67.80 26.10 24.44 32.26
2002 12.64 60.07 19.24 26.43 30.19
2003 13.70 56.00 17.79 25.89 28.99
2004 9.60 49.10 15.14 27.73 26.49
2005 10.08 32.62 10.24 29.18 20.26
2006 8.09 26.53 7.88 26.02 18.53
2007 9.82 22.39 6.42 20.50 17.79
2008 9.64 17.33 4.92 14.28 15.71
2009 8.95 20.15 5.57 14.02 17.80
2010 8.62 24.30 3.40 15.64 17.44
2011 8.02 18.90 4.61 13.45 15.40
2012 8.84 18.13 3.97 16.58 13.12
2013 10.61 23.47 3.90 13.85 12.53
2014 10.76 24.68 5.00 0.00 14.06
2015 10.07 28.97 7.90 17.51 16.35
Note: The trade connectivity index between countries can be as high as 100 and as low as zero, 
which means there is no trade relationship.




19. China’s ‘Innovative and Pragmatic’ 
Foreign Aid: Shaped by and now 
Shaping Globalisation
Lauren Johnston and Marina Rudyak1
Introduction
In his address to the 2017 annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland, Chinese President Xi Jinping said: 
[W]hen the global economy is under downward pressure, it is hard to make the cake 
of the global economy bigger. It may even shrink, which will strain the relations 
between growth and distribution, between capital and labour, and between efficiency 
and equity. Both developed and developing countries have felt the punch. (Xi 2017) 
But this, he added, does not mean the world should write off economic globalisation 
completely. He said it was a natural outcome of human progress and therefore 
‘we should adapt to and guide economic globalization, cushion its negative impact, 
and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations’ (Xi 2017).
As the plenary speech on the first visit to Davos by a Chinese president, the speech 
itself is significant, but it offers little in the way of predictions of any material results 
on economic policy—a result both of the dynamic complexities of globalisation and 
of policymaking in China. Nonetheless, Xi’s call for greater adaptation to and better 
guidance of globalisation implies that any change will itself be dynamic. A stated 
goal of China’s increasing leadership in globalisation is delivery of mutually positive 
benefits to developing countries. In his Davos address, Xi therefore drew particular 
attention to China’s foreign aid and its contribution to global growth. 
One estimate says China’s net Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) equivalent foreign aid disbursement (minus aid received by 
China) over the period 2009–13 increased annually by some 11 per cent (Kitano 
2016). It was estimated that by 2013, China’s net aid had reached US$5.4 billion, 
most of which was being disbursed bilaterally, as both grants and loans 
(Figure 19.1) (Kitano 2016). Estimated net foreign aid fell between 2013 and 2014, 
1  The authors thank the organisers, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific and participants of the ‘China: Wealth 
and Power’ conference held in Canberra, 7–8 April 2016, for helpful feedback and the opportunity for this 
collaboration.
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to US$4.9 billion, however, this did not affect China’s ranking among international 
aid donors, of ninth place. This puts China immediately behind Norway, Sweden 
and the Netherlands as a provider of foreign aid (Kitano 2016), allowing room for 
expansion of China’s ‘adaptive’ approach to globalisation and economic governance 
while also fostering global growth.
Figure 19.1 China’s net foreign aid (estimates)
Source: Kitano (2016).
African countries receive around half of China’s total foreign aid (SCIO 2011a, 
2014). Africa is also important to China’s foreign aid because of its mutually 
beneficial economic potential (e.g. Johnston 2015a), the significance of which has 
been noted by China’s current leadership on recent visits to the continent. During 
Xi’s inaugural visit to Africa as president, in February 2013, he noted that China–
Africa relations had already entered a ‘fast track of comprehensive development’ 
(Xi 2013). Adding direction to that track in April 2014, while speaking at the 
Ethiopian headquarters of the African Union, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang laid out 
four principles for deepening China–Africa cooperation: sincerity and equality; 
solidarity and mutual trust; jointly pursuing inclusive development; and innovative 
pragmatic cooperation (Li 2014). The notion of ‘innovative pragmatic cooperation’ 
itself marked a turning point, added for the first time to the traditional static notions 
of ‘equality’ and ‘solidarity’ (Johnston 2014). 
The meaning of Li’s reference to innovation in the 2014 speech was quickly revealed, 
with China establishing several new financing institutions to promote international 
development in various areas: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
the Silk Road Fund and a South–South climate fund. It has also made new and 
substantial investments in a range of existing development finance institutions, 
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including the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), and in several industrial cooperation funds, such as the China–Africa 
Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund (CAICCF) (Kamal and Gallagher 2016). 
The ‘adaptive’ approach to increasing China’s leadership in globalisation may have its 
roots in the concept of ‘Chinese characteristics’. In this chapter, however, we suggest 
that the story of China’s new globally ambitious and potentially transformative 
foreign aid policy is itself the product of a bigger global development story. First, 
the ‘trinity’ of aid, trade and investment at the core of the Chinese foreign aid 
model was shaped by a ‘chain of knowledge creation’ (Shimomura and Wang 2015: 
9–16) with its origins in Soviet and Japanese aid to China, China’s own development 
experience and the country’s half-century role in South–South cooperation. Second, 
China—the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity terms—has 
experienced a  growing scarcity of labour and therefore higher labour costs since 
about 2005. This drop in the availability of cheap labour coincides with the increase 
in the working-age and primary school–educated population in Africa, offering the 
prospect of a ‘demographic dividend’ (Johnston 2015a, 2015b, forthcoming; Chen 
and Nord 2017). 
We argue that greater elaboration of China’s development experience as an aid 
recipient, and the related links to its own outbound foreign aid, can shed light on 
China’s otherwise difficult to decipher foreign aid policy. This in turn may offer 
insight into the role aid might play in a China-led process of adaptive globalisation. 
This chapter therefore summarises the evolution of China’s inbound and outbound 
foreign aid policy. By highlighting seminal domestic and international political and 
economic influences and drivers, we set out a series of internal and external points 
of inflection in Chinese foreign aid policy over some six decades. We discuss the 
significance of China’s foreign aid for recipient countries, with particular reference 
to Africa, and turning points that may elucidate how China could influence global 
development and the globalisation agenda from now on. 
The evolution of Chinese foreign aid
Although often misleadingly referred to as an ‘emerging’ or ‘new’ foreign aid donor 
(e.g. Manning 2006; Hernandez 2016), China has a history of outbound aid 
comparable in length with its inbound aid history, dating back to the early 1950s. 
In  fact, it has been providing aid longer than many of the so-called traditional 
donors.2 China’s aid model has been uniquely shaped by its experience as an aid 
recipient, particularly its exposure to concessional loans from the Soviet Union 
2  In the contemporary literature, a ‘traditional donor’ typically refers to donors that are members of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee. 
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from the 1950s until the Sino–Soviet split in the early 1960s, and also loans from 
Japan from the late 1970s, followed by aid from Western donors from the 1980s. 
Our survey here is divided around selected turning points. 
Pre-reform and opening-up (before 1978): The ideal 
of economic self-reliance
In the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the influence of the 
Soviet Union shaped the country’s own planned economy. It also exposed China 
to tied concessional lending, which is the mode China uses for its outbound aid 
today. This laid the foundation for two core principles of Chinese aid: China should 
not impose any political conditions on its aid3—which has been criticised by some 
Western observers as ‘no strings attached aid’—and Chinese aid should promote the 
independent economic development capabilities of its recipients. 
In February 1950, in lockstep with the Sino–Soviet friendship treaty, China signed 
its first concessional loan, worth US$300 million, with annual interest charges of 
1 per cent and a disbursement period of five years (Watanabe 2013). The loan was 
‘tied’ to China’s purchase of commodities and military materials from the Soviet 
Union. China agreed to repay the sum through the supply of commodities or foreign 
currency within 10 years of 1953. A number of other concessional loan agreements 
followed, mostly packaged with provision of Soviet technical experts who would be 
responsible for carrying out the aid projects. In the process, Chinese leaders grasped 
a sense of ownership over the assistance through clear formulation of how such 
projects fitted within their strategy for building a new country (Watanabe 2013: 
88–9). The view that development assistance should primarily serve a country’s 
self-determined development strategy is evident today in the statements of China’s 
aid experts. Speaking about global aid to Africa, Peking University African studies 
scholar Li Anshan said, ‘we cannot set up a plan for Africa. We can rather join them 
in their efforts and not impose a plan for them’ (Adu-Gyamerah 2014). 
While receiving Soviet aid, China also instigated its own aid program, starting with 
support for the reconstruction of postwar North Korea in 1953 and aid to recently 
decolonised South-East Asian countries. The circle of recipients was expanded 
following the first Asian–African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, 
when China gradually began to provide aid to African countries. Hereby, China 
clearly linked its early foreign aid to the Soviet aid model, which was formally based 
on the notion of ‘mutual benefit and mutual respect for national sovereignty’. It also 
linked economic independence (which foreign aid could help to achieve) to political 
independence:
3  One notable exception is, however, the strong adherence to the ‘One China Policy’ and non-recognition 
of Taiwan. 
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It is on this principle [of mutual benefit and mutual respect for national sovereignty] 
that Socialist countries have established a new type of economic relations amongst 
each other. The friendly aid in economy and technology given by the Soviet Union 
to China is a great example of this type of relationship … China is a country that 
just recently has been liberated. Our economy is still very backward; we still haven’t 
achieved full economic independence … But we have understood that economic 
independence is of major significance for consolidating political independence. 
Therefore, while we advance the building up of our own economy, we wish, within 
the bounds of our possibilities, to contribute our meagre forces to help the economic 
development of other countries. (Zhou 1956; translated from Chinese)
These links constitute a core principle of Chinese foreign aid today and are almost 
identical to those in its foreign aid White Papers (SCIO 2011a, 2014) and other 
government aid documents (Rudyak 2014).
The Sino–Soviet split that occurred in the aftermath of Joseph Stalin’s death in the 
early 1960s was the second profound influence on early Chinese aid. When, under 
president Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet aid to China came to an abrupt halt, China 
was forced to continue alone on projects started with Soviet assistance while still 
repaying the loans. This led to an even stronger insistence on the Chinese side that 
aid should be used only as a means to achieving economic self-reliance. The aid 
model of the PRC’s early years then manifested in the announcement by Premier 
Zhou Enlai on a visit to Africa in 1964 of the ‘Eight Principles of Economic and 
Technical Aid’. Along with mutual benefit and the development of self-reliance, 
these principles include strict respect for the sovereignty of recipient countries 
and political non-conditionality, and constitute the fundamental guidelines for 
China’s foreign aid that remain in place today (Chen 2010, Chen 2011). From the 
outset, therefore, China’s foreign aid and foreign policy were linked. This, however, 
does not differentiate China from other major donor countries. For example, the 
United States instigated the Marshall Plan to both rebuild European countries after 
World War II and limit the spread of Soviet communism. 
Early reform and opening-up (1978 to mid-1990s): 
Nascent mutual benefit for common (economic) 
development
From the late 1970s, the beginning of the period of ‘reform and opening up’ under 
Deng Xiaoping and the new primacy given to economic modernisation cemented 
a gradual shift from primarily political to economic drivers of aid. The concurrent 
transformation of various ministerial structures into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
laid the groundwork for the way in which Chinese aid is implemented today—
mostly through turnkey projects executed by SOEs.
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With reform and opening up, China was again open to inbound aid. In 1979, 
it signed concessional loan agreements with Japan. Development aid from Western 
countries followed and, in April 1980, China joined the World Bank. In Chinese 
policy circles, there was, however, debate as to whether China should remain 
a parallel foreign aid provider when limited available resources were needed 
for national development. In response, the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the State Council decided that aid would remain central to 
foreign policy because China needed a stable international environment in which 
to develop (Shi 1989). Foreign aid spending was nonetheless reduced and greater 
emphasis placed on projects that were of more direct benefit to China’s modernisation 
and reform agenda (Shi  1989). That shift was cemented during Premier Zhao 
Ziyang’s visit to Tanzania in 1983 (People’s Daily 1983), where he announced the 
‘Four Principles of Sino–African Economic and Technical Cooperation’. Alongside 
continued emphasis on mutual benefit, as articulated in the earlier years, the ‘four 
principles’ reflected Deng Xiaoping’s renunciation of Mao Zedong’s ideal of self-
reliance and his belief that it was not suited to China’s opening up. Deng introduced 
the notion of ‘common development’—thus emphasising the economic aspect of 
China’s mutually beneficial aid. In the early 1980s, in other words, foreign aid 
started to develop into an economic tool for China. 
Concurrent change in domestic policy was also influencing China’s approach to 
foreign aid. In the 1980s, China’s extensive ministries were selectively transformed 
into SOEs or their functions were outsourced to new SOEs under the supervision 
of  the parent ministry. The Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation, for 
example, established the China State Farms Agriculture Industry and Commerce 
Joint Venture Corporation under its own authority in 1980, delegating to it the 
implementation of agricultural aid projects (Tang et al. 2014).4 In 1994, this 
was transformed into the China State Farms Agribusiness Group Corporation 
(CSFAGC), which is now a  leading SOE in China’s international agribusiness 
investments. The China National Complete Plant Import Export Corporation 
(Complant) offers another example. Established in 1959, Complant’s purpose was 
to undertake turnkey projects (such as the Tanzania–Zambia railway) and to provide 
technical assistance under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC), which later became the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (Tang et 
al. 2014). It was reorganised in 1993 as a comprehensive conglomerate with 
subsidiaries in many African countries that engage in aid, trade and investment. 
Similarly, at the provincial level, foreign aid construction departments were also 
transformed into international economic and technical cooperation corporations 
(Tang et al. 2014). In general, aid became subject to more competitive forces, but 
the companies implementing aid projects continued to retain the mentality of a state 
bureaucracy and the stovepipe channels to their former host ministries.5 
4  In 1994 it was again transformed, to the China State Farms Agribusiness Group Corporation (CSFAGC). 
5  Interview with Zha Daojiong, Beijing, March 2016.
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Mid-1990s to 2010: Going out with the trinity of aid, 
trade and investment 
From the mid-1990s, China’s foreign aid became increasingly important to its global 
trade strategy (Wang 2013), and was thus incrementally converted into a channel 
for promoting foreign trade and investment. Resonant with how early Soviet aid to 
the PRC had influenced China’s foreign aid, in this new period, Japan’s development 
assistance became influential. Yet, China’s appropriation of certain features of Japan’s 
cooperation trinity—the integration of aid, trade and investment—from the 1980s 
was facilitated by two major macroeconomic shifts: one in China and one in Africa. 
In China, reform and opening up were producing what would later be called a ‘growth 
miracle’ (Lin et al. 2003). By the mid-1990s, China had passed an industrialisation 
milestone: exports of machinery and electronics had exceeded those of textiles and 
clothing (Lin and Wang 2014: 4). In turn, China became a net oil importer in 1993, 
when 7.5 per cent of oil for domestic consumption had to be imported (Leung 
2011). China’s timber-consuming industries had also grown rapidly: by 2000, 
China had emerged as the main processing hub for the world’s forestry industry 
(Buckingham 2016). This gave rise to an expansive search for greater and diversified 
access to oil, minerals and timber, which also served to identify new markets for 
Chinese goods and services (Pannell 2013). 
There was also timely political change on a continent with an abundance of such 
resources—Africa. The end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, for example, allowed 
Africa’s then largest economy to integrate into its region and place a greater overall 
focus on regional economic development. From the mid-1990s, most countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa experienced increased macroeconomic stability (Arbache 
and Page 2007). Then Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi, whose Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front party had grasped power in 1991, made 
an important visit to China in 1995. A series of important agreements on trade 
and economic and technical cooperation followed (Shinn 2014; Venkatamaran 
and Gofie 2015), helping to set the foundations for today’s rapidly intensifying 
economic ties between the two countries (see Adem 2012).
With its explicit aim to promote export-oriented industrialisation, Japan’s aid had 
made a positive contribution to China’s economic growth. The approach adopted 
to achieve this had three main characteristics: 1) coordination of all three types 
of developmental financial flows;6 2) a strong link between Japan’s official aid and 
foreign direct investment in and trade flows with recipient countries; and 3) close 
collaboration between the public and private sectors (Shimomura and Wang 2012). 
Aid projects were thus commissioned by request, amid distinct efforts to develop 
6  Official development assistance, other official flows and private finance.
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recipient-country self-reliance and with Japan itself steering away from domestic 
policy issues and extensive conditionality (Shimomura and Wang 2012).7 Chinese 
officials were reportedly impressed. First, by the fact that Japan’s investment in China’s 
infrastructure and heavy industry made an important concurrent contribution 
to the latter’s economic development and poverty reduction, at the same time as 
helping Japanese industry internationalise (Nissanke and Schimomura 2013: 25). 
Second, the substantial number of Chinese aid policy officials of this period who 
received training in Japan also showed the Japanese approach to aid was pragmatic 
and effective for both sides (Nissanke and Schimomura 2013).
In December 1994, then trade minister Wu Yi introduced the ‘Grand Strategy of 
Economy and Trade’, which in essence embodied the Japanese approach of the 
interlinking of aid, investment and trade (Ma 1994). Moreover, the grand strategy 
introduced the concept of government-subsidised concessional loans and joint-
venture projects. Following in the footsteps of equivalent institutions in Japan and 
South Korea, the Export–Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) was set up under the 
State Council to operationalise this new concessional lending agenda. 
The new aid strategy was immediately reflected in China’s policies towards Africa. 
Following a visit to seven African countries in 1995, then prime minister Zhu Rongji 
stressed that Africa’s economic and social development had entered a new period 
and China’s economic assistance to Africa subsequently needed reform—namely, 
‘encouraging outstanding Chinese enterprises to engage in economic cooperation 
with Africa’ (Zhu 1995). The shift was cemented in 1996, when then president 
Jiang Zemin proposed a new concept of ‘comprehensive cooperation’ while visiting 
the headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity—core components of which 
were mutually beneficial and seeking common development through joint ventures 
with strong Chinese enterprises in Africa (Jiang 1996). The number of companies 
using preferential loans to carry out joint ventures and international cooperation 
projects increased from eight in 1995 to 70 by 1998 (Liu 2001, cited in Wang 2013). 
This also laid the foundation for the launch in 1999 of China’s ‘Going Out’ strategy. 
‘Going Out’ was a package of incentives for Chinese outbound investors that sought 
to support not only the acquisition of natural resources, but also Chinese companies 
with the potential to build global brands. The timing coincided with advanced 
preparations for China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Negotiations 
had begun in 1986 and were concluded in 2001, with China’s WTO accession 
taking place on 11 December of that year. 
7  During the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese aid faced the same critique China has been facing since the mid-2000s—
namely, being too commercial, weak on development-oriented interests and too focused on infrastructure 
(Lancaster 2007: 110–42). 
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Again following equivalent forums in Korea and Japan, China’s WTO membership 
and with its greater role in world trade at last in sight, China in 2000 initiated the 
Forum On China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This aimed to create ‘a platform 
[for] China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue 
and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into 
the category of South–South cooperation’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2017). A triennial 
summit has since rotated between China and an African country. The 2006 summit 
drew particular international attention when China promised to double its aid 
to African countries by 2009 in the framework of the Beijing Action Plan, and also 
to establish a US$5 billion China–Africa Development Fund (FOCAC 2009). 
The mid-1990s is often noted as a turning point in China–Africa ties, with a shift 
from politics to economics as the driving force (Alden 2007; Jiang 2012; Johnston 
2016). China’s experience as a recipient and observer of Japanese aid would now 
enable it to similarly reshape its relations with, and to become a major economic 
player in, Africa. 
2010 to the present: Timely reform and opening-up 
of Chinese aid
In the introduction, we indicated that Chinese aid was from the outset part of 
a global development story. In the previous three subsections, we have, moreover, 
shown how it evolved through contact points with other donors and how this 
evolution was enabled by macroeconomic shifts. Yet, if we could say that Chinese aid 
was shaped by globalisation, from 2011 it began to transition to shaping globalisation. 
Three important factors that likely helped trigger this change were: 1) the growing 
debate about Chinese aid outside China; 2) changes to the global economy following 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis; and 3) demographic change in China and Africa. 
On the first point, since the mid-2000s, as analysed comprehensively by Mawdsley 
(2012), there has been an increasingly controversial debate about the implications 
of China’s aid replacing ‘traditional’ development aid. OECD aid practitioners 
and development researchers as well as developing-country political, civil society 
and academic voices were especially concerned by the intertwining of trade and 
investment in the context of the Chinese Government’s pledge to provide aid 
free from political and measureable transparency conditions. In the second half 
of 2010, when China officially celebrated 60 years of delivering aid, the Chinese 
Government appeared to respond to this debate. In a speech to the National Aid 
Work Conference in August, then premier Wen Jiabao emphasised the need for 
reforms in the aid system, including raising standards for companies implementing 
foreign aid projects abroad (Rudyak 2014). 
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In an article in the Central Committee of the Communist Party’s periodical Qiushi 
in 2010, then Minister of Commerce Chen Deming highlighted: 1) the reputational 
risks of foreign aid–supported investment not being seen to deliver optimal benefits 
to recipient countries; and 2) the role of foreign aid in making China a responsible 
stakeholder: 
Foreign investment should be closely integrated with efforts to help recipient 
countries cultivate personnel and transfer applicable technology while abiding by 
local laws and regulations, respecting local customs and habits, maintaining good 
relations with the local people, actively participating in public welfare undertakings 
and working to protect the ecological environment. (Chen 2010; translated from 
Chinese)8 
In ‘response to Western criticism’ (SCIO 2011b), in April 2011, China issued its 
first White Paper on foreign aid (SCIO 2011a). This was the first comprehensive 
English-language document published on Chinese aid activities and included an 
overview of China’s foreign aid policy, financial resources and forms and distribution 
and management of foreign aid. It also outlined the Chinese state’s perspective on 
international cooperation in foreign aid. That it did not, however, provide data on 
bilateral aid disappointed some critics (e.g. Provost 2011). The data provided instead 
extended only to a breakdown of aid by region (Figure 19.2), which confirmed that 













Figure 19.2 China’s foreign aid by recipient region
Source: SCIO (2014). 
8  An English version of Chen’s articles appeared half a year later in the English edition of Seeking Truth, in April 
2011, just before the release of the first White Paper on foreign aid, and was obviously intended to show the 
international community that China was working on improving its system (Chen 2011). 
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Concurrent with that institutional story, economic conditions in China had 
tightened. Between the mid-1980s and 2011, China’s growth was underpinned by 
uninhibited investment and growth led by exports of low-cost manufactured goods 
(Garnaut et al. 2014: 2). Changes within China’s economy and also in the global 
economy following the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in 2008 meant that from 
around 2011 an era of tighter growth conditions and shifting economic priorities 
began (Garnaut et al. 2014). One result was that new sources of growth were 
more actively sought, which in turn meant a heightened growth imperative was 
attached to innovation, services and foreign investment—and their optimal delivery 
(see Song et al. 2015). 
An important factor underlying those tightening conditions was demographics. 
Restrictive family planning policies of the late 1970s mean that, since about 
2005, China has experienced growing labour scarcity and also higher labour costs 
(Garnaut et al. 2014). In contrast, many of the countries with which China has an 
aid program are demographically young. In the case of Africa, not only are sub-
Saharan Africa’s low-income countries youth-filled, but also, thanks to the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals, which recently prioritised investment in 
primary education, the proportion of children finishing primary education in sub-
Saharan Africa has increased to some 70 per cent (see Johnston 2015b). 
The 28th summit of the African Union convened in January 2017 under the 
theme ‘Harnessing the demographic dividend through investments in youth’. 
A  demographic dividend can arise after a decline in the mortality and fertility 
rates induces change in the population age structure. This is typically characterised 
as an increase over several decades in the working-age population share, which 
produces accelerated growth—and therefore a demographic dividend. When this 
coincides with economic development, as in China’s recent case, the returns can be 
substantial. Given the current political prioritisation and the underlying economic 
potential—alongside China’s own ageing population—China’s foreign aid to 
Africa is increasing, targeting labour-intensive investments by Chinese firms and 
infrastructure to sustain their competitiveness (see Lin and Wang 2014; Johnston 
2015a, 2015b).
The links between China’s foreign investment and its aid program in Africa have, 
however, added political pressure—such as that noted in the periodical Qiushi—for 
the aid system to become more efficient in meeting Chinese and recipient-country 
expectations. Resonant again with the earlier approach of Japan, Vice-President 
of China’s Exim Bank Zhu Hongjie spoke of a strengthened merging of the ‘going 
out’ plan and China’s foreign aid:
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Considering the present situation, we need to expand foreign aid and help developing 
countries increase their development capacity. This will promote South–South trade 
cooperation and resolve the difficulties brought to developing countries by the drop 
of exports. We need to further strengthen the scientific quality and coherence of 
foreign aid planning, and adopt innovative methods to increase the efficiency of aid 
spending. At the same time, we need to further broaden the scope of concessionary 
loans, and actively encourage and support strong Chinese enterprises with good 
reputations to participate in concessionary loan programs. While serving the 
country’s political and economic diplomacy strategy, we need to make the best use 
of concessionary loans to promote Chinese exports. (China Economic Net 2012; 
translated from Chinese)
As well as fostering opportunities for established domestic players in low-cost 
manufacturing and infrastructure, this new emphasis coincides with China’s more 
nascent push into services and innovation. China has a long history of promoting 
agricultural innovation and development in Africa, which it sees as having an 
important link to food security and poverty reduction (Xu et al. 2016). Recent 
documents, especially the 2015 FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan (for the 
period 2016–18), reiterated a commitment that both sides would continue to 
implement the ‘China–Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan’ and build 
joint laboratories and science and innovation parks. One such example is the Sino-
Africa Joint Research Centre at Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture 
and Technology, which was opened in September 2016. The centre focuses on 
biodiversity protection, remote sensing of resources, microbiology and the promotion 
of modern agriculture, and has a partner relationship with the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS). Another example is the April 2017 launch of the China–South 
Africa Science Cooperation Park. With a focus on mining and minerals technology, 
the park is expected to play a leading role in the promotion of bilateral research 
collaboration and the development of joint research institutes.
In general, these aid-based investments by China are part of its efforts to ensure its 
foreign aid can meet the previously noted international expectations that it will act 
‘responsibly’ as a donor. The importance of this was directly acknowledged by Xi 
Jinping in his AIIB inauguration ceremony speech in January 2016: 
China has taken an active part in, contributed a constructive part and benefited 
from the international development system. The initiative to establish the AIIB is a 
constructive move. It will enable China to undertake more international obligations, 
promote improvement of the current international economic system and provide 
more international public goods. (Xi 2016) 
Scholars have agreed that the AIIB is a seminal test of expectations of China’s 
international development assistance agenda (e.g. Callaghan and Hubbard 2016). 
The AIIB’s founding also marks a major step in the direction of development financing 
noted by former World Bank chief economist Justin Lin in 2014, when he wrote 
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of a shift away from official development assistance (ODA) towards other official 
flows (OOFs), ‘OOF-like loans, and OOF-like investments from development 
banks, and sovereign wealth funds’ (SWFs) (Lin and Wang 2014: 18). Brautigam 
(2011) elaborates the complex links between these diverse financial instruments and 
funding pots in the context of whether China’s aid could be governed according to 
OECD foreign aid benchmarks. For China meantime, these shifts may also serve 
to support the incremental internationalisation of China’s currency, the renminbi. 
In April 2017, for example, the renminbi was used for the first time as a currency 
of bond issuance in Africa by the Bank of China in Johannesburg (Dai 2017). 
Discussion
Slower growth in China since about 2011 has increased the importance of foreign 
aid  to its own economic ambitions. Demographic change in other countries, 
especially  in sub-Saharan Africa, makes this change timely. Given China’s 
contemporary economic weight, this situation presents an implicit challenge 
to leading sovereign and multinational firms, most of which are attached to the 
OECD, as drivers of globalisation. 
Lesser understood internationally, however, is that with China’s increasing global 
economic weight, pressures on its aid domestically and in recipient countries 
are also increasing. The range and number of tasks China’s aid is expected to 
deliver are growing rapidly: supporting the success of China’s ‘Going Out’ firms; 
supporting the implementation of China’s emerging Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); 
promoting China’s image as a responsible international stakeholder; and, last but 
not least, helping China promote its own global governance reform agenda to shape 
globalisation. Such external pressures, moreover, sit against a backdrop of an ever 
more vocal Chinese public asking why the government is generously spending rising 
sums of money abroad while large parts of the Chinese countryside remain entrenched 
in poverty. Outbound Chinese firms are not making the job easier. A 2015 report 
by the United Nations Development Programme in China (UNDP in China 2015) 
attests that the government and Chinese companies have, at best, only  limited 
awareness of sustainability issues. At the recipient end, there are equivalent concerns. 
In January 2015, for example, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun  Sen suspended 
construction of the Stung Cheay Areng hydropower plant involving China’s state-
owned hydropower giant Sinohydro, following massive environmental protests by 
the local population (Parameswaran 2015). Similar tensions have emerged around 
the quality of Chinese-funded projects in Africa, most prominently in the case of 
a power plant in Botswana. The complex organisation of China’s aid institutions 
and hierarchy, and the non-comparability of China’s aid figures, likely do not help 
the reputation of its aid program within recipient countries, nor efforts at donor 
coordination (Johnston and Rudyak 2016).
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Exogenous factors are meanwhile converging to ensure greater efficiency in the use 
of China’s aid funds. By the end of January 2017, China’s foreign exchange reserves 
unexpectedly fell below the US$3 trillion level, the lowest point in six years. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Leading Group 
for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, set up by Xi Jinping in late 2013 to 
ensure that reforms are implemented, for the first time took on the issue of foreign 
aid, in February 2017 (Rudyak 2017, People’s Daily Online 2017). Following that 
meeting, Xi Jinping was himself quoted in the South China Morning Post, saying that 
‘China must act more wisely when giving money to foreign countries by “optimising 
the strategic layout” of foreign aid’ (Huang 2017). So, it may be realistic to expect 
that China’s aid institutions and delivery mechanisms will become not only more 
‘innovative and pragmatic’ in coming years, but also more efficient and streamlined. 
The internationalised learning opportunity presented by the creation of the AIIB—
which, like a majority of leading Chinese aid and aid-related institutions, has its 
headquarters in Beijing—may, following the evolution outlined in this chapter, 
henceforth also serve as a useful learning mechanism for that process.
Conclusion
Outlining his vision for economic globalisation in Davos in January 2017, 
President Xi argued for:
growing an open global economy to share opportunities and interests through 
opening-up and achieving win–win outcomes. One should not just retreat to the 
harbour when encountering a storm, for this will never get us to the other shore of 
the ocean. (Xi 2017)
Consistent with Xi’s use of Chinese-language analogies in this speech, this notion 
could be thought of as an outbound equivalent of Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1978 
description of China’s domestic reform process as an experimental journey of 
‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’. We see it also as something of a globalisation 
of Premier Li’s call in April 2014 for China’s aid to Africa to adhere to principles 
of pragmatism and innovation (Johnston 2014). 
In this chapter, we have specifically outlined China’s transition from aid recipient to 
aid provider. We understand that China’s aid from the outset has been shaped by its 
own political and economic agenda, alongside critical shifts in the global political 
economy. Our chronology offers a lens through which to understand and project 
how and why China may now develop its own economic interests and those of other 
developing countries to more actively and directly shape globalisation.
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In so doing, we have added to the literature on foreign aid, and specifically to the far 
more limited literature on China’s foreign aid. Our political economy chronology of 
China’s mutually beneficial approach to foreign aid highlights the external origins 
of many of China’s basic institutions and approaches, especially the trinity approach 
and the importance of inducing self-reliance. It also highlights the importance of 
China’s own progress in its push to help other countries. Consistent with broader 
criticisms of China’s foreign aid as raised herein, our analysis is constrained by the 
limited data on China’s foreign aid and the scale of fragmentation of China’s aid 
architecture. 
In the longer term, whether China’s relative economic scale and changing economic 
growth imperative are among the catalysts of a new, innovative, pragmatic and 
widespread era of development in Africa and other developing regions remains to be 
seen. Moreover, African countries and other Chinese aid recipients will ultimately—
like contemporary China before them—carve out their own narrative and demands. 
In turn, a successful China-led globalisation may help instigate a more literal 
globalisation. To that end, much of the world is now effectively ‘crossing the river 
by feeling the stones’, but the globalisation equivalent of that process is really just 
beginning. 
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